

[Confidential.]

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

A PRÉCIS OF CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO

THE KASHMIR STATE.

By J. A. CRAWFORD,
ATTACHÉ IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

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A PRÉCIS
OF
CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE KASHMIR STATE.

CHAPTER I.

HISTORICAL SKETCH.

Early History.—The Kashmir State is an expression of political geography. It comprises the varieties of country, race, and creed included in the territory bounded by British districts and the chiefship of Chamba on the south, British districts on the west, Chinese Thibet on the east, Yaghistan on the north-west, and the chiefships of Hunza and Nagar and Eastern Turkistan on the north. The conventional divisions of this territory are Jammu, Ladakh, Baltistan, Kashmir proper, and Gilgit.

The State of Kashmir, as a political whole, was created by the British Government in 1816. The history of its component parts before that year may, for present purposes, be briefly described as follows:—

Jammu has from time immemorial been the capital of a Rajput dynasty. It had acquired some importance under a Chief named Rana Ranjit Dev by the end of the last century. The neighbouring country was split up into a number of independent hill principalities, such as Kishtwar and Bhadarwa on the east, Basoli on the south, Bhimbar and Rajaori on the west and north-west. These chiefships were constantly quarrelling, and at the beginning of the present century, they had become more or less subject to the Sikh Government of the Punjab under Ranjit Singh. His service was joined about this time by three great-grand-nephews of Ranjit Dev, namely, Golab Singh, Dhyan Singh, and Sachit Singh. They rose in favour, and Golab Singh distinguished himself in 1820 by capturing the Chief of Rajaori. The principality of Jammu had by then been annexed by the Sikhs, and Ranjit Singh conferred it upon Golab Singh with the title of "Raja." Shortly afterwards Dhyan Singh was made Raja of Punch (between Rajaori and Mozufferabad), and Sachit Singh obtained the district of Ramnagar (just east of Jammu) as a chiefship. In the course of the next 15 years, the three brothers, and especially the eldest, had subdued all the neighbouring hill principalities. The two younger brothers were killed about 1843, and all their estates fell to the survivor, except Punch, which was held by Jowahir Singh, son of Dhyan Singh. By the year 1844, therefore, Golab Singh had acquired authority over nearly all the country included in the present province of Jammu.

Ladakh and Baltistan.—The early history of Ladakh is obscure. The province seems originally to have been a part of Chinese Thibet. At the beginning of the 17th century, it was conquered by the Balti Chief of Skardo. Then it became independent under a "Gyalpo," or chief, of its own. At the end of the 18th century it was attacked by the Mogul tribe of Sokpos. The invasion was repelled with the aid of the Muhammadan Governor of Kashmir, and from this time till 1834 Ladakh seems to have been an independent tributary of Kashmir.

Baltistan appears to have been independent under the Raja of Skardo till 1840.

Ladakh and Baltistan were conquered in successive campaigns by Golab Singh's troops, led by Zorawar Singh and Dewan Hari Chand, between the years 1834 and 1842.

Kashmir has undergone many changes. At first it was ruled by Hindu and Tartar kings. Then came a Hindu dynasty which lasted till the beginning of the 14th century. The Muhammadan minister of the last Hindu king seized the government, and for more than two centuries and a half Kashmir remained independent under its own Muhammadan rulers. In 1588 it was conquered by the Emperor Akbar, and the Moghal régime lasted till the latter half of the 18th century. The country then became subject to Ahmad Shah Abdali, and was administered by Afghan governors from Kabul till it was wrested from them by Ranjit Singh in 1819. From this year till 1846 it remained under the Sikhs, governors being appointed by the Lahore Durbar. Of these governors Mian Singh¹ (1833-41), Ghulam Mohi-ud-din (1841-46), and Sheik Imam-ud-din (1846) are the best known. Mian Singh

¹ Secret Consultation, 4th April 1845, No. 14.

was murdered* by his mutinous troops in 1841. The Lahore Durbar then sent Raja Golab Singh with Ghulam Mohi-ud-din to Kashmir. They succeeded* in quelling the revolt, and the latter remained* as governor. He was a close friend and dependant of Golab Singh.

Gilgit appears† to have been ruled till the beginning of the present‡ century by independent Rajas of the Trakane dynasty,

† Drew, pages 436-6.

‡ Diddalphi's "Tribes of the Hindu Kooch," page 137.

§ Drew, page 436.

some of whom attained considerable power. Between about 1810 and 1842 there was§ a succession of revolutions. First, Sulaiman Shah of the Kushkwakte family of Yasin conquered Gilgit from the last Trakane Raja. He was killed, and succeeded by Azad Khan of Puniel, who again was killed and succeeded by Tari Shah of Nagar. The latter was followed by his son Shah Sakandar. He was killed and succeeded by Gauhar Aman Khushkwakte of Yasin. Meanwhile Karim Khan, brother of Sakandar Shah, applied for aid to the governor of Kashmir. A Sikh force was despatched under Nathu Shah; Gauhar Aman was defeated and expelled, and Karim Khan was installed in 1842 as Raja of Gilgit, in subordination to the Sikh government.

State of affairs at the beginning of the first Sikh War.—Thus by the year 1844 the component parts of the present State of Kashmir had acquired solidarity. Golab Singh held Jammu, Ladakh, and Baltistan, and had commanding influence in Kashmir, whence the Sikh power had extended to Gilgit.

In 1844 Golab Singh was out of favour with the Lahore Durbar. His powerful brother Dhyani Singh had been murdered in September 1843, and his younger brother Sachit Singh in March 1844. Dhyani Singh's son, Hira Singh, and Pandit Julla were jealous of Golab Singh's growing power, and there was a dispute about Sachit Singh's estates which Golab Singh had seized. Mean-

¶ Secret Consultation, 4th April 1845, No. 14.

while, troubles¶ had arisen in Kashmir, where the hill Rajas, headed by Zabardast Khan of Mozufferabad, seriously threatened the Governor Mohi-ud-din. Golab Singh fostered this outbreak. At the end of 1844, Hira Singh and Pandit Julla were killed. Their successors in power were Jowahir Singh and Lal Singh, who put down the disturbances in the hill country of Kashmir, and led the Sikh army towards Jammu. In April 1845, Golab Singh averted a contest by submission. He went to Lahore, and was called upon to pay a heavy fine, and cede territory; he accepted these conditions and returned to Jammu in August 1845. Shortly afterwards the Lahore Durbar was engaged in disturbances in Multan and the rising of Peshawara Singh. The latter was encouraged by Golab Singh, but failed; then came the death of Jowahir Singh. Golab Singh still held back, and left the power at Lahore to Lal Singh and Tej Singh.

In November 1845 the long expected collision between the English and the Sikhs began. Our successes at Moodkee and Ferozeshahar were costly, while at Badawal the Sikhs practically gained the day. The Sikh army then set aside its half-hearted leaders, Lal Singh and Tej Singh, in favour of Golab Singh,

¹ Note.—A précis, written by a Secretary to the Bombay Government in 1835, about States on the north-west frontier, contains these words: "Cashmere. Under the rule of Maharaj Ranjett Singh, sovereignty of the Sikh territories in the Punjab. Present Governor Mian Singh. Revenue about 12 lacs of rupees per annum. Revenue said to be so reduced by the late laisance and mismanagement of Sher Singh."

who arrived at Lahore on the 27th January 1846, the day before the battle of Aliwal. That was an important victory, and Golab Singh lost no time in making overtures to the Government of India. They were accepted, for the struggle with the Sikhs had been severe. But the Sikh army remained; and it was not till after the battle of Sohraon that the way for negotiations was cleared.

First Treaty of Lahore.—The victory of the 10th February 1846 was followed by the occupation of Lahore and the submission of the Sikh government. Golab Singh, the minister chosen by the army, was deputed to treat for peace; and the result was the first treaty of Lahore, signed on the 9th March 1846. Its main features were the recognition of a Sikh government at Lahore; the cession to the British Government of Sikh possessions between the Beas and Sutlej, and between the Beas and the Indus; and the aggrandizement of Golab Singh. For present purposes the two latter points only are material; and the provisions of the treaty which relate to them are quoted below:—

“ARTICLE III.

“The Maharaja cedes to the Honorable Company, in perpetual sovereignty, all his forts, territories, and rights in the Doab or country, hill and plain, situated between the rivers Beas and Sutlej.”

“ARTICLE IV.

“The British Government having demanded from the Lahore State, as indemnification for the expenses of the war, in addition to the cession of territory described in Article III, payment of one and a half crores of rupees, and the Lahore Government being unable to pay the whole of this sum at this time, or to give security satisfactory to the British Government for its eventual payment, the Maharaja cedes to the Honorable Company, in perpetual sovereignty, as equivalent for one crore of rupees, all his forts, territories, rights, and interests in the hill countries which are situated between the rivers Beas and Indus, including the Provinces of Kashmir and Hazara.”

“ARTICLE XII.

“In consideration of the services rendered by Raja Golab Singh, of Jummoo, to the Lahore State, towards procuring the restoration of the relations of amity between the Lahore and British Governments, the Maharaja hereby agrees to recognize the independent sovereignty of Raja Golab Singh in such territories and districts in the hills as may be made over to the said Raja Golab Singh, by separate agreement between himself and the British Government, with the dependencies thereof, which may have been in the Raja's possession since the time of the late Maharaja Khurruk Singh, and the British Government in consideration of the good conduct of Raja Golab Singh also agrees to recognize his independence in such territories, and to admit him to the privileges of a separate treaty with the British Government.”

“ARTICLE XIII.

“In the event of any dispute or difference arising between the Lahore State and Raja Golab Singh, the same shall be referred to the arbitration of the British Government, and by its decision the Maharaja engages to abide.”

Supplementary Treaty of Lahore.—The third and fourth of these articles were amplified by the following supplementary provisions which were settled on the 11th March 1846:—

“ARTICLE V.

“The British Government agrees to respect the *bona fide* rights of those *jagirdars* within the territories ceded by articles III and IV of the treaty of Lahore, dated 9th instant, who were attached to the families of the late Maharaja Ranjit Singh, Khurruk Singh, and Shere Singh; and the British Government will maintain those *jagirdars* in their *bona fide* possessions during their lives.”

“ARTICLE VIII.

“Commissioners shall be immediately appointed by the two governments to settle and lay down the boundary between the two States, as defined by article IV of the treaty of Lahore, dated 9th March 1846.”

Treaty of Amritsar.—Then followed the separate treaty concluded with Golab Singh at Amritsar on the 16th March 1846, which is reproduced below:—

“ARTICLE I.

“The British Government transfers and makes over for ever, in independent possession, to Maharaja Golab Singh and the heirs male of his body, all the hilly or mountainous country, with its dependencies, situated to the eastward of the river Indus and westward of the river Ravi, including Chambe,

and excluding Lahoul, being part of the territories ceded to the British Government by the Lahore State, according to the provisions of article IV of the treaty of Lahore, dated 9th March 1846."

"ARTICLE II.

"The eastern boundary of the tract transferred by the foregoing article to Maharaja Golab Singh shall be laid down by Commissioners appointed by the British Government and Maharaja Golab Singh respectively for that purpose, and shall be defined in a separate engagement after survey."

"ARTICLE III.

"In consideration of the transfer made to him and his heirs by the provisions of the foregoing articles, Maharaja Golab Singh will pay to the British Government the sum of 75 lakhs of rupees (Nanak Shahi), 50 lakhs to be paid on ratification of this treaty, and 25 lakhs on or before the 1st October of the current year H. D. 1846."

"ARTICLE IV.

"The limits of the territories of Maharaja Golab Singh shall not be at any time changed without the concurrence of the British Government."

"ARTICLE V.

"Maharaja Golab Singh will refer to the arbitration of the British Government any disputes or questions that may arise between himself and the Government of Lahore or any other neighbouring State, and will abide by the decision of the British Government."

"ARTICLE VI.

"Maharaja Golab Singh engages for himself and his heirs to join with the whole of his military force the British troops, when employed within the hills, or in the territories adjoining his possessions."

"ARTICLE VII.

"Maharaja Golab Singh engages never to take, or retain, in his service, any British subject, nor the subject of any European or American State, without the consent of the British Government."

"ARTICLE VIII.

"Maharaja Golab Singh engages to respect, in regard to the territory transferred to him, the provisions of articles V, VI, and VII of the separate engagement between the British Government and the Lahore Durbar, dated March 11th, 1846."

"ARTICLE IX.

"The British Government will give its aid to Maharaja Golab Singh in protecting his territories from external enemies."

"ARTICLE X.

"Maharaja Golab Singh acknowledges the supremacy of the British Government, and will in token of such supremacy present annually to the British Government one horse, twelve perfect shawl-goats of approved breed (six male and six female), and three pairs of Kashmir shawls.

"This treaty, consisting of ten articles, has been this day settled by Fred. Currie, Esq., and Brevet-Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, acting under the directions of the Right Hon'ble Sir Henry Hardinge, G.C.B., Governor General, on the part of the British Government, and by Maharaja Golab Singh in person, and the said treaty has been this day ratified by the seal of the Right Hon'ble Sir Henry Hardinge, G.C.B., Governor General."

Policy of the Treaty of Amritsar.—The policy of the arrangement thus made with Golab Singh has been criticised in the light of later events. It will therefore be well to set forth the reasons assigned by Lord Hardinge for its adoption; and these will be found in the following extracts from two of his despatches to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors:—

- (a) "It will be seen by the draft of treaty now forwarded that in consequence of the inability of the Lahore Government to pay the sum stipulated as indemnification for the expense of the war, or to give sufficient security for its eventual disbursement, the hill territories from the Beas river to the Indus, including the provinces of Kashmir and Hazara, have been ceded to the British Government.

Extract from a letter from the Governor General to the Hon'ble the Secret Committee, No. 7, dated 4th March 1846.

"It is not my intention to take possession of the whole of this territory. Its occupation by us would be on many accounts disadvantageous. It would bring us into collision with many powerful chiefs for whose coercion a large military establishment, at a great distance from our provinces and military resources, would be necessary. It would more than double the extent of our present frontier in countries assailable at every point, and most difficult to defend, without any corresponding advantages for such large additions of territory. New distant and conflicting interests would be created, and races of people with whom we have hitherto had no intercourse would be brought under our rule, while the territories, excepting Kashmir, are comparatively unproductive, and would scarcely pay the expenses of occupation and management.

"On the other hand, the tract now ceded includes the whole of the hill possessions of Raja Golab Singh and the Jummoo family; and while the severance of this frontier line from the Lahore possessions materially weakens that State, and deprives it in the eyes of other Asiatic powers of much of its pride and position, its possession by us enables us at once to mark our sense of Raja Golab Singh's conduct during the late operations, by rewarding him in the mode most in accordance with his ambitious desires, to show forth as an example to the other chiefs of Asia the benefits which accrue from an adherence to British interests, to create a strong and friendly power in a position to threaten and attack, should it be necessary to do so, the Lahore territories in their most vulnerable point, and at the same time to secure to ourselves that indemnification for the expenses of the campaign which we declared our determination to exact, and which, excepting by the cession of territory, the Lahore Government is not in a condition to afford.

"Raja Golab Singh has engaged to pay the crore of rupees demanded from the Lahore State on being put by us in possession of the territory ceded by the fourth article of the draft treaty, on such terms and conditions as we may approve.

"It is highly expedient that the trans-Beas portion of Kulu and Mandi with the more fertile district and strong position of Noorpore, and the celebrated Fort Kangra, the key of the Himalayas in native estimation, with its districts and dependencies, should be in our possession. These provinces lie together between the Beas and Chukkee rivers, and their occupation by us will be attended with little cost and great advantage. The Chukkee river in the hills will hereafter be our boundary to its source, and thence a line drawn to the Ravee river, and along its course and across the Chenab to the snowy ridge on the confines of Laboul. This line will be laid down by officers sent for the purpose, according to mutual agreement, and will be accurately surveyed.

"In consideration of the retention by us of the tract above described, a remission of 25 lakhs from the crore of rupees which Raja Golab Singh would otherwise have paid will be allowed, and the Raja will pay the remaining 75 lakhs, of which 50 lakhs are to be made good at once, upon the ratification of the treaty, and the remaining 25 lakhs, within six months from that date. Of the remaining portion of the territory ceded by article four of the draft treaty, the greater part, with the exception of the Provinces of Kashmir and Hazara, is already in the possession of Raja Golab Singh and his family, for which he has been bound hitherto to render military service to a small extent to the Lahore Government, and to present annually a horse with gold trappings as a *Heriot* to the State.

"The conditions which may be stipulated with Raja Golab Singh, and the treaty to which he may be admitted, will be reported in my next letter. Those conditions will be so drawn as to bind us to the least possible interference in his affairs consistently with the maintenance of our paramount position over the Raja and his country.

"I may venture to state my opinion that the Sikh nation, as a great military power, has been effectually crushed; and although it has been left sufficiently strong to defend itself against any Native power which may attack it, it never can, with its diminished population and revenues, repeat the efforts made during the last campaign.

(b) "I request your Honorable Committee's attention to the treaty made with the

Extract from a despatch from the Governor General to the Honorable the Secret Committee, No. 8, dated 19th March 1846.

Maharaja Golab Singh, by which a Rajpoot principality of the hill districts has been constructed, extending from the Ravee to the Indus, and including the province of Kashmir. The Maharaja is declared by the treaty independent of the Lahore State and under the protection of the British Government. As it was of the utmost importance to weaken the Sikh nation before its government should be re-established, I considered the appropriation of this part of the ceded territory to be the most expedient measure I could devise for that purpose by which a Rajpoot dynasty will act as a counterpoise against the power of a Sikh Prince, the son of the late Ranjit Singh, and both will have a common interest in resisting attempts on the part of any Muhammadan power to establish an independent State on this side of the Indus, or even to occupy Peshawar."

With the treaty of Amritsar, the history of the Kashmir State as a political whole commences.

The rebellion of Sheikh Imam-ud-din.—Golab Singh did not obtain possession of Kashmir without difficulty. When the treaty of Amritsar was concluded this province was being held by Sheikh Imam-ud-din as governor on behalf of the Lahore Durbar. Golab Singh regarded this man at first as a

friend. He sent his own agent, Wazir Lakpat Rai, to Srinagar with a small body of troops. Imam-ud-din made over to them the fort of Hari Parbat, which commands the city, and it was expected that he himself would soon quit the country. In four months' time, however, during which Golab Singh remained inactive at Lahore, it became apparent that the Sheikh was not acting in good faith. He professed to be busy in winding up the affairs of his administration. But he collected a large number of troops, and gained the support of all the chiefs of the neighbouring hill country, notably the Raja of Rajaori. Still Golab Singh made no sign beyond sending a few more troops to Srinagar under Wazir Ratan; while the Sikh government was at least not zealous in fulfilling one of the main provisions of the treaty of Lahore. Urgent remonstrances were addressed to each of these parties by Colonel H. M. Lawrence, the Governor General's Agent for the North-West Frontier, but without material result. At last matters were brought to a crisis by Imam-ud-din. He attacked Golab Singh's forces at Srinagar, defeated them, and besieged the survivors in the fort of Hari Parbat. Then Golab Singh prayed for help from the Government of India. He declared that he had had no reason to mistrust Sheikh Imam-ud-din, whose conduct he attributed to the instigation of the Lahore Wazir, Raja Lal Singh. The Governor General determined to afford all reasonable aid to Golab Singh. But it was not easy to find out what he really wanted. After much fencing, he begged that British troops might occupy the country about Jammu, advancing no nearer to Kashmir than Blimbar and Jasrota. To this proposal Lord Hardinge readily agreed, for he had no desire to undertake a winter campaign in Kashmir. Golab Singh was accordingly urged to send all his own troops to Srinagar, and to provide supplies for the British troops about Jammu. Political officers were deputed to aid him with advice, while strong pressure was brought to bear on the Lahore Durbar to send an auxiliary force.

The situation at one time looked critical; and its difficulty was enhanced by the extraordinary vacillation and incompetence displayed by Golab Singh.

* Secret Consultation, 26th December 1846, No. 1123.

The Governor General's Agent was so impressed by his behaviour that he wrote^{*} to Lieutenant Edwards in these words:—

"You can tell the Maharaja in friendly but plain terms, that his conduct in the Kashmir transaction had so surprised me, that I had asked his Dewan, Jowala Sahai, if the Maharaja considered he had paid too dearly for Kashmir and was desirous of cancelling the arrangement, as in that case there might be little difficulty in doing so."

Eventually effective measures were adopted. The forces of Golab Singh and the Lahore Durbar advanced on Srinagar, while British troops occupied the country round Jammu. There was no fighting, as Imam-ud-din at once surrendered. He excused his conduct by asserting that he held written instructions from the Lahore Durbar to retain Kashmir. A searching enquiry showed that this assertion was true. Raja Lal Singh had sent such instructions. But there was not evidence of complicity on the part of the whole Durbar, and the Lahore troops who accompanied Golab Singh had rendered good service. The Government of India, therefore, determined to treat Lal Singh's behaviour not as a breach of the treaty of Lahore but as a personal offence. He was deposed from office, and removed in custody from Lahore to British India.

Suppression of the revolt: its political significance.—By the end of

† Secret Consultation, 26th December 1846, 1229 and 1240 to 1241.

1846, therefore, Golab Singh had been installed in Kashmir; and British troops were at once withdrawn from his territories. The main fact which is illustrated by Imam-ud-din's revolt is that Golab Singh owed not only his title to, but his actual possession of, Kashmir, wholly to the support of the British power.

Conduct of Maharaja Golab Singh in 1849.—The last struggle of the Sikhs under Sirdar Chattar Singh ended with the battle of Goojrat and the annexation of the Punjab. The conduct of Golab Singh during this crisis was at least suspicious. After the war was over, evidence was given against the Maharaja which was fully considered by the Board of Administration. Mr. J. Lawrence held that the evidence established the treachery of Golab Singh towards the British Government. From this view, however, Sir Henry Lawrence

entirely dissented; while the other member of the Board, Mr. Mansel, entertained doubts about the loyalty of the Maharaja, but thought that he was entitled to the benefit of them.

The Government of India arrived at a finding of "not proven." Lord Dalhousie's minute on the subject is quoted below:—

"1. Shortly after the arrest of the Sirdars in the autumn of 1849, it was demi-officially made known to me, that in consequence of those proceedings documents had been seized and evidence taken which tended to cast grave suspicions on the conduct of Maharaja Golab Singh during the late war.

"It was very probable that if these papers had been officially submitted to the Government then, and further enquiries publicly ordered, intimation of such measures would have been conveyed to the Maharaja in a manner calculated to alarm him. I therefore requested that the papers might not then be forwarded to the Government, but that such further enquiries as the Board of Administration should think necessary might be carried on quietly.

"2. In November I read the depositions and correspondence, and subsequently I thought it expedient to request that the whole should be submitted to the Government in order to its being placed on record. A few days ago I received the collection of papers together with Minutes by the several members of the Board of Administration.

"3. I have again looked into the depositions, and have considered the minutes by the senior and junior members, together with the full and very able paper which has been drawn up by the President of the Board.

"4. It is impossible for any man to pronounce with certainty what may have been in the Maharaja's mind during the progress of the late campaign, what were his real wishes, his hopes, or his fears. But it is only just to His Highness to admit that the documents before me contain no proof that the Maharaja's wishes were with our enemies, or that he was actively exciting them to the injury of the British power.

"5. The impression which remains upon my mind, after full consideration of the papers before me, is much the same as that which was created by the Maharaja's course of conduct throughout the war.

"If the Maharaja promised aid to the Sikhs and protested that his heart was with them, he protested as fairly and promised as largely to us. If he allowed refuge to our enemies, and furnished them with supplies, he sent money also and guns to us.

"6. My final conclusion is, as my belief from first to last has been, that the Maharaja during the last war was playing the part which was natural to a Native Prince in his perplexed position, placed between a power in whose might and whose good-will he reposed full trust, and an army which his natural sympathies would have led him to support, and whose vengeance he had reason to dread, if he unsuccessfully joined in opposing them.

"I believe that, thus placed, the Maharaja temporised; that he spoke both parties fair, and that he sought so to steer his course as that whichever party were successful, he might not be found irrecoverably committed to its opponent; but might be free to join the winner in the hour of its success, and to share in the merit and gain.

"7. It would have been vain, perhaps, to expect more than this from a Native Prince, especially when that Prince was Golab Singh of Jammu.

"But although we have no right to be disappointed with a lukewarmness which, under such circumstances, we might have anticipated, we have not the less right to complain of the actual fact that the Maharaja's co-operation with us and his activity against our enemies, were undoubtedly less than he was bound to shew by the terms of the treaty which existed in full force between us.

"8. The dissatisfaction of the Government was expressed during the war, and not without effect: for the journal of Lieutenant Robinson shows that after the battle of Goojerat, when the instructions which were sent to the officer commanding Golab Singh's troops finally reached him, he did co-operate with the advancing force under General Gilbert. Friendly communications were shortly after interchanged. More than eighteen months have since elapsed; so that even if the evidence against the Maharaja were much stronger than it is, I should be of opinion that after so long an interval causes of complaint against the Maharaja should not be unnecessarily mooted.

"9. I propose, therefore, merely to record the documents and letters which have been transmitted to the Government, together with the reasons which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, induce me to determine that no present action should be founded upon them; and that the existing relations of friendship between His Highness and the Government of India should not be interrupted by anything which these papers contain.

"10. And as relations of friendship are to be maintained, it is good policy to maintain them with every appearance of sincerity and cordiality.

"11. I entirely dissent from the apprehensions which are frequently expressed regarding the hostility of Maharaja Golab Singh, and the probability of his entertaining secret designs or entering into combinations against us. I place no dependence on the good faith of Golab Singh, or on his fidelity to his word. I believe that he is influenced by no one consideration except a sense of his own personal interests; but, judging him by the history of his past career, I believe that he never for a moment loses sight of that interest, and I therefore feel sure that guided and governed by it he will now to the last 'hold by the skirts' of the Company, and think of nothing so little as raising his hand in enmity against it.

" 12. It seems to me expedient, therefore, that in all the intercourse of this Government with the Maharaja, every appearance of distrust should be carefully avoided, while at the same time no undue confidence should be actually reposed in him, however strong our belief may be in his desire to be a fast friend to us.

" 13. I have already so far acted on that view as to invite the Maharaja to meet me at Wuzerabad. It is my intention to receive him with all possible distinction, and I shall endeavour to take advantage of any circumstances that may arise to impress His Highness with a full conviction of the friendly feeling of the Government of India towards him, and to persuade him that we are alike free from all designs against his power, and from all suspicions that he on his part entertains against us.

" 14. We should at the same time be careful not to relax in any degree the vigilance with which we watch over the conduct of our new subjects in the districts adjoining His Highness' territories; or abandon the proper precaution of keeping ourselves well informed as to all the proceedings of a Prince so astute and powerful as the Maharaja has shown himself to be.

" 15. Acquaint the Board of Administration in the Secret Department of the disposal of this question."

Attack on Chilas: loss of Gilgit.—The years 1850 and 1852 were marked by a successful attack made by Kashmir troops on the small Yaghistan State of Chilas. Two years later, Gauhar Aman of Yasin regained possession of Gilgit.

Death of Maharaja Golab Singh, and accession of Ranbir Singh. Distinguished services rendered by the Kashmir State in the mutiny.—The Maharaja Golab Singh died on the 4th August 1857, and was succeeded by his eldest son Ranbir Singh.* The change of rulers in the Kashmir State happened at a critical time; but both the dying Maharaja and his successor proved themselves to be staunch friends to the British Government in the troubles of 1857. Their services are well described† in the following quotation from a minute‡ recorded by Lord Lawrence just eleven years afterwards:—

* Secret Consultation, 25th September 1857, No. 1.

† The description reproduces the official reports in Secret Consultation, 18th December 1857, Nos. 413—16.

‡ Political A., August 1868, No. 104.

" Maharaja Golab Singh was always an unpopular chief, both among the people of the Punjab and among the English community. I need not here explain the grounds of this feeling, but so it was. And as the crisis in the mutiny culminated in consequence of the protracted resistance of the mutineer troops in Delhi, the cry waxed loud and vehement that Maharaja Golab Singh was only watching events; that he was in strict alliance with our enemies, and only bided his time to strike with effect.

" At this time I may mention that it is no exaggeration to say that our position in the Punjab was, to a great extent, at the Maharaja's mercy. From the banks of the Indus to those of the Ravee, the mountain country in his hands march with our northern boundary. The few British troops in the province were for the most part gathered together at Peshawar, Lahore, and Mooltan; and were sorely tried in holding the country, maintaining our supremacy, and overawing our enemies. Had Maharaja Golab Singh turned against us, his ability, his prestige, his experience, would have produced a great reaction against us, to say nothing of the material means at his disposal.

" At this time, writing from memory I think it was towards the end of July or beginning of August, when I had been pressed by the officer commanding at Delhi to send to Delhi every native soldier on whom I could rely, in addition to the British troops on their way down, that I sent for Dewan Jowala Sahai, the minister of Maharaja Golab Singh. The Dewan was a subject of the British Government, and his family for the most part lived in British territory. I had known him since 1846, and had reason to believe that he was well affected to the British Government, and had considerable confidence in myself.

" After sounding him very fully as to the general state of affairs and the feeling of the people in the Punjab, I spoke to him regarding his master, the Maharaja, and gathered from him that he was well disposed towards the British Government, and prepared to remain faithful. On this I went a step further, and after alluding to the rumours which were flying about, I suggested that the Dewan should move the Maharaja to offer to send a selected body of his hill-men to help in the siege of Delhi. The Dewan at first hesitated, but on my explaining what an advantage it would prove to the Maharaja to come forward in such a crisis, provided His Highness really meant to act up to his engagements, the Dewan entered into my views, and agreed to proceed to Jammu and ascertain the state of affairs; to communicate with the Maharaja, should things appear to be propitious; and, in short, to arrange, in that case, for the march of the troops. Within a week I not only heard that all had been properly managed, but that six picked regiments of infantry, two troops of cavalry, and battery of artillery, amounting in all to rather more than 3,000 men, were on their way to Jullundur.

" No sooner was this known than all kinds of stories impugning the faith of the Maharaja were circulated through the country. It was said that these troops had in their ranks many Oudh men, relatives and friends of the mutineers, and that it was a settled plan that the

whole force would go over to the enemy on their arrival at Delhi, just as the Sikh regiments under Raja Shere Singh had joined Dewan Moolraj at Mooltan in 1848.

"These stories made me very anxious, though I did not believe them. On the one hand, it was quite possible what was predicted might happen; on the other hand, the political importance of the move on the part of the Maharaja in our favour was very great, to say nothing of its value in a military point of view. To hesitate then, to stop the Jammu troops, was to show the Maharaja that I distrusted him, and perhaps to induce him to chance his views and join against us.

"I again sent for the Dewan, and again, to the best of my judgment, endeavoured to ascertain his views and the intentions of the Maharaja. The Dewan assured me most solemnly of their fidelity, and challenged any one to point out an Oudh soldier in the Jammu force. I determined to trust in these assurances, and arranged with the Dewan that one of his brothers, a soldier of some experience, should be placed in charge of these troops on the part of the Maharaja, while I sent my own brother, Captain R. C. Lawrence, and six selected British officers, on my side with these regiments.

"By the time the Jammu troops had reached Jullundhur, I rode over and inspected them. I talked to all the leading native officers; saw that as far as I could perceive, they were all hill-men; that they were in good spirits, willing to go on, as fairly equipped as I could expect. I sent them off the next day by rapid marches. From the time they crossed the Sutlej, cholera broke out in their ranks, notwithstanding which, and the great heat of the season of the year, particularly trying to men fresh from the mountain ranges, they pressed on without hesitation or murmur.

"During the storm of Delhi, a portion of these troops of the Maharaja formed part of the column which attacked the advanced position of the mutineers in the suburbs of Delhi, with the view of making a diversion from the main object—the assault of the city. In this affair the Kashmir troops suffered considerably.

"The very day after Delhi fell, Dewan Jowala Sahai's brother, the commander of these troops, and the Maharaja's wakil, both died of cholera, which circumstance greatly depressed the minds of the native officers and men. On this being reported to me by telegram, I urged the Dewan to send off his younger brother to supply the place of the brother who had fallen at his post. To this request the Dewan at once acceded; the young man mounted the mail cart that night, and within 24 hours was doing his duty with the troops of his master. I think that these were services which demand my grateful acknowledgments and the consideration of all Englishmen."

Recent events.—Since the mutiny the principal features of Ranbir Singh's long rule have been the reconquest of Gilgit in 1860, and the subsequent development of the situation on the frontier in that direction; the Commercial Treaty of 1870 and the Yarkhand Mission; the famine in Kashmir during the years 1877, 1878, and 1879; and, connected with all these circumstances, a gradual change in the conduct of political affairs between the British Government and the Maharaja. These matters, with others requiring notice in detail, are dealt with in the following chapters.

CHAPTER II.

THE BOUNDARIES OF THE KASHMIR STATE: RIGHTS OVER RIVERS.

Boundaries.—An account of the boundaries of the Kashmir State is closely connected with history and treaties. It has been shown that when the treaties of 1846 were made Golab Singh held, as Raja of Jammu, the hill chiefships around Jammu in a more or less complete state of subjection, and Ladakh and Baltistan by right of conquest, and further, that Gilgit had become an appendage of the Sikh governorship of Kashmir. The general and practical result therefore of the treaty of Amritsar was to confirm Golab Singh in what he already possessed and to transfer to him the province of Kashmir with its newly-acquired authority over Gilgit. The language of the treaties is (no doubt designedly) vague, and scarcely applied to all the facts existent when the engagements were made. Hence boundary difficulties have arisen more than once.

Treaty provisions.—The clauses in the treaties of 1846 which relate to the boundaries of the Kashmir State are as follows:—

I. By the 4th article of the treaty of Lahore, dated the 9th March 1846, the Maharaja of Lahore ceded to the East India Company—

“in perpetual sovereignty, as equivalent for one crore of rupees, all his forts, territories, rights, and interests in the hill countries which are situated between the rivers Beas and Indus, including the provinces of Kashmir and Hazara.”

II. By the 1st article of the treaty of Amritsar, dated the 16th March 1846, the British Government transferred and made over—

“for ever, in independent possession, to Maharaja Golab Singh, and the heirs male of his body, all the hilly or mountainous country, with its dependencies, situated to the eastward of the river Indus and westward of the river Ravi, including Chamba and excluding Lahoul, being part of the territories ceded to the British Government by the Lahore State, according to the provisions of article IV of the treaty of Lahore, dated the 9th March 1846.”

III. The 2nd article of the treaty of Amritsar provided that the eastern boundary of the tract transferred by the article just quoted should be—

“laid down by Commissioners appointed by the British Government and the Maharaja Golab Singh respectively for that purpose;”

and should be—

“defined in a separate engagement after survey.”

IV. The 4th article of the treaty of Amritsar stipulates that—

“the limits of the territories of Maharaja Golab Singh shall not be at any time changed without the concurrence of the British Government.”

Literal interpretation evidently not contemplated.—A literal interpretation of the 1st article of the treaty of Amritsar would have not only given a geographically incorrect definition; but, so far as it applied at all, it would have excluded Gilgit and much of Baltistan and Ladakh from the Kashmir State.

The Eastern Boundary.—It is remarkable that the boundary on the east alone was required by the treaty of Amritsar to be formally defined. The meaning attached to the term “eastern boundary” is illustrated by the steps taken to demarcate it. These consisted of the appointment of two Commissions, one in 1846, the other in 1847.

The first Commission: Twofold object.—Messrs. Cunningham and Vans Agnew were the members of the first Commission; and they were to demarcate—first, a boundary between British territory (now the districts of Lahoul and Spiti) on the south and the Kashmir territory of Ladakh on the north, and then a boundary between Ladakh on the west and Chinese Tibet on the east.

(1.) *British-Kashmir boundary.*—In defining the boundary between British and Kashmir territories, the Commissioners were enjoined to be careful of Kashmir interests. This will be seen from the instructions issued to them by the Governor-General's Agent on the North-West Frontier with the approval of the Government of India, which are quoted below :—

"Listen to all that Maharaja Golab Singh's agents say, and give all reasonable consideration to their wishes; but when you and Captain Cunningham are agreed as to the proper boundary, lay it down at once; where you differ, let the Maharaja have the advantage. Bear in mind that it is not a strip more or less of barren or even productive territory that we want but a clear and well-defined boundary in a quarter likely to come little under observation."

And again :—

"The whole of Spiti will, I conceive, come, according to the terms of the treaty, within the British boundary; but you are requested to limit yourself to such demarcation as will give a clear and well-defined boundary, and will prevent the possibility of future dispute. To effect this object, you are at liberty to resign a portion of Spiti, and even of Lahoul, but you are not on any account to encroach on the Ladakh frontier. I request you will remember that it is an object to prevent the Jammu troops, traders, or people turning our flank to the north-eastward. The boundary line must therefore be run eastward to such point of territory as is clearly beyond the Maharaja's influence; and both the Jammu and Tibet authorities must be distinctly informed that no encroachment by any party on any pretence will be permitted."

The Commissioners submitted* their report on the 13th May 1847, and it was accompanied by a sketch† map showing the boundary between the territories of Maharaja Golab Singh and British India as determined by the Commissioners, and by the following‡ explanatory memorandum :—

* Consultation, 30th December 1847, No. 701.

† *Ibid.*, No. 702.

‡ *Ibid.*, No. 708.

"In laying down a permanent boundary through a mountainous country, it appeared to the Commissioners desirable to select such a plan as would completely preclude any possibility of future dispute. This the Commissioners believe that they have found in their adoption as a boundary, of such mountain ranges as form watershed lines between the drainages of different rivers, as detailed below.

"In 1839, when Captain A. Cunningham surveyed the Lahoul district, the boundary between the States of Kulu and Chamba was formed by the Nalda and Chukam nullahs, two tributaries of the Chandrabhaga, the one on its left, and the other on its right bank. From the head of the Chukam nullah the Commissioners determined that all the country to the eastward, which is drained by the Bhaga, the Chandrabhaga, and their tributaries, belonged to the British district of Lahoul; and that the boundary between Lahoul and the Zaskar district was the Snowy Range (called Paralassa by Dr. Gerard) dividing the drainage of the Bhaga and Chandrabhaga from that of the Zaskar river, as marked in the map (Pl. XXIX).

"Beyond the Barulacha Pass, to the eastward, the Commissioners found that there was an old well-known boundary stone, called Phalangdanda, which marked the limit between Lahoul and Ladakh. This stone is noticed by Moorcroft (I., p. 220). It stands in the midst of an open plain on the right bank of the Yunam river. As there was no known or recognised boundary mark on the other side of the stream, the Commissioners selected a remarkable cream-coloured peak, called Turam, as the northern limit of the British territory on the left bank of the river. As this peak is situated at the end of one of the spurs of the great snowy chain, already determined as the northern limit of the Lahoul district, it forms a natural continuation of the boundary line from the westward. The bearing of the Turam peak from the Phalangdanda is 9° to the northward of west.

"As it appeared that the country to the eastward of the Phalangdanda belonged to Piti, the Commissioners determined that the boundary between Piti and Ladakh on the westward should be the Yunam river. A straight line was accordingly drawn from the Phalangdanda to the junction of the first nullah on the right bank of the Yunam, from which point the Yunam river forms the boundary as far as the junction of the Cherpa or Cherep river.

"Almost due north-east from this junction there is a remarkable square rock on the top of the hill, which from its resemblance to a fort has received the name of Lanka. This curious and well-known peak was selected as another fixed point in the boundary, to which a straight line should be drawn from the junction of the Cherpa river. Beyond this to the eastward, the Commissioners, adhering to the principle which they had first laid down, determined that the whole of the Cherpa valley and its tributaries belonged to the British Government; and that the snowy range on its right bank, which feeds all the northern affluent of the Cherpa river, should be the boundary between Ladakh and the British district of Piti. This same range extends towards the east past the southern end of the Chomoriri lake, where it forms the well-known boundary between Ladakh and the Chinese territory. The Commissioners, therefore, determined that the boundary between Ladakh and Piti should continue from the head of the Cherpa along this same range to the Chinese boundary, thus including within Piti all the streams which water that district, and giving to Ladakh all the streams which water its southern district of Ratchu."

* Consultation, 30th December 1847,
No. 704.

The following passages from Captain Cunningham's journal* also describe a portion of the

boundary:—

"Monday, 7th September.—To mouth of Cherpa river, 6½ miles. Road good, over a long, level, alluvial plain, in the midst of which was a square block of mica slate thickly imbedded with large crystals of quartz. This stone, which is 8 feet square and 12 feet high above the ground, is called *Lingti* by the people of Kullu according to Moorcroft, and *Phalangdanda* by the Ladakhis. The only name that we could learn was *Phalangdanda*, which means the boundary stone, the stone being a well-known boundary-mark between the States of Kullu and Ladakh. Almost due east from the junction of the Cherpa and Yunam rivers there is, on the top of the hill, a remarkable square rock which has so much resemblance to a fort that it had received the name of Lanka from the shepherds and traders who frequent these parts. It is a well-known point, and it can be seen from the Baralacha Pass as well as from the neighbourhood of the Gumm Lake."

Apparently no orders were passed on the report by the Government of India beyond sending a copy of the papers to the Asiatic Society.

On the 20th October 1847, Captain Cunningham submitted further remarks about this same boundary, which are quoted below:—

"On the 10th of September, when encamped at Umboo Sundoo, I enquired from Chiring-Teshi, the head-man of the village of Chenner, and a subject of the Maharaja, to which district the land that we were then encamped on belonged, as well as the hill on the opposite or

Secret Consultation, 31st December
1847, No. 134.

northern bank of the Parang river. He replied, 'to Piti.' I considered this reply as very satisfactory, because Mr. Agnew and myself had last year determined that the boundary between Ladakh and Piti should run from the Lingti boundary stone to the Lanka hill, and from that along the mountain range on the northern bank of the Cherpa river, as far as the southern end of the Chomoriri lake, from which point we understood that the Chinese territory commenced. On the following day, at 3½ miles only from our last encampment, I observed on the northern bank of the Parang river, just above the junction of a small stream which comes from the head of the Cherpa, a new building without any occupants. As I had not heard of any such place last year, my suspicions were roused, and I enquired from Chiring-Teshi when it was built. He replied 'between two and three months ago,' and that some men from Leh had come down and superintended the erection of it. I then asked him how people from Leh could build in Piti; on which he at once contradicted all that he had said on the day before, and now declared that not only this building but also all the land to the north of the Parang Pass, belonged to the Rukchu (or Rupsu) district of Ladakh. The concluding paragraph of Mr. Erskine's letter, mentioning that 'new ehokies had been recently established on the Laboul Frontier,' immediately recurred to me, and it was then clear that this building was a newly-erected custom house between Lahoul and Garu.

"On the same day (11th September) I met four merchants on their way back from Garu. Their names were Chiring, Chipsa, Chirang, and Teshi, and they all belonged to Tehling, a village in British Lahoul. I at once questioned them as to when the new building was erected and for what purpose. They answered—'Three or four months ago, that two or three men of the Maharaja usually resided there for the purpose of collecting customs, on account of which we were obliged to take a different road when on our way to Garu to purchase wool; but on our return we learned that these men had decamped, hearing that some Sahebs were coming from Simla, and we have therefore taken this direct and good road to Lahoul.' In proceeding to Garu they went from the Baralacha pass down the Piti valley. In returning, they took the Parang river route, which would lead them down the Cherpa river to the Baralacha, the very route which, in my report of last year, I pointed out to Government as the best as well as the most direct from Kullu and Lahoul to Garu and Rudok.

"I now beg to bring prominently to the notice of Government the fact that this custom house has been erected since the settlement of the boundary last year by Mr. Vans Agnew and myself, and that it commands the high road between Garu and British Lahoul, by which route Loodiana and Noorpoor are chiefly supplied with wool. The very fact of the custom house men having decamped when they heard of the approach of some British officers proves that they (as well as the authorities who placed them there) knew that the custom house was built within the British boundary as determined last year. When I mentioned the subject, however, to Thanahdar Buslee Ram, the Governor of Leh, he denied all knowledge of it, and assured me that the head-man of Chumur (Chiring-Teshi) had always been quarrelling with the people of Lahoul, and that he must have built the place. Perhaps the truth may be that the present Governor, on the representation of the said Chiring-Teshi, ordered the custom house to be erected without knowing, or even enquiring, in whose territory the proposed site might be.

"With regard to the boundary between Ladakh and the British districts of Lahoul and Piti, I beg to refer to the accompanying sketch map, in which the dotted red line, running from the south of the Chomoriri Lake to the Lanak and Gauskil Passes, represents the boundary which I propose should be established on the southern frontier of Ladakh, if the cheap and regular supply of shawl wool is considered a point of much importance by the Government. This would involve the cession by the Maharaja of only one village (Chumur), possessing but

two houses and nineteen inhabitants, for which I have no doubt some arrangement might be made. The boundary would then be fixed by well-known mountain land-marks that could not possibly be disputed hereafter; and the direct road from Kullu and Lahoul to Garo, *via* the Cherra and Parang rivers, would then be open without the slightest chance of any future interruption to the traffic from the Maharaja's people.

"If the Government should decide upon establishing this line of boundary (of which the advantages are obvious), the affair could be settled at once with the Maharaja by a simple statement of the principal points in the line from Lahoul eastward, namely, the Lingti boundary stone, the Lanka hill at the junction of the Cherra and Yunam rivers, and the mountain range running north of the Cherra river and south of the Chomoriri lake to the Lanak and Gauskil Passes, including in Piti the village and pasture lands of Chumur.

"If, however, this line of boundary should not be approved by Government, the only other that I can propose, which would effectually prevent all chance of future dispute, is the chain of mountains connecting the Baralacha, Parang, and Gauskil Passes. By making this the boundary, however, we should give up altogether the best line of road from Kullu and Lahoul to the wool districts."

These passages seem to be of importance. When they were written Captain Cunningham had thoroughly examined the country and proceeded beyond Leh, and he still held to the boundary laid down in the previous year. The only portion which remained undefined was a small strip of about 30 miles between the head of the Gyu river and Umboo Sumdoo at the foot of the Chomoriri lake, where he was encamped on 10th September 1847.

Secret Consultation, 21st December 1847, No. 129.

In forwarding the above memorandum on the 23rd November 1847, Sir H. Lawrence wrote thus:—

"With regard to Captain Cunningham's remarks * * regarding the boundary between Ladakh and Piti and the conduct of the Maharaja Golab Singh's people, I have not the means of forming a satisfactory judgment, as I never received a copy of any reports from him last year connected with his work on that frontier. As no Commissioners, however, on the part of Maharaja Golab Singh were present, I do not see how he can be bound by the decision of our officers.

"If the land on which the new custom house has been erected belongs to the Maharaja, he has a clear right to build such posts thereon, however inconvenient to our traders. I think Captain Cunningham should have made full investigation and at once determined this point. As the Maharaja exacts duties and we abolish them, the representations of merchants must be taken with caution against him. The fact of the customs officers decamping is suspicious, but not conclusive.

"We cannot expect the Maharaja to cede the village of Chumur, as proposed. The question is not what revenue the village may yield, or how many houses and people it contains. On its possession, by Captain Cunningham's account, that of the shawl wool trade depends, and consequently its retention by the Maharaja is of great importance. The object which the Government had in view, and which I distinctly explained to the Commissioners last year at Simla, was to determine and lay down a frontier boundary not liable to question and dispute. It was not to secure the wool trade or any other traffic on any particular line of road to the prejudice of our neighbours. If we are fairly entitled to the northern line proposed by Captain Cunningham, well and good; if not, the southern one by Baralacha, Parang, and Gauskil Passes, will, I conceive, be equally acceptable, or nearly so."

The Government appear to have given no order and passed no opinion on these proposals at the time. The papers were forwarded to the Court of Directors with a short covering despatch No. 36, dated 2nd May 1848, which was merely acknowledged by the Home authorities. The outbreak of the second Punjab war deprived the matter of further interest at the time.

In 1851 the Deputy Commissioner of Hazara wrote* as follows about the boundary between Lahoul and Kashmir territory:—

"This boundary was laid down by Captain Cunningham and Mr. Vans Agnew in 1840. I have never visited the country, but I believe the line to be on the northern side of the Baralacha Pass, across a wide plain with no distinct geographical features. The border which divides the two territories is called Lingti."

(2.) *Ladakh-Thibet boundary*.—Owing to Sheikh Imam-ud-din's rebellion in Kashmir and other local causes, the first Commission could not reach the Thibet border.

Mr. Vans Agnew, however, wrote a memorandum† (dated the 13th May 1847) on the boundary and trade questions. As to the boundary, he thought that the line was already

† *Ibid.*, No. 154.

sufficiently defined by nature and recognised by custom with the exception of its two extremities. "The exact point," he observed,— "where the boundary of Piti (Spiti), Ladak, and Chanthan meet does not, I believe, at present exist."

As to trade, he thought that the Netighat route from Garo to Hardwar or the Dün was the best. This, however, he mentioned, had been entirely closed by the Chinese. He was also of opinion that the prospects of trade, especially in tea, would be good, provided that the Maharaja Golab Singh could be induced to abolish his heavy customs duties.

The second Commission.—In 1847 the Government of India appointed* a Commission of three officers, Captain A. Cunningham, Lieutenant H. Strachey, and Assistant Surgeon T. Thomson, M.D., for the purpose of carrying out the objects for which Captain Cunningham and Lieutenant Vans Agnew had been deputed in the preceding year. The British Plenipotentiary† at Hong-kong, and the Resident‡ at Lahore were requested to procure the attendance of Chinese and Kashmir officials respectively to meet the British Commissioners.

The instructions§ given to Captain Cunningham laid more stress on geographical and scientific research than on boundary settlement; indeed, it was observed that the latter would probably occupy but little time. Captain Cunningham was to winter beyond the Karakoram range, visit Zarkhond, Khotan, and Rodokh, and then follow the Indus to Gilgit; Lieutenant Strachey was to go as far eastwards as he could, endeavouring to reach Shafsa, and returning to India *via* Darjeeling or Bhotan. The only limitations placed on the movements of the mission were the Bolor Tagh mountains on the west, and a two years' period of absence.

The Commissioners were placed|| under the orders of the Resident at Lahore only in respect of matters directly affecting Kashmir. Otherwise they were directly subordinate to the Foreign Department.

* Despatch to the Secret Committee, No. 50, dated 31st July 1851.

The British Commissioners failed¶ in the political object of opening up friendly relations with the Chinese, for no Chinese delegate appeared at all. The demarcation of the boundary also was¶ abandoned. The Chinese authorities declared from the first that the frontier was perfectly well known already. The Maharaja Golab Singh did eventually send Boundary Commissioners, and some enquiries appear** to have been made about a disputed boundary at the village of Chumar on the Lahoul frontier.

** Secret Consultation, 31st December 1847, Nos. 129—134.

But the scientific results of the Thibetan mission were valuable. Complete maps were made of the valleys of the Indus and Shayok rivers, and much information was collected†† about the Ladakh country generally. One member of the Commission (Dr. Thomson) visited the Karakoram pass; and Captain Cunningham's‡‡ book on Ladakh was the outcome of his researches.

The eastern boundary of the Kashmir State has therefore never been defined; and the second article of the treaty of Amritsar has remained a dead-letter.

Lingti boundary dispute.—This dispute related to about 80 miles of the boundary laid down by Captain Cunningham and Lieutenant Agnew in 1846, between the British districts of Lahoul and Spiti to the south and Ladakh on the north; the extremities of the disputed line were the Baralacha pass on the west, and the Gya peak (south of the Chomoriri lake) and the Chinese frontier on the east.

On the 25th May 1869 the Punjab Government reported§§ that the Ladakh officials had encroached upon the British boundary north of the Baralacha pass, and had occupied the important pass of Lingti. The Maharaja was called upon to withdraw, but he demurred. He claimed the encroachment on the strength of a map published by Allen & Co. in London, which had been given to him by Lord Canning in 1860.

§§ Political A., May 1874, No. 241.

†† Secret Consultation, 29th December 1846, No. 322.

‡‡ Secret Consultation, 12th September 1851, No. 164.

§§ Secret Consultation, 27th May 1848, No. 72.

¶¶ Foreign Department Consultation, 14th December 1851, No. 6.

This map, however, allotted to the Maharaja much more than he claimed. The maps of the revenue and trigonometrical survey, on examination, were found to differ from one another, and to be both wrong. Accordingly, it was decided that the locality should be re-surveyed, and that two officers, one on behalf of the Government and one on behalf of the Maharaja, should mark out the boundary as defined by the Commissioners in 1846. Messrs. Shaw and Drew met for this purpose on the 13th July 1871. For about 8 miles, viz., from the Baralacha pass eastwards to the Lanka peak they agreed in accepting the line of 1846. But as to the rest of the line they differed. Between the Lanka peak and the Chomoriri lake, Mr. Drew considered¹ the boundary of 1846 to be so vague as not to admit of identification. In the decision of that year it was said that the drainage of the Para river should be included in British, and that of the Phirsa river in Ladakh, limits. It appeared that the waters of the Phirsa river (a feeder of the Chomoriri lake at its southern end) sometimes found their way through a gap in the mountains on the south of the lake into the Para river before they entered the lake. Hence, Mr. Drew argued, the Phirsa valley was brought temporarily into the drainage of the Para river, and therefore the description of the boundary given in 1846 was too vague to be followed. This contention was rejected, because it merely showed that the award of 1846 admitted of an interpretation less favourable to the Maharaja than that which the Government chose to put upon it; and further because the main and obvious course of the Para river admitted of no doubt. Consequently the decision of Mr. Shaw retaining the line² of 1846 on this bit of the boundary was upheld.

The last portion of the boundary was found by the Government of India to be really indefinite. The suggestions of 1846 would have included in British territory the village of Chumar, which at that time was held by Kashmir. But they had never been acted on, so it was decided to leave the village to Kashmir, and to draw the boundary line from the village of Norbo Sumdo southwards on a convenient ridge to the peak of Gya on the Chinese frontier. Orders issued^{*} accordingly; and in July† 1872 the boundary was demarcated by the Assistant Commissioner of Kullu and Mr. Johnson of the Maharaja's service. Their proceedings were approved by the Government of India.

* Political A., October 1871, No. 688 C.

† Political A., January 1873, Nos. 203-206.

Mr. Drew's account of the eastern boundary.—Writing in 1875, Mr. Drew, who was for some time the Maharaja's governor of Ladakh, stated‡ that from the Kuenlun mountains southwards to the head of the Changchenmo valley the boundary between Ladakh and Thibet is quite doubtful. From the head of the Changchenmo valley to the south and south-west till Gya peak is reached, the boundary appeared to be fairly well understood as representing actual occupation—

“So far that it divides pasture lands occupied by the subjects of the Maharaja from those occupied by subjects of Lhasa.”

“In the neighbourhood of the Pangkong lake,” Mr. Drew observes, “there have been boundary disputes which may now be said to be latent.”

Northern boundary.—The northern as well as the eastern boundary has been officially declared to be indefinite. The question first arose in connection with the commercial treaty of 1870. The Kashmir Durbar tried to insert in this treaty a stipulation that the officers surveying the new trade route should accept the northern boundaries of Kashmir as pointed out by the Durbar's officers. Mr. Forsyth was instructed§ as follows in the matter:—

§ Political A., July 1870, No. 96.

“As the boundaries of the Maharaja's territories to the north and east have never been accurately defined by survey, Mr. Forsyth will be careful to commit Government in no way as to the boundaries of the possessions of the Maharaja in any direction.”

Accordingly the treaty of 1870, while defining the limits of the jurisdiction of the joint Commissioners on either side of the trade route, is silent as to the extent of that jurisdiction northwards to Yarkhand.

¹ He also objected to the justice of the whole settlement of 1846, but here he was over-ruled at once.

² i. e., the mountain ridge forming the drainage of the Chirpa and Para rivers, and excluding the valley of the Phirsa from British territory.

The question came up again in 1873. A map,* published by the Survey Department of India in 1873, showed the northern boundary of Kashmir as lying along the northern edge of the Changchenmo Valley and the ridge of the Karakoram mountains. The compiler, Colonel Walker, noted that the boundary had thus been "brought back a considerable distance," on the authority of Mr. (now Sir) Douglas Forsyth. The latter denied that he was the authority, but afterwards admitted his mistake. He remarked, however:—

"In the present state of our knowledge it would be very unsafe to define the boundary of Kashmir in the direction of the Karakoram, and if it must be put down at all it should run as near the lower Karakash river as possible. Between the Karakoram and the Karakash the high plateau is perhaps rightly described as rather a no-man's-land, but I should say with a tendency to become Kashmir property. It might prove hereafter very inconvenient to put the Kashmir boundary on the Karakoram ridge, and thus exclude us altogether from any benefit which arise from having the high plateaus under our control."

This discussion was brought on record in order to point out that the boundary in this direction was not authoritative. The Foreign Secretary (Mr. Aitchison) noted thus:—

"The real fact is that the northern boundary of Kashmir has never been defined. No one knows where it runs. Notwithstanding the treaty stipulation that the boundaries of Kashmir shall never be changed without the concurrence of the British Government, the Maharaja boasted to Sir R. Montgomery in 1863 that his boundary to the north was as far as his arms could carry it. At one time I believe he had an outpost at Shadoola Khoja† till he was driven out of it."

† Situated on the Karakash river in 78° long. and 36° lat. north.

To this the Viceroy, Lord Northbrook, added—

"Certainly; and Mr. Wynne‡ should be told that it is not laid down authoritatively. We should not do so without communicating to the Maharaja of Kashmir."

‡ Officer on special duty in Kashmir.

Mr. Elias' account.—Writing in 1878 about the trade routes to Central Asia, Mr. Elias, the British Joint Commissioner at Leh, said§—

"In the above description the various loops of the road are followed up to the Yarkhand frontier at Shahidulla, but it would appear from the latest maps that the Maharaja's territory hardly extends so far as that post, but is limited by the Kuenlun water parting."

Mr. Drew's account.—Beginning from the north-western end of the line Mr. Drew describes the boundary thus:—

"(a) From Nagar for the most part, and from the upper part of the Hunza Valley, the separation is effected by a great and almost impassable ridge of mountains.

"(b) As to the boundary with Yarkhand territory, from the Mustagh pass to the Karakoram pass, there is no doubt whatever: a great watershed divides the two territories.

"(c) From the Karakoram pass eastwards to past the meridian of 80° there has been no authoritative demarcation, and as the country is quite uninhabited for more than 100 miles in every direction, the actual state of occupation is no guide."

North-western boundary.—Three English officers, Messrs. Winterbotham, Vans Agnew, and Young were sent to Gilgit immediately after the treaty of Amritsar was concluded. They were apparently intended to find out something about the frontier in the neighbourhood; but they do not seem to have arrived at definite results. Here, again, from Hunza southwards along the frontier of Yasin, Darel, Thalicha, and Chilas to Khaghan, no boundary appears to be officially recognised.

Mr. Drew's account.—Mr. Drew states that on the principle of following actual occupation, the line is correctly defined in the maps which accompany his book|| on the "Jammu and Kashmir territories."

|| Page 465.

Colonel Tanner's account.—Colonel Tanner of the Survey of India, who was for a time on duty at Gilgit, has described† the boundary thus:—

"From the Khaghan boundary the frontier line follows the watershed of the Indus, the Kishengunga, and the Astor streams, till it dips into the Indus valley at a point nearly opposite Thalicha. It then follows the Indus for a short distance (say 2 miles) after which it strikes up-hill to the watershed of the Gilgit river on one side, with Darel, Tangir, and Hudar on the

† In an unofficial note, which he was good enough to give me.—J. A. C.

other. This ridge is followed to a point where the Batras stream rises. It then leads down the Batras and Gakuch watersheds to Hupar on the Gilgit river, ascends the range opposite Hupar so as to take in the slopes above Hatun, circles round that place, descends, crosses the Iskoman stream, and then strikes up the range, following the ridge to a point north of Bar. From this point icefields and glaciers occur and the boundary is undefined; it eventually strikes a spur which leads south, down to the Hunza river midway between Budlas and Moyun, crosses the river and ascends the slope on the opposite side, after which it is taken along the east of the Himalayas over Rakhaposhi to the Mustagh pass."

Western boundary: Definition in the treaty of Amritsar.—The first article of the treaty of Amritsar transferred to the Maharaja of Kashmir—

"all the hilly or mountainous country situate to the eastward of the river Indus and westward of the river Ravi."

Occupation of Hazara by Maharaja Golab Singh.—Accordingly Golab Singh sent Dewan Hari Chand to collect the Hazara revenue. He reached Hariapur on the 22nd May 1846, and established himself in the fort. Most of the people of lower Hazara tendered their submission. But the Jaduns resisted him and defeated his troops, and disorder continued in Pakhli.

By the beginning of November 1846, Sheikh Imam-ud-din, the Governor of the Sikh Darbar at Srinagar, had submitted. And Dewan Karam Chand, with Mr. Vans Agnew and Lieutenant Lumsden, Assistants to the Lahore Resident, marched with troops from Srinagar, *via* Muzaffarabad, to coerce upper Hazara. On the 6th January 1847, they were opposed ineffectually by the Hindustanis and Swatis at the Dub Pass above Garhi Habibulla; and the Swatis submitting to the Kashmir Governor after the battle, the Hindustanis fled the country.

First demarcation of the western boundary.—Meanwhile Captain Abbott had been appointed to settle the western boundary of Maharaja Golab Singh's territories. For this purpose he was instructed* to follow the words of the treaty of Amritsar which have been quoted; that is to say, he was to determine whether lands in dispute were or were not, as a matter of physical geography, "hilly or mountainous country."

Captain Abbott's report of the 28th October and 9th November 1846, and his letters† Nos. 90 and 99, dated, respectively, the 22nd November and 22nd December 1846, to the Governor General's Agent on the North-West Frontier, contained the decisions at which he had arrived. The general effect of them was to assign certain patches of territory between the Jhelum and the Chenab to the Lahore State, and certain portions to the west of the Jhelum to Kashmir. Colonel Lawrence concurred in most of them.

The practical results of these decisions, however, would have been unsatisfactory. In the first place, they would have afforded an irregular and intricate boundary. Secondly, they would have deprived Golab Singh of territory in the neighbourhood of Jammu which he was eager to retain. Thirdly, they would have made over, as subjects of the Maharaja, turbulent tribes in the hills of Hazara whom he could not have controlled, but with whom the Lahore Durbar might have hoped to deal successfully. Colonel Lawrence said‡ that such a boundary line—

"would have divided tribes from their legitimate means of support; have tempted many of them, by hope of impunity, to rebellion; and have kept up a perpetual petty war in the country."

Territorial exchange: transfer of Hazara to the Lahore State.—*The Jhelum, now the western boundary.*—The Durbars were not slow to perceive the disadvantages of such an arrangement, and Golab Singh proposed as an alternative an exchange of territory which would leave the disputed lands near Jammu with him, and award most of the disputed hill country to the west of the Jhelum to the Lahore State. The details of this proposal were not settled without diffi-

* Letter to Foreign Department No. 60, dated 28th May 1847.

† Foreign Department Secret Consultation, 26th June 1847, Nos. 180—182.

‡ Jammu and Kashmir territories, pages 484 and 485.

culty; but on the 28th May 1847, the Agent to the Governor General was able to report* that he had negotiated an agreement between the Durbars. This document is quoted in the foot-note,† and it will be seen that it constituted the river Jhelum as the western boundary of the Kashmir State, roughly between Jhelum and Mozufferabad; or as Mr. Drew says‡—

“from near Dulial on the Jhelum upwards to the falling in of the Khaghan river, the right and left banks belong respectively to the British and the Maharaja's governments.”

The basis on which the exchange was agreed to was that an equitable assessment should first be made in Hazara, including the release of jagirs and other rent-free holdings, and that on the reduced income lands should be given on another part of the border (Jammu-cis-Jhelum) equal to half the value of those of Hazara.

Major Abbott was instructed to settle the details. He was specially§ to aim at a clear boundary between the Chenab and the Jhelum; and the only suggestion§ made by the Agent to the Governor General was that he would wish “Sardar Tej Singh's jagir of Bijawat to be left with Lahore.”

It will be observed that the agreement between the Lahore and Kashmir Durbars contemplated the definition of the northern part of the western boundary by a limit which was to follow the Kunhar or Kurnaha river from the border of Mozufferabad “until such place as Captain Abbot can determine a distinct and well-marked line across to the river Indus.” But this last piece of demarcation was apparently never carried out. Writing in August 1850, Major Abbott stated the western boundary to be complete, and described|| it in these words:—

|| Letter No. 215, dated 2nd August 1850, to the Secretary to Board of Administration.

Foreign Department Consultation, 27th September 1850, No. 31.

“The Jhelum being here full of cultivated islands, boundary pillars are set up in the same, as the boundary ascends the river nearly to Manghuk, where the islands cease, and the deep, rapid, clearly-defined current of the Jhelum requires no columns to aid in exhibiting the boundary. At the confluence of the Nynsuk or Kunhar river with the Jhelum, the boundary quite the latter river and climbs the current of the Nynsuk to Berarkote British and Berarkote of Jammu, where, leaving the river, it strikes to the summit of the Dhub mountain about 6 miles, and then follows the ridge of that very elevated mountain until lost in the snow, the water falling into the river Kishengunga belonging to Jammu, that received by the Nynsuk being British.

“Here also no boundary pillars are required, the mountain ridge being the best possible boundary. In the snow aforesaid terminates the boundary common to British India and Jammu—the British boundary afterwards meeting with lands inhabited by independent tribes.”

The Hazara settlement report says that the Khaghan part of the Hazara district is separated from these independent countries by the Khaghan range, and from Kashmir by the mountain range bordering the left bank of the Kun-

¹ Agreement concluded between the Governments of Lahore and Jammu by Dewan Dina Nath and Rai Kishen Chand on the part of Maharaja Duleep Singh and Dewan Jowala Sahai and Kazi Mulkam-ud-din on that of Maharaja Gulab Singh, in the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence, Agent, Governor General, North-Western Frontier, and Resident at Lahore, and subject to the approval of the Governor General of India, regarding the exchange of the districts of Hazara, Pakli, Sabuta, &c. west of the river Jhelum for lands east of that river in the direction of Jammu.

We the undersigned consent and agree that Captain J. Abbott, the Boundary Commissioner, having examined the revenue records of the country west of the Jhelum shall, after deducting jagirs and rent-free lands, fix the yearly rent, after which lands producing half that rent shall be made over to Jammu from the Lahore Territory. Captain Abbott shall then lay down a well-defined boundary so as to prevent all future dispute, viz., on the west the Jhelum river to the border of Mozufferabad, whence it is to follow the Kurnaha river until such place as Captain Abbott can determine, a distinct and well-marked line across to the river Indus. This done, the mutual exchange of territory shall be effected, after which it will belong both parties to adhere for ever to the terms now settled, but should difference arise, they are to be referred to the Agent, Governor General, North-Western Frontier.

This agreement is signed in the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence, Agent, Governor General, and is subject to the confirmation of the Governor General of India. A copy of this agreement to be made over to each Durbar and one to be lodged in the Agency Office.

(Sd.)	DEWAN JOWALA SAHAI.
“	DEWAN DINA NATH.
“	KAZI MULKAM-UD-DIN.
“	RAI KISHEN CHAND.

True translation,
(Sd.) H. M. LAWRENCE,

Agent, Governor General, and Resident of Lahore.

lar river. So, too, Mr. Drew (Jammu and Kashmir Territories, page 406) states that from the confluence of the Jhelum and Khaglan (or Kunhar) rivers—
 “the boundary line still fixed and undisputed follows the ridge which divides the drainage of Khaglan from that of Kishenganga.”

Southern boundary.—(1) *From the Jhelum to the Ravi.*—The only portion of the British-Kashmir boundary which has been demarcated with boundaries is that which lies between the rivers Jhelum and Ravi, from a point above Dulial to Madhopur. This settlement was made by Captain Abbott with the aid of Commissioners of the Lahore and Kashmir Durbars, and pillars appear to have been erected along most of the boundary under his instructions at the end of the year 1846.

But the Hazara exchange, which has just been described, affected Captain Abbott's decisions on the border between the Jhelum and the Chenab. Captain Abbott had awarded the talukas of Kathna and Suchetgurb, and part of Minawur to Lahore. The territorial exchange modified this decision in favour of Kashmir. No accurate account or detailed map of this part of the boundary seems to be on record. But it has certainly all been defined with pillars.

In 1850 Major Abbott* said the work had been done eighteen months before, and that the pillars went as far north-westwards as Mangla on the Jhelum, because there were islands in the river for that distance. And on the 6th February 1851, Major Abbott reported on the condition of the pillars, after having been over the whole line from the Ravi westwards.

† Foreign Department Consultation, 4th June 1852, No. 68. The portion of the line between the Chenab and the Ravi was surveyed† and mapped‡ by the trigonometrical survey in 1850 and 1851.

Chak Bharat dispute.—Before leaving this part of the boundary, mention may be made of the Chak Bharat boundary dispute, the circumstances of which are as follows:—

The village‡ of Chak Bharat is in the Bijwat portion of the Sialkot district. It is well within the British limits as defined by the Boundary Commissioner in 1849. The Maharaja of Kashmir, however, claimed the village, alleging that it had been assigned to him by Sir Henry Lawrence for the support of the temple of Raghunath in Jammu. No proof of this assertion could be found. To end the long dispute it was agreed in 1874 that British sovereignty over the village should be upheld, but that the revenue therefrom (Rs. 200 per annum) should be assigned to the Maharaja for the support of the temple “during the maintenance of the institution.”

Pathankot transfer.—There is one more transaction to be noticed in connection with the eastern end of the boundary between the Jhelum and the Ravi. After the rebellion of Sheik Imam-ud-din in Kashmir had broken out,

§ Foreign Department, Secret Consultation, 25th September 1847, No. 220. Dewan Jowala Sahai§ signed a document before Colonel Lawrence at Simla on the 27th September 1846, promising on behalf of Golab Singh to give fair and reasonable maintenance to the different hill chiefs in Jammu territory. The whole amount ultimately awarded was Rs. 6,22,200, and of this Rs. 42,800 were payable to parties who had elected to live in British India and draw their allowances from Government treasuries. As a set-off against these charges the Government took over from Golab Singh the districts of Sujanpur, part of Pathankot, and certain lands between the Chukki and Beas rivers. It was

|| Foreign Department, Secret Consultation, 25th September 1847, No. 220. estimated that the Government, though apparently a loser by this arrangement, would not suffer eventually. And Colonel Lawrence pointed|| out that it—

“improves our boundary very much, giving the Chukki river to the Hamsuli Canal as the boundary, then a nearly straight line of only a mile to the Doogyanee Nuddae, up which it runs to opposite Sujanpore, whence a straight line of a mile or two takes it to the Ravi. We have thus obtained a good frontier without giving offence to the Durbar by taking a single canal village. The fort of Pathankot, however, comes within the British boundary.”

* It is remarkable that one of the “References” in this map states that—
 “The only portion of the Jammu boundary demarcated by pillars is represented in this map.”

(2). From the Ravi to the Lahoul border:—

(a) The southward curve of the river Ravi is the boundary for most of the border between Madhopur and a point about 14 miles west-north-west of the town of Chamba. In regard to this portion* the Boundary Commissioner explained the principles which he had followed thus:—

"It was impossible in some cases to avoid the river boundaries. When the river was a single clear stream, without cultivated islands, the main current was laid down as the boundary, and one boundary pillar of masonry was planted where the boundary from the east first entered the river, and another where it left the river, though the interval should be of many miles.

"When the boundary ran through the inhabited islands of a river, as in the Jhelum above the town so named, pillars were built all along the line dividing lands, and on either side of the subordinate arms of the river where these formed the boundary.

"Where the boundary line entered a river and ran up the main stream for miles, the boundary pillars were generally of greater size and stability than the ordinary pillars.

"As rivers in India are constantly encroaching upon the land at their salient curves, and receding from it at their re-entering curves, and village lands become thus transferred from one State to the other, it was ruled that the proprietor of such village should remain, notwithstanding, still proprietor, paying his dues to each State according to the extent and value of his lands in either."

(b). *The Kashmir-Gurdaspur dispute.*†—This dispute related to the boundary between British and Kashmir territories from the point where the Ravi leaves the mountain gorge near Fort Lakanpur,‡ and the first of the series of boundary pillars erected by the Commissioner, Major Abbott, between the Ravi and Jhelum, a distance of about 8 miles.

The dispute lasted for 10 years, till it was first dealt with in a resolution§ of the Punjab Government No. 180, dated 9th February 1870. The gist of the decision then given (purporting to be based on the intentions of the original Boundary Commissioner) was that the main current of the Ravi should be regarded as the boundary; and that since the stream varied yearly, the main current should be ascertained in October yearly by British and Kashmir officials. The question had acquired special importance with reference to claims to waif timber.

No orders were passed on the case by the Government of India when it was first submitted. Five years later, however, the question came up again. The Maharaja of Kashmir objected to a variable boundary which admitted of a change in political jurisdiction consequent on a change in the main stream. More particularly he urged that the current had of late changed much (partly owing to canal dams in British territory), and that east of Madhopur it had taken a westward turn leaving several villages formerly on the Kashmir side of the boundary on the British side. Dewan Kirpa Ram, therefore, suggested that one of two principles should be followed in settling the question, *viz.*, either that the boundary should be deemed to run at a distance of half the average width between the two permanent banks taken in a line at right angles from the permanent left bank; or that the *status quo* of present possession being taken as a basis, the settlement should be made in accordance with the following rule which had been laid down by the Government of India in respect of the Nepal boundary; *viz.*:—

"When a boundary river *suddenly* quits its bed and cuts for itself a new channel, it ceases to be the boundary, and the Government which ruled over the territory cut off by the change in the river continues to rule it. Rivers shall continue to be the boundary if their encroachments on either side are only gradual, and in the ordinary course of alluvion and diluvion but not in the case of sudden changes in the bed of the deep stream, whereby land capable of identification is cut away."

The matter having been discussed during the meeting between the Viceroy and the Maharaja at Madhopur in 1876, the latter alternative was accepted.|| The variable main channel was no longer to be the boundary, but a line was to be drawn as far as possible down the centre of the stream, the benefit of reasonable doubts as to actual possession being given to the Maharaja. The subsequent demarca-

* Political A., August 1870, No. 359.

† Political A., August 1870, Nos. 357—363.

‡ Just north of Madhopur.

§ Political A., August 1870, Nos. 359 and 360.

|| Political A., January 1877, No. 210.

* About 1,100 acres.

† Political A., March 1878, No. 115.
‡ The word originally used was "Sovereignty."

[K. W. Political A., September 1878, Nov. 10-21.]

§ Political A., January 1879, No. 891.

(c) *The northern Chamba border: the Lakhimpur transfer.*—This part of the line involved some complications. The first article of the treaty of Amritsar transferred to the Kashmir State—

"all the hilly and mountainous country situated to the eastward of the river Indus, and westward of the river Ravi, including Chamba."

Part of Chamba lies on one side of the Ravi, and part on the other. It was not clear whether the treaty intended to make the whole over to Kashmir. Colonel Lawrence thought that it did, but the Government entertained doubts on this point. Moreover, when the treaty was made, Golab Singh was in possession of the district of Lakhimpur, which clearly belonged to the British territory acquired by the treaty of Lahore. Further, the Chamba Chief claimed the district of Badrawar which had been granted to him by Ranjit Singh, but which was being held by Kashmir and had undoubtedly been transferred to that State by the treaty of Amritsar. The Raja of Chamba had been tributary to the Sikh Durbar and he objected to occupying that position under Golab Singh.

** Foreign Department, Secret Consultation, 26th December 1846, No. 1323.

Foreign Department Consultation, 31st December 1847, Nos. 2360 and 2361.

Foreign Department Consultation, 30th December 1848, Nos. 158-161.

Ravi became independent of Kashmir, and the Raja undertook to pay tribute, and furnish a contingent on demand, to the British Government. This arrangement was approved.

†† Letter from Captain Abbott to the Resident at Lahore, No. 259, dated 23rd March 1848.

Foreign Department Consultation, 30th December 1848, No. 161.

‡‡ Foreign Department Consultation, 30th December 1847, Nos. 701 and 702.

§§ Drew's "Jammu and Kashmir territories," page 497.

The Chamba border was apparently demarcated with pillars by Captain Abbott in 1848-49. It reaches the westward limit of the Lahoul boundary defined by Captain Cunningham's Commission at a point 29 miles due north of the confluence of the Chandra and Bhaga tributaries of the Chenab, and about the same distance west-north-west of the Baralacha pass. There is apparently no doubt about the boundary on the Chamba border.

Rights over Rivers.—Since an important part of the boundaries of the Kashmir State consists of rivers, it will be convenient to refer here to the questions which have arisen regarding the Maharaja's rights over rivers in his territories.

Abolition of duties on timber.—On the 1st March 1850 the President of the Board of Administration in the Punjab addressed the Maharaja Golab Singh as follows:—

"When the treaty was ratified at Lahore, it was provided therein that the customs duty of the river lying between the jurisdiction of the Lahore Government and the Honourable Company should be abolished; * * * about two years ago His Highness's Dewan, Jowala Sahai, was told that of the tax levied on wood passing across the river Ravi half would be paid to His Highness; * * * now a fresh order has arrived from the Honourable Company determining that all taxes are to be abolished except that on salt, whereby His Highness's subjects will gain much benefit, and as the tax on shawls, &c., has been included in the abolition, for this reason it is hoped His Highness will relinquish the half tax on wood."

*** Secret Consultation, 31st May 1850, No. 58.

Maharaja Golab Singh agreed; and the Government of India expressed satisfaction with this result.

Ferries.—The Kashmir Durbar recently advanced a claim to levy tolls on ferries on the Ravi. The matter is under consideration, and its present state is sufficiently shown by the subjoined extract from letter* No. 315, dated the 21st July 1863, from the Punjab Government to the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir:

* A—General E., August 1858, No. 18.
(Also Foreign Department Consultation, 27th June 1851, Nos. 68 & 69.)

"The Dewan states that, agreeably to the wishes of the Punjab Government, His Highness the Maharaja has issued a proclamation prohibiting the levy of tolls at the Ravi ferries until the matter is duly decided, and I am desired by the Lieutenant-Governor to request that his acknowledgments may be conveyed to His Highness the Maharaja for the action which has been taken in this respect. At the same time attention is called to the fact that whereas the tolls for the Jhelum river at ferries where one bank lies in His Highness's territory and the other in the British dominion are considered to be the joint property of both Governments, the same rule ought to hold good in the case of other rivers, from which view it would follow that His Highness the Maharaja is entitled to half the tolls at the ferries in the Gurdaspur district, regarding which this reference has arisen. The case, as put by the Dewan, is not, however, analogous to that now under consideration.

"In regard to the Jhelum ferries, it was decided that 'at each ghât where the Maharaja had a ferry before the annexation of the Punjab he would get half the income,' and the Lieutenant-Governor believes that this decision, which was communicated in a letter from this office, No. 521, dated 3rd June 1850, to the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Jhelum division, is still in force. It was subsequently arranged in regard to the tolls levied at the Kohala bridge over the Jhelum, that half the tolls should be made over to His Highness; but the reason for this decision was that half the cost of its construction had been borne by the Maharaja. There had previously been a ferry at Kohala which was worked by the Sikh Government before the annexation of the Punjab; and in 1855 it was arranged that the tolls on this ferry should be shared between the British Government and the Kashmir Government, each party levying the tolls from persons leaving its banks, and none from those reaching it from the opposite side; but this decision appears to have been based upon the fact that from the annexation of the Punjab, and perhaps from the time antecedent to annexation, the Maharaja's officials have levied tolls on the Kashmir side of the river.

"In the case of the ferries on the Ravi now under consideration, no tolls have been taken by the Kashmir Government since annexation. They were first imposed by the officials of His Highness on the 1st May 1852. The Lieutenant-Governor thinks, therefore, that the claim of His Highness to levy tolls at those ferries is untenable. The ferries have been maintained and managed throughout by the British Government, and tolls have been levied by British officials only. Sir Charles Aitchison conceives that no objection could be taken to the Jammu Durbar starting ferries of its own across the Ravi at any point where it forms the boundary, but it would be contrary to custom and friendly procedure for such ferries to be started in the immediate vicinity of those already existing; and by the analogy of Section 13 of Act XVII of 1873, such ferries should not, in His Honour's opinion, be started within a distance of two miles from any ferry maintained by the British Government."

Drift timber on the Jhelum.—The headwaters of the Jhelum are partly in Kashmir, and partly in British territory, while for a considerable distance the Jhelum river forms the boundary of the two States. Even since 1852 more or less difficulty has existed regarding the ownership of drift timber on this river, and various agreements regarding it have been entered into between the British Government and Kashmir, the details of which may be summarised thus:

From 1852 to 1854 the British Government collected all waif timber, giving a half share to the Maharaja. From 1854 to 1870 continuously, the Maharaja collected the whole waif, making over a share to the British Government as follows:—

1854-55	300 logs in lieu half share.
1855-56	350 " " "
1856-57	400 " " "
1857 to 1868	450 " " "

In 1868-69 timber was collected by the Maharaja, but it does not appear what share was paid to Government.

In 1869-70 450 logs, in lieu of the half share. From 1871 to 1877, the waif timber was collected by the Forest Department, who sold it and made over two-thirds of the net proceeds to the Maharaja of Kashmir as his share. It does not appear why during these years the share of the Maharaja was raised.

In August 1876 the Punjab Government proposed that the arrangement then existing by which waif timber on the river Jhelum was collected by the British Government should terminate, and that the collection of such waif

should be left to the Kashmir authorities on payment by the State of Rs. 1,000 annually as compensation for such timber as might come from British forests. In letter No. 973, dated 19th September 1876, from the Revenue and Agricultural Department of the Government of India, this arrangement was sanctioned with effect from the 1st April 1877, subject, however, to reconsideration after the expiry of five years from that date.

In the meantime the Forest Act, VII of 1878, came into force, and it became necessary to give the management of the drift timber on the Jhelum to the Government Forest Department wherever the river ran in British territory. Accordingly the Punjab Government proposed that the arrangement of 1876 should be superseded by a new one of which the main features were that the Maharaja of Kashmir should collect the drift timber on that part of the river Jhelum which flows through his territory; that British authorities should collect the drift on the part of the river flowing through British territory; that, where the river flows between Kashmir and British territories, each Government should collect the drift settling on its own bank; that drift timber collected by one Government which could be identified as the property of the other, should be handed over to the other, on payment of salvage dues fixed under, or in accordance with, the principles of Section 51 of the Indian Forest Act.

The Maharaja did not refuse to accept this settlement, but he urged that it would cause him loss. He represented that for thirty* years the principle had been recognised that

* This is incorrect.

Kashmir was entitled to a larger share because it had a larger forest area draining into the river. He therefore requested that one of the two systems of collection hitherto in force should be maintained, *viz.*, either that Kashmir should collect the drift on the whole river and pay the British Government Rs. 4,000 as the money value of the British share of timber, or that the British Government drift and hand over to Kashmir two-thirds of the whole collections. The decision of the Government of India was communicated to the Officer on Special

▲—General E., May 1883, No. 37.

Duty in these words :—

“The Governor-General in Council has very carefully considered the letter from Dewan Anunt Ram enclosed in your predecessor's letter of 23rd June 1882, but he is still of opinion that the scheme proposed by the Government of the Punjab is the most simple and satisfactory of which the circumstances of the case admit. The systems advocated by the Dewan appear to him to involve serious political and administrative difficulties. The doctrine which he urges, that the right of a State to drift timber is commensurate with the area of its forests draining into a river, is not in accordance with universal usage, and would, moreover, be likely to raise a number of complicated questions which, if settled on the same basis, would injuriously affect elsewhere the interests of the Kashmir Durbar. At the same time the Governor-General in Council is of opinion that the proposals made by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor may have the effect of reducing the Durbar's receipts below the amount realised under recent arrangements. Having regard to this contingency and being, moreover, desirous to treat His Highness's wishes with the utmost consideration, the Governor-General in Council is pleased to authorize you to tender to the Durbar the sum of Rs. 60,000 by way of compensation for any loss of revenue involved in the introduction of the system which has finally been approved by the Government of India.”

▲—General E., May 1883, No. 41.

This settlement was accepted by the Durbar.
The Chenab and the Ravi.—There are Kashmir forests also on the Chenab and Ravi rivers. They were referred to by the Conservator of Forests (while the Jhelum case noted above was under consideration) in these words :—

† *Ibid.*, K. W., page 7.

“The Chenab, after running through Pangri (a portion of Chamba), where we have extensive deodar forests leased from the Raja of Chamba for 99 years, enters Kashmir territory, and, after passing for some 150 or 200 miles through it and receiving several feeders which drain Kashmir forests, enters British territory. The Government of India has no power, as far as I am aware, to prevent the Maharaja from collecting and appropriating all unmarked drift timber throughout the reach of over 150 miles, although it may have come from British (leased) forests, and he certainly has never been called upon to pay any compensation to the Government of India. On the other hand, some of the unmarked timber coming from the Maharaja's forests may be carried into British territory, and if so it has, as far as I am aware, always been considered the property of the Government of India. Here, then, is a very complicated case, which it would be difficult to settle on the lines suggested for the Jhelum. The Ravi drains the Chamba territory, in which extensive deodar forests are situated which we have leased for 99 years, and a few small feeders also come from Kashmir territory. It is not known exactly

what forests are situated on these feeders, but so much is certain that they form only a fraction of the total area on the Ravi, and certainly I should say not one-sixth. For some distance the Ravi runs between British and Kashmir territory down to the Dari Doab canal works. Here each Government collects on its own side, and as, owing to the canal works, by far the larger portion of the drift is stopped above Madhopur, the Maharaja gets a far larger share than he would be entitled to if the timber was apportioned according to the area of forests in each territory; the British Government, if proceeding on the lines suggested for the Jhelum, might fairly claim a solatium in this instance.⁴

CHAPTER III.

SUCCESSION: THE RULING FAMILY; TITLES; CEREMONIALS; TRIBUTE.

Succession.—The Treaty of Amritsar.—An account has been given of the circumstances under which the Kashmir State came into the hands of the first Maharaja. It was “transferred and made over for ever” by the British Government, under the first article of the treaty of Amritsar, “to Maharaja Golab Singh and the heirs male of his body.”

Death of the Maharaja Golab Singh.—Maharaja Golab Singh died[†] in Kashmir of fever on the 4th August 1857. He had been ill for some time. In 1851† he was reported by a European Surgeon to be suffering from diabetes; and in April of 1857 the Government of India informed[‡] the Secretary of State that His Highness had had an attack of palsy, and that his death would probably be followed by disturbances, as great discontent prevailed in his dominions.

The Maharaja's death was announced by his confidential agent, Dewan Nihal Chand, to the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab. It was unexpected news at the time, for His Highness's health had lately rallied. The eldest son, Ranbir Singh, was at Jammu when his father died, superintending the despatch of the Kashmir troops for service in the mutiny. He left at once for Kashmir.

Accession of Maharaja Ranbir Singh.—The Chief Commissioner sent[§] a letter of condolence to Ranbir Singh, and “assured His Highness that the friendship and good-will of the Supreme Government will in no wise be diminished by his accession to power and dominion in Jammu and Kashmir.” Subsequently, the Chief Commissioner sent^{||} to the new Maharaja “a *Khilat*[¶] of investiture on the part of the British Government.” He was unwilling to do this at first, “as it appeared to him more desirable that it should be given direct from the Supreme Government.” The Maharaja, however, was urgent in requesting “the usual *Khilat*,” being “under an apprehension that mischief might arise in his own country from delay.” The Chief Commissioner therefore complied, and his action was approved by the Government of India and^{**} the Secretary of State.

[¶] Its value was ₹ 9,580, see E. W. Secret E, January 1858, Nos. 427—430.

^{**} Despatch to Court of Directors, No. 52, dated 22nd September 1858.

Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 4, dated the 2nd April 1859.

Title and warrant of succession.—In November 1858 the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab recommended^{††} that the following titles, which Ranbir Singh was anxious to obtain, should be conferred on him:

مہاراجہ صاحب مشفق مہربان کرم فرمائی مخلصان سرآمد و نڈلاران دولت سلطانہ اشرف الامراء
حضرت خاتونہ فرورغ خاندان رنگ نوس مہاراج دھیراج راجندر سري مہاراجہ راجگان مہاراجہ صاحب
بہادر سلامت

^{††} *Ibid.*, K. V.

These titles were rendered^{‡‡} in English by the Foreign Secretary (Mr. Edmonstone) thus:—

“Maharaja Sahib, beneficent, kind and generous to his sincere friends; the chief of royal subjects of the sovereign; the most noble amongst the Lords under the sovereign; light of the family descended in the line of Rughoo; §§ Raja of Maha Rajas; chief of Rajas; the prosperous Maharaja of Rajas; Maharaja Sahib, the brave, may be saved.

The Chief Commissioner stated further:—

“The Maharaja is also anxious to obtain a warrant or patent from Her Majesty the Queen acknowledging his position as Sovereign of Jammu and Kashmir, and the services of

his father and himself to the British Government during the crisis of 1857. The Chief Commissioner suggests that this distinction may be solicited on His Highness's behalf."

The records of the Foreign Department do not show that any orders were passed on this letter.

Illness of the Maharaja Ranbir Singh, 1868.—On the 22nd April

* Political A., May 1868, No. 58.

† The records of the Foreign Department do not contain information about any previous illness.

1868, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab telegraphed* that the Maharaja was "again seriously ill." He went on to say that there appeared to be considerable excitement in His Highness's dominions, and that the Dewans were reported to be opposed to the heir-apparent. He therefore asked what measures should be taken in the event of the Maharaja's demise, and of complications arising; and suggested that the Deputy Commissioner of Sialkot might be despatched to Jammu.

‡ *Ibid.*, No. 54.

The orders† of the Government of India were as follows:—


"Should the illness of the Maharaja unfortunately have a fatal termination, then His Highness's eldest son will of course be at once recognised as successor. Measures of interference on the part of British Officers should not be adopted, unless the plainest necessity for such shall be seen to exist; and even then should only be adopted to the extent of supporting the authority of the new ruler. Accordingly, if the new Maharaja's Government should expressly desire the presence of a British Officer at Jammu, one may be deputed, and the Commissioner of the division, not the Deputy Commissioner of Sialkot, is the proper person for such deputation. But a British officer need not otherwise proceed thither unless some such necessity as that above indicated should arise.

"As regards the Dewans or Ministers, His Excellency in Council would learn with much regret that they had lost their well-earned position in the administration of the young chief. They are old and faithful servants of the State. They have also rendered important services to the British Government, which can never be forgotten. But the British Government cannot undertake to maintain them in their places against the wishes of the ruler. It can, however, very properly stipulate in case of necessity, that these men should be allowed to retire with their property in honor and safety into British territory."

The Maharaja, however, soon recovered his health.

Genealogy.—A genealogical table of the ruling family of Jammu and Kashmir may conveniently be inserted here. It is taken from Cunningham's "History of the Sikhs," supplemented by Appendix VI to Drew's "Jammu and Kashmir territories."

Genealogy of the Rajas of Jammu.



Adoption.—In March 1860 Lord Canning took the opportunity of a visit to the Maharaja at Sialkot to repeat to His Highness in his Durbar the thanks of the British Government for services rendered in the mutiny. He assured the Maharaja that, if unfortunately a direct lineal successor to his house should fail, the British Government would recognise an heir adopted according to family traditions and usage. The Maharaja immediately afterwards asked

* Proceedings, April 1860, Nos. 269-271.

for a formal document embodying this assurance, and signed and sealed by the Governor-General.

His request was complied* with.

† Proceedings, March 1862, No. 61.

Two years later the Maharaja, in common with many other Chiefs, received† a *Sanad*, dated the 5th March 1862, which guaranteed to his house the right of adoption. Its terms were as follows:—

“Her Majesty being desirous that the Governments of the several Princes and Chiefs of India, who now govern their own territories, should be perpetuated, and that the representation and dignity of their houses should be continued, I hereby, in fulfilment of this desire, repeat to you the assurance which I communicated to you in the Sialkot Durbar, in March 1860, that on failure of natural heirs the adoption of an heir into your Highness’s house, according to its usage and traditions, will be willingly recognised and confirmed by the British Government.

“Be assured that nothing shall disturb the engagement thus made to you, so long as your house is loyal to the Crown and faithful to the conditions of the treaties, grants, or engagements which record its obligation to the British Government.”

Collateral Succession.—In July 1868 Kirpa Ram, Dewan of the Maharaja of Kashmir, verbally preferred two requests on behalf of his master. One of these was that a *sanad* should be granted expressly recognising the succession of collaterals in the event of the decease of the Maharaja’s direct issue without children or an adopted heir.

The Lieutenant-Governor mentioned these requests in a demi-official letter to the Governor-General, Sir J. Lawrence, with the intimation that the Maharaja had no wish to subject himself to a refusal in such matters, and awaited an announcement of the views of Government before taking action officially.

Sir Donald Macleod’s own opinion was stated as follows:—

“As we have expressly authorised him by *sanad* to adopt an heir, we have assumed a right to dictate in this matter. But I presume there can be no desire or intention to restrict succession to direct lineal descent, which would certainly be opposed alike to Hindu law and the usage of oriental countries as regards Chiefships.”

Discussion in the Governor General’s Council.—On receipt of this letter the matter was very fully considered by the Government of India; and the Council was divided in opinion. The following extract from the despatch in which the question was referred to the Secretary of State will serve to show the view taken by His Excellency and those Members of Council who concurred with him:—

“At Sialkot, in March 1860, Lord Canning took the opportunity of a visit to the Maharaja, to repeat, in the Maharaja’s own Durbar and before his own Court, the thanks of Government for the good service rendered by His Highness to the Queen’s armies during the troubles of 1857; to assure the Maharaja that it is the sincere desire of Her Majesty’s Government that his illustrious house may be perpetuated and continue to hold its possessions in peace and prosperity; and that if, unfortunately, a direct lineal successor to the Maharaja should fail, the British Government would willingly recognise the adoption of an heir into his house, according to its usage and traditions. A similar assurance was afterwards given to the Maharaja by a *sanad* dated 5th March 1862.

“The sovereign house of Kashmir dates only from Maharaja Golab Singh, with whom the treaty of 1846 was concluded. The present Maharaja has a son, who is in very delicate health; and should he die, there will remain no male issue of Maharaja Golab Singh to succeed to the territories of Kashmir and Jammu. Only one son of Dhan Singh, the brother of Maharaja Golab Singh, is alive, or had male issue. This son is Motee Singh, and it is probable that the present Maharaja, on failure of male issue, would adopt the son of Motee Singh, and this adoption would be highly popular among the Hill Rajpoots generally. These, however, are the only near relatives of Maharaja Golab Singh whose immediate family is threatened with extinction.

“But in speaking of Maharaja Golab Singh’s house, ‘its usage and traditions,’ the Maharaja no doubt understood Lord Canning to mean the Rajpoot family of Th’rov Deo, from which he was descended; and under the Adoption *sanad* granted in 1862, the Maharaja would undoubtedly have the power to adopt any collateral relative descended from Th’rov Deo in accordance with the usages and traditions of the family.

"The Maharaja now asks that an assurance be given him that, in the event of his death without leaving natural issue and without adopting an heir, the British Government will recognise the succession of collaterals; in other words, that, for the purposes of succession, Throo Deo, and not the late Maharaja Golab Singh, be considered the founder of the sovereign family.

"The Viceroy, in whose views the Hon'ble Mr. Taylor and Sir Richard Temple concur, would grant this request without hesitation, subject to the condition that, in the event of an unadopted collateral succeeding, a nuzzerana of a year's revenue of the State shall be paid to the British Government.

"The concession now asked is, in reality, no great extension of the boon conferred in 1860. The Maharaja has now the right of adopting any descendant of Throo Deo, and while it is but a small matter to promise to recognise, under all circumstances, as a right what the Maharaja or his successors can at any time secure by adopting an heir, the concession would be most agreeable to the feelings of the Maharaja, who, like most Native Chiefs, has an aversion to adopt until the last hour; and it would be an assurance to him that under no circumstances have the British Government any desire for the annexation of his territories.

"The mind of the Maharaja has of late been much disturbed, partly by misapprehension of the object of the deputation of a British officer to Ladak, partly by the somewhat arbitrary measures adopted last year with respect to Central Asian trade, and partly by the persistent attacks made upon his government by some of the leading English newspapers in this country. If we are desirous of removing from the mind of the Maharaja any doubt as to the sincerity of the promise which Lord Canning gave him of the perpetuation of his dynasty, and the desire of the British Government that his family should continue to hold its possessions in peace and prosperity, there could be no more fitting opportunity of doing so than now by a concession to the Maharaja's request. On the other hand, the Maharaja will never be able to understand the refusal of it, and will not fail to attribute such refusal to the lingering desire of the British Government to absorb the valley of Kashmir in their own dominions. Whether considered with reference to the assurances already given to the Maharaja, or to the advantage of maintaining a Native dynasty on our frontier, in view to the possibility of complications in Central Asia, the annexation of Kashmir is not to be contemplated by us as a possible event; and there can be no advantage in allowing doubts of our good faith to linger in the Maharaja's mind when they can be so easily removed by a concession which costs us nothing, while it would attach a powerful ally more securely to our interests.

"The services rendered by the Maharaja in 1857 make it incumbent on us to comply with so moderate a request. These services were rendered willingly and ungrudgingly in the hour of our greatest need, when it was doubtful whether the British troops could longer maintain their position before Delhi, and when the slightest symptoms of wavering or disloyalty on the part of the Government of Kashmir would have produced most disastrous results in the Punjab. For these services, which are personally known to the Viceroy, and the value of which at the time it is difficult to over-estimate, the Maharaja has received no reward, beyond the assurance of the succession of adopted sons—a boon which lost all its value as a personal distinction by the subsequent concession of it to all Chiefs, great and small, in accordance with a change of policy. To refuse the concession now asked would therefore, in our opinion, be illiberal and ungracious: at the same time in granting it there would be no danger of the concession being made an inconvenient precedent on which to support similar claims by other Chiefs. The position of Kashmir in its political relations both with the British Government and Central Asia, the circumstances of the family, and the unrewarded services of the Maharaja and his late father, make the case so special, that what it might be wrong to concede to other States, it would be wrong to refuse to the Maharaja.

"In granting the Maharaja's request, we should, of course, make it distinctly understood that the collateral heir would succeed by the selection and approval of the British Government. It might possibly lead to disputes in the family if we were to leave the question to be determined at the time on purely legal grounds, as between the eldest collateral or the nearest collateral, or any other. To prevent this, while assuring the Maharaja of the perpetuation of his house by the recognition of collaterals—which is in reality the gist of his request—we would add that the collateral to be put in power would be the one whom the Government of the day might select as the most fit."

Appended to this despatch were several minutes, the following summaries of which will explain the other view taken of the question.

Sir Henry Durand completely dissented from the views of the Governor-General and Sir Richard Temple. He was of opinion that the proposed concession would, "instead of costing us nothing, cost us a great deal." It would be a most inconvenient precedent. Either all Hindu Chiefs holding adoption *sanads* must be granted the same concession, or their fears of annexation would be excited by its refusal. And putting aside the inconvenience of the precedent, Sir Henry maintained that the concession was in itself a most baneful boon. He pointed out that the rivalry of collaterals had given rise to numberless wars and troubles both in Europe and in the East. If a Native Chief were encouraged to neglect the privilege of adoption, the rivalry of collaterals would be the obvious consequence. The British Government

could no doubt suppress conflict between the rival claimants and decide where the right of succession lay. But decision was not always easy, and might be opposed to the sense of the family and the people. And the very fact that the succession remained for decision after the Chief's death had the inevitable result of splitting up the State into parties and breeding turmoil and confusion. The only security against these evils was a timely adoption by the Chief during his life-time. "If," Sir Henry Durand wrote—

"I were an advocate for the policy of slow but certain annexation, I should support the proposed concession to Kashmir, and as would be then inevitable, in due course, to all other Hindu Chiefs. It undermines the permanence of their dynasties by humouring one of their weaknesses. On the contrary if the Maharaja wishes the Kashmir dynasty to be perpetuated, he and his successors have power to do so by adopting. And as Government never insist on the performance of all the Hindu ceremonies, adoption becomes practically little more than nomination, which, unless under very exceptional circumstances, the ruling Chief can do even *in articulo mortis*.

"It must be remembered that the Maharaja has no doubt the right to adopt collaterals who may be lineally descended from Golsab Singh, or adopted within the ordinary degrees in unison with Hindu law and family custom.

"Under these circumstances I think it extremely inexpedient to issue a sanad which practically sanctions the evasion of a duty which the Maharaja, if he comprehended the true interests of his State and dynasty, ought to consider sacred. By thus evading his duty he parts with the security which Lord Canning conferred against British interference; he invokes it, and casts on the Government of India the delicate duty of selection from collaterals, and of *maintaining* our selection if questioned by rival collaterals supported by strong parties in the State.

"A further and material objection is, that this obligation of our own creation would be opposed in spirit to treaty stipulations.

"It is also worthy of consideration whether the proposed concession is in accordance with either Hindu law or Sikh and Hindu practice. It violates some essential principles of Hindu law, namely, among others, widow rights. The British Government has repeatedly had to decide on the adoption made by a widow of a Chief who died heirless, the widow claiming the right of adoption as successor to the indivisible property of her husband, namely, the Raj or Chiefship, and the concomitant right of adoption. Sometimes the claim has been allowed, sometimes it has been contested and set aside; but, whether for good or whether for evil, widow Ranis have often a strong party in the State, and manage to assert their claims with more or less of success according to circumstances. Here again adoption by the Chief himself prevents all the evils which may arise from widow rights and widow rule or adoptions."

The views of Sir William Mansfield were expressed as follows:—

"After a very careful consideration of the matter of the despatch, I continue to adhere to the view that it is inexpedient to make the concession desired by the Maharaja, for the reasons stated by Sir Henry Durand. Out of deference to the Governor General, I have however said that I would not oppose the concession in the case of the Maharaja himself, while denying the privilege to the family coming after him."

In this minute Mr. Strachey concurred.

Mr. Maine's opinion was as follows:—

"While I think that the opinion of His Excellency the Viceroy as to the services of the Kashmir House ought to be regarded as conclusive, and while I consider it most expedient to take some step which may re-assure the present Maharaja after the persistent attacks made on his government, I feel myself compelled to agree on the question of principle with Sir Henry Durand. I cannot doubt that this concession, if made, will almost immediately become known to the other Native Chiefs of India, and will be the foundation of universal demands for similar indulgence. If it be true that the minutest distinction accorded at a Viceregal Durbar makes its way to every Court in India, and is cited as a precedent or a grievance on the next available occasion,—how can we possibly suppose that the establishment of a new principle of succession in a Hindu house will be regarded as exceptional and as affecting that house alone? The Kashmir dynasty rules a wealthy and powerful State, but the claim to consideration appears among Native Chiefs to rest not more on extent of dominion than on antiquity and splendour of family descent. How can we deny to families whose antiquity inspires an almost religious reverence that which we concede to a dynasty whose origin is extremely modern and viewed, I believe, with anything but respect? The existing system of succession among quasi-sovereign Hindu Princes in India has the advantage of extreme simplicity. The right of adoption in default of heirs of the body, now firmly secured to them, amounts to a power vested in the reigning Chief of selecting a successor from among his collaterals. To take a very famous illustration, it is the rule of succession which practically obtained in the early Roman Empire, though in that case the power of selection could be exercised not only by adoption, but by will. If we once depart from this simple principle, I own that, from a purely legal point of view, I cannot look forward without dismay to the sea of doubt in which we shall be launched. What is the rule of succession to a Hindu sovereignty among unselected collaterals? The answer is, that

nobody knows. Not only does the general Hindu law of succession to private property give us little help in solving the question, but it rather confounds our ideas, because (putting aside some unimportant exceptions) it is essentially a system of class succession, excluding primogeniture. In succession to a Hindu sovereignty does the collateral who is nearer to the founder of the house exclude the collateral who is nearest to the last reigning Chief? Does a nearer collateral connected through females only exclude a more remote collateral connected through males? A man may, of course, have an opinion on these two points founded on supposed analogies in Hindu or even in English law; but, in truth, nobody can give a reply with confidence or certainty. It happens, however, that out of the two questions above suggested grew the longest and bloodiest wars, or rather series of wars, in which the English monarchy has been involved. The fact is, that nothing is more arbitrary in itself, and nothing has been more gradually settled, than the system of collateral succession to European sovereignties; and it is no slight thing to propound the same set of problems for decision in India.

"I am informed that in Oudh, where the property of certain families claiming a 'guddee,' and probably older than most of the reigning houses of India, descends individually, there is no pretence whatever of the existence of any general rule of collateral successions applicable to such a case; but each family professes to have a complete set of proveable family usages governing its own successions. It is extremely improbable that the reigning Hindu houses can produce proof of any such customs, partly because of the virtual universality of the system of adoption, partly on account of the recent accession of several of them to sovereign power and their previous obscurity.

"It may be said that the British Government will decide between the conflicting claims of collaterals. But, unless it be distinctly stated that no collateral is to succeed as of right, the promise to allow collateral succession will be regarded as a promise to respect the rights of collaterals to succeed, and each collateral will be practically invited to make preparations for pressing his own claims. I venture to assert, too, that, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, the future British Government of India, having no reason *à priori* for preferring one collateral to another, will select the one whom it supposes to be legally entitled, to succeed, and the question of legal right will be raised after all. But, if any other candidate seems to a portion of the people to have a better claim than the nominee of the British Government, what security have we against an outbreak of partisanship, similar to that which, in spite of all the influence of the British power, has just plunged a miserable little Cuttack State in war?

"One very unfortunate result of diminishing the inducement to Hindu Princes to adopt will be, that minorities will obviously become much rarer. An adopted successor is almost invariably a child; a collateral successor will almost invariably be a grown man. It seems to be generally admitted that there is no happier episode in the modern history of Native States than the minority of the Chief. The British Government, temporarily assuming the administration in a tutelary capacity, secures for the young Prince the best education available, and for the people the best possible combination of Native and British institutions, without exposing itself to the suspicion of intended annexation, and without placing itself under the temptation to go too far in anglicising the country. Nobody denies that the best governed Native States owe their superiority to a minority wisely dealt with.

"I cannot help believing that the just claims of the Maharaja of Kashmir might be met in a simpler manner. Advantage might be taken of the policy so conspicuously inaugurated in Mysore. His attention might be directed to what has taken place in Mysore, as a proof of the earnest wish of the British Government to maintain Native States. And he might be assured in decided language of the strong sense which the British Government entertains of the services of his family. Putting the two together, he could scarcely fail to draw the conclusion, which would certainly be a sound one, that if he should fail to adopt, he would be succeeded by one of his family. But the inconvenience of a precedent would be avoided."

Political A., November 1868, Nos. 167-168.

Views of Her Majesty's Government.—In the following November the Secretary of State telegraphed:—

"The Maharaja of Kashmir may be assured that, if he die without a natural born or an adopted heir, the succession of a collateral will be recognised; he should, however, be advised to adopt an heir for the sake of preventing dispute in his family."

The decision of Her Majesty's Government was communicated to the Punjab Government in the following words:—

"The Secretary of State has intimated by telegraph that the Maharaja of Kashmir may rest assured that, if he die without an heir, natural born, or adopted, the succession of a collateral will be recognised. But it will be well if he adopt an heir. On receipt of despatch from Secretary of State, further instructions will be issued."

A few weeks later the views of Her Majesty's Government were more fully expressed in a despatch from the Secretary of State, which ran as follows:—

"I have fully considered in Council the question submitted to Her Majesty's Government in Your Excellency's letter of the 6th of August (No. 131), 1863, relating to the succession to the government of Kashmir.

"It appears from the enclosed correspondence that the Maharaja Ranbir Singh has requested that a sanad may be issued to him 'especially granting succession in favour of collaterals in the event of the decease of his direct issue without children, or without appointing an adopted heir.'

"The request, as thus stated, suggests two questions for consideration: firstly, whether the right of adoption, which has been guaranteed by sanad from Lord Canning to the Maharaja, is to be considered as limiting the selection to the descendants of Golab Singh, that is, to members of the Kashmir line, or whether the 'family usages and traditions,' to be respected in such a case, are those of the old Rajpoot line of Jammu Chiefs: and secondly, whether the British Government will pledge itself to continue the succession in the family in the event of the Maharaja dying without heirs of the body and without adopting an heir.

"With respect to the first of these questions, I have to observe that, although in the treaty of 1846 the British Government transferred the territory of Kashmir, on certain conditions, 'to the Maharaja Golab Singh and the heirs male of his body,' Her Majesty's Government have no desire to limit the assurance given to the Maharaja Ranbir Singh by Her Majesty's Viceroy in 1860, and again by sanad in 1862, with respect to 'the adoption of an heir into His Highness' house, according to its usages and traditions,' to the descendants of Golab Singh, but will recognise the adoption of a collateral relative descended from Throov Deo, in accordance with the usages and traditions of the family.'

"In regard to the second question, I have fully considered in Council all that has been advanced by Your Excellency and by the several members of your Government. Adverting to the peculiar circumstances under which the family of Golab Singh became possessed of their principality, and to the eminent services performed and the unvarying good feeling displayed by the late and present Maharaja towards the British Government, I have no hesitation in according my sanction to the amplest possible assurance being given to His Highness that Her Majesty's Government desire to perpetuate his dynasty. But it might be advantageously pointed out to him at the same time that it was with a view to the perpetuation of the Hindu dynasties and to the peaceful undisputed transfer of authority to a properly-appointed successor on the death of a reigning Prince, that the power of adoption in default of heirs of the body, by the Native Princes of India, has been formerly recognised by Her Majesty's Government; and that it is their object that the wishes of the Chief himself may be made known to them during his life-time, in accordance with the religious and social usages of the country. But, in the present instance, as a wholly exceptional case, Her Majesty's Government, in the event of the failure of natural heirs, and of the formal adoption of a successor, will be prepared to consider the wishes of the Maharaja with respect to the question of adoption in the manner best calculated to prevent future embarrassment.

"In according their sanction to these concessions, Her Majesty's Government believe that they grant all that has been requested by the Maharaja, so far at least as His Highness's requests are set forth in the statement of the Secretary to the Punjab Government, who received them from the Maharaja's minister. Her Majesty's Government do not consider it desirable to go beyond them, by taking upon themselves, in the event of the Maharaja dying without heir, to select a successor. A pledge to this effect might give additional assurance to Ranbir Singh himself, but might be considered by others as an act of interference on our part, designed to bring the principality more immediately under British influence, and it might involve our Government in very embarrassing complications, in the event either of the Chief of our selection mismanaging his territory or becoming unpopular with the people. It is true that, ultimately, if there should be a disputed succession, the British Government might have to become the arbitrators, but this appears to me to be very different from an original selection, and it would not, to the same extent, identify us with the measures of the *de facto* ruler."

This despatch was forwarded to the Punjab Government with the request that the chief points in the document might be communicated to the Maharaja.

Recent illness of the Maharaja Ranbir Singh.—The Maharaja has been suffering for years from diabetes. In November 1881 the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir reported that His Highness was very ill, and that although the danger might not be immediate, his death was a contingency to be expected. It was observed in the Foreign Department that there could be no difficulty about the succession, seeing that His Highness had three sons, of whom the eldest, Tikka Partab Singh, was 32 years of age. At the end of June 1882 the Maharaja's health was said to be very bad, and the Officer on Special Duty advised that the Government should be prepared for a fatal termination.

In reply, the following instructions* were sent to Mr. Henvey:—

"There seems to be no doubt that, in the event of His Highness' death, the succession would devolve on his eldest son, Tikka Partab Singh, whom, it is understood, his father distinctly acknowledged and treats as his heir. His Excellency desires me to say that he thinks it desirable that the Officer on Special Duty should, in view of the position he now holds towards

* Secret. E. January 1883, No. 428.

the British Government on the one side and the Durbar on the other, take a prominent part in any formal ceremonies which may attend the accession of the new Maharaja. You or your successor should therefore inform the Government of India at once if you should have reason to believe that the health of the Maharaja was becoming worse, and that his life was in danger."

Proposal to divide the State.—Information was soon afterwards* received which seemed to show that the Maharaja was disposed to set aside his eldest son in favour of his youngest, Amar Singh, or at least to allot to the latter and to his second brother Ram Singh, important administrative jagirs. It was reported that His Highness's will would leave to the third son (Amar Singh) the Bhimbar, Nanshera, and Rajaori districts; to the second (Ram Singh) the Kishtwar and Badrawar districts, and to the eldest (Pertab Singh) Jammu and all the outlying dependencies, *viz.*, Kashmir, Ladakh, Baltistan, and Gilgit. The Government of India were averse to any such partition.

Character of the Maharaja Golab Singh.—On the 22nd September 1846, Lieutenant Herbert Edwardes described* Maharaja Golab Singh's entourage thus:—

"The Maharaja has not one sardar at his Court, which seems to be a small coterie of zemindars and mutsaddies. His sons are clownish boys, who have inherited none of his intellect, and of his two nephews the only one who gives any promise of ability is a child about nine years old, Mian Moti Singh."

About the same time Captain A. Broome, who was on special duty with the Maharaja at the time, described † Golab Singh's character in the following words, which, Lord Hardinge said, showed much discrimination:—

"One of his great elements of government is failing him—what he would call wholesome severity, and others probably cruelty. The fear of complaints being made to the British Government prevents his employing the wholesale system of execution and maiming formerly in vogue, and rebels can no longer be flayed alive by the hundred as an example. He complains of this himself, vindicating severity as the only means of controlling his lawless subjects. Although I have learned to doubt his great ability or real talent, I cannot deny that he has great cunning, a natural and instinctive talent for intrigue, great readiness of resource, decision, energy, and wonderful activity. He has, moreover, a most kind and paternal manner to all ranks, which, though known to be only manner, still tells. The prestige of past success, the long established reputation for ability, and the recollection of past severities, still invests him with considerable influence: but this cannot last for ever. His mainstay even now is the belief that he can always command British support."

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"His inability to appreciate the British character and past conduct points out his great inferiority in judgment and discrimination to Ranjit Singh or to Dhyansingh. I consider him as quite incapable of taking an enlarged view on any subject, though shrewd and quick in mastering details. His ambition and greed of power are insatiable, but his ruling passion is avarice, and his constant object is to obtain his ends at the smallest possible cost, the result of which is that he is frequently led into a penny-wise and pound-foolish system of policy. He is not, I believe, cruel by nature, but he is so upon principle, though this, as already mentioned, is now under a check. Although I believe him to be possessed of great courage, he would always prefer gaining his objects by intrigue rather than by force. Such is the opinion I have formed of his public character. I may have judged him harshly, but I fear that my estimate is not far from the truth. His position of late has been a difficult one, but I can make, and have made, full allowances for this. His private character is a much brighter one. As in his public life, he is thoroughly deceitful and unscrupulous, but he has none of the vices so common to natives in authority. He is active, industrious, accessible to all, kind to all, moderate and simple in his habits, and I believe perfectly free from every description of debauchery. He is agreeable in his manner and conversation, but rather prosy and exceedingly egotistical."

Secret Consultation, 28th December 1846, No. 1197.

Sir H. Lawrence, however, took a more favourable view, as the following extract from a letter shows:—

"I do not agree with many of Lieutenant Edwardes's remarks and opinions. I have no doubt that Maharaja Golab Singh is a man of very indifferent character, but if we look for perfection in Native Chiefs we shall look in vain. Very much, if not all, said of him might, as far as my experience goes, be so of any Sovereign or Chief in India. He has many virtues that few of them possess, *viz.*, courage, energy, and personal purity: his disposition is cruel, but not a

whit more than that of hundreds who have not his excuse for such conduct. The next worst feature in his character is miserliness, but this I cannot believe he carries to the extent lately reported by Captain Broome and Lieutenant Edwards. It is trying to have to deal with a niggardly person and one whose word cannot be depended on, but if such vices were to influence our dealings with Native Chiefs, further than putting us on our guard against the consequences, there would be an end of all communication."

Character of the Maharaja Ranbir Singh.—The following extracts from a memorandum written by Mr. Girdlestone on the 14th November 1871 illustrate the character of the present Chief:—

"Whatever may be the faults of the Maharaja of Kashmir as a ruler, there is this good feature in his administration that he devotes a great portion of his time to the conduct of the public affairs."

* * * * *

"The Maharaja is manly, not only in his person, but in his habits. He is fond of sport and fond of riding.

"In his domestic relations he is very affectionate, caring to have his children much with him, and to make up to the younger ones for the loss which they have sustained by the early death of their mother. Last year and this he helped with money many shawl-weavers from Amritsur who were returning to Kashmir, because they could not earn a livelihood in India owing to the dulness of their trade. In affairs of State he is not influenced by the zenana. Nautehas and such like amusements have no charm for him. In his manner of life he is abstemious."

* * * * *

"For want of firmness the Maharaja often cannot rise superior to the influence of the officials immediately connected with him. He lacks moral courage. His intentions are good, and he is persuaded in his own heart that they are so. But if it comes to a trial of strength between him and his ministers, he is the likelier of the two to yield. He is no statesman, but if freed from existing restraints and supported by impartial advisers, his natural desire to do what is right would, I believe, be more prominently developed than it is now. Impulsiveness is another of his failings. At one time his hobby is to establish a shawl agency in Europe, at another to set on foot a museum in his own capital. Anon he is anxious to give an impetus to some special class of industry; and whilst the fit is on him he will be most keen in his desire to further his object. But after a time his ardour relaxes, and his well-intentioned schemes fall through for want of continued support."

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"But the worst feature in the Maharaja's character is his excessive superstition. His weakness, though innate in him, has been aggravated by his ministers, who have found in it a convenient means of furthering their own designs. The Maharaja is surrounded by Brahmins, who are in fact the tools of the dewans. The oracle speaks as the dewans direct, for it is dependent on them for subsistence. Having got the Brahmins thoroughly subservient to them, they make it to their interest to remain so. In private conversations with his intimate friends the Maharaja has admitted that he feels the incubus. But he is so superstitiously afraid of religious consequences, and so vacillating in purpose that he will make no persistent effort to free himself. Except he has assistance and support from without he will never, I fear, be rid of this baneful entourage."

Mr. Henvey's account of the Maharaja and his sons.—Mr. Henvey's last report on Kashmir (dated the 9th December 1862) alludes to the ruling family in these words:—

"No one can be more courteous than His Highness when he chooses to be so. In spite of illness he retains his habits of unremitting diligence in the conduct of affairs. This is not an unmixed advantage, for where a ruler meddles with everything, the administration partakes of whatever inconstancy there may be in his disposition, and the moods of the Maharaja are, to use a native expression, like pictures drawn on water.

"I have not had much opportunity of studying the character of His Highness' eldest son, Mian Partab Singh. Whether from inclination, or by order, the Mian Sahib avoids European society. I had occasion to call upon him once, but he never returned my visit. His reputation certainly does not stand high among his countrymen either as a private individual or as manager of the State Councils over which he has been lately called by his father to preside. I guard myself, however, against any attempt to predict what the Mian Sahib may turn out to be when he ascends the *mansad*. The Maharaja himself, with some good and amiable qualities, has unmistakeably failed as a ruler, and it may happen that Mian Partab Singh, who is gifted with less external advantages, may prove a better man than his more showy and plausible father. The second son, Mian Ram Singh, seems to be an efficient head of the army, and he is generally popular, though a trick of stammering spoils his address. The third son, Mian Amar Singh, is still a lad, but he is beginning to take an active share in public business. His manner is somewhat sullen and unpleasing. All three sons are married, but as yet none

has issue. The most favourable specimen of the family is, in my opinion, the Maharaja's cousin, Raja Moti Singh of PUNCH, whose successful handling of that tributary province is often contrasted with 'the dictatorship of incapacity' reigning in the Jammu-Kashmir State."

It can hardly be doubted that the eldest son is a miserable character, and that the youngest promises best and is his father's favourite.

Domestic details.—In 1871 the second wife of Tikka Pertab Singh, heir-apparent of Kashmir, died; the fact was reported by the Officer on Special Duty, but no message of condolence was apparently sent, because the Maharaja gave no official intimation to the Government.

The Maharaja's youngest son, Amar Singh, was one of the Viceroy's pages* at the Delhi Assemblage. He was married on the 5th May 1878, and His Excellency Lord Lytton wrote letters† of warm and personal congratulation both to him and to his father, and sent a wedding present of a dagger. No precedent‡ for a present of this kind could be found. His Excellency's letters and present were acknowledged in suitable terms by the Maharaja and by Amar Singh.§

The principal Maharani of the present Chief died on the 3rd December 1880. The Viceroy's personal condolences were telegraphed to the Maharaja. Just at this time the second son (Ram Singh) of the Maharaja was being married.

Donations by the Maharaja Ranbir Singh.—(1) *Punjab University.*—The Maharaja gave a donation of R 63,000 in 1868 to the Punjab University.

(2) *Thank offering*||.—On the recovery of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales the Maharaja gave a sum of R 21,000 for the relief of the sick and infirm as a thank-offering.

(3) *Bengal Famine*¶.—The Maharaja subscribed R40,000 in 1874 to the Bengal Famine Relief Fund.

All these donations were acknowledged in *Kharitas* from the Viceroy, and by the Secretary of State.

(4) *Thank offering*.—When Her Majesty escaped assassination in 1882 the Maharaja sent to the Private Secretary to the Governor General—

"the sum of R 5,000 as a propitiatory offering to Heaven, to be used and appropriated as such in any manner which His Excellency the Viceroy, as Her Majesty's representative, may think proper"

This gift was acknowledged through the Officer on Special Duty, and was forwarded to the Mayo Hospital at Lahore. The Secretary of State was informed.

(5) *Endowment in memory of Sir Donald McLeod.*—In 1871 the Maharaja presented Sir D. McLeod, the retiring Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, with R 30,000 to found an institution in the Punjab connected with the Lieutenant-Governor's name. A Sanskrit Scholarship was founded. The Maharaja was thanked privately by Sir D. McLeod.

The Star of India.—In 1861, Maharaja Ranbir Sing was made a Knight of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India. Thereupon His Highness expressed a wish that the new title should be included in the style of address to which he was entitled in public communications.

Ibid., No. 133.

The Government of India decided that—

"on all occasions on which it is customary to make use of the titles and address of the Maharaja of Kashmir in full, the new title of 'Knight of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India' should in future be added in full. On other occasions the abbreviated title of K.S.I. will be sufficient."

The Maharaja, having received the Insignia of the Order, addressed three *kharitas* to (1) Her Majesty, (2) the Secretary of State for India, and (3) His Excellency the Viceroy, all of them expressing thanks for the honor conferred on him. The

Political B., October 1871, No. 2.

*Political D., 1878, No. 46 K.W.

†Political B., 1878, No. 48.

‡Political B., August 1878, No. 160, K.W.

§Political B., August 1878, No. 165.

||General, September 1872, No. 33.

¶General A., March 1874, Nos. 4-9.

General A., December 1870, Nos. 39-44.

Political A., December 1861, Nos. 131-132.

Political A., March 1862, Nos. 97-98.

first two were forwarded to the Secretary of State in despatch No. 33, dated the 8th March 1862.

The Maharaja was invested with the Grand Cross of the Order on the 1st November 1861.

Honorary* rank of General in the British Army conferred on Maharaja Ranbir Singh.—On the occasion of the Delhi Assemblage the Viceroy intimated to the

* Political A., December 1877, Nos. 27-33.

Maharaja that this distinction would be conferred upon him.

A Commission under the Royal Sign Manual was transmitted to the Officer on Special Duty for delivery to the Maharaja. It was accompanied by the following *Kharita* from the Viceroy:—

"Kharita, dated 14th September 1877.

"From His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

"To His Highness Maharaja Ranbir Singh Indar Mahindar Bahadur Sihar-i-Saltanat, G.C.S.I., Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir.

"It afforded me sincere gratification to announce to Your Highness at the Delhi Imperial Assemblage that Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen-Empress of India had been pleased to signalise the assumption of Her new title by appointing you to the honorary rank of General in the British Army. I have now the pleasure to transmit a Commission under the Royal Sign Manual formally conferring the above-mentioned title upon you.

"The exalted dignity thus graciously bestowed upon Your Highness is a special mark of esteem and favor never before conferred upon any of the Chiefs of India. It has been accorded to Your Highness as an appropriate recognition of your loyal attachment to Her Majesty's Imperial Throne, and of the services rendered by your troops in the maintenance of peace upon the frontier, and in the suppression of the great mutiny of 1857. May this further token of the friendship of the Suzerain Power serve to draw still closer the bonds of union between the Crown of England and the greatest of her border Feudatories.

"With best wishes for Your Highness's health and happiness and the prosperity of Your State and people, I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for Your Highness, and to subscribe myself, &c., &c."

The Officer on Special Duty delivered the Commission and *Kharita* to the Maharaja in a public Darbar. His Highness acknowledged the honor in a suitable speech, and the proceedings closed with a royal salute of 101 guns.

The matter was reported to the Secretary of State.

Exemption of the Maharaja from payment of tolls.—When the Maharaja visited Simla in 1875 it was ruled that—

Political A., June 1875, No. 83.

"The Governor General in Council does not consider it desirable that Native Princes of the rank of His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir should be required to pay tolls on roads and bridges while travelling in British territory, and orders should therefore be issued exempting Native Princes of high rank from the payment of such tolls."

Celebration of the birth-day of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress at Srinagar.—On the 29th May 1880, the Officer on Special Duty wrote as follows:—

Political D., June 1880, No. 22.

"I have the honor to report that a salute of 31 guns was fired this morning from the Fortress of Hari Parvat in honor of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress.

"A fête at the Shalimar gardens has also been arranged, by order of the Maharaja, for the entertainment of the English visitors at Srinagar.

As this is, I believe, the first occasion upon which Her Majesty's birth-day has been fitly recognised by the Kashmir Durbar, I have much pleasure in bringing the circumstances to the notice of the Governor-General in Council."

The Viceroy's procession at Lahore, 1880.—When the Viceroy visited Lahore early in November 1880, it was at first arranged that the Maharaja should ride in the elephant procession conducting His Excellency to the camp abreast of the Commander-in-Chief, and His Highness's agent agreed to this procedure. But a few hours before the procession Dewan Govind Sahai objected. The Punjab Government thought that he was justified by precedent, so the Viceroy agreed to excuse the Maharaja from riding in the procession. But it was afterwards ascertained that the Punjab Government had not strong grounds for supporting the Dewan's objection: he in fact "succeeded in carrying by surprise a material alteration of programme," thus sowing the seeds of future inconvenience.

Secret, August 1882, Nos. 322.

328.

TRIBUTE.

Treaty of Amritsar.—The tenth article of the treaty of Amritsar contains these words:—

“Maharaja Golah Singh acknowledges the supremacy of the British Government, and will, in token of such supremacy, present annually to the British Government one horse, twelve perfect shawl-goats of approved breed (six male and six female), and three pairs of Kashmir shawls.”

The shawls are regularly despatched to Her Majesty. They are first submitted for the inspection of His Excellency the Viceroy. In 1857 Her Majesty signified her wish that the shawls should be all of square shape, but of the same texture as before. The Maharaja agreed to furnish square shawls.

The goats have caused correspondence because they do not thrive in British India. In 1881 the Punjab Government gave orders (unauthorisedly) for the discontinuance of this tribute, but they were not apparently carried out at the time. Recently pashm and yarn have been substituted. The necessary modification of the treaty was announced to the Maharaja in a *khariṭa* dated 13th March 1884 from the Viceroy which is quoted below:—

“By the tenth article of the treaty of Amritsar dated the 18th March 1846, it was agreed that the Maharaja of Kashmir should present annually to the British Government, in token of the supremacy of that Government, twelve perfect shawl-goats of approved breed, six male and six female. Accordingly, the late Maharaja and Your Highness have presented year by year the twelve shawl-goats for which stipulation was made. But the nature of these animals is such that they do not thrive in India. It has therefore been proposed that twenty-two pounds of *pashm* and three pounds of white yarn of the qualities and proportions which are described in the attached memorandum should be presented to the British Government, instead of the twelve shawl-goats, as tokens of the supremacy of the said Government.

“I have been informed by the Officer on Special Duty that Your Highness approves of this modification of the tenth article of the above-mentioned treaty, and this letter is accordingly written to formally acquaint Your Highness that the new arrangement will, with the consent of both parties, be henceforward adopted.

Memorandum of articles to be substituted for the annual tribute of shawl-goats, to accompany the Khariṭa from His Excellency the Viceroy to His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir, dated the 13th March 1884.

First.—Pashm in its natural state as brought to Kashmir from Leh, ten pounds.

Second.—Picked and assorted black wool, four pounds.

Third.—Picked and assorted grey wool, four pounds.

Fourth.—Picked and assorted white wool, four pounds.

Fifth.—White yarn of the three best qualities, three pounds, one of each quality.

CHAPTER IV.

JAGIRDARS AND FEUDATORIES.

Treaty of Lahore.—It will be observed that by the 5th article of the supplementary treaty of Lahore, dated the 11th March 1846, the British Government agreed to "respect the *bonâ fide* rights of those *jagirdars*" within the territories ceded by the Lahore State, who "were attached to the families of the late Maharajas Ranjit Singh, Kharok Singh, and Sher Singh; and to maintain those *jagirdars* in their *bonâ fide* possessions during their lives." In regard to the parts of the ceded territories transferred by the British Government to the Maharaja Golab Singh, this obligation was imposed on the new ruler by the 8th article of the treaty of Amritsar. The records do not seem to show what steps were taken to give effect to these provisions, or who the persons were in whose behalf they were made. Probably the point is one of no great practical importance now, since the guarantee, whatever it was, covered only the lives of parties who were in possession some 44 years ago.

Settlement of jagir claims effected in 1846-47: Hill Chiefs near Jammu: the Khukka-Bumbas.—Quite apart from treaty provisions, certain *jagir* settlements were negotiated by the British officers who helped Maharaja Golab Singh to arrange his affairs after he had been placed in possession of Kashmir. The *jagirdars* thus dealt with were of two classes, *viz.*, *first*, the Chiefs of the old hill principalities in the neighbourhood of Jammu; and *secondly*, certain Chiefs styled "Khukka-Bumba," who occupied the hill country in the west of Kashmir about Mozufferabad and the Baramulla pass. In 1846 both these classes were active opponents of Maharaja Golab Singh. The first comprised Chiefs, such as those of Rajaori, Bhimbar, Kishtwar, and Basoli, who had only recently become subject to the Raja of Jammu. Their leaders were Rahimulla Khan and Fakir-ulla Khan of the Rajaori family. They had a special grievance, for Golab Singh had* kept the head of the house in prison till he became an idiot, and had bestowed the estate on the youngest branch of the family. This opposition was of serious importance. Fakir-ulla Khan was described* as "the life and soul of the Sheik's† rebellion, and the firebrand in his council." The other Chiefs of this class had similar reasons for complaint.

The second class, the Khukka-Bumbas, are described in the memorandum‡ which is printed as Appendix (1). They are petty Muhammadan Rajas living on the banks of the Jhelum between Baramulla and Hazara. "The condition," it was said in 1846,§ "of some of these petty Chiefs is very miserable. Each Sikh ruler seems to have taken a slice out of their possessions, until some paid a tribute nearly equal to their entire professed income." They were reported|| to be "the most formidable and troublesome allies of Sheik Imam-ud-din." They opposed Golab Singh not so much because¶ they were Muhammadans, as because they feared that he would enhance their tribute payments.

The Governor General's Agent (Colonel Lawrence) considered it essential to the establishment of Golab Singh's rule that these causes of disaffection should be removed. He therefore constantly urged the Maharaja to deal liberally with the claims of his feudatories. "When the hill country was made over to you," he wrote,** "it was so with all its duties and obligations, and it was expected that you would not only leave all who had grants of land of old standing in posses-

* Secret Consultation, 26th December 1846, No. 1160. A genealogical table of the Rajaori family is amongst these papers.

† Imam-ud-din.

‡ Secret Consultation, 26th December 1846, No. 1149.

§ *Ibid.*, No. 1245.

|| *Ibid.*, No. 1198.

¶ *Ibid.*, No. 1198.

** *Ibid.*, No. 1243, and see also No. 1137.

sion, but that you would arrange for the comfort and well-being of your subjects generally." This exhortation was based on the letter from the Government of India which is quoted below:—

"The Governor General approves of the line you propose to follow— * * *

Extract from a letter No. 395, dated the 19th October 1946, from the Secretary to the Government of India to the Governor General's Agent on the North-Western Frontier. Secret Consultation, 26th December 1946, No. 1139.

and he vests you with discretionary power to call upon Maharaja Golab Singh to make equitable arrangements for the tributary and dependant Chiefs whose territories have been transferred to His Highness under the treaty of Amritsar. The spirit of the treaty requires that he should do so, while the example which we have set him in regard to the territories retained by us and its results, should make His Highness anxious to follow their just and politic course. The mismanagement of Maharaja Golab Singh, and his questionable conduct in regard to his assuming possession of the Kashmir province, have made our interferences necessary to aid in coercing these now refractory Chiefs. British interference cannot be exercised to enforce injustice, nor will the Governor-General consent to exercise it without seeing that justice is done to those whom our power is employed to coerce or overawe.

"You are requested to explain this distinctly to the Maharaja, and to impress on His Highness that every Prince, who is invested with power and dominion, is also charged with corresponding duties to his people placed under his rule, and that dignity, honor, and prosperity arise, not from the possession of the former, but from a just discharge of the requirements of the latter.

"The Governor-General will leave to your discretion, in which he has full confidence, the arrangements which should be made on behalf of the Chiefs above referred to. Our guarantee for the performance of the Maharaja's engagement should not be given where not absolutely necessary. Those who may reside in our territories, in receipt of a money stipend, may receive such stipend from our treasuries, and it would be advisable that, for the sums so guaranteed by us, we should receive from the Maharaja territorial assignments, the tenure of which would of course terminate with the termination of the stipendiary payments."

† Secret Despatch No. 1244, dated the 7th December 1946.

The orders were approved by the Court of Directors† in these words:—

"Although the Maharaja Golab Singh may not be disgraced by all the bad qualities attributed to him, he has still misconducted himself in late affairs in a manner and to an extent which justifies any precautionary measures which you may think fit to adopt in regard to him, more especially with reference to those tributary and dependant Chiefs whose territories have been transferred to His Highness under the treaty of Amritsar."

‡ Secret Consultation, 26th December 1946, Nos. 1242 and 1218.

The Maharaja consented‡ to take the Agent's advice in respect of jagirs.

Guaranteed settlement for the Hill Chiefs.—The nature of the settlement effected and guaranteed in respect of Chiefs of the first class is fully described in the papers§ printed as Appendix (2). Briefly, certain cash allowances aggregating Rs. 62,200 per annum were assigned in perpetuity to the Rajas of Rajaori, Jasrota, Mankote, Ramnagar, Basoli, Kishtwar, and others. The Chiefs were given the choice of remaining in or quitting the Maharaja's territories, and most preferred the latter alternative. The share of those who remained was Rs. 42,800, and this the British Government undertook to pay. In consideration for doing so the British Government received from the Maharaja the districts of Sujanpur, part of Pathankot, and certain lands between the Beas and Chukkee rivers. On the complete extinction of a pensioned family, the amount of the allowance is payable to the Kashmir Durbar.

Settlement about the Khukka-Bumabs: no guarantee.—The arrangement made with the Khukka-Bumba Rajas has not been guaranteed by the British Government.

In the first instance, the Maharaja agreed to exact from them no more than the Sikhs had taken, and even to remit one-fifth of that amount. This agreement was reduced to writing, and was attested by the Political Officer, Lieutenant Edwardes. But the Chiefs did not submit for some time, so it became void. Eventually¶ they signed a paper promising allegiance to the Maharaja;

¶ Secret Consultation, 26th December 1846, No. 1249.

while the latter signed one promising to them kind treatment, the confirmation of all grants made up to one year before the death of the Sikh Governor,** Sheik

** This occurred in April 1848.

* It is not quite certain that the Governor, Mian Singh, was not meant. See Secret Consultation, 26th December 1846, No. 1246.

they were willing to obey the Maharaja or not. If not, they would be allowed to emigrate to British territory, and would there receive allowances. But if they remained, the Maharaja would be "master of their fortunes,"† and "all would henceforward depend on their own good faith and submission." They all determined to stay. Subsequently the Maharaja defined, in certain regulations‡ which he framed on Lieutenant Taylor's advice, the obligations of these Chiefs in regard to personal service: his words are quoted below:—

"Some of my zamindars hold their lands on advantageous terms, and these in cases of emergency, I summon for service. I give Rs 2 as *rasad* allowance per man to the under-mentioned soldiers when called into the field. I take in all 2,500 men; from the—

Sultan of Mozufferabad	500
Ditto Doputtah	300
Ditto Kottiar	300
Ditto Uri	300
Ditto Karnao	300
Raja of Booniar	50 (or Rs. 50.)
Ditto Chittar and Dunuah	300
Ditto Danuah and Kot	250 (or Rs. 250.)
Raja of Muzuffer Khan Habat Khan Madu- poreah	250 (or Rs. 250.)

Raja of Skardo.—A case which resembles those just mentioned in so far that Golab Singh was induced to be liberal by the mediation of British officers is that of the Skardo family. About this Colonel Lawrence wrote as follows:§—

"Skardo is the richest of these (feudatory) states, and pays Rs. 6,000 to the Maharaja, the Raja receiving for himself about Rs. 1,000. His name is Muhammad Shah, and he is the eldest surviving son of the late Ahmed Shah, who died in confinement at Jammu. He has for years been obedient to the Maharaja, and lost his toes in the disastrous expedition of Zorawar Singh. Several of his brothers are still under restraint, but they will all be released, and provision made for them either in these hills or in the British dominions."

The brothers were Muhammad Ali and Ahmed Ali, and ultimately Lieutenant Taylor || seems to have obtained for them Rs. 6 per diem. In 1872 Mr. Girdlestone (lately Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir) recommended¶ that the allowance should be increased. This suggestion was not accepted, but the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab was informed that one of the family, Lutf Ali, was anxious for employment in Government service.

Punch.—The principality of Punch was allotted by Ranjit Singh to Golab Singh's brother Dhyam Singh, who had three sons, Hira Singh, Jowahir Singh, and Moti Singh. The second of them was a boy when his elder brother was killed, and his estate was in the first instance seized by the Maharaja. His name is not mentioned in the treaties of 1846, nor in subsequent arrangements. When he came to manhood he tried to recover his losses, and through the intervention of the Resident at Lahore he did get a share of his father's estate. But from this a bitter quarrel arose between him and Golab Singh. At the end of 1854

the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab reported** that matters were coming to a crisis. The Maharaja seemed to be bent on crushing his nephew, who had applied for assistance to the Chief Commissioner. The question was whether the request should be complied with at all; and, if so, to what extent. The case is an important one of its kind, and the Chief Commissioner's letter gives a good account of the Maharaja's family affairs. The following extracts are therefore quoted at some length:—

"For many years His Highness the Maharaja has been on bad terms with Raja Jowahir Singh. During the life of Raja Dhyam Singh, the father of the latter, he and Raja (the

§ Secret Consultation, 26th December 1846, No. 1242.

|| Secret Consultation, 31st July 1847, No. 168, and 25th September 1847, No. 134.

¶ Political B, March 1872, No. 83.

** Consultation, 30th March 1854, No. 1.

present Maharaja) Golab Singh had but one interest. The union of the two brothers was one of the main causes of their remarkable fortune. Dhyani Singh was the minister and favorite of Maharaja Ranjit Singh; he resided always at Court and cared for the welfare of the family. Golab Singh was generally absent as a civil or military officer on duty in various parts of the Punjab; or residing on his jagirs in the Jammu territory. All the wealth of the two brothers was accumulated in its strongholds under Raja Golab Singh's immediate care.

"When Dhyani Singh, together with his master Maharaja Sheru Singh, was murdered by the Sindanwalla sirdars, his son Hira Singh managed to win the army to his side and destroy the murderers. Hira Singh then became minister, and virtually the ruler of the Punjab.

"During Raja Hira Singh's lifetime, some ill-feeling arose between him and his uncle Golab Singh regarding Dhyani Singh's wealth; and at one time it was in contemplation to send an army against Jammu. Matters, however, did not come to an open rupture; Raja Golab Singh satisfied his nephew for the time being, who as the real ruler of the Punjab was of course the more powerful of the two.

"Shortly after this, Raja Suchet Singh, the youngest of the three Jammu brothers, instigated, it is said, by Raja Golab Singh, tampered with the Sikh troops, and endeavoured to supplant his nephew Hira Singh. But the plot proved a failure. Raja Hira Singh got timely notice of the affair, and was enabled to keep the army on his side. They moved out against Suchet Singh, and killed him and all his followers. Raja Suchet Singh had no children and had adopted Raja Ranbir Singh, the present heir of Jammu. The prince affects to have a blood feud on this account with Raja Jowahir Singh, as the nearest relative of Hira Singh.

"A short time only elapsed when Raja Jowahir Singh, brother of the Maharani, and Raja Lal Singh, induced the army to desert Hira Singh, who was slain in his flight from Lahore. With him died the second son of Raja Golab Singh, Mian Ootum Singh, who, after the failure of Suchet Singh's plot, had come to Lahore on his father's part.

"On the death of Raja Hira Singh, his full-brother Raja Jowahir Singh became head of the family, and with his half-brother Moti Singh succeeded to his rights and property. Raja Jowahir Singh, therefore, had claims against Raja Golab Singh, both in his own right, as one of the heirs of Dhyani Singh and Suchet Singh, and as the heir also of Hira Singh. The latter held Jusrata, now a part of the Jammu territory, in jagir where he had accumulated a large amount of treasure. Both it and the jagir were appropriated by the Maharaja. Raja Jowahir Singh being then but a boy, neither understood his own rights, nor had power to assert them.

"Matters continued in this state until the first Sutlej war. By the treaty of Amritsar no provision was made for Jowahir Singh, whom his uncle actually kept out of the way, by sending him to Chubal to take possession of his paternal jagir.

"Thus all the accumulated wealth of Rajas Dhyani Singh, Suchet Singh, and Hira Singh remained with the Maharaja. And all the Kohistan, except the Chubal and Punch estates, have fallen into that Chief's hands, and even these lands are held as a fief under him.

"Since 1818, Raja Jowahir Singh has been endeavouring to recover his share of his father, uncle, and brother's property. In 1847, he and his brother Moti Singh appealed to the Resident at Lahore, and in May of the following year, Sir F. Currie mediated between the two parties. On this occasion the Maharaja agreed to confirm to the two brothers their father's jagirs; to make them both Rajas, and to give them certain other advantages.

"In 1852, Raja Moti Singh, instigated, it is generally said, by his uncle, quarrelled with his half-brother Jowahir Singh, and claimed a division of their estates, which had hitherto been held in common. This division was effected early in 1853, but its result has been to increase the feud between the Maharaja and his nephew, Jowahir Singh.

"Raja Jowahir Singh has always endeavoured to obtain permission to keep a wakil at Lahore—an arrangement which has not been allowed as being offensive to the Maharaja. He has taken into his service persons who have been dismissed by the Maharaja; he has carried on communications with his officers and agents; and resisted his authority. On the other hand, the Maharaja has not carried out the promises which he made through Dewan Jowala Sahai to Sir F. Currie in favor of Jowahir Singh. He has by various acts of annoyance and petty affronts endeavoured to drive the Raja's family out of the town of Jammu, and has instigated his ryots to resist his authority.

"The animosity between the two parties has become inflamed to that degree that there is nothing, it is believed, which the one would not do to injure the other. The Maharaja has alone refrained from ruining Jowahir Singh out of fear of the resentment of the British Government, while the Raja only waits for his sovereign's death, to endeavour to supplant his son and successor.

"In October 1853, Raja Jowahir Singh rode down from Chubal to Gujerat, and endeavoured to induce the Chief Commissioner, then on his way to Peshawar, to interfere and protect him. This was refused, but the Chief Commissioner gave him a letter to the Maharaja, which he promised to take himself and deliver in Kashmir, and endeavour to come to a reconciliation. The Raja, however, did not do so; the fact probably being, as he since said, that any such arrangement was hopeless.

"In June last, Raja Jowahir Singh sent his confidential agent to the Chief Commissioner at Murree to represent the state of his relations with the Maharaja; and a few days after-

wards Dewan Jowala Sahai, who had been deputed to arrange regarding the timber duties on the Chenab, also arrived.

The Chief Commissioner had repeated interviews with both parties, and fully ascertained the views and objects of their principals. Raja Jowahir Singh desires our interference, without which he feels satisfied he must be ruined. He wishes to hold his jagirs as a fief from the British Government, with which the Maharaja shall have no concern. The Maharaja desires to expel the Raja from his jagir, and is only held back by the fear of our resentment. Dewan Jowala Sahai distinctly asked whether we would interfere or not in behalf of the Raja? Whether the Maharaja would be allowed to take his own course with him or not?

"The Chief Commissioner allowed the Dewan to return to Kashmir, telling him that he wished to see Jowahir Singh himself, whom he had for that purpose invited to Lahore; that the Maharaja's wishes would be duly considered, and a reference made on the subject for the orders of Government.

"Raja Jowahir Singh visited the Chief Commissioner at Lahore, and explained with great frankness his hopes and fears. He assured the Chief Commissioner that no real reconciliation with his uncle was possible, that no submission on his part could prove effectual, that his uncle was bent on getting rid of him, and that without the interference of the British Government this intention would most assuredly be carried out. The Raja remarked very frankly that he had no desire, nor indeed the power, to forcibly resist the Maharaja, but that on the demise of the latter he would be able to maintain himself against his cousin; and that all he required was our interference to prevent his present ruin.

The Chief Commissioner explained to the Raja that he did not think it probable that the British Government would interfere, but that so far as the treaty with the Maharaja would admit, the Chief Commissioner would be glad to aid him. Finally he recommended to the Raja three courses—first, to reconcile himself at any cost to his uncle; secondly, to return to his jagirs and maintain himself to the best of his ability if attacked; and thirdly, to request the Chief Commissioner in writing to obtain the consent of the Supreme Government for him to mediate between the Raja and his uncle on the basis that the former should relinquish his jagirs and reside in British territory, provided that an adequate allowance was granted to him from the Maharaja, payable through the public treasury.

"The Raja replied to these propositions that the two first were impracticable, and that he could not agree to the last, as it would render him an exile without power or authority. The fact is that this arrangement, which would no doubt prove acceptable to the Maharaja, is distasteful to Raja Jowahir Singh, as rendering him powerless for a future effort.

"Raja Jowahir Singh is still at Lahore, unwilling, perhaps afraid, to return to his own estates, and still in hopes that something may occur to save him from his uncle. On the other hand, the Maharaja is only waiting for an expression of the views of Government before taking further steps in the matter.

"Maharaja Golab Singh feels that he has not long to live; he is now, it is believed, stricken by a mortal disease; he perceives that he has made a bitter enemy of his nephew, that his own son and heir, Raja Ranbir Singh, is unpopular and inexperienced in business. He is aware of Raja Jowahir Singh's aspiring and ambitious character, and is resolved to get rid of him during his own life.

"The feelings of Raja Ranbir Singh towards his cousin, Jowahir Singh, are still more bitter. He both hates and fears him, and will never believe he is safe, so long as Jowahir Singh holds a foot of land in the country. Under the pretext of Jowahir Singh being the brother of Suchet Singh's murderer, he will not even eat with him—conduct peculiarly offensive among Rajpoots so nearly allied together.

"Raja Ranbir Singh conceives that if he can once get rid of his cousin, he has nothing to fear for the future. While marching through Hazara the other day, the Chief Commissioner urged Dewan Jowala Sahai to endeavour to effect a reconciliation between the parties. But the Dewan excused himself, remarking that Raja Ranbir Singh would never hear of it, and had urged him on no account to listen to any compromise.

"Such being the state of feeling between these near relations, it is difficult to know what course to advise. Raja Jowahir Singh will never voluntarily leave the country, while it is perfectly clear that he is unable, if unaided, to maintain his position. The Maharaja is urgent to be allowed to deal with him in his own way.

"The Chief Commissioner believes that it would be ultimately beneficial for Raja Jowahir Singh to accept our mediation on the terms proposed in paragraph 19. It no doubt would prove extremely distasteful to him to be compelled to leave his country. But at any rate wealth, peace, and complete security would then be his lot. At present there is no assurance that he will escape with his life. Though he now refuses our mediation on these conditions, he may be too glad to accept them in a brief space of time, at which juncture, however, the Maharaja may no longer be willing to grant the terms which he would now subscribe to.

"By the treaty of Amritsar, the British Government are doubtless in no way called on to interfere in the internal concerns of Jammu. But on the other hand, ever since 1846, its officers have interfered. Towards the end of that year, when but for our energetic measures, Maharaja Golab Singh would never have obtained possession of Kashmir, Sir H. Lawrence induced His Highness to allow a maintenance in perpetuity to the Rajaori family and other Chiefs, who had been exiled, or were unwilling to live under his authority. These arrangements were approved by the Supreme Government, which guaranteed the pensions, for payment of which the Maharaja ceded a tract of country.

" In 1848, Sir F. Currie mediated between the Maharaja and his nephews, and again in 1853 Sir H. Lawrence acted in a similar way between the two brothers, Rajas Jowahir Singh and Moti Singh.

" Should His Lordship in Council, however, disapprove of the proposed arrangement, the question seems then to be, shall Jowahir Singh be left to his fate, or shall his uncle be prevented from injuring him? The Chief Commissioner believes that no general considerations of future evil consequences will deter the Maharaja, and still less his son, from ridding themselves of him. Compared with this object, they care for nothing save the resentment of the British Government. No advice, no warning, short of a prohibition, will restrain them from accomplishing their intentions."

The matter was considered* by the Government of India, and the gist of the orders passed is contained in the subjoined extracts from Foreign Department letter† No. 41, dated the 29th January 1855:—

* Secret Consultation, 30th March 1855, Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, and 6.

† Secret Consultation, 30th March 1855, No. 7.

" The Governor General in Council, after a careful study of the provisions of the treaty of Amritsar, and the history of the transactions between the Maharaja and his nephew, is unable to discover in any of these documents any thing which would justify the Government of India in interposing in this quarrel by any exercise of its power.

" By the treaty in question, the British Government binds itself (article 9) to 'give its aid to Maharaja Golab Singh in protecting his territories from external enemies': but it nowhere binds itself to interfere, or reserves any right to interfere, in internal disputes.

" Maharaja Golab Singh, on his part, agrees to acknowledge the supremacy of the British Government (article 10) and (article 5) to 'refer to the arbitration of the British Government any disputes or questions which may arise between him and the Government of Lahore, or any other neighbouring State,' and to 'abide by the decision of the Government.' But the treaty nowhere recognises any right of authoritative interference in the internal affairs of the Maharaja's kingdom, nor any right of compelling the Maharaja to submit to its arbitration in matters between his government and those who may be subject to its authority. Raja Jowahir Singh is so subject, being a feudatory of the Maharaja; his case has no special provision made for it; his name is not even mentioned in the treaty.

" As it appears to the Governor General in Council that the course to be followed by the Government of India in connection with the disputes between Raja Jowahir Singh and his uncle the Maharaja, must be regulated by the general provisions of the treaty of Amritsar, His Lordship in Council is of opinion that any such interference as you point to, regarding the exercise of our power to restrain Maharaja Golab Singh, and to prevent the measures which he may resolve to take towards his nephew and feudatory Jowahir Singh, must be put out of the question.

" In reply to your question whether Jowahir Singh shall be 'left to his fate,' I am desired by the Governor-General in Council to state that the Government of India, although it cannot interfere on behalf of Raja Jowahir Singh with authority, is prepared, upon grounds of humanity and policy, to interpose its good offices in his favour by exhorting the Maharaja, as forcibly as words can convey such an exhortation, to act with justice to his nephew, and to abstain from those extreme measures, which his feelings of bitter animosity suggest to him.

" The Governor-General in Council cannot advise Raja Jowahir Singh to submit to our mediation, or to accept our good offices on the very unfavourable terms described in the 19th paragraph of your Secretary's despatch, nor on the other hand can His Lordship in Council accede to the wish of Jowahir Singh that he should 'hold his jagir as a fief from the British Government, with which the Maharaja shall have no concern,' or undertake to press any such requisition upon the Maharaja in opposition to the express provision of the treaty, which forbids our direct interference, and recognises no right on our part to arbitrate in the internal affairs of his kingdom. The Government of India must confine itself, in this matter, to the simple exercise of its good offices with Maharaja Golab Singh in favour of his nephew: to an endeavour by advice and exhortation to restrain him from the severe and unjust measures which he contemplates. If Raja Jowahir Singh should decline our good offices on this understanding, or should refuse his assent to the conditions which may be obtained for him by their interposition, the Government of India, he may be informed, must then withdraw, and leave the feud between him and his uncle the Maharaja to take its course, so long as it does not injuriously affect the interests of the British State."

* Secret Despatch, No. 1818, dated 5th April 1855.

These instructions were approved* by the Court of Directors.

Accordingly the Chief Commissioner informed† Jowahir Singh that the Government were not free to interfere in his behalf.

At the same time the Maharaja was warned that his seizure of Jowahir Singh's jagirs would be viewed with displeasure by the Governor-General in Council. Nevertheless, the Maharaja, who had already collected troops near his nephew's possessions, proceeded to attack him; and eventually defeated‡ him and confiscated his jagirs.

† Secret Consultation, 31st August 1855, No. 4.

‡ Secret Consultation, 31st August 1855, Nos. 4-7.

The Government of India approved* of the Chief Commissioner's endeavour to settle the quarrel. But they repeated their refusal to interfere on receiving an application for assistance from Jowahir Singh. This action was apparently not in accordance with the Chief Commissioner's view. He pointed out that Golab Singh's rule was extremely unpopular, and that his success against Jowahir Singh was mainly due to the support which it was believed the British Government would always be ready to afford in an emergency. Jowahir Singh was then allowed to live at Lahore. But the quarrel lasted for some years longer. Jowahir Singh not only continued to complain, but intrigued with discontented factions in Jammu. His party grew stronger after the death of Golab Singh; and at the end of 1858 a conspiracy was discovered which had for its object the murder of the new Maharaja and his son and the succession of Jowahir Singh. There was considerable ground for supposing that the Raja was directly implicated in this plot. The affair brought matters to a crisis. It was clear that the old quarrel would be indefinitely prolonged with danger of disturbances unless the British Government interfered to effect a settlement. Moreover, both parties expressed their willingness to abide by the arbitration of the Lieutenant-Governor. Sir J. Lawrence, therefore, framed an agreement† by which Jowahir Singh renounced all claims to possessions in the Kashmir State, undertook to abstain from intrigues, and promised to live outside of Kashmir territories at a place not nearer to them than Umballa; while the Maharaja agreed to pay Jowahir Singh's debts, and to give him a cash allowance of one lakh per annum for his life, half a lakh being heritable by his male issue in perpetuity. These terms were guaranteed by the British Government, which, it was declared, "shall have and will exercise," the power of compelling either party to fulfil them. The agreement was approved‡ by the Government of India and the Secretary of State. Jowahir Singh died|| at Umballa on the 15th December 1860, apparently without issue. The jagir of Punch was conferred by the Maharaja on Moti Singh (Jowahir Singh's younger brother), on condition of fidelity and allegiance, and is still held by him.

* Foreign Department Consultation, 4th March 1859, Nos. 137-140.

† Despatch to the Secretary of State, dated 10th July 1859, No. 122, and Despatch from the Secretary of State, dated 22nd December 1859, No. 73.

‡ Foreign Department Consultation, 4th March 1859, No. 139.

§ Foreign Department Consultation, 4th March 1859, No. 140.

|| Despatch from Secretary of State, Political No. 72, dated the 22nd December 1859.

¶ Dacca, page 9A and Appendix VI. Political A., July 1863, Nos. 115-117.

Foreign Department Proceedings A, January 1861, No. 150.

Maharaja Ranbir Singh's request for a guarantee against interference.—In July 1868 Ranbir Singh preferred¶ unofficially to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab a request—

"that the British Government undertake, as in the case of Nabha, Patiala, and Jhind, to attend to no complaints or petitions brought against the Maharaja for the time being by any of his relatives or 'jagirdars.'"

The Lieutenant-Governor (Sir D. MacLeod) submitted this application in a demi-official letter to the Viceroy, remarking**—

"as we have always refrained from interfering on behalf of any complainants amongst his relatives or dependants except those for whom from special causes we have become in any way pledged, or where their wrongs may appear of an outrageous character, the request and the assurance appear to be hardly necessary. But as he wishes it I presume there can be no objection to giving him the same assurances as have been given to others."

The Government of India refused this request. Their reasons are set forth in the following extract from a demi-official letter†† of the Foreign Secretary:—

"The second request, that the Maharaja receive the same assurance of our non-interference between him and his relatives and jagirdars as has been given to the Maharaja of Patiala, and the Rajas of Jhind and Nabha, is one which the Viceroy is unable favourably to entertain. The British Government of course are desirous at all times to respect the sovereign authority of the Maharaja over his subjects, and have never interfered between him and his relatives and dependants unless in very special and exceptional cases. But the formal assurances given in 1859 to Patiala, Jhind, and Nabha, although they were in reality only a renewal of one of the clauses in the sanads of 1847, have been found in practice not to work well; indeed, notably in the case of the Sonthi Sikhs and Nabha, the formal assurance given to the Raja

* Secret Consultation, 31st August 1855, No. 6.

† Secret Consultation, 28th September 1855, No. 33.

of Nabha has resulted in misunderstanding and objectionable complications. On general grounds, therefore, the Viceroy is opposed to the grant of a similar assurance to Kashmir.

"But apart from this, there are special reasons why, in the case of Kashmir, the indulgence could not be conceded. By article 8 of the treaty of 1846, the Maharaja is bound to respect, in regard to the territory transferred to him, the guarantee which the British Government gave under the treaty of Lahore, that the *bona fide* rights of the jagirdars and their possessions would be respected and maintained for life.* The obligation to maintain these rights is one from which the British Government cannot escape, and we are therefore bound to see that the Maharaja respects them in the territories which we obtained under treaty from the Lahore Durbar, and afterwards ceded to the Maharaja's father.

* This argument may have had more force in 1868 than it has now. It will be seen from the first paragraph of this chapter that the guarantee only covered the lives of those in possession in 1844—46.

J. A. C.

Under these circumstances, the assurance asked for could not be granted without a breach of faith on our part. At the same time, as already observed, the right of the British Government to interfere with the Maharaja's internal government will never be unnecessarily or vexatiously exercised, but will always be limited, as in times past, to special and exceptional cases."

CHAPTER V.

THE "OFFICER ON SPECIAL DUTY IN KASHMIR."

The presence of a representative of the British Government in the Kashmir State is not provided for by treaty.—The object of the treaty of Amritsar, as shown by its language and by the despatches of Lord Hardinge (which have been quoted) was to leave the new Maharaja as free as possible from interference on the part of the British Government.

Early discussion about the appointment of a Resident in Kashmir.—Nevertheless, for at least a year and a half after the treaty, such interference became necessary and actually occurred. It has been shown how this came about. Golab Singh would never have obtained possession of Kashmir had not the Government of India supported him against Sheik Imam-ud-din. When the support was given, it was pointed out that the Maharaja had partly excited opposition by his own injustice to the hill Chiefs and others; and that the Government could not support tyranny. Golab Singh asked for the advice of British Officers in the first instance, and Lieutenant Reynell Taylor was sent to enquire into the whole system of administration in the province of Kashmir and to draw up a programme of reform. This he did, and the Maharaja agreed to carry it out. But the Government soon had reason to doubt whether the engagement was being fulfilled, and with the entire approval of the Court of Directors they proposed to depute two officers to make fresh enquiries. The intention was postponed for temporary reasons, and was apparently allowed to drop. It is remarkable, however, that the appointment of a Resident in Kashmir was discussed as a possible consequence of Golab Singh's neglect to comply with Lieutenant Taylor's programme of reform. Thus, in a letter of the 12th November 1846, Colonel Lawrence wrote to the Government of India from Kashmir as follows* :—

* Secret Consultation, 26th December 1846, No. 1242.

"Under any circumstances one officer will go to Hazara and one remain here until affairs are brought into some order; but I doubt the advantage of permanently leaving an officer with the Maharaja; though perhaps it may prove useful to depute a respectable Native Agent who can keep Government informed without being an incubus on the local authorities, and detracting from their credit without himself having any authority."

† Secret Consultation, 28th August 1847, No. 186.

Writing of Lieutenant Taylor's deputation Colonel Lawrence used† these words—

"Lieutenant Taylor is, I think, doing much good, with as little offence as possible to the Maharaja; who, however, must feel his dignity touched by the presence of a British authority in the capital of Kashmir. But he has fairly brought the penalty on himself, for I have always tried to impress on him two things; first, that we did not wish to interfere with him; secondly, that we must insist on the terms of the treaty, and look to the protection and rights of the people twice made over to his rule. * * * * * Before I left Kashmir last October, I gave him plain rules how to remain independent."

When Colonel Lawrence had learnt from a report‡ by Mr. Vans Agnew that the reforms planned by Lieutenant Taylor were not being carried out, he repeated his warning to the Maharaja—

‡ Secret Consultation, 28th January 1848, Nos. 41 and 42.

"If you will not act for yourself," he said, "some other arrangement will be made for the protection of the hill people. * * * * * The least that will occur will be that one or two officers will at an early date proceed to Kashmir to examine and report on the real state of country."

Colonel Lawrence addressed the Government of India on the same subject, and definitely recommended that two officers should be sent in 1848 to enquire into the state of affairs.

"If necessary then," he continued,* "an Assistant Resident could remain in Kashmir. I deprecate the permanent residence of one officer in an out-of-the-way place like Kashmir or Nepal, where most men are apt to imbibe prejudices for or against the authorities. An intelligent Assistant of some standing relieved every year from Lahore might keep the Maharaja straight; but if he can, or rather will, do so without such incubus, I hope it will be done; for assuredly his own happiness and honour much depend on his independence."

In a demi-official† letter to the Foreign Secretary, Colonel Lawrence said that he intended to discuss the causes of complaint with the Dewan Jowala Sahai—

"explaining to him that early next season one or two officers will go to thoroughly examine the valley, and on their report will depend whether the Maharaja is to be saddled with a permanent Resident or remain independent."

‡ Secret Consultation, 29th January 1848, No. 43 A.

Lord Hardinge, too, sent a serious warning to Golar Singh in a *kharita*‡ from which the following words are quoted:—

"In no case, therefore, will the British Government be the blind instrument of a ruler's injustice towards his people; and, if in spite of friendly warnings the evil of which the British Government may have just cause to complain be not corrected, a system of direct interference must be resorted to, which, as Your Highness must be aware, would lower the dignity and curtail the independence of the ruler."

These quotations have been made at some length, because they set forth the views of Lord Hardinge and of one of the officers principally concerned in framing the treaty of Amritsar. Some years later another of those officers, Sir F. Currie, stated§ that to the best of his recollection it was understood when the treaty was drawn up that "so long as he (the Maharaja) was loyal, there should be no Resident imposed upon him." But the records seem to show that immediately after the treaty of Amritsar had been concluded, the Government of India did not feel debarred by any kind of positive pledge from appointing a British representative in Kashmir; or indeed from internal interference on behalf of an oppressed people.

Appointment of an "Officer on Special Duty."—The first "Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir" was deputed in 1852. The measure had apparently nothing to do with the loyalty or the misrule of the Maharaja. It originated in the misconduct of English officers who visited the province of Kashmir during the year 1851. For this reason the Governor General wrote demi-officially to the Board of Administration in the Punjab, suggesting that the deputation of an English officer should be recommended to the Maharaja. This officer was—

"to remain|| there (in Kashmir) during the ensuing season, to be the referee in any misunderstandings that may arise between the authorities of the country and British visitors, and to take cognizance of any oppression or irregularities which may be charged against British officers."

On the 27th February 1852, the Board reported that the Maharaja had agreed to this proposal.

Major Macgregor, Deputy Commissioner of Lahore, was accordingly deputed¶ on special duty, drawing his ordinary pay, from the 1st April to the 15th November 1852.

¶ *Ibid.*, No. 68.

After this a civilian** or military officer in civil employ was ordinarily deputed†† every year during the hot weather and rains. He was nominated by the Lieutenant-Governor, subject to the approval‡‡ of the Government of India.

** In 1855 the nominee was a Bengal Civilian. Political A., May 1865, Nos. 51 & 52.

†† Political A., May 1865, No. 127.
‡‡ Foreign Consultation, 22nd August 1856, No. 178.

Jurisdiction of the officer on special duty.—
In 1856 this officer was authorised—

"to interfere in cases where public decency may be outraged by European officers, or aggravated breaches of decorum or propriety may be committed, or where the local laws or usages of the country may be violated."

He was invested with—

"the powers of a Court of Requests to decide all cases of complaints preferred by servants against officers for non-payment of wages."

He was empowered to expel from Kashmir any European visitor who might be guilty of unseemly conduct, reporting the circumstances to the Punjab Government, and to the official superior of the person expelled. But before taking such action he was to associate himself with at least three European visitors of rank equal or superior to that of the offender, and obtain their concurrence.

* Foreign Consultation, 21st March 1860, No. 44.

Under revised rules which were issued for the guidance of visitors in 1860,* it was laid down that all disputes with Kashmir subjects should be referred by British subjects to—

“the officer on deputation, who is there for the purpose of maintaining order.”

The same officer was indicated as the—

“only proper channel of communication between the Durbar or Kashmir officials and European visitors.”

The officer's authority to expel visitors behaving badly was reaffirmed. In the case of a first offence, an appeal was to lie from him to—

“a Court of three experienced officers whom the Civil officer is empowered to summon for hearing such appeals, and the decision of such officers shall be final.”

In the case of a second offence there was to be no appeal.

* Political A., November 1872, Nos. 132—125.

All these provisions were reproduced in instructions issued by the Punjab Government in 1865.†

† Political A., October 1872, Nos. 374—377.

Political A., March 1873, Nos. 212—214.

Political A.,—April 1873, Nos. 187—196.

In 1873 the powers of the Officer on Special Duty were thoroughly revised and formulated in the rules quoted in the foot-note.†¹ It is noticeable—

(a) that they are based on the consent of the Maharaja;

¹ By virtue of authority duly acquired in that behalf by agreement with the Maharaja of Cashmere, the Governor General in Council is pleased, under Sections 4 and 6 of Act XI of 1872 (*The Foreign Jurisdiction and Extradition Act*), to delegate to the British officer for the time being on duty in Cashmere the powers described in the following Regulations:—

1. The British officer for the time being on duty at Srinagar shall represent the British Government in Cashmere, and for the maintenance of good order the following powers and duties are respectively conferred and imposed upon him:

(a.) He may direct any European British subject who is travelling or residing in Cashmere, and who is guilty of any gross misconduct, to leave Cashmere forth with, and may punish any person knowing of such direction and disobeying the same with rigorous or simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.

(b.) He shall receive, try, and determine in his Court (which shall be called “The Court of the British Officer in Cashmere”) all suits of a civil nature between European British subjects, or between European British subjects and their servants, provided—

(1) that the right to sue has arisen, or the defendant at the time of the commencement of the suit dwells or carries on business, or personally works for gain, within Cashmere.

(2) that the suit is not of the same nature as those suits of which the cognizance by the ordinary Civil Courts of British India is barred by law.

(c.) He shall have the powers of a Magistrate of the first class as described in Section 20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1872) for the trial of offences committed by European British subjects, or by native British subjects, being servants of European British subjects.

Provided that in the case of any offender being a European British subject, he shall only have power to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, or fine not exceeding one thousand rupees, or both; and when the offence complained of is under the Indian Penal Code punishable with death, or with transportation for life, or when it cannot, in the opinion of such officer, be adequately punished by him, he shall (if he thinks that the accused person ought to be committed) commit him to the Chief Court of the Punjab.

II. Fines shall be recovered in manner provided by Section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1872).

III. Sentences of whipping shall be carried into execution in manner provided by Sections 310, 311, 312, and 313 of the same Code.

IV. Persons sentenced to imprisonment shall be transferred to, and confined in, the Sialkote or Rawul-Pindi Jail.

V. The procedure in all civil suits between European British subjects or European British subjects and their servants, shall be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure. The procedure in all criminal prosecutions shall be regulated by the Code of Criminal Procedure.

VI. The said officer shall make rules to regulate the service and execution of processes issuing from his Court, and shall fix the fees to be charged to suitors for serving such processes.

VII. All questions of law, or fact, or both, arising in cases before the said officer, shall be dealt with and determined according to the law administered in the Courts of the Punjab.

VIII. The said officer shall keep such registers, books, and accounts, and submit to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab such statements of the work done in exercise of the aforesaid powers, as may, from time to time, be prescribed by the said Lieutenant-Governor. He shall also comply with such requisitions for records as the said Lieutenant-Governor may, from time to time, make upon him.

IX. Duties and fees of the same amount respectively as the stamp duties and Court-fees prescribed by Act XVIII of 1869 and Act VII of 1870, shall be enforced by the said officer.

X. There shall be no appeal against any order, judgment, or decree passed by the said officer in a civil suit. But if, in the trial of any such suit, any question of law or as to the construction of a document (which construction may

- (b) that they recognise the officer on special duty as the representative of the British Government in Kashmir;
- (c) that the personal jurisdiction of this officer is limited to European British subjects and their servants;
- (d) that civil suits concerning Kashmir subjects are cognizable by a "mixed Court" of which a Kashmir official is a member;
- (e) that the officer's authority to expel European British subjects is made absolute and sanctioned by a penalty.

The consent of the Maharaja was given to these rules without much demur. He would have preferred "the mixed Court" to have had jurisdiction in all cases, and he did not like the provision for imprisonment in British jails; but he did not press these points.

The origin of the rules was the report* submitted by the Officer on Special Duty in 1871 (Mr. Girdlestone), in which he represented that British officers visiting Kashmir frequently omitted to pay their debts in the country, and that the creditors had no legal redress.

European Foreigners in Kashmir.—The question of jurisdiction in respect of European foreigners residing in or visiting Kashmir is one of considerable difficulty. The Maharaja has employed Frenchmen, Belgians, and others in the shawl, silk, vine, and timber trades, and European foreigners have from early times visited his country.

Case of M. M. Quinemaut and St. Quentin.—The Officer on Special Duty has not at present any recognised jurisdiction over such foreigners. This fact is illustrated by the well-known case of M. M. Quinemaut and St. Quentin. They were two Frenchmen, of whom the former entered into a contract with the Maharaja concerning a trade in walnut wood, and the latter joined the former as a partner in the undertaking. When they were both in Kashmir they quarrelled, and the first phase of the case was that M. St. Quentin prosecuted M. Quinemaut in the principal Criminal Court at Srinagar on charges of cheating, peculation, and defamation. The accused was convicted and fined. He appealed to the Maharaja, but the decision was upheld, and the fine was paid. The next phase of the case was that M. Quinemaut slanderously charged certain high Kashmir officials with bribery. This circumstance came to the knowledge of the Durbar through the evidence produced at the trial of M. Quinemaut. The Maharaja was indignant, and announced his intention of prosecuting him for libel; but eventually accepted a written apology and retraction. The third feature in the case was the cancellation of the contract between M. Quinemaut and the Durbar. This followed close upon the other proceedings, and M. Quinemaut complained that it was an arbitrary and unjustifiable act which practically ruined him. His case was taken up by solicitors in Bombay and by the Consul General for France at Calcutta. But enquiries showed that M. Quinemaut had little, if

affect the merits of the decision shall arise, he may draw up a statement of the case, and refer it for the decision of the Chief Court of the Punjab; and he shall, on receipt of a copy of such decision, dispose of the case conformably thereto.

And any person convicted on a trial held by such officer may appeal to the Commissioner of the Rawal Pindi Division; and if such person be a European British subject, he may appeal either to the said Commissioner or to the Chief Court of the Punjab.

XI. The appellant shall in every case give notice of the appeal to the said British officer in Cashmere, who shall, if necessary, instruct the officer empowered to prosecute the case.

The Mixed Court.

XII. Civil suits between European British subjects or their servants not being subjects of the Maharaja on the one side, and subjects of His Highness the Maharaja of Cashmere on the other side, shall be decided by a Mixed Court composed of the said British officer and the Civil Judge of Srinagar, or other officer specially appointed in this behalf by the Maharaja of Cashmere.

XIII. When the said British officer and the said Civil Judge or other officer are unable to come to a final decision in any such suit, they shall reduce their difference into writing and refer it to a single arbitrator to be named by them.

XIV. The arbitrator so nominated shall proceed to try the case, and his decision shall be final.

XV. And in every case of a reference under these Rules—

- (a) the arbitrator shall be at liberty to proceed *ex parte*, in case either party, after reasonable notice, neglects or refuses, without good and sufficient cause, to attend on the reference;
- (b) the arbitrator shall have power to summon witnesses in cases referred to him;
- (c) and the parties respectively shall produce before the arbitrator all books and documents within their possession or control, which the arbitrator may call for as relating to the matters referred;
- (d) and the parties and their representatives in interest shall abide by and perform the award.

any, grievance. He had cut fruit-bearing walnut trees in contravention of the terms of his contract; and he had altogether made himself so obnoxious that the Maharaja could not be expected to strain a point in his favour.

The significant fact in the case is that the Frenchmen submitted to the jurisdiction of the Native Courts. On this subject the Officer on Special Duty wrote as follows:—

"The authorities here have assumed, and I have hitherto acquiesced tacitly in the assumption, that these gentlemen *not being European British subjects* are beyond my jurisdiction. But His Highness' Court has kept me informed of the progress of the affair, and I have requested that they will continue to do so. Seeing that there is no one in Kashmir who is authorized to watch the proceedings and interests of European foreigners residing or carrying on trade in the country, I conceive that I, as the local representative of the British Government, am bound to fulfil this function to the extent at least of seeing that no oppression or gross injustice is practiced on such persons by the Native Courts."

These remarks applied to the criminal trial of M. Quinemaut at the instance of M. St. Quentin. In regard to the contemplated State prosecution of M. Quinemaut for libelling Kashmir officials, the Officer on Special Duty wrote thus:—

"The Durbar desire that the enquiry on this fresh charge should be conducted before a jury composed of English and French gentlemen resident here, and in my presence: but before writing to me on the subject His Highness' Government wished to ascertain my views.

"I have replied that I am obliged to His Highness the Maharaja for the confidence which this proposal implies, but that I do not clearly understand from the message in what capacity I am to act; that is to say, whether as Judge representing the Durbar and specially empowered by His Highness, or as a Judge associated with the Presiding Officer of the Kashmir Court, or merely as *amicus curiæ*. I added that His Highness might rest assured that I am ready to give any assistance in my power, but that it would be right for me, considering the peculiarity of the circumstances, to solicit instructions from my Government in the first instance.

"It would be most satisfactory, I think, if the Durbar would make over the case to me entirely, on the understanding that a Kashmiri Judge would sit with me to assist me with his advice."

The instructions of the Government of India were conveyed to the Officer on Special Duty in these words:—

"You should take no part in the actual proceedings in the case. The view taken by the Government of India is, that if you were to participate in the enquiry you could not eventually avoid joining in a verdict either against the native officials or against the Frenchman. In either case there are likely to be protests and discontent, and the finding is open to dispute and appeal, which might end by the intervention of the Maharaja. It would be difficult for you to take part in these proceedings, having no definite judicial powers, without some risk of compromising your position as a political officer. But it is quite right that you should watch the course and result of the trial, and that you should interpose if the Frenchman is threatened with over-harsh treatment."

Monsieur Quinemaut at first declined to pay the fine inflicted on him, and thereupon the Native Court attached his property. He prayed for aid from the Officer on Special Duty. Mr. Henvey replied, enquiring in what way he desired him to intervene. At the same time he wrote to the Durbar deprecating "undue severity." His action was approved. The fine was paid and the property was released. It may be mentioned that the Foreign Secretary obtained an assurance from the Kashmir *vakil* at Simla that Monsieur Quinemaut would not be imprisoned.

The third part of the case relating to the contract between Monsieur Quinemaut and the Durbar was taken up by the Consul General for France at Calcutta. He observed that there was no representative of the French Government in Kashmir, and therefore hoped that the Government of India would see that Monsieur Quinemaut was not wronged. In reply he was informed of the facts reported and the action taken by Mr. Henvey; and here the matter dropped.

It is noticeable that the Kashmir Agent in Calcutta, Babu Nilambar Mukerji, said that the Maharaja was unable to understand why the Government of India should interfere in a commercial transaction between the Durbar and a foreigner who was not a British subject, and did not acknowledge British jurisdiction in Kashmir. He was told that it was the custom of the British Government to watch in a general way over the interests of subjects of friendly Euro-

pean Governments which were not represented in Native States; and that the case of Monsieur Quinemant had been referred by the French Consul General. Then Babu Nilambar suggested that it might have been more convenient had the Consul General communicated directly with the Durbar; but he took the hint when it was explained that the French Consul General was not accredited to the Maharaja.

Further discussion in 1860.—The question was fully discussed in 1860.*

* Judicial A, May 1860, Nos. 5—11. The Bombay High Court issued a Commission directing the Officer on Special Duty to examine a Monsieur Bigex and other European foreigners in the employ of the Kashmir Durbar. Monsieur Bigex refused at first to be examined. But shortly afterwards he was fined by a Kashmir Court for assault. He then wrote to the Officer on Special Duty not only submitting to his jurisdiction, but claiming it as his privilege as a Frenchman to be exempt from the jurisdiction of the Native Courts. The orders† of the Government of India were as follows:—

† Foreign Department, No. 1608, dated the 5th May 1860.

“The papers now before the Government of India raise two points for decision. These are, *first*, whether the Kashmir Durbar shall be informed that it must allow or compel the attendance of Europeans other than British subjects before the Court of the Officer on Special Duty if they are summoned; *secondly*, whether the Officer on Special Duty should assume the protection of Europeans other than British subjects in Kashmir.

“The question of jurisdiction over foreign Europeans resident in Native States presents considerable difficulties, but it appears to the Governor-General in Council that the points now referred for decision may be satisfactorily settled for practical purposes independently. It is certain that Europeans in Kashmir, other than British subjects, are at present subject to no other jurisdiction in India than that of the Kashmir Courts. But on the other hand, though the British Indian Courts in foreign territory have not, and do not, claim to have any legal jurisdiction in such cases, the British Government fully recognises, on political grounds, the expediency of watching over the interests of foreign Europeans resident in Kashmir, and of protecting them effectively from injustice or barbarous treatment of any sort. Our exclusive relations with the Kashmir State make it impossible for us to refuse this responsibility, which indeed, when the subjects of a friendly European Government are concerned, the British Government is at all times ready to assume. The Officer on Special Duty should therefore be instructed that though he has no legal jurisdiction, he is authorised to interfere in the case of foreign Europeans who claim his interposition, provided that there be special and sufficient reason for interference in the particular case. By limiting the action of our officer in this manner, we shall avoid the main difficulty involved by the contingency of finding our interference repudiated by the European foreigner himself, whenever it may suit his private interests to disclaim it.”

It may be observed that the Kashmir Durbar objected to summoning the witnesses named in the Commission from the Bombay High Court in this case, and also in another case, asserting that the Commission should have been addressed directly to the Srinagar Court. The Durbar was informed‡ that it was discourteous to raise such difficulties.

‡ Judicial A, May 1860, Nos. 5—11.
 “ „ July 1860, „ 36-38.
 “ „ August 1860, No. 1.

Case of Mons. Ermens.—The next case of this kind occurred in 1881, and was reported demi-officially§ to the Foreign Secretary by the Officer on Special Duty in these words:—

§ Demi-official letter from F. Henvey, Esq., to Sir A. C. Lyall, dated the 14th July 1881.

“Some days ago Monsieur Ermens, the Belgian vine-grower, informed me that one of his French workmen had been summoned to appear before the Srinagar Court to answer for his conduct in having arrested and detained a Pandit, who was caught stealing the Maharaja's grapes. I hinted to Monsieur Ermens that the question of jurisdiction was an important one for himself and other European foreigners in Kashmir, and that although I did not claim jurisdiction over them, every occasion upon which they submitted to the orders of the Native Court would make it more difficult hereafter to give them any special privileges or status. He caught my meaning at once and asked me what I would advise. I then gave him my unofficial opinion that he would do well to apply directly to the Maharaja, and endeavour to induce His Highness to take up the case of this Frenchman executive as one concerning an employé of the State. Next morning Monsieur Ermens told me that he had presented himself in Durbar, and laid the case before the Maharaja, dilating upon the difficulties which might arise with the British Government, at the instance of the French Republic, if Frenchmen were tried and punished by Native Judges. He said that the Maharaja was most gracious, and had excused Monsieur Bouley from appearing before the Court, besides delegating to Monsieur Ermens the authority of a Governor in his own department, i.e., in matters connected with the vineyards, whereby he will be able to take up and dispose of complaints against his subordinates.

"So far this appears to me to be well, but I apprehend that sooner or later, most trouble. some points will come up for decision in respect to Monsieur Bigex, and the five or six artisans whom he is intending to import for the cloth business. Although the sanction of the Punjab Government has been accorded to the employment of these latter men, it might not be too late to give the Maharaja a hint that the establishment of a considerable number of European foreigners in Kashmir is not viewed by us with approval. Monsieur Bigex is himself a man of violent temper and coarse manners, and if it were not that the Durbar has made money out of him from the walnut wood speculation, he would have been in trouble long ago for insulting and beating natives of all ranks."

Case of Monsieur and Madame Ujfalvy.—The same question was referred to again by the Officer on Special Duty in 1882, in connection with the visit to Kashmir of Monsieur and Madame Ujfalvy, one of whom was a Hungarian naturalized Frenchman and the other French. They both received strong letters of introduction at Simla, and they both behaved in Kashmir in a questionable manner. The Officer on Special Duty drew attention to the embarrassment arising from the presence of European foreigners in Kashmir:—

"They are not," he said, "and cannot be made, subject to my jurisdiction, while on the other hand the Maharaja's Courts are not fitted to exercise jurisdiction over Europeans of any nationality. . . . When I pointed out to Monsieur Ujfalvy that the rules of Government forbade him as a visitor to accept a costly present for his wife, he defied me, and said that the rules were for the English and not for him. . . . The conclusion which I draw from these and similar experiences of an unpleasant kind is that European foreigners should not be encouraged to visit Kashmir, and that every opportunity should be taken to prevent their settling in the country, whether as traders or as employés of the State. There are now four

* Mons. Dannergue	} Merchants.	Frenchmen* in Kashmir, and at any moment delicate and complicated questions may arise on the subject of their liability to Kashmir laws and Courts. The affair of Quinemaut and St. Quentin in 1878 is an illustration of the difficulties to which I refer."	
" Bigex	} In His Highness' service as		
" Bouley			} vine-growers.
" Peychaud			

The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, to whom these remarks were submitted, did not think that any special action was required in regard to the presence of European foreigners in Kashmir. By article VII of the treaty of the 16th March 1846, the Maharaja was prohibited from taking such persons into his service without the consent of the British Government, but it would be impracticable to prevent them from visiting Kashmir as travellers or traders, or from settling in the country.

"It would no doubt be possible," it was added, "to bring such foreigners within the jurisdiction of the Officer on Special Duty by an arrangement with the Maharaja, but Sir Charles Aitchison does not think that it would be advisable to do so at present. They are better left to the jurisdiction of the Kashmir Courts, with such undefined power of interference on the part of the Officer on Special Duty as is described in the letter from your (Foreign) Department No. 1563, dated the 5th May 1880."

No orders were passed on this case by the Government of India.

† Political A., August 1882, Nos. 150-154, K. W. No. 1. In a demi-official letter on the same subject the Officer on Special Duty remarked:—

"I have ground for suspecting that one of these troublesome gentry, a certain Monsieur Bigex, is trying to work himself into the position of a French Consular or Diplomatic Agent at Srinagar, since he told me that Ujfalvy's creditors had mentioned their claims to him, and that he had reported the case to the French Ministry. . . . As yet I have merely observed to Monsieur Bigex that it was quite needless for him to take any steps in the affair, and I have asked the creditors to explain why they applied to him about a business which was in my hands."

Mr. Henvey made similar remarks about the same time in connection with sanction given by the Punjab Government to the employment of some French cloth manufacturers by the Durbar.

"I know," he wrote † "that Monsieur Bigex, the man who is to conduct the cloth manufacture, has made efforts to induce the French Government to demand his recognition as a Consular Agent at Srinagar. . . . The point was brought to my notice last year at Srinagar by Monsieur Le Farges, the French Consul-General."

The views of the Foreign Department seems to be that this question of jurisdiction is one which may prove very troublesome, but that it should not be worked out till positive necessity arises.

‡ Secret, December 1881, Nos. 518-525, K. W. page 2.

§ Political A., August 1882, Nos. 150-154, K. W. No. 1.

Political position of the Officer on Special Duty.—Between the years 1852 and 1871 the Officer on Special Duty was a nominee of the Punjab Government, approved by the Viceroy, and with few exceptions a member of the Punjab Commission. In 1871,* however, the Viceroy overruled the recommendation of the Lieutenant-Governor, and appointed Mr. Girdlestone (Junior Under-Secretary in the Foreign Department) to the post. In 1873† Mr. Wynne (Under-Secretary in the Foreign Department) was appointed, his services being placed at the disposal of the Punjab Government for the purpose. Similarly in 1874‡ Captain Henderson (Under-Secretary in the Foreign Department) was nominated. His successor in 1878§ was Mr. Henvey (Under-Secretary in the Foreign Department), who remained till the end of 1882. In fact it may be said that from 1871 to 1883 the appointment has been held by Under-Secretaries in the Foreign Department of the Government of India; and that, as far as patronage is concerned, it has been severed from the Punjab.

It has been shown that the appointment of a political officer was discussed immediately after the treaty of Amritsar; that the plan was not carried out; and that the origin of the deputation of an officer to Kashmir was the necessity for appointing some one to adjudicate in the affairs of European visitors to the country. Generally, the officers selected appear to have confined themselves to this duty. They submitted reports of their proceedings to the Punjab Government, and the deputation used to end with the touring season in Kashmir. Some of the reports show that the officers took note of the administration and politics of the country, and had a good deal of intercourse with the Maharaja. Mr. Ford's report|| of 1860, Mr. Girdlestone's¶ of 1871, and Mr. Wynne's** of 1873, are the best specimens.

Lord Mayo's opinion.—The circumstances of the murder of Mr. Hayward (see appendix 18) induced Lord Mayo to record the following minute:—

"I do not know what were the particular objections entertained by my predecessor, by Sirs R. Montgomery and McLeod to the deputation of a permanent Resident to Kashmir. But Mr. Davies may now be addressed demi-officially on the point. I believe that much trouble would be avoided if we had a sagacious and prudent representative constantly with the Maharaja."

Mr. Girdlestone's opinion.—In 1871†† Mr. Girdlestone, who was then the Officer on Special Duty, wrote a memorandum on Kashmir affairs; and the extracts quoted below show that he strongly advocated the appointment of a Political Officer permanently accredited to the Maharaja of Kashmir:

"Some weeks ago I expressed, in a demi-official letter to the Foreign Secretary, my decided opinion, for reasons given, that the sooner a permanent Resident is appointed to the Court of Ranbir Singh the better for his interests and ours. This view the Foreign Secretary has reciprocated. A year and a half have††† passed since the Government of India urged "the strong necessity for constant watchfulness over all diplomatic proceedings (of the Kashmir Government) in which British interests are directly or indirectly involved."

It is directly to the interests of the British Government that the true position of the Maharaja should be known and felt beyond his border, and that it should have full knowledge of his correspondence with Foreign States. It is directly to the interest of the Maharaja that he should learn by personal contact with a duly accredited Political Officer the truth that the British Government is, in all its dealings with him, actuated by pure motives, that it has no desire to annex or occupy any portion of his country, that it wishes to protect him against designing persons, and that under all circumstances and at all times, it will give him the best advice in its power. Till the fear of annexation or occupation is entirely removed, it is useless for obvious reasons to try and induce him to initiate material improvements. In the days of the Moguls, Kashmir must have deserved the Persian poet's epithet of an earthly paradise. At present it is a country of neglected opportunities.

* * * * *

"To conclude with, if a permanent Resident be appointed, I would earnestly urge the nomination of such a man, be he who he may, as would at once inspire confidence in the Maharaja. There is much of the secret working of His Highness's Government which the

Maharaja alone would be likely to divulge, and he would not divulge anything except to one whom he considered a friend. At present I expect we know little of what it would be to the Maharaja's real interests that we should know. Again, whoever is chosen, should remain for some years at his post. In regard to superior control I recommend the supervision of the Foreign Office. The Punjab Government is rightly or wrongly looked on with suspicion by the Maharaja. He believes that its traditions are such that it will admit little of good in his conduct. What is wanted is that both sides should start fair, without distrust of each other. As a matter of fact, the majority of cases, other than those relating to visitors, referred from Kashmir, are such as only the Supreme Government can decide. As to the visitors, the less the Resident is interfered with, and the greater the absoluteness of his responsibility, the better. If he abuses his authority, which is very unlikely, punish him, but do not, as is now the case, let there be a chance of appeal against his orders to a committee of officers, whom he, if an appeal is claimed, has the misfortune to have to nominate. The Foreign Office, with its general control of all great feudatories, has a wider point of view than any Local Government can have. By direct correspondence it would ensure greater rapidity and greater uniformity of action. The Local Government need not be prejudiced thereby, because wherever its interests are concerned it could be duly consulted or informed."

Proposal to appoint a resident Political Officer in 1873.—The first great discussion about the political position of the Officer on Special Duty took place in 1873. Till then he had no recognised political authority, the communications between the Government and Kashmir being carried on through the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, in attendance on whom was a *vakil* of the Maharaja. But in 1873 the attitude of Russia towards Central Asia attracted serious attention. She had entered into a commercial treaty with the Atalik Ghazi of Yarkhand, and had asserted claims over Badakhshan. She had also made overtures to Kashmir, and though the fact was brought to the notice of Government by the Maharaja, yet it could only be regarded as a sign of the times. For these reasons Lord Northbrook's Government determined to convert the temporary Officer on Special Duty into a permanent Political Resident in Kashmir. He was to be a member of the regular political service, in which he would rank as a Resident of the 3rd class. He was to be subordinate to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, who would remain the channel of communication between the Durbar and the Government of India. These arrangements were made, it was said—

"entirely* for reasons relating to the external relations of British India the Viceroy has no intention of interfering more than heretofore in the internal affairs of Kashmir."

* Secret, March 1875, No. 23.

This decision was communicated officially to the Punjab Government as a *fait accompli*, and was at once recommended† for the sanction of the Secretary of State. Meanwhile Mr. Wynne was directed to remain on duty in Kashmir throughout the year 1873.

But both the Secretary of State‡ and the Maharaja objected. The former enquired whether the new appointment was acceptable to the Durbar, and in accordance with engagements. The Government of India replied that the Maharaja was "reported not to like the proposal;" that there was no engagement preventing it; and that it had been thought necessary by Lord Mayo, and was certainly required during the Yarkhand Mission. The Secretary of State, however, would only "not interfere with any temporary arrangements, you (the Viceroy) have already announced to the Maharaja of Kashmir."

The Maharaja protested§ warmly. The new appointment would be an innovation derogatory from his dignity, and certain to cause interference in his administration. It had been intimated that His Excellency the Viceroy would be willing to receive an Agent from Kashmir, but His Highness desired no such privilege, for he had no pretensions to deal with Government on equal terms. Finally, His Highness suggested that it would suffice for the interests of Government in Central Asia if the Officer on Special Duty were to remain at Srinagar for eight months in the year instead of six; while the newly-appointed Joint Commissioners under the commercial treaty of 1870 could stay at Leh throughout the year; and to these arrangements he was ready to agree.

Meanwhile, the Government of India had heard demi-officially from the Secretary of State that there had been an understanding between Lord Har-

† *Ibid.*, No. 24.

‡ *Ibid.*, Nos. 19-29.

§ *Ibid.*, E.-W.

inge and Golab Singh when the treaty of Amritsar was made that "no Resident would be imposed" on the Maharaja so long as he behaved loyally. This contention, it has been shown,* is not supported by the records of the time. It has never been used by the Maharaja, and it rests in fact on the personal recollections of Sir F. Currie, the Foreign Secretary who negotiated the treaty of Amritsar. Lord Northbrook has recorded his opinion that the personal recollections of Sir F. Currie about the treaty of Amritsar cannot and ought not to bind the British Government; and it is believed that the Duke of Argyll concurred in this view.

However, Lord Northbrook accepted the compromise suggested by the Maharaja as sufficient at any rate for the time being. The matter ended for a while with a demi-official letter addressed by the Viceroy to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab on the 25th March 1874, from which the following extract is quoted:—

"As to the manner of communicating between the Punjab Government and the Maharaja, you may use your own discretion from time to time, and communicate either with the Maharaja direct or through the Maharaja's Agent at Lahore, or through the Officer on Special Duty, as may be found most convenient in particular cases. I believe that hitherto communications have occasionally taken place in each of these ways, and I see no immediate reason at present for any change. The main thing will be to keep the Officer on Special Duty informed of all that takes place; otherwise confusion may arise. The Maharaja's Agent, accredited to you, may, therefore, remain as before; his presence with you has not produced any inconvenience in the transaction of business so far as I am aware. I can say, at all events, that no inconvenience has arisen in transacting business with Nepal from the presence of a Nepalese representative with me; and, if the Maharaja should at any time hereafter change his mind and desire to have a representative at Calcutta, I will gladly welcome him."

It appears that the appointment of the Officer on Special Duty was henceforward borne on the list of the political service, the salary being Rs. 2,250 a month. When Major Henderson was appointed the understanding apparently was that he should do duty in the Foreign Office during the four months of his annual absence from Kashmir. In 1875† he proposed to stay for these months at Sialkot. But the Lieutenant-Governor thought that the proximity of this place to Jammu would make the arrangement distasteful to the Maharaja, and it was decided that no change in former arrangements was needed. Since then, however, Major Henderson's suggestion has been adopted.

The "Officer on Special Duty" placed directly under the Government of India.—In April 1877‡ the Punjab Government asked for definite instructions regarding the position of the Officer on Special Duty. Major Henderson had complained that he was not kept fully informed by the Punjab Government of business transacted with the Durbar. Thereupon the Lieutenant-Governor raised the following questions—

whether Major Henderson was to be regarded as a Political Agent and a recognised channel of communication with the Durbar in political affairs; or whether he was an officer charged with the duty of keeping order in Srinagar, and invested with no political function beyond that of making intelligent enquiries regarding matters in Central Asia, or beyond the frontier of Kashmir;

whether Major Henderson was subordinate to the Punjab Government, which was declared by orders issued in 1849|| to be responsible for our relations with Kashmir, or to the Government of India;

whether Major Henderson, if subordinate to the Punjab Government, should correspond directly with the Government of India; and if subordinate to the latter, whether the orders of 1849 should not be cancelled, and the Maharaja informed of the new arrangements.

The Lieutenant-Governor observed that Major Henderson was not a Political Agent in the technical sense of the term, and that he was not considered to hold that position by the Kashmir Durbar. To treat him as such appeared

* See pages 40 and 47.

† Political A., May 1877, Nos. 269—274, E. W., page 1.

‡ 1875.
Sialkot as a winter residence.
General B., January 1875, No. 176, and E. W.

§ Political A., May 1877, Nos. 269—274.

|| These are the orders defining the powers of the Board of Administration.

to the Lieutenant-Governor "to involve a distinct breach of faith towards His Highness the Maharaja."

"It is true," the letter continued,—

'that no pledges have ever been given by the British Government that a permanent Resident should not be appointed in Kashmir, and should His Excellency the Viceroy consider this to be

* *i.e.*, the semi-official correspondence in Secret, March 1875, Nos. 19—28, and K. W.

Government, and it is understood, though no official communication has been made on the subject, that it was equally abandoned by His Excellency the present Viceroy† at Madhopur."

† Lord Lytton.

It will be seen from the last chapter of this précis, that just at this time the negotiations with Kashmir about Chitral was engaging attention, and that they were being conducted personally by Major Henderson. Having regard to this fact and to the growing importance of the Kashmir frontier in imperial politics, it was resolved that the position of the Officer on Special Duty should be altered. The decision was conveyed in these words‡:—

378. "The Governor General in Council has had under consideration the arrangement now in force for conducting the political relations of the British Government with His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir.

"2. Since the year 1849 those relations have been conducted by the Government of the Punjab, acting under the general control of the Government of India, and His Excellency in Council has no reason to be dissatisfied with the manner in which the duty has been discharged.

"3. But the course of events on the external frontiers of Kashmir has given and is giving increased importance to our political relations with His Highness, and cases have arisen, and may, under present circumstances, frequently arise, requiring the immediate attention and orders of the Viceroy in Council.

"4. It appears, therefore, to the Government of India that the time has now arrived when the present arrangement, which necessarily involves delay and inconvenience in matters requiring reference to high authority, may with advantage be reconsidered, and the Ruler of Kashmir and the representative of the British Government on duty in his territory placed for certain purposes in direct communication with the British Government.

"5. Accordingly, His Excellency in Council is pleased to direct that from the date of receiving a copy of this letter, the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir shall be placed under the immediate orders of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and shall correspond directly with that Department regarding trans-frontier affairs and other political matters of imperial concern. In matters of local or provincial interest, such as the extradition of criminals; disputes relating to waif timber, and other questions which can, if necessary, be more particularly defined hereafter, the Government of the Punjab can continue to correspond directly with the Kashmir Durbar, and such correspondence may, as decided by Lord Northbrook, be conducted either with the Maharaja direct, or through the Maharaja's Agent in attendance on the Punjab Government or through the Officer on Special Duty; but in the event of correspondence being conducted otherwise than through the Officer on Special Duty, the latter must be kept fully informed of all that passes. Arrangements may at the same time be made to keep the Punjab Government fully acquainted with the progress of events on the Kashmir border and matters of importance passing between the Officer on Special Duty and the Supreme Government."

§ Political A., May 1877, No. 278.

The Maharaja was informed of the change in a *kharita*§ from the Viceroy which is quoted below:—

"I do myself the honour of transmitting, for the information of Your Highness, copy of a letter which I have caused to be addressed to the Government of the Punjab, intimating that henceforth the relations of the British Government with Your Highness will, in all matters of importance, be conducted by the Officer on Special Duty under the immediate orders of the Government of India.

"In making this communication I would wish Your Highness clearly to understand that this arrangement has been decided upon solely with a view of expediting the transaction of business, and not with any intention of altering the position or enlarging the functions of the Officer on Special Duty; it is my hope, therefore, that this modification of official routine—a modification which is made as much in the interest of the Kashmir State as of the British Government—will meet with Your Highness' approval and concurrence.

"In view of the change of system thus inaugurated, it is possible that Your Highness may desire to have a representative in attendance at the head-quarters of the Supreme Government as well as upon His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. Should such be the case, I need hardly say that it will give me the greatest pleasure to receive and recognise any confidential Agent Your Highness may appoint."

It was further ordered|| that the British Joint Commissioner at Leh should be subordinate to the Officer on Special Duty.

|| Political A., May 1877, No. 274.

The alteration in the status of the Officer on Special Duty led to much discussion, chiefly with the Maharaja, but partly also with the Punjab Government.

Views of the Maharaja.—On the 29th June 1877,* the Maharaja replied to the Viceroy's *khariṭa*, and urged objections to the change of system, on the grounds that it was an innovation, which practically made the Officer on Special Duty a Political Agent; while the avowed object of despatch in business would be sufficiently attained by the telegraph which was being laid down in Knslmir.

"Although," he remarked, "I have hitherto supplied Major Henderson with information on delicate important questions, yet since it is recorded as a custom in His Excellency's exalted *khariṭa*, it is a cause of anxiety to me, and a fear to me of a future example."

These objections having been considered, a demi-official note was made over on the 20th July to Dewan Gobind Sahai, the Maharaja's representative with the Government of India, which contained the following passage:—

"In point of fact the only change made is this, that whereas formerly any communication of political importance from His Highness to the Government of India, or from the Viceroy to His Highness, had to be made through the Punjab Government, under the new system such communications will not pass through the Punjab Government, but be made directly to the Viceroy or to the Secretary in the Foreign Department.

"With regard to the channel of communication, it will be open to the Maharaja, as heretofore, to communicate with the Viceroy or Lieutenant-Governor as the case may be, that is to say, in matters of political importance with the Viceroy, and in other matters with the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, either through his own representative in attendance at the head-quarters of the Government of India or the Punjab, or through the Officer on Special Duty, whichever mode may in any case be most convenient or agreeable to His Highness."

It may be observed that while the distinction as to the kinds of business to be dealt with by the Supreme and Punjab Governments respectively was carefully preserved in this note, there was some obscurity as to the channel of communication. In one paragraph, it is said, communications on matters of political importance will be made directly either to His Excellency or to the Foreign Department. In the next paragraph, direct communication is apparently prohibited, and the Maharaja is given the choice of writing either through his representative at head-quarters, or through the Officer on Special Duty, "as may be most convenient or agreeable." It is possible, however, that the expression "directly either to His Excellency or to the Foreign Department," may have been intended to mean that communications should pass through the channel indicated in the succeeding paragraph, but should go thence direct to the Supreme Government instead of passing first through the Punjab Government.

The next communication on this subject was a letter from the Maharaja, dated the 27th October 1877. In this His Highness referred to the memorandum of the 20th July, and professed to quote therefrom certain words which it did not contain.

The misquotation† was serious, for the Maharaja said that in the demi-official memorandum given to Gobind Sahai on the 20th July 1877—

"it is clearly stated that no alteration or increase in the position or authority of the Officer on Special Duty will take place either at the present or at any future time."

No such passage occurred in the memorandum, and the only one at all resembling it was the penultimate paragraph in the Viceroy's *khariṭa* intimating that the Officer on Special Duty would be directly under the orders of the Government of India. The Maharaja's attention was drawn to the circumstance, and he admitted his mistake.

"Sincerely relying," he observed, "upon Your Excellency's favours, both private and public, I was led to deduce such meanings from Your Excellency's written and verbal statements, that I, without taking into consideration the present and the future, exaggerated the self-evident fact."

But the letter which acknowledged the mistake also notified the re-appointment of Dewan Gobind Sahai to attend upon the Government of India, and it was forwarded unopened through the Punjab Government. The atten-

tion of that Government was thereupon called to the orders of the 14th May 1877, and it was observed—

“that correspondence addressed by the Maharaja to His Excellency the Viceroy or to the Government of India should be forwarded through the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir.”

To this the Punjab Government replied that the instructions of the 14th May did not appear in any way to prohibit the transmission to the Supreme Government of communications such as those to which their attention had been drawn. The Punjab Secretary remarked :—

“My demi-official letter of the 21st July last, to your address, requested official instructions as to the disposal of correspondence forwarded by the Maharaja for the information of the Government of India, and it was pointed out that there would be very great delay if such papers were, on receipt by this Government, either at Lahore or at Simla, returned to the Officer on Special Duty at Srinagar for transmission to the Imperial Government. To that letter no reply has been received, nor have any further instructions been furnished, and the Lieutenant-Governor thinks that it would be convenient that His Highness the Maharaja be informed by the Government of India of the manner in which it is desired that letters to their address should be transmitted, as, until this be done, the Lieutenant-Governor does not see that he has any option but to forward letters which may be of immediate importance from the Maharaja to the addressee.”

No answer was sent to the Punjab Government, but their letter was transmitted to Mr. Henvey, who was desired to take occasion to draw the attention of the Maharaja to the precise arrangements which had been made for correspondence between His Highness and the Government of India. He was told that he might observe that all such correspondence would ordinarily be forwarded through himself except in urgent cases requiring letters to be sent direct to save time.

Mr. Henvey, therefore, wrote to the Maharaja a letter (dated the 17th May 1878), from which the following passage is an extract. Having referred to the demi-official memorandum, dated the 20th July 1877, as containing the arrangements for correspondence between the Maharaja and the Government of India, he thus explained his own view of the matter :—

“I observe, then, that in questions of political importance correspondence between Your Highness and the Viceroy or the Government of India will be carried on through the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, or through Your Highness’s representative in attendance at the head-quarters of the Government of India, and that it is only in matters other than those of political importance that communications will be addressed to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab or the Government of the Punjab. The arrangements, as I understand them, do not contemplate correspondence with the Viceroy or the Government of India, being in any case carried on through the Government of the Punjab.

“I further understand that all correspondence with the Viceroy or Government of India would ordinarily be forwarded through the Officer on Special Duty except in urgent cases requiring letters to be sent direct to save time.”

In reply, the Maharaja expressed his opinion thus :—

“That in accordance with the memorandum of the Foreign Secretary delivered to Dewan Gobind Sahai on 20th July last, all matters of political importance will be, as they are now, communicated *directly* to His Excellency the Viceroy and not through the Government of the Punjab.

“With regard to the channel of communication, it has been definitely settled by the memorandum mentioned above that, in matters of political importance, all correspondence will be carried on with His Excellency the Viceroy through my own representative in attendance at the head-quarters of the Government of India, and in all other matters with His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, through my own representative in attendance at the head-quarters of the Government of the Punjab, and I have appointed a confidential agent to attend on His Excellency the Viceroy for this very purpose.

“I shall, however, have no objection to inform you of important matters in the same way as I used to do when Major Henderson, C.S.I., was the Officer on Special Duty.”

Mr. Henvey then wrote :—

“Respecting the memorandum delivered by the Foreign Secretary to Dewan Gobind Sahai on the 20th July 1877, I beg leave to observe that the said memorandum indicates ‘the Officer on Special Duty’ as a fitting channel of communication. It was in view of this provision that I expressed to Your Highness the opinion that all correspondence with the Viceroy or the Government of India would ordinarily be forwarded through the Officer on Special Duty. I still cherish the conviction that this course will be found the most convenient

and most advantageous, and will be followed, for I am glad to recognise in the concluding sentences of the letter now under acknowledgment an appreciation, on Your Highness's part, of the benefit which must result from keeping the Officer on Special Duty regularly informed of correspondence between Your Highness and His Excellency the Viceroy or the Government of India."

The Kashmir *wakil* in Simla at this time took exception* to the construction put upon the orders of the Government of India by the Officer on Special Duty, urging that the Maharaja understood the new arrangement to

mean that he was at liberty to correspond with the Government of India either through the Officer on Special Duty, or through his own *wakil*, in the latter case keeping the Special Officer informed. The Maharaja, it appeared, attached a good deal of importance to this condition as giving status to his *wakil*, and Lord Lytton felt bound not to depart from it. The instructions which had been sent to the Officer on Special Duty were altered† accordingly.

* Political A., August 1878, No. 275—281, K. W. No. 2.

† Political A., August 1878, No. 280.

Deputation of the Maharaja's Agent.—The Maharaja informs His Excellency the Viceroy by *kharita* of the deputation of a Kashmir Agent to the head-quarters of the Government of India. No reply is sent to the

Political, D., May 1881, No. 240, K. W.

kharita.

Political position of the Officer on Special Duty since the year 1877.—The orders of 1877 gave to the Officer on Special Duty a recognised political authority. But his position has been one of difficulty. It was defined by the Foreign Secretary (Sir A. Lyall) in a demi-official letter‡ of the 3rd July 1878, thus:—

‡ *Ibid*, K. W. No. 3.

"The policy which I now understand the Government of India to desire to maintain is one of general abstention from interference with the internal administration of Kashmir to the extent of refraining from enquiries and criticism which are not absolutely necessary. Of course it is useful and expedient for a Political Officer to collect information whenever he can; but in the case of Kashmir there is an implied understanding with the Maharaja that the Special Duty Officer shall do nothing of that kind which the Maharaja might construe into interference, so that it is your *role* to pass over without notice or enquiry many things as to which an ordinary Political Agent would consider it is his duty to ask questions. * * *

"In short, I make out your position to be much that of a *chargé d'affaires* in a secondary European State; your prime business is with matters touching external politics, especially frontier politics, and with the interests and affairs of British subjects in the State, and of visitors to Kashmir. * * *

"We must allow the Kashmir Administration to take its own course, and concern ourselves only with the special political objects for which British officers have been posted in a frontier State."

The arrangements of 1877 did not work without friction. In the first place the Durbar studiously ignored the Officer on Special Duty as much as possible. Mr. Henvey used to complain bitterly that he was the last to hear of important events on the frontier. News of interest constantly reached the Government of India through the alternative channel of the Kashmir *wakil*. Again, anything like interference in internal administration was quickly resented by the Durbar. Yet the famine of 1878 necessitated such interference to some extent. And it must be confessed that the action of the Punjab Government did not tend to make the situation more easy. The orders of 1877 left to the Lieutenant-Governor a control in Kashmir affairs relating to "matters of local or provincial interest;" and this definition has at times been too liberally interpreted, the result being, of course, to further the views of the Durbar.

Change caused by the withdrawal of the Gilgit Agency, 1881.—The withdrawal of the Gilgit Agency which is described in the last chapter of this précis afforded an opportunity to impress upon the Maharaja the necessity for keeping the Officer on Special Duty fully informed of matters of political interest. That officer was in fact declared to be the *proper* channel of correspondence between the Durbar and the Government of India in respect of the external relations of Kashmir. And this position has been carefully maintained by the recent practice illustrated in the correspondence set forth below.

When the Gilgit Agency was withdrawn a *kharita* was addressed by His Excellency the Viceroy to the Maharaja on the 18th* June 1881, which contained these words:—

* Secret. July 1881, No. 298.

“ It is well known to me that Your Highness, in undertaking to administer the affairs of your northern frontier, in accordance with the engagements entered into in 1876, has undertaken an important task. I shall always be ready to aid Your Highness in its discharge with my countenance and advice, and I trust that, in all questions of importance connected with your external relations, Your Highness will refer to me through my Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir.”

† *i.e.*, the engagement about Chitral.

In May and June 1882 the Officer on Special Duty reported that he had reason to believe that recent disturbances in the Chiefships of Hunza and Nagar were being, or had been, instigated by the Kashmir Durbar. And he complained that he had not been kept fully acquainted with events in this neighbourhood.

‡ Secret E., September 1882, No. 607.

“ I fear,” he said, † “ His Highness is not dealing as openly and candidly with the Government of India in this matter as he promised to do when the Gilgit Agency was withdrawn.”

About the same time the Kashmir *vakil*, who was then at Jammu, forwarded§ copies of papers about Hunza and Nagar affairs, which the Government of India received also through the Officer on Special Duty, and then Foreign Department letter|| No. 80 E., dated the 11th July 1882, to Mr. Henvey reviewed the relations between the Government of India and the Durbar in these words:—

“ Under the treaty of 1846 the British Government is responsible for the protection of Kashmir, and the Government of Kashmir, on the other hand, acknowledges British supremacy, and engages to submit to the arbitration of the British Government in cases of dispute with neighbouring powers. Moreover, when the Political Officer at Gilgit was withdrawn, it was intimated to the Maharaja, in the Viceroy's letter of the 18th June 1881, that the Government of India would expect His Highness to refer to them, through the Officer on Special Duty, all questions of importance connected with his external relations. It cannot, therefore, be disputed that the Government of India has a material interest in His Highness's relations with the States on his frontier, and the Maharaja is bound by his engagements to refer to the Governor-General in Council before he adopts any line of action calculated to excite hostile feelings among those States.”

The letter then went on to say:—

¶ “ It is well known to me that Your Highness, in undertaking to administer the affairs of your northern frontier, in accordance with the engagements entered into in 1879, has undertaken an important task. I shall always be ready to aid Your Highness in its discharge with my countenance and advice, and I trust that, in all questions of importance connected with your external relations, Your Highness will refer to me through my Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir.”

“ It may further be desirable that you should remind His Highness that, under the terms of the Viceroy's letter of 18th June 1881, the Officer on Special Duty is the proper medium¶ of correspondence in such matters, and you will take the opportunity of returning to His Highness the enclosures to this letter, which are papers relating to the affairs of Nagar, received direct from Jammu.”

Mr. Henvey addressed a letter** embodying these remarks (which was approved by the Government of India) to the Kashmir Dewan. The letter repeated the words of the Viceroy's *kharita* of the 18th June 1881, *viz.*—

“ I trust that, in all questions of importance connected with your external relations, Your Highness will refer to me through my Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir.”

It also returned the papers which had been sent to the Government by Gobind Sahai.

On the 21st August 1882, Gobind Sahai (then at Simla) forwarded to the Foreign Secretary a copy of a letter †† received by the Maharaja from the Ruler of Chitral and asked that instructions on the subject (immigration from Zebak to Chitral) might be sent to himself. The receipt of this letter was acknowledged with the remark that a similar communication had been addressed by Aman-ul-Mulk to His Excellency, and that it had been sent to the Officer on Special Duty for the purpose of obtaining any observations which the Maharaja might wish to make.

** Secret E., September 1882, No. 625.

†† Secret E., January 1888, No. 179-181.

On* the 12th, 19th, and 25th September 1882, Gobind Sahai (then at Simla) forwarded to the Foreign Secretary a number of papers about Chitral and Gilgit affairs which had for the most part already been received from Mr. Henvey, and asked for a reply and instructions. No reply was sent to Gobind Sahai. It was proposed that the papers should be returned to the Durbar with the remark that "it would be more convenient if such papers were submitted through Mr. Henvey." This proposal was not, however, carried out, apparently because the papers got mixed up with some others, and it was not observed till the 10th November 1882 that His Excellency the Viceroy had passed no orders on the suggestion to return the papers. Thus no action was taken about them.

On the 28th September and 11th October 1882 Gobind Sahai (then at Simla) forwarded to the Foreign Secretary more papers† about Hunza and Nagar affairs, which also had mostly been received already from the Gobind Sahai asked that instructions for the Maharaja about them might be sent through him. No reply was sent to Gobind Sahai; but in answering‡ Mr. Henvey, it was said (Foreign Department letter No. 919E., dated 30th October 1882) :—

"I am to enclose certain papers which have been received direct from Dewan Gobind Sahai on the same subject, and to request that, when returning them to the Durbar, you will again remind His Highness the Maharaja that the Officer on Special Duty is the proper medium of correspondence with the Government of India in matters regarding the frontier, and that confusion results from papers being submitted through two channels."

In October§ 1882 the Officer on Special Duty submitted translations of papers which he had received from the Durbar about Hunza and Nagar affairs. A few days later similar papers were forwarded to the Government by Dewan Gobind Sahai, who was then at Jammu. Foreign Department No. 1001E., dated 11th November 1882, replied to Mr. Henvey's letter, and ended with these words :—

"I am to request that you will return to the Durbar the accompanying papers, which have been received direct from Dewan Gobind Sahai, and which are mostly duplicates of letters already received from you."

In May, June, and July 1883|| Gobind Sahai forwarded to the Foreign Secretary (from Simla) copies of several important papers about affairs in Chitral, Yasin, Tangir, and Darel. Duplicate copies were shortly afterwards received through the Officer on Special Duty.

Gobind Sahai's letters were acknowledged¶ on the 3rd August 1883, with the following** remark :—

¶ *Ibid.*

** For the orders on which this letter was written, see Secret E., August 1883, Nos. 253-300, K.-W., pages 7 and 9.

Highness's Government and the

†† For the orders on which this letter was written, see above.

"I am to take this opportunity of transmitting to you the papers specified in the margin‡‡ which have been received by the Foreign Secretary from Dewan Gobind Sahai. I am to invite your attention to my letter No. 919E.§§ of 30th October 1882, to your predecessor's address, and to request that you will return the papers to the Durbar, with the intimation that the Officer on Special Duty is the only proper medium of communication on frontier matters between His Highness's Government and the Governor-General in Council, and that delays and inconvenience will be avoided by their bearing this in mind in the future."

His Highness the Maharaja recently complained, for the first time during a period of two years and a half, that his representative in attendance on the

Viceroy has, under the orders which have been set forth, "practically ceased to be recognised as the regular channel of communication." In reply it was observed that the withdrawal of the Gilgit Agency had necessarily caused a change in regard to business about the Maharaja's external relations. When the arrangements of 1877 for the Kashmir Vakil were made, it had been determined that the Gilgit Agency would be established; and the withdrawal of the Agency had been accompanied by a declaration of policy in respect of the Kashmir Vakil's position.

Instructions given to the Punjab Government in 1881.—In regard to the Punjab Government the orders of 1877 were lucidly explained in 1881. It had been brought to notice that the Lieutenant-Governor had sanctioned the employment by the Maharaja of a number of Europeans, some of them foreigners, and also that His Honor had excused the Maharaja from sending to India any more of the shawl-goats which he was bound to furnish as tribute under the treaty of 1846. In neither of these cases had the Officer on Special Duty been consulted, or even acquainted with the orders passed. The Government of India commented at some length on these circumstances, and then laid down the following rules*

* Secret, December, 1881, No. 624.

for future guidance :—

"Briefly stated, the procedure in all dealings with the Kashmir State should for the future be as follows. In matters of political importance, and upon business not exclusively of local or provincial interest, the correspondence should be conducted by the Officer on Special Duty, acting in direct subordination to the Government of India. In deciding whether a particular case falls under this class, and therefore whether the Durbar should or should not be referred to the Government of India, through the Special Officer, it will be necessary to proceed with some care, as issues of material political interest may at times be connected with matters of slight apparent importance.

* * * * *

Finally, in dealing with unimportant questions, whenever it may seem to His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor inconvenient and unnecessary to communicate with the State authorities through the Special Officer, the condition that he is to be kept fully informed of all that passes should not be overlooked. He should receive without delay a copy of all correspondence, and should be made aware of the issue of all orders which may in any way concern the Kashmir State."

† Secret, December 1881, No. 625.

A copy of this letter was sent to the Officer on Special Duty, with the comments† quoted below :—

"It should be distinctly understood by the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir that in all matters not of local or provincial interest the Government of India regard him as the proper channel of communication. It will not be necessary to make any formal intimation to the Kashmir Durbar on the subject, as the orders now issued simply enjoin adherence to previous instructions, with which His Highness the Maharaja is fully acquainted."

Sir A. Lyall's opinion about the position of the Officer on Special Duty.—This branch of the subject may appropriately end with an extract from the opinion‡ recorded by Sir A. Lyall, as Foreign Secretary, on which the orders quoted above were based :—

"What Kashmir strives in every way to do," he said, "is to depress or keep down the position and influence of the officer stationed within its territory. My own opinion is that it is in the interest, not so much of the British Government as of Kashmir itself, that we should keep in Kashmir an officer of some rank who should have direct political relations with the Maharaja. I think that if this is not done, the Kashmir Government will certainly get into trouble, sooner or later, especially now that we have withdrawn our officer from Gilgit and propose to leave, in the Maharaja's hands, the management of a difficult frontier. And it is to be remembered that the residence and influence of our officer are disliked far more by the Kashmir officials, who exploit the whole country for their own gain, than by the Chief himself. I am not proposing to insist on raising or advancing the present position or powers of our Special Officer; but I would steadily maintain them at their proper level according to arrangements already made, and I would not discourage the growth of his influence, but the contrary."

CHAPTER VI.

EUROPEAN VISITORS: EMPLOYMENT OF EUROPEANS, &c.:
EXTRADITION.

Rules for European Visitors.—Kashmir has for many years been frequented by European visitors.

* Secret Consultation, 31st December 1847, No. 148.

In 1847* the Government of India prohibited all civil and military officers from visiting Golab Singh's dominions without special permission.

In 1850† it was found necessary to draw up rules for the guidance of visitors. These‡ were approved by the Government of India. The only one of interest is that which is quoted below:—

“If by accident or otherwise a traveller, or his servants, be brought in contact with the Maharaja, his son, nephew, or any of his agents, they must remember they are travelling in the dominions of an independent Sovereign, and must treat him and his officers with respect, and be guided by, and conform to, the local laws and usages.”

The other rules chiefly enjoined the necessity for paying for coolies and supplies, and prohibited the acceptance of presents from the Durbar. About the same time the Maharaja intimated that he had made arrangements for the convenience of visitors entering Kashmir by the Bhimbar route. The Board of Administration in the Punjab proposed§ to allow

§ Secret Consultation, 26th July 1850, No. 21.

|| *Ibid.*, No. 22.

Baramulla pass if stationed west of that river. The Maharaja, it appeared, desired that certain routes should be adhered to. This proposal was sanctioned.||

In 1851 the Maharaja complained of the conduct of certain European officers in Kashmir. Accordingly in 1852 the Board of Administration submitted¶ for orders an application from the officer commanding the 22nd Regiment for permission for his officers to visit Kashmir. The Board recommended that this request might be granted subject to the following conditions, which were approved** by the Government of India:—

¶ Secret Consultation, 28th May 1852, No. 132.

** *Ibid.*, No. 134.

“That there be a positive prohibition against *russud* (supplies) being taken without payment (except on the first and last day of a visitor's stay in Kashmir when a *russud* is sent expressly by the Maharaja). The Board are also of opinion that each officer applying for permission to visit Kashmir, should state in his application that he has engaged or will engage before proceeding, a sufficient number of ponies or mules for the carriage of his own baggage, and that but two roads should be authorised as routes for European visitors, *viz.*, the road *via* Bhimbar and that by Punch.

†† Secret Consultation 30th July 1852, Nos. 167–170.

In June 1852 the Government of India sanctioned †† the following additional rules at the request of the Maharaja:—

“*First.*—Officers travelling in the Maharaja's territories should encamp at the fixed encamping places, otherwise supplies may not be procurable.

“*Second.*—When going out on shooting excursions in the valley, visitors are to take supplies with them, and not to persist in demanding them of *kardars*, at places where they are not procurable.

“*Third.*—Visitors, when out on shooting excursions, are not to press into their service the people of the country to act as beaters.

“*Fourth.*—Travellers who have reason to consider that they or their followers have been ill-treated or affronted, are prohibited from taking the law into their own hands and punish-

ing the parties offending; but they are invited to prefer their complaint to the authorities of the country."

The circumstances under which an official referee was appointed in 1852 have been already described.

* Secret Consultation, 28th May 1852, No. 125-6.

† Foreign Consultation, 4th March 1853, No. 642.

‡ Foreign Consultation, 30th December 1853, No. 124.

In March 1852* the Government of India considered it inexpedient that ladies should visit Kashmir. A year later the restriction was withdrawn.†

In 1853 ‡ the Maharaja earnestly requested that—

- (a) The Bunnihal route between Jammu and Kashmir should be closed to European visitors.
- (b) European visitors should not be allowed to spend the winter in Kashmir.

On the recommendation of the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab both requests were complied with.

In the same year the Government of India found it necessary to issue a general order § prohibiting the practice of borrowing money from Native Chiefs in general, and the Maharaja of Kashmir in particular.

In 1854 revised rules for the guidance of visitors were published.¶ They were much the same as those of 1852. Three new routes for visitors were authorised, one *via* Mozuf-ferabad and Baramulla; another *via* Punch and Baramulla; and a third from Murree *via* Chakar and Baramulla.

¶ Foreign Consultation, 9th March 1850, No. 45.

¶ Foreign Consultation, 8th April 1859, No. 152.

In the year 1858 no one was allowed to visit Kashmir; but in March 1859 the restriction was cancelled.¶¶

In February 1860 it was proposed that applications of military officers for leave to travel in Kashmir territory should be supported by the countersignature of their commanding officer, and the countersignature should be granted only when the general conduct of the officer wishing to visit Kashmir was a sufficient guarantee for his good deportment towards the people of the country.

Certain rules were added** in 1860. These again related chiefly to the payment of coolies and other details of the road, but the provisions quoted in the foot-note † are noteworthy:—

** Foreign Consultation, 9th March 1860, No. 44.

It appears†† that the rules were revised in 1865 by the Punjab Government, the following additions being made to those of 1860:—

"Instances having been brought to notice of European visitors to Kashmir having permitted the goods of native merchants to be mixed up with their own, with the object of evading the customs duties leviable thereupon by the Kashmir Government, it is hereby pointed out that such conduct will involve legal penalties, and, in the case of persons in the civil or military services of the Queen, will be reported to the Supreme Government.

"The Maharaja occasionally invites European visitors to entertainments, at which, if the invitation be accepted, they should appear in undress uniform or evening costume.

Should any officer be guilty of any aggravated breach of decorum or propriety, or of violating the local laws and usages of the country, or other grave misconduct, the Civil Officer on Special Duty in Srinagar is empowered to call upon such officers to quit forthwith the territories of the Maharaja. Such requisition on the part of the Civil Officer must be promptly complied with. An appeal from the order of expulsion will lie in the

†† In any case of dispute, officers should avoid putting themselves in direct collision with the authorities, soldiers, servants, or subjects of the Maharaja: they are also warned not to place entire confidence in the statements of their servants, who have often their own objects to serve.

** All such cases which may occur at the capital are to be preferred at once to the officer on deputation, who is here for the purpose of maintaining order. Officers are not themselves to repair to the Durbar of the Maharaja or the Courts of his delegates, or to communicate directly with them.

¶ Officers are not allowed to take away with them, either in their service or with their camps, any subjects of the Maharaja, without obtaining permission and a passport from the authorities.

¶¶ They are strictly required to settle all accounts before they quit Kashmir, and to be responsible that the debts of their servants are similarly discharged.

case of a first offence to a Court of three experienced officers whom the Civil Officer is empowered to summon for hearing such appeals, and the decision of these officers will be final. In the case of a second offence there will be no appeal against the order of the Civil Officer.

"All European visitors are expected to leave the territories of the Maharaja by the 15th October at latest."

Genl. A., March 1868, No. 80.

The deputation of a clergyman during the summer season to Kashmir was sanctioned in 1863.

In 1865 the question of limiting the number of visitors to Kashmir was mooted by the Punjab Government. The number

Poll., A., May 1866, No. 127.

had risen from 200 in 1856 to over 400 in 1864.

The Agent of His Highness the Maharaja represented great difficulty in providing supplies and carriage, and it was thought desirable to limit the number to 150 or 200. The matter was referred to the Government of India.

Ibid., No. 128.

It was then settled that only 200 military officers should be allowed to visit annually, and that the

Adjutant General's Office should check all applications for leave. This plan, however, was found insufficient to keep down the number of visitors, as officers of the Punjab who were not under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief began to take advantage of their leave to go to Kashmir. It was decided, therefore, that the applications of these officers should be submitted by their commanding officers to the Lieutenant-Governor, who was also to keep a check upon the number of the civilian visitors. But this caused another inconvenience. Passes were issued both by the Lieutenant-Governor and the Commander-in-Chief, and visitors thus became too numerous. It was at last decided that the Lieutenant-Governor alone should grant permission to visit Kashmir.

Poll., A., June 1865, Nos. 136-137.

Poll., A., May 1865, No. 128.

Poll., A., August 1865, No. 26.

It was then settled that only 200 military officers should be allowed to visit annually, and that the Adjutant General's Office should check all applications for leave. This plan, however, was found insufficient to keep down the number of visitors, as officers of the Punjab who were not under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief began to take advantage of their leave to go to Kashmir. It was decided, therefore, that the applications of these officers should be submitted by their commanding officers to the Lieutenant-Governor, who was also to keep a check upon the number of the civilian visitors. But this caused another inconvenience. Passes were issued both by the Lieutenant-Governor and the Commander-in-Chief, and visitors thus became too numerous. It was at last decided that the Lieutenant-Governor alone should grant permission to visit Kashmir.

In 1866 the Punjab Government reported that disappointment was caused by the restriction on the number of visitors to 200 annually. The applications for visiting Kashmir were, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, disposed of according to their priority, and applications in many instances, which otherwise deserved favorable consideration, had to be refused only because they were submitted somewhat late. It was therefore suggested that the number might be limited to 200 for the same time, instead of to 200 for the season. The Government of India agreed, provided the Maharaja had no objection. His Highness, however, was averse to this plan: he consented only to relax the restriction so far as to issue special invitations to officers commanding regiments, or of similar or higher rank, to visit his territories in addition to the 200 to whom passes might be granted.

Ibid., No. 51.

Poll., A., December 1866, No. 108.

In 1872 the Punjab Government submitted a revised set of rules for the guidance of European visitors to Kashmir. They were approved by the Government of India, subject to slight modifications, and are quoted below:—

Poll., A., October 1872, No. 375.

"Rules for the guidance of travellers visiting the dominions of His Highness Maharaja Ranbir Singh of Jammu and Kashmir.

"1. The Punjab Government no longer issues passes for visitors to Kashmir.

"The number of military officers in Kashmir at one time is restricted to two hundred. The disposal of passes for this number, less a certain number reserved for the Punjab Frontier Force, is with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. Frontier Force officers desiring to visit Kashmir must apply to the Brigadier-General Commanding.

"Civilians and military officers in civil employ, but a small proportion of whom under the leave rules can visit Kashmir the same season, do not require any passes; but they should report their intention to travel in Kashmir to the Assistant Secretary, Lahore, and can obtain at the Secretariat Office, Lahore, a copy of the rules to which they must conform.

"2. There are four authorised routes for European visitors to Kashmir:—

"First.—The principal road from the plains by Bhimbar and Rajouri. This road, over

the Pir Panjal range, is not open till May, and is closed by the snow at the beginning of November; it is the old imperial road.

No.	Name of stage.	Distance in kos.
1.	Dhimbar
2.	Serai Saidabad	8
3.	Naushera	7
4.	Serai Changas	7
5.	Rajouri (Rampur)	8
6.	Thana Maudi	8
7.	Baramgalla	7
8.	Poshiana	6
9.	Serai Aliabad	7
10.	Dubjian (Hirpur)	6
11.	Shapiyon	6
12.	Ramu	7
13.	Srinagar	9
		86

[NOTE.—In calculating distances the kos may be taken as equivalent to about 1½ English miles.]

“At all these stages the Maharaja has had rest-houses erected, and the supply of coolies and carriage is arranged for by contractors.

“*Second.*—The road from the plains of Kottipanch, Uri, and Baramulla. This road is open in April, but it is difficult and is not recommended.

“*Third.*—The road from Murree by Chakar and Baramulla.

No.	Name of stage.	Distance in miles.
1.	Murree
2.	Dawal	12
3.	Kohala	10
4.	Chakar	11
5.	Rhara	9
6.	Thandali	14
7.	Gharri	8
8.	Hattian	12
9.	Chikoti	14
10.	Uri	14
11.	Uran Buach	10
12.	Baramulla	13
13.	Srinagar

“There are dák bungalows at all the stages, and carriage, &c., is provided by contractors. The road generally is good, and travelling easy. The stages from Rhara to Thandali, and from Hattian to Chikoti, are troublesome, and in coming from Gharri to Hattian there is a mountain stream to cross which may cause considerable delay when it is swollen by the rains. The last stage from Baramulla to Srinagar, is usually done by boat in two days, the first night being spent at Supar.

“*Fourth.*—The road from Peshawar, through Hazara and by Mozufferabad, Katlai and Baramulla. This road is comparatively easy, and is open throughout the year.

“The special permission of the Punjab Government must be obtained by travellers proposing to travel from Kashmir to Simla (or *vice versa*) across the hills, or to the plains (or *vice versa*) by Kishtwar, Bhadravar, and Chamba. British officers are prohibited from making application on behalf of themselves or their friends direct to His Highness the Maharaja or his officers for permission to proceed to or from Kashmir by any but the authorized routes.

[NOTE.—Throughout Chamba territory rest-houses and supplies for travellers will be found.]

“All other routes are positively forbidden.

“3. *Carriage and coolies* :—

“The rates ordinarily payable per stage are—

Per cooly	4 annas.
„ kahaar	6 „
„ pony or mule	8 „

“On the Murree road the hire for a cooly per stage is only three annas.

“Where the rates according to schedules attested by the district officer are higher than the above, payment shall be made at such higher rates.

“A cooly's load shall not exceed 25 seers, nor that of a pony or mule exceed three maunds.

"Coolies must be paid daily, and travellers should see payment made in their own presence.
 "4. Travellers on reaching a stage must send forward to the next stage notice of their requirements, otherwise delay will be experienced.

"5. In returning from Kashmir coolies or carriage are not to be taken beyond the Maharaja's frontier, or the first stage beyond the frontier.

"6. Unless travellers encamp at the fixed stages and encamping-grounds, no guarantee can be given that supplies will be available. They should not encamp within villages.

"7. Arrangements for coolies and carriage are made as follows:—

"(a.) On the Murree road, by a contractor who has the line or road from Baramulla to Kohala, and is bound to keep 50 coolies and 10 ponies at each stage. He has two sepoya and the village shopkeeper at each stage as his agents, and application for carriage should be made to them or to the thanadar.

"(b.) On the Mozufferabad road the same contractor as on the Murree road will supply carriage on due notice being given beforehand. In case of need, travellers may apply to the officials of the Rajas of Kathai and Uri within their respective territories,—elsewhere to the lambarbars.

"(c.) On the Bimbar road carriage is supplied by contractors.

"(d.) At Srinagar, Babu Mohish Chand supplies carriage, &c.; from Namu to Pir Panjal there is one contractor, from Thana to Bimbar another, who have as agents the village shopkeepers along the road. From Thana to Baramgalla the subjects of the Maharaja serve as coolies; from Baramgalla to Shapiyon those of Raja Moti Singh, of Punch; from Shapiyon to Baramgalla those of the Maharaja. The thanadar of Baramgalla is responsible for the coolies coming from Raja Moti Singh's territories; he will also see to the supply of coolies along the Punch road, having as agents the lambarbars of the villages.

"Travellers must make their own arrangements with the contractors. They are recommended to use mules or ponies wherever possible rather than coolies.

"8. Travellers must not interfere with any Kashmir officials, and no calls are to be made on them except in real emergencies. All payments are to be made at the rates demanded, which, if exorbitant, can be reported to the officer on duty at Srinagar.

"9. A book will be presented at each stage, in which every traveller is required to write legibly his name, rank, station, and the date of his arrival.

"10. When going on shooting excursions visitors must take carriage and supplies with them and are not to demand them in places where no provision is made for supplying them. They are not to press into their service the people of the country as beaters for game.

"11. Should travellers have reason to consider that they or their servants have been ill-treated or affronted, they are strictly forbidden to adopt any other means of obtaining redress than by making complaint to the officials of the Maharaja on the spot, and immediately reporting the circumstances to the British officer on duty at Srinagar.

"At Srinagar complaints are to be preferred direct to the officer on duty, and are not to be preferred in any Kashmir Court.

"12. Visitors are forbidden to take away with them from Kashmir, on any pretext whatever, any subjects of the Maharaja without obtaining permission and a passport from the Kashmir authorities.

"13. Travellers are strictly required to settle all accounts before they leave Kashmir, and are responsible that the debts of their servants are similarly discharged. Should any officer of Government leave Kashmir without discharging his debts, he will not be permitted ever to revisit it.

"14. Visitors are prohibited from receiving any presents whatever during their stay from the Kashmir Durbar or officials.

"15. Visitors are required to take care that the customs regulations of His Highness the Maharaja are in no way violated by themselves or their servants.

"16. Officers invited by His Highness the Maharaja to evening entertainments at the palace are required to appear in ordinary evening dress or uniform."

Residence of Europeans in Kashmir during the winter.—There has been discussion about the residence of Europeans in Kashmir during the winter. It has been shown that a prohibition was issued on the subject, at the Maharaja's request, in 1853. This provision re-appeared in the rules of 1865. Just before then (in 1863-64) a Mr. Clark,* a missionary, expressed a wish to stay at Srinagar during the winter. The Maharaja objected, urging that the Muhammadans of the place were fanatical. The Government of India decided that Mr. Clark could remain only at his own risk. In the following year he was not allowed to stay at all in the winter against the wish of the Durbar. This decision was reported to, and approved by, the Secretary of State. Similarly, in 1868, when a Mr. Thorp† proposed to go to Kashmir in the winter, he was informed that he could not do so except with the permission of the Maharaja, and that his safety would not be guaranteed by the Government. Again in 1870‡ the prohibition was expressly retained.

* Political A., September 1864, Nos. 74-76.

† Political A., January 1868, Nos. 140-141.

‡ Political A., March 1870, Nos. 57-58.

In 1872 the question was revived by the Church Missionary Society. In its memorial it was urged that the restriction was damaging to missionary work; that it was unequally enforced, since the Maharaja did not apply it to French shawl-makers; that it was unnecessary because missionaries behaved well, and had been in favour with Maharaja Golab Singh. The Foreign Secretary (Mr. Aitchison) supported the Society in the following note* dated the 25th August 1872:—

* Political A., August 1872, No. 420-421, K. W. pp. 3 and 4.

"Three sets of rules for the guidance of officers and travellers in Kashmir have been made public—1st, those of 1850; 2nd, those of 1854; 3rd, those of 1860. In none of these is there any restriction placed upon the term of a traveller's sojourn in Kashmir. The origin of the restriction now appealed against by the Church Missionary Society is this. In 1851 some British officers on a visit to Kashmir gravely misconducted themselves, and in the following year Government were in consequence induced to depute a British Officer during the summer to Srinagar to be a referee in any misunderstanding that might arise. Since then, an officer, with certain defined powers, has been deputed annually. In 1863 Maharaja Golab Singh unjustly preferred a request to this officer when leaving, that officers should not be allowed to remain in Kashmir during the winter, and the Chief Commissioner recommended that this should be acceded to 'because he does not think it expedient to allow officers to remain in Kashmir for any time after the Government representative has left the valley.'

"The request was granted in Government letter to Punjab, No. 5502, dated 30th December 1853.

"It seems clear that these instructions referred to officers of the British Government only, and were connected with the presence of the Resident, who had been sent simply because some officers had misbehaved themselves the previous year.

"However in 1864 the rule was applied constructively to all European visitors, inasmuch as the Revd. Mr. Clark was told that, although Government would not order him out of Kashmir, he would have to remain at his own risk. Again in 1868 Government informed Mr. Thorp, an executive officer of the British Army, that if he remained the winter in Kashmir, he would have to obtain the Maharaja's consent, and that Government could not give him any guarantee of protection owing to the absence of a British representative.

"With all deference I think the orders in both cases were a mistake. The original orders prohibiting officers of Government from remaining all the winter in Kashmir had no connection whatever with any difficulty of the Kashmir Government in protecting them. It would be a scandal if a feudatory State, actually created by the British Government, could not afford protection to European British subjects within its limits, and if the British Government were to refuse protection to its own subjects who conduct themselves properly within its subordinate States. Neither the one position nor the other is tenable. And while Government may very properly order its own officers out of Kashmir when the Resident leaves, because the improper proceedings of one or two officers had necessitated the presence of a Resident, and such improprieties reflect injuriously upon Government and its servants, it is a very great stretch of authority, and one which public opinion in England is not likely to support, to say that Kashmir shall be closed to Englishmen for six months in the year. There is no reason why Englishmen should not travel and reside in Kashmir at all times as well as in any part of Rajputana, or in any subordinate State in which we have no representative. If Christian missionaries can live in Africa, or China, or Thibet, and enjoy the protection of the British name so long as they behave properly, *à fortiori* they ought to be free to come and go in any part of the world which, like Kashmir, is actually under British protection."

The Punjab Government was addressed in the sense of this note; and it was observed that the restriction in force should apparently apply only to Government officials, and that it did not seem to have been sanctioned by the Government of India. The Punjab Government* replied that although the Government of India, yet it was in accordance with the orders passed in Mr. Clark's case, and had been embodied in revised rules which had been issued by the Punjab Government in 1865.

* Political A., November 1872, No. 122.

restriction in respect of all European visitors had not been specifically sanctioned as a rule by the Government of India, yet it was in accordance with the orders passed in Mr. Clark's case, and had been embodied in revised rules which had been issued by the Punjab Government in 1865.

"The matter," it was remarked, "is one which concerns His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir alone, and His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor has no objection whatever to any European gentleman of proved respectability remaining in Kashmir during the winter should he have obtained from the Maharaja special permission so to do. But the Lieutenant-Governor is very strongly of opinion that the rule which has been in force for many years cannot be set aside without the consent of the Maharaja being previously obtained; nor does the Lieutenant-Governor consider that any pressure can be justly put upon the Maharaja in favor of the application of the Church Missionary Society."

* Political A., November 1874, No. 125.

(This was incorporated in the revised rules which were at the same time under consideration.)

† Political A., October 1872, No. 876.

Thereupon the Punjab Government‡ pointed out that as the restriction had been abolished in respect of non-officials, it could not properly be retained in regard to officials; and in this view the Government of India concurred.

§ Political A., May 1876, Nos. 26-64.

¶ Secret., August, 1877, Nos. 73-75.

‡ Political A., August 1882, Nos. 150-154, K. W. No. 2.

** General A., December 1877, Nos. 31-34.

On the 17th September 1877, the Commander-in-Chief issued a General Order in these words:—

“The Commander-in-Chief in India directs that all officers on leave in Kashmir, who may be guests at public entertainments given by His Highness the Maharaja, shall appear on those occasions in uniform. The senior officers on leave at Srinagar will be held responsible by the Commander-in-Chief that no infringement of this order takes place; and senior officers at all places of resort in Kashmir are further required to direct the immediate return to his regiment or station of any officer whose conduct may necessitate such a measure, reporting the same to Army Head-Quarters.”

The Officer on Special Duty and the Punjab Government objected to this order, as interfering with the authority of the former. But it was ruled by the Military Department that—

“the order issued by the Commander-in-Chief is one of a purely military nature, and the authority, which indeed is always existent, required by His Excellency to be exercised by the senior military officer present, cannot in any way interfere or clash with the special powers given by the Government of India to the Officer on Special Political Duty in Kashmir.”

Supplementary to the rules of 1872, are the rules issued†† in the same year by the Commander-in-Chief respecting the grant of leave to military officers to visit Kashmir. These are printed in the foot-note.¹

¹ General Order by the Commander-in-Chief, dated Mooltan, 25th October 1872.

General Order, No. 23 of 1869.
“ 63 of 1870.

In supersession of the orders marginally noted, and under instructions from Government, the Commander-in-Chief is pleased to lay down the following rules respecting the grant of leave to officers to visit Cashmere:—

1. On the 15th March (at latest) in each year, Officers Commanding Divisions and Districts will forward to the Adjutant-General's Office a Return showing the number of Officers desirous of travelling during the leave season within the Province of Cashmere.
2. Passes and copies of the rules will then be furnished to divisions and districts in equitable proportion; and whenever, during the course of the leave season, it may happen that a command has more passes than are required, the surplus copies will be returned to the Adjutant-General for distribution to other commands.

Passes.—The system of passes has fallen a good deal into disuse. There was discussion on this point as long ago as 1869-70. It arose out of an application for a passport preferred by a Mr. Godby. He wished to travel in the Cis-Sutlej States and Kashmir to collect materials

Mr. Godby's case, Political B., October 1869, Nos. 10-11.

for a history, and he avowedly intended to use his passport as a letter of introduction. The request was refused, and the Punjab Government then enquired whether the pass system was to be abandoned altogether in respect of Kashmir. It was observed that this question was based on a misapprehension. A letter of recommendation was one thing, and a pass designed to check the number of European visitors to Kashmir was another. The Punjab Government were informed * that the check should be retained by arrangements about leave, but that—

"the practice of granting passports to British subjects travelling in Kashmir should be discontinued."

† Political A., March 1870, Nos. 57-58.

‡ Mr. Aitchison's note in K. W. Political A., January 1870, Nos. 256-259.

But this order did not imply a relaxation of restrictions imposed by existing rules on European visitors. The reason † for the order was that the issue of passes—

"tends to foster in the mind of the Kashmir Durbar ideas altogether at variance with their (sic) position as a feudatory State of our own creation."

Nevertheless, the passes figure in the revised rules for visitors sanctioned by the Government of India two years later; and they are insisted on in the subsidiary military rules of 1872. In 1882 the pass system came four times under consideration.

Military Officers.—A British officer shot a beater by accident, and when reporting the matter the Officer on Special Duty mentioned that military officers not infrequently came to Kashmir without passes. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab (the Foreign Secretary of 1870) thought that this point should not be noticed, seeing that civilians were not bound to obtain passes. And the Commander-in-Chief was of opinion that passes should be altogether abolished. No orders were passed.

M. and Mme. Ujfalvy's case.—Just then the question arose in another form. Two foreigners who had been furnished by persons of rank with strong letters of introduction to the authorities in Kashmir turned out to be swindlers.

* "I do hereby declare that I will abide strictly by the rules for the guidance of Officers travelling in the territories of His Highness the Maharaja of Cashmere, and that I will on no account whatever, or under any circumstances, interfere with the natives, except through the legitimate authorities of the district."

3. Every Officer desirous of visiting Cashmere whether on privilege or general leave, must attach to his application the usual certificate* agreeing to conform to the rules prescribed for travellers.

4. General Officers will then furnish to each Officer obtaining leave a copy of the rules in question, with a pass bearing the Officer's name and the signature of the Staff Officer of the division or district in which he may be serving, without which no Officer is to be permitted to proceed to the Cashmere territory.

5. On the return of an Officer to his post, the pass in his possession is to be at once forwarded to the divisional or district Staff Officer for re-issue, and at the conclusion of the leave season may be destroyed.

6. Not more than 160 Officers of those under the immediate orders of the Commanders-in-Chief of the three Presidencies can be present on leave at the same time in Cashmere; and in order to meet any infringement of this rule, His Excellency is pleased to notify that the Resident there is empowered to direct any Military Officer who may not be in possession of a pass to rejoin his Regiment, or Station, reporting the same to Army Head-Quarters.

7. General Officers will therefore be particular to grant leave to Cashmere strictly within the limit indicated by the number of passes furnished to them.

8. Before granting leave to Cashmere on medical certificate, Medical Boards will satisfy themselves that the sick Officer is in possession of a pass, without which he cannot be allowed to visit that territory.

PASS.

THE undermentioned Officer has permission to travel in the territories of His Highness the Maharaja of Jummoo and Cashmere.

Corps.	Rank and Name.	From.	To.

Station and Date.

By Order,

Signature of Staff Officer.

* E. W. Political A., August 1882, No. 150-154. **The Foreign Secretary then observed:—**

"The objections to the passport system in Kashmir seem to me inadequate as compared with its advantages. Kashmir is a pleasure ground for Europeans, and will become more and more so. On the other hand it is inconveniently close to dangerous frontiers; and both in our own interests and in those of travellers, it would be very useful to have some check over their movements."

Gray & Co.'s case.—Messrs. Gray & Co., of Calcutta, requested a passport for a native agent whom they proposed to send to Kashmir for trading purposes. They were told that—

A. General E., September 1882, No. 20-21.

"passes are not required in the case of natives of India who proceeded to Kashmir."

Von Rath's case.—A German subject † asked through his Consul at Calcutta for a passport as he was about to tour in Kashmir. He withdrew his application, so it was unnecessary to refer him to the Punjab Government.

† Political A., August 1882, Nos. 148-149.

Limits of travel in Kashmir.—In July ‡ 1882 the Officer on Special Duty had occasion to remark that European officers had gone as far as Gilgit for sport, and had some idea of crossing the frontier into Nagar, the States of Hunza and Nagar being disturbed at the time. The rules of 1872 do not impose limits on the travels of visitors northwards. But in 1881 when the Gilgit border was disturbed, the Officer on Special Duty had issued § a notice prohibiting visitors from proceeding beyond Astor without the previous permission of the Political Officer (then) at Gilgit. In accordance with this precedent the Officer on Special Duty was instructed ¶ to issue an order at the beginning of each Kashmir season prescribing the exact limits to which European visitors may go. The order was to be prepared in consultation with the Durbar, which was to be asked to co-operate; and disobedience on the part of visitors was to be reported to the Government of India.

‡ Political A., August 1882, No. 309-310.

§ Political B., April 1881, Nos. 158-160.

¶ Political A., August 1882, No. 310.

EMPLOYMENT OF EUROPEANS OR BRITISH SUBJECTS BY THE KASHMIR DURBAR.

The Treaty of Amritsar.—By the seventh article of the treaty of Amritsar the Ruler of the Kashmir State is bound—

"never to take or retain in his service any British subject, nor the subject of any European or American State, without the consent of the British Government."

* See Political A., February 1872, Nos. 39-49. K. W., and the original treaty.

The term "British subjects."—These words, though authoritative, are not reproduced by the Persian version of the treaty. The latter rendering is literally* translated thus:—

"The Maharaja engages that without the consent and permission of the Officers of the English Company Bahadur, he will not entertain as an employé or servant any of the people of the foreign country of England or other European people or residents of America."

This discrepancy was brought † to light in 1871, when a question had arisen about the enlistment of Kukas in the Kashmir army.

In 1881 it was ascertained ‡ that a number of Native British subjects were employed by the Maharaja, and that His Highness had never asked for the sanction of the Government to their engagement. A discussion then followed about the intention with which the words "British subjects" had been used in the treaty of Amritsar. The Punjab Government had read the term as being equivalent to European British subject. No action was taken; but the following note by the Secretary was agreed in by the Viceroy:—

† Secret, December 1881, No. 628-629.

"I think we may quite fairly read the treaty condition in its natural sense, that is to say, as empowering us to veto the employment by Kashmir of any of our subjects, European or

Native. But we have allowed the power to remain unused for so long that it would certainly lead to controversy to assert it without specific cause; and I would therefore wait to do so till we really had a strong case. It does not of course follow that the justice of the particular decision on which we chose to take our stand would reconcile the Durbar to the assertion of a hitherto dormant treaty right; but at any rate they would not be able to object that we were raising difficult and distasteful questions without sufficient reason."

Secret K, January 1868, No. 267.

The Kashmir Durbar seem to interpret the treaty provision as applying only to *European* British subjects.

The question is of importance because the Maharaja employs many Native British subjects and appears sometimes to make very bad selections. In December 1881, the Officer on Special Duty forwarded* a list of 140 such employés, describing them thus:—

"Many of them are old hereditary followers of the State: others are dependants and nominees of influential Ministers; and others again are men whose sole claim upon the favour of the Maharaja seems to consist in their bad character and disgraceful conduct while in the employ of the British Government."

It may be added that in 1882, the Maharaja applied for permission from the Punjab Government to his engaging a Native Assistant Surgeon on the Bengal establishment. Sanction was given by the Government of India after a reference to the Officer on Special Duty.

R. Genl. G., December 1882, Nos. 122-128.

Employment of Europeans.—The Maharaja has but few Europeans in his service. The return for the 30th June 1883 shows only six, most of whom have been recently engaged and draw small salaries. There has been a good deal of correspondence about the employment of Europeans in Kashmir, but it has grown out of a matter affecting the position of the Officer on Special Duty.

A Political, E., July 1883, Nos. 244 & 245.

Foreign Dept. Procs., February 1861, No. 464.
Political D., May 1871, No. 33.
Political A., May 1872, No. 250.

In 1861, 1871, and 1872 the Maharaja applied to the Punjab Government for permission to employ three Europeans. The requests were referred to and sanctioned by the Government of India.

In November 1874, when the question of the employment of Europeans by the Punjab Hill States was under consideration, the Government of India decided* to prohibit such employment without special sanction, even in the case of those States whose powers in this matter were not limited by treaty. The orders then given were that the sanction of the Lieutenant-Governor should in future be obtained before Europeans were employed in the service of Native States within His Honor's jurisdiction. These orders the Punjab Government read to mean that the Lieutenant-Governor could sanction the employment of Europeans by the Kashmir Durbar without reference to the Government of India. But when this procedure was brought to notice, the Government of India observed that the position of the Officer on Special Duty had been specially defined in these words:—

* Foreign Dept., No. 2466, dated 14th November 1874.

Secret, December 1881, No. 524.

"Accordingly His Excellency in Council is pleased to direct that, from the date of receiving a copy of this letter, the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir shall be placed under the immediate orders of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and shall correspond directly with that Department regarding trans-frontier affairs and other political matters of imperial concern.

"In matters of local or provincial interests, such as the extradition of criminals, disputes relating to waif timber, and other questions which can if necessary be more particularly defined hereafter, the Government of the Punjab can continue to correspond directly with the Kashmir Durbar, and such correspondence may, as decided by Lord Northbrook, be conducted either with the Maharaja direct, or through the Maharaja's Agent in attendance on the Punjab Government, or through the Officer on Special Duty; but in the event of correspondence being conducted otherwise than through the Officer on Special Duty, the latter must be kept fully informed of all that passes. Arrangements will at the same time be made to keep the Punjab Government acquainted with the progress of events on the Kashmir border and matters of importance passing between the Officer on Special Duty and the Supreme Government."

"In matters of local or provincial interests, such as the extradition of criminals, disputes relating to waif timber, and other questions which can if necessary be more particularly defined hereafter, the Government of the Punjab can continue to correspond directly with the Kashmir Durbar, and such correspondence may, as decided by Lord Northbrook, be conducted either with the Maharaja direct, or through the Maharaja's Agent in attendance on the Punjab Government, or through the Officer on Special Duty; but in the event of correspondence being conducted otherwise than through the Officer on Special Duty, the latter must be kept fully informed of all that passes. Arrangements will at the same time be made to keep the Punjab Government acquainted with the progress of events on the Kashmir border and matters of importance passing between the Officer on Special Duty and the Supreme Government."

The Government of India then proceeded to apply the orders to the particular case under consideration with these remarks :

"In the first place there is nothing to show that the Officer on Special Duty was kept fully informed of the correspondence regarding the employment of Europeans; while there is reason to believe that, until he made a reference on the subject of some allusion to the matter in the newspapers, he had not heard about it from the Punjab Government.

"Therefore, even on the supposition that the entertainment of foreign Europeans by the Kashmir Durbar could be regarded as merely a matter of local or provincial interest, it would still seem that the instructions above quoted had been in some measure overlooked. But, secondly, to admit such a supposition would be, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, contrary to all precedent and principle. The entertainment of Europeans, especially Foreign Europeans, by Native States in India, is incontestably a matter of imperial concern. The grave complications which have arisen in past times from the free employment of foreign adventurers by the Native Durbars are well known; nor is it by any means safe to assume that similar causes might not hereafter produce similar embarrassments. To take one instance in point, His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor had under his notice some twelve months ago a very troublesome question regarding the exercise of jurisdiction over foreigners in Kashmir itself. Many other cases might be cited to show the necessity for carefully watching and controlling the entrance of Europeans into Native States, and the Governor-General in Council can have no hesitation in regarding the matter as one of political importance, which should, under the instructions of 1877, have been dealt with by the Officer on Special Duty."

Shortly afterwards the Punjab Government submitted a request from the Durbar for permission to employ a Mr. Johnson. Secret, December 1881, Nos. 533—538. This was referred to the Officer on Special Duty for opinion, and sanction was communicated through him. At the same time the Punjab Government was instructed to return similar applications in future to the Durbar for submission through the Officer on Special Duty.

In 1882 Mr. Henvey brought to notice that two Europeans had been engaged by the Durbar without sanction. He was told to point out to the Durbar that this procedure was in contravention of the seventh article of the treaty of Amritsar. The Durbar explained that the men had only been engaged temporarily, and that one was about to be discharged at once. Secret E., January 1883, Nos. 265—273. The Government of India replied thus to the Officer on Special Duty—

"The Governor-General in Council considers that the provisions of article VII of the treaty should be strictly adhered to, and I am to request you to inform the Durbar that the sanction of the Government of India should invariably be obtained before persons of the classes named in that article are entertained for His Highness's service either provisionally or permanently"

About the same time the Officer on Special Duty was ordered to submit, directly to the Foreign Department, half-yearly returns of Europeans and Eurasians in the service of the Kashmir Durbar. *Ibid.*, No. 266.

EXTRADITION.

Rules framed in 1856.—At the end of 1872 all Local Governments were consulted about rules to be framed under section 15 of Act XI of 1872. The Punjab Government replied that the extradition rules then obtaining in respect of Native States in the Punjab were contained in a notification published by the Chief Commissioner on the 23rd December 1858. These rules were originally drafted to meet the case of Kashmir. In April 1856 this Durbar made certain representations to the Chief Commissioner regarding the mutual surrender of offenders. The Chief Commissioner then recorded the following vernacular proceeding which contained rules about extradition :—

"The following translation of a vernacular proceeding of the Chief Commissioner, dated 28th May 1856, regarding surrender of offenders accused of heinous crimes, being subjects of a foreign State apprehended in British territory, and *vice versa*, is published for general information :—

"Read a petition of Dewan Jowala Sahai, Prime Minister of Maharaja Golab Singh Bahadour, Ruler of Jammu, dated 8th April last, relative to the demand and surrender, on both sides

(British and Jammu Governments), of persons accused of crimes as before, detailing the character of crimes, and soliciting suitable orders.

"It is desirable that the same rules which are in force, in accordance with the orders of Government, in respect to the demand and surrender of offenders accused of heinous crimes between the British Government and the foreign States, should be made applicable to this State (Jammu), so that the rule in this respect, with regard to all the foreign States, may be uniform.

"After examination of the office records, a list of heinous crimes for which parties committing them may be demanded or surrendered by either State in accordance with the under-mentioned rules is given below:—

1. Abduction of a female, whether married or unmarried, without her consent, attended with tumult or assault.
2. Affray.
3. Arson or incendiarism.
4. Assault attended with violence of blood.
5. Burglary.
6. Counterfeiting coin.
7. Child stealing.
8. Dacoity.
9. Forgery.
10. Homicide.
11. Convicts (under sentence for any of the crimes included in this category) escaped from prison.
12. Murder.
13. Administering poison.
14. Perjury.
15. Rape.
16. Highway robbery.
17. Selling females.
18. Thuggee.
19. Theft exceeding ₹50 in value.
20. Cattle theft.

"Except the 20 classes of crimes above enumerated, persons accused of petty theft under ₹50 value, or fornication (Fel-i-Shameea), or petty assault, or defaulters of revenue, or debtors in a civil case and the like, will not be liable to be demanded or surrendered on the part of either Government. In such cases, the plaintiff, being a resident of Jammu territory, will have the option of prosecuting his claim either in British Courts, or in the Courts of the Jammu Government. In the latter case, on the original proceedings of enquiry being forwarded by the Chiefs to a British Court, the claim of the prosecutor will be satisfied on its being substantiated in accordance with the established usage of the Court.

Rules for the apprehension, demand, and surrender of persons charged with the heinous crimes as enumerated above.

Firstly.—Any person being a British subject, having committed any crime of the class above enumerated in Jammu territory, will be punishable by the Government of the country. And in like manner any subject of the Jammu Government, if apprehended in British territory for a crime committed in that territory, will be punishable by British Courts.

But the Maharaja may (if he so choose) forward a subject of the British Government so circumstanced to a British Court for trial and punishment.

Secondly.—If a subject of the Jammu State should commit any crime of the classes enumerated above within British territory, or a subject of the British Government commit a crime in Jammu territory, and if the party, after committing such a crime, should escape to his home, then the British subject having committed crime in the Jammu territory if found in British territory will not be liable to be demanded by the Jammu Government. The Maharaja will, however, be at liberty to prosecute the party through his servants in the British Court, which will award due punishment if the charge shall be proved after enquiry.

But the Jammu subject, who shall have escaped to that territory, and be traced there after having committed crime in British territory, will be liable to be sent to British Courts on being demanded by British authorities.

Thirdly.—Subjects of either State who escape into foreign territory will be liable to be surrendered on being demanded by either Government for the surrender of an offender of this class by the Maharaja. If the party accused shall have been residing in British territory for a period of less than six months, the officer presiding on the local British Court shall, before giving up the party, institute a summary enquiry to ascertain whether the accused be really guilty of the charge brought against him to any extent; and should the guilt be imputable to the prisoner, he will then be made over to the Jammu authorities.

But if the party so demanded by the Jammu Government shall have resided in British territory for more than six months, he will not be liable to be surrendered to the Jammu authorities, but will be liable to be prosecuted in the British Court and punished on the charge being proved against him.



"*Fourthly*.—If on the occurrence of any crime in the Jammu territory, tracks of the offender should be followed into British territory, it will be the duty of the servants of the Maharaja to inform the local Police officers, and to take steps through their medium for the apprehension of the delinquent. The Maharaja's servants ought not to act independently of the British Police. The Police officers of the British Government should not, however, surrender to the Maharaja's officers any party who may be thus traced and apprehended without the permission of their District Court, whether he be a resident of foreign or British territory. But it will be the duty of the Police to report immediately the circumstances to the District Court and then act as they may be directed.

"*Fifthly*.—In like manner, if the track of any heinous crime committed within British territory should be pursued into the Jammu territory by officers of the British Police, they ought to inform the local Kardar, or Thannadar, and take steps for the apprehension of the delinquent through the Maharaja's Police. But British Police officers ought not to act independently of the local officers of the Jammu State.

* * * * *

"It is hereby ordered that a copy of this proceedings be forwarded under cover of a short Kharita to the Maharaja, with a request that he will act accordingly. Copies also to be forwarded with a transmitting English letter to each of the Commissioners of Peshawur, Lahore, Jhelum, and Trans-Sutlej States, with a request that they will furnish their Subordinate District Officers with a copy thereof for their guidance."

Effect of the rules discussed.—The Punjab Government argued in 1872

Judicial A., July 1872, No. 25. that these rules, having been assented to by the Kashmir and other States, were equivalent to a treaty within the meaning of section 4 of Act XI of 1872, and therefore that they were not affected by that section and could not be modified without the consent of the States concerned. The Government of India did not agree in this opinion, but held

* *Ibid*, No. 27.

that even if the rules had amounted to a treaty they would not have affected the Act or rules framed under it. The Chief Commissioner's rules might stand in respect to Kashmir so far as they were not inconsistent with the Act; but it would be open to the Durbar to follow the more favourable procedure of the Act. The Officer on Special Duty, it was observed, was a Political Agent within the meaning of the Act.

Further discussion.—In May 1877 the Officer on Special Duty raised

Judicial A., October 1877, Nos. 31-34. several questions as to the effect of the rules of 1858 when read with Act XI of 1872. It appeared that, under the orders of the Punjab Government, the rules of 1858 were considered to be in abeyance while the Officer on Special Duty was in Kashmir. During this time he followed the rules framed by the Governor-General in Council under Act XI of 1872. But Major Henderson showed that the Magistrates of British districts were generally inclined to follow the rules of 1858 which did not recognise a Political Agent's intervention; and, moreover, that the Maharaja would probably demur to the position of a Political Agent being assigned to the Officer on Special Duty, even for the purposes of Act XI of 1872. Major Henderson also pointed out several inconsistencies between the rules of 1858 and Act XI of 1872 and the rules framed under that Act. He therefore advised that the rules of 1858 should be recast, and should then be declared to constitute a treaty within the meaning of section 14 of Act XI of 1872. The Punjab Government agreed. The case was referred to the Standing Counsel, who replied that Act XI of 1872 and the rules framed under it contained the whole law about extradition in British India; that they superseded the rules of 1858, and that proceedings taken under the latter which conflicted with the former would be illegal. The Government of India were not convinced, and it was determined that the rules of 1858 should be left untouched, "until the validity of extradition under them has been impugned by competent judicial authority."

CHAPTER VII.

INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION: VARIOUS ACCOUNTS; THE FAMINE; THE DURBAR.

General sketch.—The territories of the Kashmir State are divided for administrative purposes into three principal portions. One comprises what Mr. Drew calls the "outlying Governorships" of Gilgit, Baltistan, and Ladakh; another includes Jammu and the neighbouring districts which were formerly petty Chiefships, Punch being on a different footing from the rest; the third consists of the province of Kashmir.

Throughout his dominions the Maharaja is the final Court of Appeal.

* Secret Consultation, 24th December 1847, No. 172.

In 1847* Golab Singh prohibited slavery, "suttee," and infanticide in all his territories.

Gilgit, Baltistan, and Ladakh.—About the "outlying Governorships" little need be said. Each is under a Governor (Gilgit is at present under two Joint-Governors) who corresponds directly with the Maharaja, and who

† Drew's Jammu and Kashmir Territories, pp. 497-498.

‡ Girdlestone's memorandum dated the 14th November 1871, on "The Maharaja of Kashmir."

a heavy one. Of Baltistan

§ Central Asia, Part VII, Section II compilation by the Quartermaster-General's Department).

apparently† has considerable independence in internal matters. The countries thus administered are not productive. Gilgit does not‡ pay the cost of military occupation; and the State demand is light‡ because the people would probably resist still less is known. The Governor is supposed to reside at Skardo, but actually§ lives at Jammu. In Ladakh§ there is a Governor who must be chiefly at Leh, because he is a Joint-Commissioner under the commercial treaty of 1870. Under him there are five "thanadars." The revenue is derived mainly from a house-tax and transit duties, and it covers the expenses of the province.

|| Drew, page 497.

Jammu—Is the head-quarters of the Maharaja. Around it there are seven|| administrative districts, *ris*, Jammu proper, Jasrota, Ramnagar, Adampur, Riasi, Minawar, and Naushabra. These are divided into 'tehsils', and may be said to correspond roughly to Deputy Commissionerships. There are courts of justice in each. The districts have been surveyed and assessed, and the land revenue is paid

¶ Pol. A., February 1874, No. 272.

in cash. The last settlement¶ was made in 1873, for a period of ten years. The cultivated area was then found to have extended considerably since 1860, and the rates were raised by 10 per centum. The general condition of these districts appears** to be fair.

** Central Asia, Part VII, section I.

†† The boundaries of Punch are a branch of the Pir Panjal range on the north; the same range on the east; Rajouri and other Jammu districts on the south; the Jhelum on the west.

‡‡ Drew, page 497.

§§ Pol. A., July 1868, Nos. 116—117.

Punch††—As already observed, Punch is the *jagir* of the Maharaja's cousin Moti Singh. It is held‡‡ by him in close dependence on the Maharaja, who, however, interferes but little in its internal management. In 1863 Pandit Munphul drew up "Notes§§ on Punch" for the Punjab Government, which are printed as Appendix (B.) They describe the *jagir* as divided into seven administrative districts, yielding an unalienated revenue of nearly three lakhs. The land revenue was regularly assessed and collected in cash, but various taxes were taken in kind. The courts of justice were said to be primitive. The *tehsildars* did the original work, and the Raja heard appeals. The system of monopolising trade in the hands of Government officials was noticed, and finally it was remarked that—

"the administration of Raja Moti Singh is complained of as being very oppressive, and the taxation as exceedingly heavy."

On the other hand Sir O. St. John has recently referred in a demi-official letter of the 6th August 1883 to the "success of (the Maharaja's) cousin Moti Singh of PUNCH in governing that little dependent State."

Kashmir.—"The separation of the Government of Kashmir," according to Mr. Drew, "from that of the other divisions, is almost complete: the country is treated as a separate *suba* or province in the same way as it was when the Emperors of Delhi ruled over it." It is administered by a Governor who is called the *Suba*. It is divided into the districts of Srinagar, Patan, Islamabad, Kamraj, Shuyyon, and Mozufferabad, which again are sub-divided into a number of *parganas*. The chief executive authority is the *suba*, under whom are the *wuzzeers*, or district officers, and the *tehsildars*. The courts of justice are classified thus by Mr. Girdlestone:—†

* *Drew*, page 497.

† Memorandum on Kashmir and some adjacent countries, page 5.

Secret, March 1874, Nos. 172-173.

"(1) Court of the *tehsildar*, who may hear civil suits not exceeding R 100 in value and has power of imprisonment up to one month in criminal cases.

"(2) Court of the *Wuzzeer*, having power to hear civil cases up to R 1,000 in value and to punish in criminal cases with imprisonment up to six months. Appeals lie to him both in civil and criminal cases from the *tehsildar*.

"(3) The City (Srinagar) Magistrate's Court, with power to hear civil cases up to R 5,000 in value and to punish in criminal cases with imprisonment up to two years. This Court has no appellate jurisdiction.

"(4) The Chief Court, hearing civil suits without any limitation in regard to value, and empowered in criminal cases to punish with imprisonment for five years. Appeals lie to this Court both in criminal and civil cases from the city and district (*Wuzzeer's*) Courts, those from the latter being usually heard by the Chief Judge *in circuit*, which he undertakes not only on this account, but also in order to inspect the local registers, and to enforce the duties of the village headmen, who are held answerable for detecting and reporting crimes, and for exerting themselves for the arrest of offenders."

Political interest in the Maharaja's administration is concerned chiefly with Kashmir.—The brief historical sketch which has been given will serve to show that the province of Kashmir stands, in respect of the British Government, on a footing different from that of the other component parts of the State. It is the one portion of which both the constructive and the actual possession was derived by Golab Singh directly from the British Government. Hence that Government has never been able to divest itself entirely of moral responsibility on account of Kashmir. And this obligation has been the more difficult owing to certain historical and physical characteristics of the country. Kashmir has been the subject of a succession of conquests, and of a corresponding series of misgovernments. Its Mussulman population has been ruled by aliens in creed since the time of Ranjit Singh. It is a land of great natural capacities; but its mountains hinder intercourse with other countries.

Policy of the treaty of Amritsar.—The extracts which have been quoted from the treaties of 1846, and from Lord Hardinge's connected despatches, indicate that, when the treaty of Amritsar was concluded, the object in view was to establish a strong Rajput power, hostile to, and independent of, the Sikhs. The object was one of political importance at the time; and in order to obtain it the Governor-General was prepared to leave the new Ruler as unfettered in administrative details as his Sikh predecessors had been.

Change caused by the conduct of Golab Singh.—But the conduct of the Maharaja in regard to Sheik Inam-ud-din's rebellion made a change of policy necessary. In the first place the Government was obliged to undertake to some extent the very military burden which it had sought to throw on Golab Singh, and at a peculiarly inconvenient time. Further, it became evident that the opposition to the new Maharaja was due in a great measure to his own character as a ruler. He was intensely avaricious, and consequently left his establishments unpaid, levied heavy taxes, and encroached on his feudatories. These evils the Government of India had, apart from matters of sentiment, a direct personal interest in removing. The sentimental reasons were also strong. When the treaty of Amritsar was concluded, its scope might fairly be said to be merely this, that Golab Singh was allowed *carte blanche* to carry out the policy which he had inaugurated when he obtained the governorship of

Kashmir for his friend and creature Mohi-ud-din in 1841. As far as the province was concerned it seemed that the treaty merely transferred the administration from the alien Sikh Durbar to its most capable lieutenant. But the circumstances of Sheik Imam-ud-din's rebellion, and more especially the support which he received from the hill Chiefs around Jammu and Mozufferabad, showed that Golab Singh's rule was distasteful to, and could be resisted by, his new subjects. Since therefore the Government of India forced that rule on the insurgents they were bound to try to eradicate its manifest defects.

Deputation of British officers to advise the Maharaja.—Consequently, when the Government of India consented to give material aid to Golab Singh in reducing Sheik Imam-ud-din, they also urged upon him the necessity for mending his ways. And at His Highness' own special* request two officers were sent to help him with advice, while he proceeded with troops to Srinagar. Their functions were strictly limited to advice. They were to "remember that the Maharaja Golab Singh is an independent sovereign." Still the advice might be plain. It was to relate as much as possible to the affairs of Kashmir. When Golab Singh had been established in Srinagar, the Governor General's Agent (Colonel Lawrence) gave him more advice. And here it took a precise form: for instance, the Maharaja was required to give a written promise about the treatment of some of the hill Chiefs. Colonel Lawrence could only stay for a few days in Srinagar, but he left an assistant to advise the Maharaja.

* Secret Consultation, 26th December 1846, No. 1216.

† Secret Consultation, 26th December 1846, No. 1242.

"Under any circumstances," he wrote, "one officer will go to Hazara, and one remain until affairs are brought into some order."

Accordingly, first, Lieutenant Reynell Taylor, and then Mr. P. S. Melvill also, was sent to Kashmir. The instructions which they received are not on record, but it is evident from their diaries that they were both intended to enquire thoroughly into the state of the country, while Mr. Taylor was to point out to the Maharaja the reforms which these enquiries suggested. Here again the system of the advice was retained. But it is clear that Mr. Taylor considered himself bound to enter into details. One‡ of his diaries for instance contains the entry—

"Heard the case of the murderers."

This was an ordinary murder; yet Lieutenant Taylor felt his responsibility, for he went on to say—

"It is a serious thing, even in this way, to have in a manner to sanction capital punishment."

Result of Lieutenant Taylor's deputation.—The principal fact which is illustrated by the diaries and reports of Messrs. Melvill and Taylor is that Golab Singh took over Kashmir when it had reached a state of much misery and misgovernment. The evils which prevailed at that time had not been caused by Golab Singh; but were the legacies of the Sikhs.

The matters which seem to have chiefly occupied Mr. Taylor's attention were, the badness of the land revenue system, the general heaviness of taxation, more especially in the case of the shawl§ manufacture; the restrictions on trade imposed by a Government monopoly of grain and all important products, heavy transit duties, forced labour, bad roads, prohibition of emigration. It is remarkable that no mention is made of a bad administration of justice or of religious intolerance.

After some months spent in enquiry and advice Lieutenant Taylor succeeded|| by the end of the year 1847 in inducing the Maharaja to agree to a programme of reforms, designed to remedy the most serious evils. Thus His Highness signed a set of regulations¶ about the shawl manufacture, and another** about the whole system of administration. These with Lieutenant Taylor's last report are printed as Appendices (4) & (5). Having accomplished

‡ Secret Consultation, 28th January 1849, No. 38.

§ Secret Consultation, 28th August 1847, No. 190.

** Secret Consultation, 28th January 1849, No. 39.

* Secret Consultation, 28th January 1848, No. 30.

so much Lieutenant Taylor left the country. He recorded[¶] his opinion that—

"The Maharaja's acts, with regard to the actual cultivators of the soil, have been characterised generally by kindness and consideration; and that in no instance have his demands from them exceeded those of his predecessors, while in some they have fallen short of them."

On the whole Lieutenant Taylor hoped for good results from his work; and the Governor General wrote a despatch which took the same view.

Within a few weeks Lieutenant Vans Agnew passed through Srinagar on his way from Gilgit to Lahore. He wrote a memorandum and demi-official letter in which he positively affirmed[†] that Golab Singh had not fulfilled his promised reforms. The revenue system was as bad as ever: taxation was no less oppressive; and above all the State monopoly of grain and other produce remained undiminished. In fact Mr. Taylor had done harm rather than good:

"Those who did not come forward are now told that they must have no cause of complaint; and those who did are twitted with their so doing, and told that having got what they could (*i. e.*, *nothing*) by complaining, they need expect no more."

Neither the Governor General's Agent nor the Government of India could readily accept this direct contradiction of Lieutenant Taylor's words. Colonel Lawrence believed that Mr. Agnew had been misled by hastily listening to a few complainants of one class. At the same time he thought that there must

† Secret Consultation, 27th November 1847, No. 48, and 28th January 1848, No. 41.

be some ground for the charges made, and he therefore proposed[‡] that Mr. J. Lawrence and Mr. Vans Agnew should be deputed in the spring of 1848 to make further enquiries. At the same time he warned[‡] the Maharaja that persistent neglect to redress serious evils would compel the Government of India to interfere directly in his affairs. Lord Hardinge agreed[‡] with Colonel Lawrence and emphasised the admonition given to Golab Singh. Of these measures the Court of Directors "heartily approved."[§]

In February 1848 Mr. John Lawrence, who had succeeded his brother as Resident at Lahore, wrote again about Kashmir affairs. He said^{||} that he had very strongly urged upon the Maharaja the necessity for carrying out the stipulated reforms. All accounts from Kashmir, he admitted, were bad. They should be received with some reserve, but the result was certainly unfavourable. On the other hand, there was no evidence of unusual cruelty or "signal oppression." It was true that the Maharaja was "the great grain factor;" but this was due to the fact that the revenue was taken in kind while the country was inaccessible. The shawl trade, too, had always been in the hands of the State. Similarly, all the chief products of the country had, under the Sikh rule, been monopolised by the Government. "The real point," said Mr. J. Lawrence, "is whether his exactions and interference are greater or less than formerly."

In regard to the deputation of Mr. Agnew and himself, Mr. Lawrence said that the former did not wish to go and could not be an impartial judge; while he himself had a number of Sessions cases to try. For these reasons the proposed deputation was postponed.[¶]

No further enquiry made.—The proposed enquiry was never made. For many years after 1848 the Government of India had much to occupy them in their own affairs without attending to the internal administration of Kashmir. Besides, after the great services rendered by Golab Singh and the present Maharaja during the mutiny, there must have been reluctance to resort to a system of interference which was known to be highly distasteful to the ruler of the Kashmir State. Information has, however, been collected from time to time about the system of administration.

Description of the country in 1861.—In 1861 the Officer on Special Duty wrote^{**} unfavourably of the state of the country and the system of administration. He reported that the land revenue was collected in kind, two-thirds of the crop being taken by the Government. Cultivation was decreasing. The season had been bad, and the grain monopoly maintained by the Maharaja resulted in fraud and in

** Political A., January 1862, No. 230.

"apparent scarcity of food."

"Moreover," he said, "the Maharaja has a share of all produce, whatever be its value. Justice was practically unknown: those who can pay can at any time get out of jail, while the poor and destitute live and die there without hope, and without even the common justice of any term of imprisonment being either fixed or awarded."

Finally he wrote—

"The people of Kashmir are wretchedly poor, and in any other country their state would be almost one of starvation and famine In a country capable of supporting a large population nature has done everything, art little or nothing."

Description of the country in 1863.—Mr. Forsyth prepared "Notes* on Kashmir and Jammu" in 1863. It was said that they might be "considered reliable." They are printed as Appendix (6). The following extracts may be quoted here:—

"The population of the capital, Srinagar, is returned at 81,153 souls:

Hindus	9,370
Mussulmans	72,830

"There are 16,529 houses in the city. The revenues of the province of Kashmir proper are shown in detail. The total revenues from all sources may be thus summarised:—

<i>Kashmir Proper.</i>		<i>Co.'s R</i>
Land		17,73,632
Other sources		10,63,086
		28,58,000

* * * * *

"In Kashmir proper the collections are made in both cash and kind.

"The revenues are to a large extent farmed out.

"Where kind rates prevail, the following is the apportionment of the rice, maize, and pulse produce:—

"Government share	½ gross produce.
also Tirukko	4 tiruks per kharwar. ¹
"Canoongo	1 munwutta per kharwar.
"Putwaree	1 Do. do.
"Zilladar or chowkeydar	1 Do. do.
"Russoon khidmutgaree	6 tiruks per 100 kharwars.
"Khidmutgaree	
"Religious grants to temples	7 tiruks per 100 kharwars.

"leaving a balance of about one-third to the zemindar.

"Cash rates are levied on wheat, barley, mussoor, flax, oorud, tel, moong, cotton, and on one-half estimated value of gross produce; and 2 tiruks and 1 munwutta per kharwar.

* * * * *

"The Maharaja has the monopoly of the sale of rice throughout the valley; he takes the best rice as his share from the zemindar.

"The rice is sold to shawl weavers at a fixed rate of Rs. 2 per kharwar = 1 rupee per 1 maund 3 seers; to others it is sold at the current rates: rice is also given in rations to the army.

* * * * *

"Rice is the staple produce of the valley of Kashmir, and this tax is taken in kind by the Maharaja, who stores the rice in granaries; it is estimated that 12,35,358 kharwars, or about 25,00,000 maunds, are yearly garnered. Of this about four lakhs of kharwars are sold to the shawl weavers at the fixed rate of R 2 per kharwar, and the rest is distributed to the troops in rations or sold in the valley, or exported.

* * * * *

"The Maharaja of Kashmir has few of his relatives or kinsmen in high office, as he fears their intrigues.

¹ Table of Kashmir weights.

1 Seer 5 chustaks English standard	= 1 Munwutta.
4 Munwuttas	= 1 Tiruk = 5 seers 4 chustaks English standard.
16 Tiruks	= 1 kharwar = 2 maunds 4 seers English standard.

"His chief officers are natives of the Punjab, and the family of Dewan Jowala Sahai exercise the chief influence over his councils; this family belongs to the town of Eminabad, in the Gujranwalla District.

* * * *

"The general appearance of the country gives an idea of poverty. There are few men of respectable, none of wealthy, appearance. As compared with the hills of Kullu, Busahir, and Gurhwal, the houses of Kashmir are inferior, and the people seem to have much less spirit than their neighbours in the East.

"The present Maharaja, however, does not oppress his subjects, as Golab Singh did, and he has made remissions of taxes in their favour. Had he the moral courage to overcome the opposition of his ministers, the Maharaja might make his rule very beneficial to the people; as it is, however, the officials exercise great power, and to their own advantage.

"One great blot on the Maharaja's rule is the state of trade and the almost prohibitive duties levied on all merchandise imported or exported."

Description of the country in 1871.—Mr. Girdlestone, in November 1871,

* "The Maharaja of Kashmir."

recorded some remarks* which are printed as Appendix 7. He thought that much attention was paid to public business both by the Maharaja and by his officials. His Highness, though no statesman, was well meaning. But he was extremely superstitious and too much influenced by the family of the old Dewan Jowala Sahai; he was also fickle and impulsive. The condition of the labouring classes was on the whole fair: "though their standard of living is not a high one it is far removed from actual want." But the revenue demand was excessive, and much cultivable land was lying waste. The agricultural population was scanty, a large number being employed as mere carriers. Communications also were bad. In short, Kashmir was "a country of neglected opportunities."

Description of the country in 1872.—The Maharaja published a report

Political A., February 1874, Nos. 271-278.

on the administration of Jammu and Kashmir during the year 1872. A good summary of it was given by Mr. Wynne, the Officer on Special Duty in 1873, in a paper which is printed as Appendix 9. It presented several satisfactory features—educational progress; horse and cattle breeding; tea and silk cultivation; police reorganization in Srinagar; proposals for outlay on roads. But the most important point was a reform in the revenue administration of the province. This purported to be the abolition of the system of farming the land revenue, of taking the revenue in kind, and of the Government monopoly of grain; and the substitution, save in a few exceptional districts, of leases embodying a cash settlement fixed for three years between the State and the cultivator. Mr. Wynne laid stress on the fact that—

"the Maharaja inherited from previous administrations a most unfortunate revenue system, the evils of which were but slightly lessened by the various experiments that had been made previous to this year of real improvement."

To illustrate this statement he sketched the history of the revenue system, showing that the demand had been increased by the Mussulman kings of Kashmir, and then by the Delhi Emperors till it reached its climax under the Afghan rule. Under the Sikhs a very high rate had been retained notwithstanding reductions made by the Governor Mian Singh. The Maharaja Golab Singh had granted a slight remission. His son had also made changes in this direction, but throughout the system of farming had been retained, and with it the intervention between the State and the cultivator of a crowd of petty and extortionate officials.

The Punjab Government commented on the reform introduced in 1872 in these words:—

"In reference to the reform of the land revenue administration, the account of the past assessments of Kashmir is interesting. It affords a vivid picture of the difficulties and abuses connected with grain collections by State officers, and His Honour trusts that, however, hateful the reform may be to those who lose thereby the opportunity for extortion, His Highness will never be induced to retrace his steps. But, though the reform is doubtless a great step in the advance, and was creditable to the Maharaja's statesmanship, the assessment, judged by the standard of those effected in British territory, must be considered high. The assessment, it appears, is based upon the principle that the State is entitled to the value of 82 per cent. of the gross produce calculated on the average of 10 years, from which demand, however, remissions

are made of one-sixth, one-fifth, or one-fourth, according to the circumstances of each village. Allowing for the deductions made, the land revenue demand in Kashmir is still upwards of three times the maximum demand in settlements now being made in the Punjab, and contrast even more remarkably with the settlement recently effected in the adjacent British districts of Hazara."

The Kashmir famine.—The condition of Kashmir is best known in connection with the famine of 1878-79-80. It will be convenient first to follow the correspondence on this subject in some detail.

Summary of correspondence.—In January and February 1878, Major

Letters to Foreign Department, dated 16th and 24th January and 16th February.

General B., March 1878, Nos. 106-108.

Henderson, the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, reported that he had good reasons for believing that there would be great scarcity, if not actual famine, throughout Kashmir during the ensuing year. As the summer progressed, Mr. Henvey, who had succeeded Major Henderson, received letters from visitors to the valley, reporting the existence of great distress in Lahoul, and at Baramulla, Chakoti, and Uri, one traveller writing that—

"the people between Goond and Dars were eating grass and roots, and had eaten nothing else for two months according to their own account."

On receipt of these letters it was arranged that the Foreign Department should not undertake any administrative measures for relief of the scarcity, and that all material aid should come from the Punjab Government. The Home

Demi-official letter of 1st July 1878.

Political A., December 1878, Nos. 155-209, K. W. No. 20.

enquire from His Highness

Demi-official from Mr. Cordery to Secretary, dated 6th July 1878.

Ibid., K. W. No. 23.

local authorities might be

Letter dated 7th July and copy of telegram to Punjab Government, forwarded, with demi-official from Mr. Cordery to Mr. Bernard, dated 12th July.

Ibid., K. W. Nos. 26, 28.

only 390 maunds of wheat

Vide Mr. Cordery's demi-official to Secretary, dated 12th July 1878.

Ibid., K. W. No. 26.

were living on mulberries,

Vide demi-official from Mr. Cordery, to Mr. Bernard, dated 16th July 1878.

Ibid., K. W. No. 27.

the rabi harvest would not

Letter forwarded by Mr. Cordery in demi-official to Secretary, dated 6th July, and demi-official of Mr. Henvey's to Secretary, dated 7th July 1878.

Ibid., K. W. Nos. 23, 24.

In consequence of these

**Vide* demi-official from Mr. Cordery, dated 31st July 1878.

Ibid., K. W. Nos. 30-31.

valley for the remainder of

the country was of little use,

No. 1132, dated 12th August 1878.

to the effect that Kashmir

On the 31st July the Punjab Secretary wrote demi-officially to the Foreign

Secretary, informing him that the Maharaja's agents had purchased 12,000 maunds of grain at Jhelum, and were purchasing more at Rawalpindi, and that they had applied for

† *Ibid.*, K. W. No. 30.

* No. 1182, dated 12th August 1878, K. W. No. 82.

carriage sufficient to convey two lakhs of maunds ; and on the 10th* August he wrote again that the agents had come to terms with the owners of carriage in the Rawalpindi Division, and that grain was now being exported. Mr. Cordery also forwarded two demi-official letters from Mr. Henvey dated the 25th July and 1st August, giving an account of the state of the country and the measures which the Durbar was taking for the relief of the famine. Mr. Henvey wrote that the mortality was awful, that the Lolab was absolutely depopulated, and the country between Bandipur, Gurais, and Astor, was a desert ; and that Vazir Punnoo had informed him that the food-stocks in the country on the 28th June amounted to 87,000 kharwars of paddy, 12,000 kharwars of wheat, and 2,000 kharwars of barley, and that the outturn of the rabi was much less than had been anticipated. He added, however, that there was no question but that the Durbar was thoroughly alarmed, and he had been informed that the Maharaja intended to import not less than 3½ lakhs of maunds of grain, while some grain had actually reached Srinagar and was being sold at a loss by the Maharaja's orders. He also enclosed a paper which had been sent to him privately by Dewan Anant Ram showing the measures which the Durbar had already taken and proposed to take for the relief of the famine. These measures were as follows :—

- (a) It was proposed to spend three lakhs of rupees in the purchase of grain from the Punjab, Jhappa, and Manawar, and about one lakh had already been expended.
- (b) Notices had been issued to the general public and traders in Srinagar and in the direction of the Punjab, that any trader might import grain free of duty from the Punjab into Srinagar, and rewards and *khilats* would be given by the Maharaja in proportion to the amount of grain imported.
- (c) That barley and wheat would be sold at the same price as in former years.
- (d) That lakhs of kharwars of rice had already been sold by Government at the old cheap rate.
- (e) That poor-houses had been established at Srinagar, in Kamraj, Shapyon, and in Anuntnag.
- (f) That relief works, such as repairs to roads, forts, &c., had been arranged for.
- (g) That officers had been deputed with money to different parganas to buy forest produce from the zemindars.
- (h) That food was daily distributed to the poor in Srinagar, and the cost defrayed by the Durbar and charitable contributions.
- (i) That the Maharaja had appointed a committee composed of leading Hindus and Muhammadans of Srinagar to supervise measures for famine relief.
- (j) That the Durbar had arranged to buy any grain that might be brought into the valley by private traders at a price which would give the trader half an anna in the rupee clear profit.

On the 15th* August the Secretary in the Home Department wrote demi-

* *Ibid.*, K. W. No. 32.

officially to the Punjab Government that he was glad to see that the Durbar were taking measures for the relief of the scarcity, and that as the Maharaja had not accepted the proffered aid, the Government could only prepare for the immigration of starving paupers. He therefore proposed that the Maharaja should be informed that the temporary sojourn of immigrants in British territory would not be objected to. Mr. Cordery in reply suggested that the immigrants might be set to work on the Punjab

Northern State Railway or the Railway from Chak Nizain to Guzerat. He also forwarded another letter from Mr. Henvey reporting that the relief works which had been started by the Durbar were an absurd pretence, and that guards were placed at all the passes to prevent emigration from the country. Mr. Henvey's letter contained an extract from a letter from Mons. Ermens, the head of the Maharaja's Agricultural Department, saying that the greater part of the land in the valley was uncultivated, and that he feared "Kashmir was

in its death agony." Relief works were then opened at Rawalpindi by order of the Punjab Government for the Kashmiris who had made their way out of the valley; but on the 27th August the Commissioner telegraphed* that they all, with the exception of the sick and infirm, had fled from Rawalpindi directly the works were opened.

In the beginning of August the Secretary to the Famine Commission wrote to the Punjab Government requesting information regarding the famine in Kashmir, and the measures adopted by the Maharaja and the Punjab Government for its relief.

Letter No. 134, dated 2nd August 1878.
(Poll. A., December 1879, No. 166.)

Mr. Henvey was accordingly called upon by the Punjab Government for a report, which he furnished in his letter No. 521,† dated 21st August 1878, to the Government of the Punjab. The substance of this report was as follows:—

† Poll. A., December 1879, No. 168.

The famine was confined to the province of Kashmir proper, Jammu and Ladakh being fairly well off. The crop in Kashmir on which the people chiefly relied for food was rice, though a small quantity of wheat, barley, maize, millet, and buckwheat were also grown. The Maharaja took one-half of the gross produce of the land, generally in kind; but a custom appeared to have prevailed by which the State took more than half its proper share of rice, and allowed the zemindar in compensation to take more than the regular share of miscellaneous grains, such as millet and maize. The grain thus collected by Government was supplied at fixed rates to the officials and population.

The famine was first caused by an untimely fall of rain and snow in the kharif harvest of 1877, which destroyed the standing crops; whereupon the Kashmir officials, seeing that famine was inevitable, collected all the rice they could lay their hands on, so that no surplus stocks were left in the villages.

In April 1878 the Dewan informed Mr. Henvey that the stocks of food in the valley amounted to seven lakhs of maunds of shali (unhusked rice, which would yield about half that quantity of grain), and that this, with the produce of the rabi crop, would be sufficient till the next kharif. The rabi, however, was injured by wet and unseasonable weather, and the outturn was only about 1,00,000 maunds of barley and wheat, instead of four lakhs of maunds as the Durbar expected. The rain was succeeded by weeks of very hot dry weather, which was unfavourable for the kharif sowings, and then a great portion of the valley was flooded by an unusual rush of water from the hill streams swollen with snow, the fall in 1876 having been extraordinarily heavy. To crown all, the fruit on which many of the poor people in the valley generally subsist for weeks was scanty.

The gravity of the crisis was not at first appreciated by Vazir Punnoo, the Governor of Srinagar, and he consequently did not report matters in their true light to the Maharaja. As the summer proceeded, however, His Highness became alarmed by the reports at length supplied by Vazir Punnoo and the accounts given by travellers and emigrants to Jammu, and he then directed that the measures for famine relief, which have been already specified, should be undertaken. In August 1878 the situation was this:—The stock of old rice was low and bad, and the maize, millet, and buckwheat crop was short and thin. The rice in the eastern section of the valley was good, but the area sown was not one-half of the average, while in the western section the area sown was not one-fourth of the average, so that under the most favourable circumstances, the outturn of the kharif of 1878 would be less than that of 1877. The millet and maize crop was said to have been given up to the zemindars, and a small amount of grain had arrived from the Punjab, but the free importation of grain was prevented by the state of the roads which the heavy rain had rendered almost impassable.

Mr. Henvey considered the measures of famine relief proposed by the Durbar (with the exception of the daily distribution of food) to be mere paper schemes, as it was out of the question that labourers on public works would be supplied with food when there was not grain enough in the country for those who had money to pay. A few of the inhabitants had made their escape from the valley across the mountains, but the Durbar discouraged emigration, and

placed guards at the passes to prevent it. The severity of the famine, Mr. Henvey attributed to the—

- (a) want of any revenue settlement ;
- (b) difficulty of the approaches to the country ;
- (c) system under which the State was the only grain-seller ;
- (d) prohibition against emigration ;
- (e) dishonesty of the Durbar's servants, which was largely to be attributed to the irregularity with which they received their wages.

The remedies suggested by Mr. Henvey were the importation of grain and the employment of trustworthy agents to superintend its distribution.

The Secretary to the Punjab Government, in submitting this report, added*

* Poll. A., December 1879, No. 162. that the Maharaja had been recommended to allow free emigration, and the Commissioner at Rawalpindi had been directed to facilitate the transport of grain into the valley.

On the 31st August the Punjab Government forwarded demi-officially a copy of a letter addressed to Mr. Henvey by Dewan Anant Ram, reporting that the zemindars were

being allowed to eat the "chena" and "kangani" crop, and that the maize when ripe would be given over to them in the same way ; that the Maharaja's agents had purchased 50,000 maunds of grain, though there was some difficulty in obtaining carriage for transport ; and that the Maharaja had remitted the tax on shawl-weaving for two months. On the

21st September the Punjab Government forwarded a copy of a letter written by the Maharaja in reply to their letter recommending him to allow free

emigration, saying that he had no objection to the emigration of his famine-stricken subjects as a temporary measure, and that cooked food was supplied to emigrants *en route* at Nath, Ram Bau, Udhampur, and Jammu. On the 28th September the Punjab Government forwarded three letters† from Mr. Henvey, reporting that Dewan Anant Ram had

been deputed from Jammu to make arrangements for famine relief, and giving an account of the measures taken by the Dewan on his arrival at Srinagar. The Dewan had first issued an address informing the farmers of the revenue that they would assuredly be held responsible for the revenue and all arrears, but exhorting them at the same time to leave to the zemindars their full share of the crops, and directing the village officers to sedulously protect the crops against theft. The necessity of cultivating all available land for the rabi was also strictly enjoined. The Dewan informed Mr. Henvey that, from what he had seen, and from the official reports he had received, he believed that the outturn of the kharif would be about 12 annas in the rupee, and that with the produce of the rabi there would be sufficient food to last for ten months. He asked Mr. Henvey for his advice, and a meeting was then held to discuss measures of famine-relief, at which the Dewan, Mr. Henvey, Mr. Wade, and Dr. Downes, Missionaries, and Mr. Russell and Mr. Chapman, merchants, were present. A scheme was drawn up arranging for the establishment of relief works for the able-bodied, and a gratuitous distribution of food to the weak, but Mr. Henvey was not sanguine as to its success, though the arrival of the Dewan had been followed by a more ready sale of food to those who had money to buy.

Early in September the Government of India came to the conclusion that, on the one hand, the condition of Kashmir rendered it necessary that the British Government as the paramount power should assist the Maharaja to prevent the complete depopulation of his country ; and that on the other, owing to the difficulty of importing food into the country, and the impossibility of undertaking any relief measures in the interior of the country without subverting the Maharaja's authority, the only way of co-operating with the Durbar's efforts for the alleviation of the distress was to encourage emigration from Kashmir into British territory. It was proposed therefore that the consent of the Maharaja should be obtained and arrangements made by the Commissioner of Rawalpindi and the Governor of Kashmir for the emigration of about 60,000 persons from

† Poll. A., December 1879, Nos. 155-259, K. W. No. 34.

‡ Poll. A., December 1879, Nos. 164-166.)

§ Letter No. 789C, dated 21st September 1878.

¶ Letter No. 841C, dated 28th September.

‡ Dated 14th, 15th, and 18th September.

§ Poll. A., December 1879, Nos. 169-178.)

¶ Poll. A., December 1879, Nos. 155-259, K. W. No. 35.

‡ Poll. A., December 1879, Nos. 155-259, K. W. No. 36.

§ Poll. A., December 1879, Nos. 155-259, K. W. No. 37.

¶ Poll. A., December 1879, Nos. 155-259, K. W. No. 38.

‡ Poll. A., December 1879, Nos. 155-259, K. W. No. 39.

§ Poll. A., December 1879, Nos. 155-259, K. W. No. 40.

¶ Poll. A., December 1879, Nos. 155-259, K. W. No. 41.

Kashmir by the Murree and Guzerat routes, depôts of food being established on the way; that the immigrants should be employed on relief works by the Punjab Government; that the cost of the relief works should be borne by Government, but that the Maharaja should pay all expenses connected with the establishment of emigration routes and the feeding of emigrants unfit for work. It was also arranged that Mr. Henvey should visit Jammu, and that the Punjab Government should depute an officer to meet him there, to consult with the Maharaja and explain to him the views and proposals of Government.

The result of this consultation was embodied in a note* by Mr. Bernard, and was sent to the Punjab Government for an expression of opinion.

* Political A., December 1879, Nos. 165-289, K. W. No. 2.

The Lieutenant-Governor agreed that Mr. Henvey should visit Jammu and consult personally with the Maharaja, but he considered that the obstacles in the way of emigration on the scale proposed were so great, that it would be easier to convey grain to the people in Kashmir than to bring them to the Punjab, the Government should rather strive to second the efforts of the Maharaja to convey grain into the country, European officers being appointed to supervise its distribution.

Mr. Lepel Griffin's demi-official to Secretary, dated 10th September 1879. (*Ibid.*, K. W., No. 36.)

Secretary's demi-official, dated 10th September 1879.

(*Ibid.*, K. W., No. 37.)
Secretary's telegram, dated 17th September 1879.

(Poll. A., December 1879, No. 163.)
† Poll. A., December 1879, No. 174.

ing him that his own stay in time.

Mr. Henvey was accordingly directed to postpone his departure from Kashmir and authorised to summon the British Joint Commissioner at Leh to Srinagar to assist him. Shortly afterwards† he was directed to proceed to Jammu to consult with the Maharaja on measures for famine relief, inform-

The Punjab Government was requested to depute an officer to meet

Letter of Government of India, Nos. 2656G & 2657G., dated 3rd October 1878.
(Poll. A., December 1879, No. 175.)

Mr. Henvey at Jammu, and consult with him and the Maharaja. It was suggested that the civil officers of Sialkot, Guzerat, and Rawalpindi should be directed to assist the Maharaja's agents in transporting grain, and the Lieutenant-Governor was authorised to appoint special European officers to superintend the transport; the cost being liable to subsequent adjustment with the Durbar, and all details being arranged with the Maharaja's officials. Mr. Henvey was at the same time requested to personally explain to the Maharaja the reasons which had induced the Government of India to offer their assistance, and to impress upon him the necessity of hearty co-operation with any measures that might be adopted.

On the 22nd September Mr. Henvey wrote that the relief measures had not gone much beyond the limit of good intentions, and that, though a small quantity of Punjabi wheat was daily arriving in the country, cheap food was not procurable by the poorer classes. He had been informed that the estimate of the rice crop about Islamabad was 12 annas in the rupee, in Shapyon 8 annas, and in Kamraj 4 annas. He had learnt from Dewan Anant Ram that three new poor-houses had been established at Golad Bagh, the Government School at Maharajgunj, and Nowshera, that arrangements had been made for supplying grain to respectable paupers and receiving those unable to work into the poor-houses; and that the able-bodied poor would be employed either on transport duty or Mons. Ermens' workshops.

On the 26th September Mr. Henvey reported that he had an opportunity of seeing the relief works at Hari Parbat, and that, although he had no doubt preparations had been made for his arrival, he could only see 25 or 30 old women and children employed in throwing earth on a small out-work. He doubted, in spite of the Durbar's assertions, whether emigration was in reality freely allowed.

Forwarded by Punjab Government in their letter No. 898C., dated 7th October.
(Poll. A., December 1879, Nos. 179 & 180.)

On 29th September Mr. Henvey wrote again that, in spite of the assurances of the Dewan that emigration was freely permitted and the guards withdrawn from the passes, no proclamation to that effect had been issued, and the people were ignorant that they were at liberty to leave the country; and further, that a European gentleman lately leaving the country had been obliged to procure a pass for some of his servants who wished to accompany him. He added that he had been informed by the Revd. Mr. Wade, who had just returned from a tour up to the Lolah Valley, that the crop was not more than one-fourth of the average, and that the few fields of maize which existed had been taken possession of by the Durbar, and that the people were actually living on grass seed. The Dewan when questioned about the "zabti" of the maize, said that Government had hoped to get a lakh of kharwars of maize, but that only 10,000 had reached Srinagar, the rest having been eaten by the villagers. Mr. Henvey also forwarded a copy of a notice issued by the Dewan reducing the price of maize by 4 annas a kharwar, and threatening the corn-sellers (persons possessed of private stores) that if they did not sell abundantly and at a cheap rate, the State might be compelled to interfere.

On the 15th October the Punjab Government forwarded another letter, dated the 2nd October, from Mr. Henvey giving an account of a conversation which he had had with the Dewan. The Dewan informed him that some hundred kharwars of Punjabi wheat and 2,000 or 3,000 kharwars of shali were arriving in Srinagar daily, and that he had opened twelve grain shops instead of three, and had abolished the system by which grain could only be bought under a written order from Vazir Punnoo. Mr. Henvey also forwarded a letter from a gentleman crossing the Pir Panjal, reporting that a great exodus of starving people was taking place along that route; and he wrote that the Dewan appeared "most earnest in his efforts to introduce reforms."

On the 11th* October it was reported that a Punjab officer had been deputed to meet Mr. Henvey at Jammu, but that it was doubtful whether much would be done unless the British Government took the import of grain into its own hands. On the 18th† October a kharita was written to the Maharaja, informing him that the Officer on Special Duty would remain in Kashmir during November and December to facilitate the measures for famine relief that were to be concerted at Jammu with the Maharaja. On the 25th‡ October the Officer on Special Duty was requested to convey to the Maharaja an expression of the satisfaction with which His Excellency the Governor-General in Council had read more recent reports on the famine, showing that the relief measures which had been undertaken had done good.

On the 26th October the Punjab Government forwarded two letters from Mr. Henvey, one dated the 9th October, reporting that Vazir Punnoo had been recalled to Jammu, and Dewan Anant Ram left in charge of Kashmir, and that the state of things in the city of Srinagar had somewhat improved, as the very poor were now receiving relief from poor-houses. He added, however, that his impression of the condition of the country south of Srinagar was unfavourable, as many of "the fields were lying waste, the villages were half empty, and living skeletons were visible on the roads and near the houses;" and also that the people did not believe that they were at liberty to leave the country, and that he knew as a fact that one party of emigrants had been stopped at Kohala. In any case, emigration was almost impossible as no food was obtainable on the routes. In his second letter, Mr. Henvey gave an account of a conversation he had with the Dewan, in the course of which he was informed that the old stocks of grain were exhausted, that the new Indian-corn was nearly consumed, and that there was scarcely any Punjabi grain in the city, and only 10,000 or 12,000 maunds on the roads; 50,000 kharwars of new rice, however, had come in which would be distributed, and the Dewan himself was about to make a tour through the valley, and would then be able to give a more correct estimate of the total outturn, but that at present, according to official reports, the rice crop would

Forwarded in letter No. 027C. from Punjab Government, dated 4th October 1878.
(Poll. A., December 1879, Nos. 181—183.)

Letter No. 055C.
(Poll. A., December 1879, Nos. 184—186.)

* Poll. A., December 1870, Nos. 155—289, K. W. No. 39.

† Poll. A., December 1879, No. 187.

‡ *Ibid.*, No. 188.

Letter No. 1080C
(*Ibid.*, Nos. 192—194.)

be about half the average. The crop in the Islamabad Vazirat, Mr. Henvey, after passing through it on his way to Jammu, estimated at ten annas in the rupee. The amount of grain imported from the Punjab was still but little, the traders being discouraged, in Mr. Henvey's opinion, by the smallness and irregularity of the Durbar's payments. On the 25th*

* *Pol. A.*, December 1879, Nos. 155—298, K. W. No. 41.

October, Mr. Henvey wrote demi-officially that it had been arranged at Jammu that the Durbar should import one lakh of maunds *viâ* Banihal, and the Government of India another lakh *viâ* Murree, but that so far from encouraging emigration the Durbar were actually bribing people who had emigrated to return to the valley.

Ibid., No. 195.

really publicly permitted, and authorised him to make a strong representation to the Durbar if it was not. It was decided that he should stay at Srinagar all the winter.

† *Pol. A.*, December 1879, Nos. 155—298, K. W. No. 45.

On the 2nd‡ November, Mr. Henvey wrote that he considered the outlook very gloomy, because the kharif crop was "miserably poor in extent," although the season had been most

‡ *Ibid.*, K. W. No. 46.

favourable, merely because the Muhammadan cultivators had been deprived of their share of the last rice crop by the Hindu officials, and that, although Dewan Anant Ram had promised to leave the cultivators their share of the crop, he did not believe that this would be done, as the Dewan's own Private Secretary, when asked how the villagers would support themselves during the winter, had replied that they had "gourds, sag, and grass." He added that the shawl trade was in a bad way; the silk crop had failed; and the wine manufacture was at a standstill, and that, although the Maharaja himself was full of amiable intentions, his administration was quite powerless to meet the crisis. About the same time the Dewan gave Mr. Henvey the most positive

Letter No. 671.

(*Ibid.*, K. W. No. 47.)

assurances that the passes had been opened for emigrants, and that the Maharaja had ordered supplies to be collected for the use of emigrants on the Banihal and Murree routes; and he consulted Mr. Henvey as to the best means of letting the people know that they might go. Mr. Henvey suggested that an announcement might be suitably made when the price of cleaned rice was raised, as proposed, from 32 seers a rupee to 20 seers; that all who could not buy at that rate might leave the country, and this suggestion was accepted.

Then came a letter from Mr. Henvey dated the 24th§ October, giving a

§ *Pol. A.*, December 1879, Nos. 198—206.

full account of the measures which were concerted at Jammu for the relief of the famine. The actual outturn of the autumn harvest was not known, but the Durbar hoped to get 25 lakhs of maunds of shali (the average yield being 40 lakhs of maunds), so that after deducting one-third of the 25 lakhs of maunds for husk, the actual yield in rice would be 17 lakhs of maunds. Assuming therefore that the population of Kashmir was 350,000, and that three-fourths of a seer of grain per diem would be a fair average for each person's consumption, 17 lakhs of maunds of rice would be food for 8½ months; and as ten months must elapse before the early autumn crops came in, there would be a gap of 1½ months' consumption, which was equivalent to three lakhs of maunds. The rabi crops in ordinary years produce four lakhs of maunds of grain, and the Kashmir authorities hoped by extraordinary exertions to get eight lakhs, but Mr. Henvey did not anticipate an outturn exceeding two lakhs of maunds. Estimating the kharif outturn therefore at 17 lakhs of maunds, and the rabi outturn at two lakhs, there would be a total deficiency of one lakh of maunds; but Mr. Henvey considered that this estimate was too sanguine, and that the shali crop would probably not exceed 20 lakhs. The Durbar themselves anticipated that the deficiency would be about two lakhs of maunds, and they therefore proposed to supply that amount by importing one lakh of maunds *viâ* Banihal, and by asking the British Government to arrange for the purchase and importation of another lakh of maunds *viâ* Murree and Baramulla. Mr. Henvey raised the question of emigration on a large scale, but he saw that the idea was most distasteful to the Durbar, who feared that the people, when once beyond the passes, would never return to Kashmir; and to show how hopeless it was to expect the Durbar to co-operate in this way, he mentioned the fact that refugees who had reached Jammu were actually being bribed to return by cash presents and orders for food on the

Government stores on the road back to the valley. Mr. Henvey therefore considered that the only course open was to import grain, and that no time should be lost in collecting it and arranging for transport, as the supply, to be of any use, should arrive in Kashmir before May at the latest. The Durbar promised to furnish the British Government with funds for purchase of the grain and import as far as Baramulla; to keep the road in Kashmir territory in good order; to provide an adequate supply of fodder, and to place responsible officials at every stage to ensure the carrying out of the arrangements. His Highness also agreed to accept Native officers, such as tahsildars, from the British Government, to supervise the transport, but at once negated the idea of Europeans being employed. He also promised to give Mr. Henvey early information regarding the actual outturn of the kharif, so that if necessary the British Government might arrange to send in more grain by the Punch and Pir Panjal routes directly they were open in the spring.

The measures proposed by the Durbar did, not, however, meet with the approval of the Punjab Government.

The Lieutenant-Governor pointed out that in Mr. Henvey's calculations the actual outturn of shali in the kharif of 1878 was taken at 25 lakhs of maunds, though Mr. Henvey had recorded his opinion that it would probably not exceed 20 lakhs, and that therefore there would actually be a deficiency of three lakhs of maunds, if Mr. Henvey's estimate of the yield of the kharif and rabi harvests, and estimate of consumption per man, were correct. He thought, however, that the estimated consumption of each person per diem should be taken at half a seer or eight chittaks of rice instead of three-fourths of a seer, and that at this estimate a population of 350,000 would only consume in eleven months 14,61,584 maunds. Allowing therefore that the actual outturn of cleaned rice did not exceed 13,00,000 maunds, *i.e.*, 20 lakhs of shali as estimated by Mr. Henvey, there would only be a deficit of 1,61,584 maunds, which would be more than covered by the estimated yield of the rabi harvest, *viz.*, 2,00,000 maunds. The Lieutenant-Governor therefore considered that it would be sufficient to urge the Durbar to import the lakh of maunds *via* Banihal; and that it would not be necessary for the British Government to undertake to send another lakh *via* Murree, unless the actual outturn of the kharif of 1878 proved to be less than Mr. Henvey anticipated. In the meantime it would be well to encourage the private grain trade and voluntary emigration from Kashmir.

On the 31st* October, Mr. Henvey wrote from Jammu demi-officially to the Foreign Secretary, informing him that since the report of 24th October was written, the Durbar had asked him to arrange for the importation of 200 maunds of potato seed, and had communicated its intention of ordering the cultivators in Kashmir to grow gourds by way of producing an early crop. He added that the official statement of the Durbar that emigration was freely permitted had not been acted upon, and that even then, when the Durbar was discussing suggestions for getting people out of the country, agents were being deputed to entice people back from British territory by presents of money and grain, and that emigration was almost impossible, as no food was procurable on the routes. As soon as he heard that these appeals were being made to refugees, Mr. Henvey addressed an indignant remonstrance to the Durbar, and was informed in reply that "expatriation was a hard thing, and the Maharaja wished both emigration and immigration to be free." Mr. Henvey stated that he felt most anxiety for the cultivating classes, as they were all Muhammadans and consequently hated by the Hindu officials, and he was much afraid that the whole or nearly the whole of their share of the rice crop would be taken from them, as had been done in the winter of 1877-78, merely to fill the Government granaries and provide food for the urban population.

A private letter, dated 24th† October, which was received from Dr. Downes, the medical missionary at Srinagar, gave a brighter account of the prospects. Dr. Downes wrote that the Dewan had done very well, that the incoming crop was a good one, and that there was then no distress; and on the 20th October Mr. Henvey wrote demi-officially to the Secretary that the uproar in Kashmir had much diminished since the distribution of new rice, but that it was doubtful how long the fresh stocks would last.

On the 11th* November Mr. Henvey again wrote from Banihal reporting that grain was being imported and fodder collected along that route, and that emigrants passed him daily, but that he was afraid the Durbar would not be able to import a lakh of maunds before the route was closed by the snow. He also forwarded a letter from Dr. Scully (medical officer of the Gilgit Agency), giving some information regarding the condition of the country in the direction of Astor. Dr. Scully estimated the kharif crop in Bandipur to be less than half an acre; the mortality had been great, and the districts of Gurez and Tiel were almost depopulated. At Astor the prospects were brighter, the outturn of the crop having been sufficient to feed the inhabitants, if the troops were supplied with grain from Kashmir, as was usually done. A week later† Mr. Henvey forwarded a letter from Mr.

Russell, a merchant at Srinagar, giving some account of the working of the Kashmir administration from the time of the arrival of Dewan Anant Ram. Mr. Russell thought that the Dewan had every intention of effecting reforms, but was hampered by the Pandits at the Maharaja's Court. At the Dewan's request Mr. Russell took charge of one of the Government houses for the sale of grain, and resolutely set his face against the system by which the Pandits produced written orders to obtain daily from one truck to one kharwar of wheat, and he informed all those who produced these orders that the grain would be supplied to all alike. The Pandits formed a combination against him, and threatened to commit suicide before the Dewan's Durbar if an Englishman were allowed to superintend the sale of grain. The Dewan yielded, the house was closed, and Mr. Russell was requested to take charge of another house in the Muhammadan quarter of the city; but the same system of orders prevailed there also, and by the influence of the Pandits this house too was closed. All grain purchased by the Pandits by means of these orders was again retailed at 100 per cent. above the selling price fixed by the Government. This work was done by Mr. Russell for no remuneration; but he then entered into a contract with the Dewan, by which he agreed to open ten shops in the city and sell 100 kharwars of grain daily at R1-6 a kharwar, not more than 3 seers being sold to each person, R1-2 being paid to the State, and 4 annas going to cover all expenses of establishment and management. This arrangement also met with strenuous opposition from the Pandits. They first accused Mr. Russell of selling at R 1-8 a kharwar, and when that plan failed, they tried to evade fulfilment of the contract by supplying less than the amount of grain agreed on, and at the time that his letter was written Mr. Russell was only receiving 40 to 45 kharwars of grain a day instead of the 100 kharwars promised by the Dewan.

Mr. Henvey, in forwarding this letter, said that Dewan Anant Ram had told him that he was anxious to leave Kashmir, because he found himself ill-supported at Jammu, and that he knew that Vazir Punnoo, the former Governor of Kashmir, who had been recalled for his mismanagement of the famine, was in high favour and was consulted on all relief measures. He added that no proper arrangements existed for distributing the incoming rice to the inhabitants of Srinagar, and that the zemindars had not been allowed to remove their share of the produce. The passes, however, were open, and the Durbar was providing food upon the road, so that people were availing themselves of the opportunity to emigrate.

On the 17th November Mr. Henvey reported that he had returned to Srinagar, and that on the road he had observed considerable activity in the work of importation of grain, though the amount actually collected was small; and that the road was really open to emigrants who passed him in considerable numbers, arrangements having been made to supply them with food at Chaveni, Rambun, and Banihar. At Srinagar he found that the rice crop had been cut and stacked, but that the division of the zemindars' from the Government share would not be completed for a month, though the Dewan informed him that in the meantime advances of grain would be made to the zemindars. The Dewan was then starting for a tour through the valley to make a personal survey of the harvest, and ensure obedience to his orders. At Srinagar a house census had been taken which return-

* Political A., December 1879, Nos. 155-289, K. W. No. 48.

† *Ibid.*, K. W. No. 49.

Letter No. 1294.
(Political A., December 1879, Nos. 207-209.)

ed the population at 130,000, and the amount of shali sufficient for their maintenance was reckoned at 30,000 kharwars per mensem. The Dewan proposed to distribute this grain in bi-monthly instalments, each householder being provided with tickets showing what he was entitled to, the amount being calculated according to the number of his family. It was also proposed to open several shops and to raise the price of shali from R1-4 to R1-8, or R1-14 per kharwar. Mr. Henvey thought that the estimate of the population was too high, as of course it was everybody's interest to make out that the number of his family was larger than it really was. He also reported that only 12,000 maunds of hay had been collected on the Kashmir side of the Murree and Baramulla route, and he feared that the arrangements for facilitating the transport along that route would be defective.

On the 4th December the Punjab Government forwarded a letter from Mr. Henvey, dated the 21st November, and an enclosure from Mr. Elias, the British Joint Commissioner at Leh, dated the 19th November. Mr. Henvey forwarded extracts from a private letter he had received from the Maharaja, saying that substantial assistance was being given to emigrants by providing food along the route, but admitting that some Kashmiri cultivators who had left the country had been helped to return in the belief that a cultivator could produce more food than was necessary for his own consumption. He also reported that all appearance of excitement in Srinagar had subsided, though he had heard rumours that some disturbance had been created by a body of Pandits, who objected to the high price of food.

Mr. Elias' letter gave an account of a visit he had paid to several of the houses established by Government for the sale of food. He found the people very much dissatisfied, because the price of grain had been raised to R1-14 per kharwar; and the supply of rice at most of the houses was inadequate. The people, moreover, declared that it was not possible for them to emigrate, as no one without money could make such a long journey, and all those who had money were not allowed to escape until they had been mulcted in bribes. Mr. Elias, however, did not observe much distress throughout the city that could well be attributed to the famine.

On 1st December* Mr. Henvey telegraphed to the Punjab Government, that the estimate of the yield of the kharif was 25 lakhs of maunds of shali, equal to 15,000 maunds of cleaned rice, and that the yield of the rabi was estimated at four lakhs of maunds, that 5,000 maunds of fodder had been collected at the stages on the Murree route, and that 10,000 maunds would be eventually procurable.

The Lieutenant-Governor considered that these estimates encouraged a reasonable hope that the future in Kashmir would not be so gloomy as had been anticipated, and that it would not be necessary for the Punjab Government to take any special measures to import grain.

On the 30th November Mr. Henvey wrote to the Punjab Government, giving a full account of the estimates made by the Durbar of the yield of the kharif and rabi harvests.

He explained that his previous calculation was based on the Durbar estimate of the rabi outturn, *viz.*, 25 lakhs of maunds of shali, and not on his own conjectural estimate of 20 lakhs, and secondly, that the consumption rate of three-quarter seer per man per diem was fixed by the Durbar, and not by himself, and that he did not think that the Durbar would be likely to exaggerate their own difficulties. In considering these estimates the following points should be taken for granted :—

- (a) that the population of Kashmir is 350,000;
- (b) that the Government kharwar is equal to 90 seers or 2½ maunds;
- (c) that the proportion of rice to shali is 60 per cent.

The food stocks in Kashmir were reported in round numbers to be—shali 11,00,000 kharwars, or 25,00,000 maunds, equal in cleaned rice to 15,00,000 maunds, but the Dewan Anant Ram, for some reason which he could not or would not explain, stated that the 11,00,000 kharwars only equalled 23,00,000

Letter No. 1210.

(*Ibid.*, Nos. 210, 212.)

* Political A., December 1879, No. 214.

Letter No. 1228, dated 7th December.
(*Ibid.*, No. 213.)

Letter No. 710.
(*Ibid.*, No. 216.)

† *Vide* letter No. 646, dated 24th October 1878.

(*Ibid.*, No. 199.)

maunds or 13,80,000 maunds of cleaned rice. Assuming, therefore, that the average of consumption was eight chittaks per diem for each man, the total amount of grain consumed between the 1st December 1878 and the 30th September 1879 would be 13,30,304 maunds, leaving a surplus, independent of the yield of the rabi harvest, of 49,696 maunds. The rabi yield was estimated by the Dewan at four lakhs of maunds. He reported that 17,000 kharwars of seed had been sown, and as the yield in Kashmir varies from 20 to 25 fold, 17,000 kharwars ought to produce more than four lakhs of maunds, but the Dewan preferred the latter estimate.

The 11,00,000 kharwars were distributed by the Dewan as follows:—

	Khr.
Share of State	6,00,000
„ of Zemindars	5,00,000
	11,00,000

Share of State sub-divided—

	Khr.
For seed	1,00,000
Hire to boatmen bringing shali to city	2,00,000
Food of city for nine months	3,00,000
Various expenses	30,000
Food for army and officials	50,000
Supplies for poor zemindars	1,00,000
	6,00,000

Mr. Henvey, however, said that though he had no means of checking the official figures, he was convinced, from his own personal observation of the distress in the country, that they were untrustworthy; and that Dewan Anant Ram did not himself rely upon their accuracy, as he would not authorise Mr. Henvey to telegraph to the Punjab Government and say the stocks were sufficient. He therefore recommended that the Government should aid the Durbar by importing the lakh of maunds of grain *via* Murree. The rise in the price of grain from R1-4 to R1-14 per kharwar, or 25 to 32 seers the rupee, Mr. Henvey considered to be beneficial, and he referred to the case of Mr. Russell whose stores were thronged with purchasers, though he was selling four annas per kharwar above the Government rate, simply because of the greater honesty and regularity of his distribution. He added, however, that the people still maintained that they were unable to leave the valley, in spite of the official assurances which had been given, and that unless large numbers of emigrants were flocking into the Punjab, the permission to emigrate must be a delusion, as the people undoubtedly were anxious to go if they could obtain supplies on the road. He also reported that scarcely anything had been done in the way of opening poor-houses and establishing relief works; and that the arrangements for supplying and selling shali in the city were defective. No grain was sold to the Muhammadans until the orders of the Hindu Pandits were complied with, and the store was frequently emptied before the Muhammadans got any grain at all. In fact at no store except Mr. Russell's did Mr. Henvey see any grain given to Muhammadans, and even when grain was supplied to them they only got 3 seers of shali, which was to last for eight days or sometimes longer. The total amount of shali brought into the city was 600 kharwars daily, and the people could not have subsisted on the rations supplied, if turnips and vegetables had not been abundant and cheap. Mr. Henvey addressed the Dewan on the subject, and he admitted that the distribution had been insufficient, but said that arrangements had been made to give out 1,000 kharwars daily on the calculation of three-quarters of a seer per head. The Dewan also informed Mr. Henvey that he did not think that the Durbar would succeed in importing more than 30,000 maunds *via* Banihal. Mr. Henvey expressed his conviction that the deficiency of food in Kashmir could not be supplied by private trade, as free private trade was impossible in a country where the selling rate was arbitrarily fixed by the Durbar and the grain trade was a monopoly of its officials. And in support of his theory he referred to what happened in the summer of 1878, when the Pandits were actually selling rice from

private stores at six seers the rupee, and yet not a bag of grain was imported into Kashmir, except under an agreement with the Durbar by which the grain on arrival became the property of the State. He expressed regret at the departure of Dewan Anant Ram, who had been recalled to Jammu, and whom he considered an amiable and well-intentioned man. His successor, Badri Nath, also appeared to be anxious to do his duty.

On the 13th December* Mr. Henvey wrote again that Dewan Anant Ram had supplied him with a revised estimate of the food-stocks which was as follows:—

Total outturn of shali from the beginning of the harvest	Kharwar.
Expenditure, exclusive of general population	11,00,000
	1,41,500
Balance	9,58,500
Deduct supply required for 350,000 people for ten months from 1st October 1878 up to 1st August 1879, at 13 chittaks of shali, or 8 chittaks of cleaned rice per diem	9,33,000
Surplus	25,500
Maunds	57,375

According to this estimate there would be abundant food in the country for next year, but Mr. Henvey considered that the frequent changes in the method of computation were not calculated to inspire confidence. With regard to the question of re-opening Kashmir to visitors, Mr. Henvey said that he had asked the Dewan to ascertain the Maharaja's views, but that he was inclined to recommend that visitors should be allowed to enter the valley in 1879, unless there was danger of an actual failure of stocks.

Ibid., No. 220.

The Lieutenant-Governor recorded his opinion that the estimates of the Dewan were unreliable, and that from personal conversation with the Maharaja he had ascertained that there would be scarcity in Kashmir during the month of Jeth before the rabi harvest. He therefore thought that it was necessary for the Government to import the lakh of maunds of grain *via* Murree, and that as carriage was very scarce in consequence of the war, he thought that the work might best be done by contract. He therefore proposed to call for tenders for supplying 1,00,000 maunds of grain at Srinagar by 30th April 1879. He also considered that some measures should be taken to secure a better distribution of the grain, and that visitors should not be allowed to enter the valley during 1879, unless the stocks of food were increased by importation.

Mr. Henvey forwarded* on the 24th December a letter from an English missionary which gave a most gloomy account of the condition of Kashmir. He added that he had no confidence whatever in the official estimates, but that he could not pretend to offer any more reliable figures, as he was kept completely in the dark by the officials regarding the real state of affairs. He believed, however, that the stocks were really much lower than the Durbar wished to make out, because though the loss of life had been very great, and large masses of people were now on the brink of starvation, the Durbar was not giving out grain according to its own calculation of the requirements of its subjects; and the Durbar had not opened any poor-houses or public works, though there were thousands of people with no means of subsistence. The distress was great, and yet if a starving Muhammadan killed a cow or even ate the flesh of a cow which had been killed, he was immediately "manacled and sent down to God knows what." He finally stated that the condition and prospect of Kashmir filled him with despair, and that a careful "distribution of stocks under English control might perhaps save the country, but not without much suffering."

On the 27th December Mr. Henvey wrote again to the Punjab Government explaining the manner in which the outturn of the rabi had been estimated at eight lakhs of maunds, *viz.*, by multiplying the amount of seed said to have been sown, 17,000 kharwars, by the average rate of yield. The calculation he considered

to be utterly worthless, as four lakhs of maunds represented Dewan Anant Ram's most sanguine estimate; and the "frugality with which the Durbar were doling out the grain could only be accounted for on the hypothesis that the stocks were lower than the Durbar wished to make us to believe."

The Lieutenant-Governor then said that Mr. Henvey's letters had altered his opinion regarding the necessity of action on the part of the British Government, and that he thought the estimates of food-stocks submitted by the Durbar could not be relied on. He accordingly recommended that a lakh of maunds of grain should be sent *via* Murree as already proposed, contracts being given by Government for the transport, and that the Kashmir Durbar should be called upon to store fodder at the stages along the route sufficient for all the animals employed on the transport, and to pay into British treasuries a sum sufficient to cover the cost of importation. He also thought that an equitable distribution of the grain could not be hoped for, unless British officers were employed for the purpose, and—
 "that the gravity of the case was such that pressure should be brought to bear upon the Maharaja to permit the appointment of British officers to generally superintend the distribution and sale of food at the principal centres of distress."

On the 7th January* 1879, Mr. Henvey wrote demi-officially to the Foreign Secretary that he understood that the Punjab Government had recommended that a lakh of maunds should be sent into Kashmir *via* Murree, and that European officers should be appointed to supervise the importation and distribution of the lakh of maunds. He thought that these officers might be useful to look after the import of grain, but that it would not be worth while to offend the Durbar merely to secure a proper distribution of one lakh of maunds, while 18 lakhs of maunds of food-stocks were left in the hands of the Durbar officials, more especially as the lakh of maunds would be purchased and imported at the expense of the Durbar, and the grain would necessarily be sold from its stores on the principle of a State monopoly, in the same way as the grain already in the country. He thought that the Government should either go much further, *i.e.*, assume the whole administration of the country for a time or not so far, *i.e.*, merely throw the lakh of maunds into the country as requested by the Durbar, warning them that the Government could not "sit idly by and allow Kashmir to become a desert." He also suggested that he should be allowed to return to Kashmir as soon as His Excellency had determined on the course to be pursued, as he thought that Kashmir should not be left without a responsible officer to keep Government informed of the progress of affairs. He added that the Durbar intended to send a few High Commissioners to Kashmir to report on the famine, one of the Commissioners being Bhai Gunga Sing, a notorious bad character.

On the 20th January 1879, the Punjab Government telegraphed† that further grave reports had been received of the distress in Kashmir, and of the gross mismanagement which prevailed. The Lieutenant-Governor, therefore, recommended strongly that Mr. Henvey should be directed at once to return to Srinagar and to report fully and constantly on the course of events. Mr. Henvey was instructed‡ accordingly.

On the 3rd February Mr. Henvey reported§ the result of an interview with the Maharaja at Jammu on the 31st January. His Highness assured him that the distribution of rice and the relief of distress had much improved since high officials had been specially deputed from Jammu to see to the work. But he was anxious about the spring crop on account of the want of rain, and he considered it more than ever necessary to import grain into the country. From Dewans Anant Ram and Gobind Sahai, Mr. Henvey also learnt that affairs had grown rapidly worse in Kashmir after he and Anant Ram had left in December 1878. Hence the deputation of special officers from Jammu. The results of this measure were said to have been good: they were briefly as follows:—

- (a) grain was being given out in Srinagar at the rate of 18 seers of unhusked rice per head per mensem, in three instalments, in exchange for tickets which had been issued under the orders of responsible officers after a house-to-house census;

- (b) for those who had no houses poor-houses had been opened, the inmates of which received small sums of money and grain tickets;
- (c) in addition to, or merged in, the poor-houses were private charitable kitchens;
- (d) in the rural tracts the zemindars were receiving their share of the last rice crops (three months after the harvest); to those who had no rice or no share rice was sold at the rate of 12 seers per head per mensem;
- (e) 80,000 maunds of grain had, it was said, been sent from Jammu towards Kashmir, of which 20,000 had been used as seed for the rabi crop, and the rest was lying on the road *en route*.

From what Dewan Anant Ram said Mr. Henvey calculated that the supply of rice then in Srinagar would be exhausted within five months, or at least four months before the next rice harvest.

Owing to the want of winter rain and snow the prospect of the spring crop of wheat and barley was precarious.

Finally, Mr. Henvey joined with the Durbar in recommending that a lakh of maunds of grain should be despatched by the Punjab Government in April, May, and June to Baramulla.

On the 24th February the Government of India replied* to the letter from the Punjab, dated the 6th January, in which it had been recommended that British officers should be employed to superintend the distribution and sale of food at the principal centres of distress. The Government of India remarked that, apart from the political objections to such a course, which were generally recognised, and grave, its practical utility seemed doubtful unless it were followed up by giving over the whole administration of Kashmir to British officers. Reconsideration was therefore requested with special reference to the latter point.

The proposed importation of a lakh of maunds of grain at the cost of the Durbar was sanctioned, with discretion to exceed the limit.

On the 6th March 1879 Mr. Henvey wrote† that a fall of rain and snow had improved the prospects of a rabi crop. They were still critical, but some wheat and barley might be looked for. Importation was, however, no less necessary. Fodder for the carriage of imports had, it was said, been stored on the Baramulla route. In Srinagar the system of relief was bad, the supply per head was inadequate; there was no distinction between the able-bodied and the incapable: on the road-works which had been opened the labourers would not stay because they were not paid. Mr. Henvey gave a horrible description of the mismanagement which he had himself seen in a poor-house.

On the 21st March the Punjab Government‡ reported that they had entered into contracts with Mr. Russell of the Central Asia Trading Company and Bansi Lal and Ram Battan, bankers of Mian Mir, to deliver the lakh of maunds of grain (chiefly barley and wheat) at Baramulla or Srinagar by the Bhimbar, Punch, or Baramulla routes. Mr. Henvey was informed of these arrangements, but he replied§ that the local authorities refused to help him in procuring carriage for the grain imports, and that the contractors would, therefore, have to find their own in the Punjab. Thereupon the Lieutenant-Governor wrote|| a strong letter of remonstrance to the Maharaja which was approved|| by the Government of India. His Highness answered¶ that the carriage had been refused to Mr. Henvey, because it was all needed to bring the grain in which had been stored on the road between Jammu and Kashmir, but that half would be at once set apart for the new imports, and the rest as soon as the Jammu supply should have been conveyed.

On the 31st March the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab** had interviews with the Maharaja at Sialkot. There was a long conversation about the famine. From the description given by His Highness it appeared that the distress was more severe, and the prospects more gloomy, than had been anticipated. The population, he said,

* Political A., December 1879, No. 237.

† *Ibid.*, No. 242.

‡ *Ibid.*, Nos. 243-245.

§ *Ibid.*, No. 247.

|| *Ibid.*, Nos. 248 & 249.

¶ *Ibid.*, No. 260.

** *Ibid.*, No. 250.

had, within the last four months, been estimated and returned at 528,000. The Maharaja thought this might be a fair estimate, but taking it at 450,000 souls he estimated that they required 90,000 kharwars of *shali*, or uncleaned rice, each month. The whole stock in the country at the time was about 170,000 kharwars, or about a month and a half's supply, for it was necessary to take 50,000 kharwars for seed. It was estimated that *shali* lost half its bulk in cleaning, and that thus the estimated 90,000 kharwars would not give more than a quarter of a seer of clean rice per head. Till the rabi ripened there must be great distress; and the Maharaja seemed to anticipate severe mortality. There was also danger that the zemindars would eat the grain reserved for seed and so increase the distress in the future. The people had, after the last sowing, in their distress, taken up the seed after it had been planted and eaten it. The rate of $\frac{1}{4}$ seer was very low; and people in Kashmir were accustomed to supplement their rice food by fruits of various kinds and greens. Melons, pumpkins, &c., would unfortunately not be ready till the time the rabi was ripe. The Maharaja was grateful for the assistance which had been rendered by the Punjab Government in sending in grain. He quite appreciated the necessity of making every exertion to import as much as possible. On the question of distribution he said he had endeavoured without any distinction of race or creed to cause it to be fairly done; that members of the different guilds in the city of Kashmir,—Muhammadans, Rajputs, and Pandits—had been appointed; that 28 stores for sale of grain had been opened in the city of Srinagar itself as against 10 a short time ago. Relief-houses for the gratuitous distribution of food had also been established. The Lieutenant-Governor mentioned the complaints which had been made on all sides of the manner in which the Muhammadan population was neglected, and suggested the expediency of appointing a Muhammadan Governor to the valley in order to silence these complaints. The point was not, however, pressed; but it was further suggested that a representative committee should be appointed of Hindus and Muhammadans to arrange famine relief measures, rates of food, manner of distribution, &c. The Maharaja agreed to this, and also consented to the appointment of the Medical Officer on Duty in Kashmir as Member of the Committee. The appointment of the Officer on Special Duty was then suggested. To this the Maharaja had no objection to offer. He thought, however, that Pandit Badrinath, the Governor of Kashmir, had better not be on the Committee, as his presence might overawe the Native members, and possibly they would not vote with freedom. It was pointed out by the Lieutenant-Governor that this was a special matter, and that in the emergency it was likely that his advice would be valuable, and indeed without the presence of the Governor the Committee would not have the same weight. The Maharaja agreed in this view, and added that he would cause a list of members to be drawn out, with rules for their guidance. A few hours later, the Maharaja withdrew from the consent to the appointment of the Officer on Special Duty as member of the Committee, saying that though he personally had no objection to his nomination, yet that being a high official of the British Government, his appointment might be misunderstood by the people generally. The Lieutenant-Governor did not press the point in opposition to the Maharaja's wishes. He said he thought the presence of the Officer on Special Duty would be a guarantee that famine relief would receive due attention, especially as Mr. Henvey was an officer who had considerable experience in famine arrangements. His Highness seemed to entertain a decided objection to the appointment of this officer, and the matter was not further pressed. With reference to English visitors in Kashmir this season, the Maharaja thought that supplies would be short on the Murree route, and that Bhimbar would be a preferable one for visitors. It was agreed that this should be recommended, and the Maharaja saw no objection to visitors using the Murree route if they took all their necessary supplies with them. He was in favour of visitors going to the valley.

* Pol. A., December 1879, No. 851.

† *Ibid.*, No. 253.

‡ *Ibid.*, No. 266.

On the 11th April Mr. Henvey protested* against his exclusion from the new Committee; but he was shortly after nominated† as a member, the other English officer being Surgeon-Major Ross.

The Maharaja then framed rules‡ for the guidance of the "Famine Relief Committee." It con-

sisted of two English officers, eight Muhammadans, and three Hindus. The presence of one English officer and of Babu Nilambar Mukarji or the latter's deputy was to be indispensable for a quorum, the limit in number being seven. The special duties of the committee were defined thus:—

- "(a) to make arrangements for the distribution of grain which is in Kashmir, or which is or will be sent to Kashmir from the Punjab;
- "(b) appointment and dismissal of the establishment of the store-houses in the city or in the villages;
- "(c) to have offenders punished by the proper Courts;
- "(d) to search and confiscate the grain collected by unlawful means. The person who protests against this can file a complaint in the Court, and the committee will have to defend itself;
- "(e) to purchase the grain, which is lawfully collected by a person, but which exceeds his wants, according to the rates fixed by the committee;
- "(f) it has the power to spend R 500 every day on the poor and orphan houses; and
- "(g) to supervise the works established for the relief of famine, such as the construction of roads, canals, &c."

* Pol. A., December 1873, No. 258.

On the 9th April Mr. Henvey was able to report* that the wheat and barley crops promised well, and that the fruit was likely to be abundant. The distress, however, had not diminished, and the mortality was great. The supply of food to the poor was inadequate and mismanaged; there were no relief works worth mentioning.

† *Ibid.*, Nos. 262, 263, 264, 271. During the last week in April urgent letters† were written by Mr. Henvey and Dr. Ross. The rabi crops were then perishing from want of rain. The relief system was shockingly mismanaged. The importation of grain was at a standstill for want of carriage. But the worst fact was that in Srinagar not more than forty to sixty thousand maunds of rice was available according to official estimates. These Mr. Henvey entirely disbelieved. Judging by the earlier figures given by Dewan Anant Ram, he insisted that large stores must have been accumulated by officials and other privileged persons. The Governor of Srinagar (Dewan Badrinath) was not a member of the committee, and the Maharaja would not allow him to be examined by the committee. His immediate agent in the distribution of grain had been allowed to go on a pilgrimage. The committee were therefore powerless. The Native official members recorded the admission that an honest Native official could not be found in Kashmir, and that those who had been sent from Jammu were equally corrupt. Under these circumstances, Mr. Henvey urged that the only way left of saving the population from starvation was for the Government of India to take over the whole administration of the famine.

‡ *Ibid.*, No. 270.

A little later the Maharaja censured‡ the committee for inactivity, and then Mr. Henvey and Dr. Ross withdrew from it, protesting that they had been unable to obtain the information and assistance from the local authorities without which it was impossible to act. The committee thus came to a standstill.

§ *Ibid.*, No. 261.

The Punjab Government, while admitting§ the badness of the state of affairs described by Mr. Henvey, could not accept his recommendations, which, it was observed, "would be no less than taking over the administration of the country." They would be, moreover, useless. The situation had changed since the Lieutenant-Governor advised the employment of British officers; for there was apparently no longer any grain left to distribute.

|| *Ibid.*, No. 275.

On the 19th May the Viceroy telegraphed|| to the Maharaja urging him to go to Srinagar at once, and personally superintend the measures for relief. Ten days later His Highness started.§

¶ *Ibid.*, No. 289.

** *Ibid.*, No. 277.

On the 22nd May the Government of India** passed orders on the letters from Mr. Henvey which had been submitted by the Punjab Government. Briefly, they agreed with the Lieutenant-Governor in thinking that Mr. Henvey's proposals were politically inadmissible, and practically useless: it was too late for active administrative interference, and its only result would be to attach the discredit of failure to British officers. This being so, the only hope of remedy lay in working through the Maharaja himself; and it was probable that the real state of affairs had

* Political A., December 1870, No. 284. never been fully brought to his notice. Accordingly a serious letter* of advice and warning was addressed by the Lieutenant-Governor to the Maharaja. The following extracts show its nature—

“It would not be the act of a sincere friend, as I desire Your Highness to consider me, were I to conceal from you, that a portion of the distress now prevailing in Kashmir is due, not to the difficulty of the roads, nor to the system of monopoly which, whether politic or not, has long prevailed in Your Highness’s territories, but to the corruption and oppression of the Kashmir officials, who have enriched themselves at the cost of the Muhammadan peasant population, and who, according to official reports which have reached the Government constantly, have been permitted to purchase large quantities of grain at the Government stores, far in excess of the wants of themselves and their families, while the Muhammadan population has not been permitted to purchase enough to support life. Besides this favoritism in the sale of grain at the Government stores, large amounts have been misappropriated through the connivance of officials, and this to an extent which has materially reduced the food-stock in the valley and to the danger of starvation to the poorer portion of the population.”

“The British Government has no wish nor intention to interfere in any manner in the internal administration of Kashmir, and only desire to see Your Highness’s Government strong and prosperous. At the same time, the Government cannot regard with indifference the sight of sufferings and death of the Kashmir population, and I am consequently desired by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General to point out to Your Highness the urgent necessity of your taking such measures with regard to the administration of famine relief in the valley, as may at least ensure all being done that is possible to save life. Should the depopulation of Kashmir ensue as the result of the present famine, which accounts reaching the Government show to be not unlikely, then it cannot be doubted but that, in the opinion of Her Majesty’s Government and the people of India, the blame will attach to the administration of Your Highness, which has not cared, by energetic measures, or by the removal of corrupt and incompetent subordinates, to save the lives of its subjects.”

† *Ibid.*, Nos. 290—295. On the 26th May more letters from Mr. Henvey were submitted by the Punjab Government. The accounts given in these were very alarming. The mortality was dreadful, and the agricultural prospects owing to depopulation were bad. The local authorities had failed to furnish the contractors for the carriage of grain. Babu Nilambar Mukerji had been offered full powers to deal with the famine by the Maharaja, but had declined responsibility for evils which he felt he could not avert. The Lieutenant-Governor then despatched another urgent appeal by telegram to the Maharaja.

At the end of May Mr. Fanshawe of the Punjab Commission was sent to assist Mr. Henvey in work connected with the famine.

All through the early part of June the reports from Kashmir were exceedingly gloomy. Mr. Henvey and Dr. Ross visited the southern part of the province and found the prospects of the rabi harvest bad; to the north-west they were better. Mr. Fanshawe was struck with the depopulation of Srinagar. The only improvement was that the transport of grain by the contractors had been facilitated.

In the latter half of June prospects for the future began to mend. The contractors got their arrangements for transport into fair working order. In the Kamraj district Mr. Fanshawe reported the crops to be promising. He spoke somewhat more favourably of the still inefficient system of relief. On the other hand, the distress in the city was still great, and cholera and famine-diarrrhea made great ravages. The authorities were quite unable to procure accurate information about the stocks of food or of the population to be fed.

On the 30th June the Maharaja arrived in Srinagar.

In the middle of July Mr. Henvey reported that rain was much wanted. Cholera had abated. The system of relief was as bad as ever. The Maharaja had practically been able to effect nothing. Indeed, he suggested that Vazir Punnoo should be reappointed Governor of Kashmir.

§ *Ibid.*, Nos. 364—381. At the end of August matters were mending. The early autumn crops had been lost from want of rain. But the fruit was abundant; the imports of wheat and barley had made a sensible difference; and the rice crops promised to be exceedingly fine.

On the 1st October Mr. Henvey said that it would be unnecessary to make further reports on the progress of events. The rice crops seemed to be ample. Imports of grain were coming in. He added—

"Grain is now procurable for money in Srinagar and elsewhere, and although distress is still visible, it is not so keen or so general as before."

On the 3rd April 1880 Mr. Henvey described the state of the country as "considerably improved." The rice crop had been good and sufficient for the reduced population; and abundant snow promised well for the next harvest. The rabi and early autumn crops still depended on rain, but there was no cause for serious anxiety; Government rations were being sold cheaply and in fair quantities. Moreover, those who had accumulated private stocks were selling openly: "a man with money in his hand can buy, irrespective of Government rations."

A large poor-house was being fairly managed.

But there was still some starvation and much want. The Maharaja was recommended to go himself to Srinagar, and—

(a) issue seed for cultivation;

(b) bring in the grain which was still on the road to Srinagar;

(c) open well-organised relief works.

On the last point the Punjab Government laid great stress. The Government of India passed no orders.

On the 1st June 1880 Mr. Henvey reported again. Abundant rain had secured the rabi and autumn crops. Agricultural prospects could not be better, and rice cultivation was being vigorously carried on. Starvation had ceased, but there was much abject poverty. The city poor-house was being fairly well managed. Efficient relief works had been opened near Srinagar.

"The Kashmir famine may be said to have died out by a natural process of exhaustion."

But the depopulation had been very large. The recovery of the country depended on radical and sustained administrative improvements.

Review of the famine.—A complete and striking account of the Kashmir famine will be found in Mr. Henvey's memorandum[†] Secret E, March 1883, Nos. 82 & 83 of the 15th May 1880, and Mr. Fanshawe's note of the 16th October 1879, which are printed as Appendices (10) and (11). Mr. Henvey's description may be considered exaggerated by some, and all the views put forward may not be readily accepted. But it must be remembered that the writer was an eye-witness of what he narrates; that he is corroborated by the testimony of Europeans who were in Kashmir at the time; that he started with considerable knowledge of the details of famine work; and lastly, that he was *not* an ardent administrator fresh from a British district.

The great facts which the baldest account of the famine establishes are that Kashmir is by nature the last country in India to suffer from scarcity of food; that it did suffer owing to protracted misgovernment and immediate incompetence; that about three-fifths of the Mussulman population perished.

Mr. Henvey's remedies for the future are concisely stated in these words:—

"To sum up, then, the regeneration of Kashmir depends on the construction of good roads, the introduction of a light settlement, the reform of the fiscal and commercial policy of the State; and the appointment of adequately and regularly paid officers. And none of these vital changes will be effected unless the Paramount Power resolves to exercise its legitimate influence, and persuade its Feudatory to adopt them."

Administrative reforms introduced by the Maharaja since the famine.—When His Excellency Lord Ripon assumed the Viceroyalty he urged upon the Maharaja the necessity for reforming his administration.

A year later the Officer on Special Duty was instructed to remind the Maharaja of the expressions contained in the Viceroy's *Kharita*, and to obtain information on the matters alluded to therein, especially as to the construction of a road from Murree *via* Kohala to Srinagar, and the introduction of a new revenue settlement. Mr. Henvey replied on the 12th September 1881, that the Durbar had willingly given him

† *Kharita*, dated the 18th July 1880. (A—Political—E, September 1882, No. 263.)

§ A. Political E, September 1882, No. 277.

|| *Ibid.*, No. 278.

information, but that he could not report satisfactory progress in reforms. An European Engineer in the Durbar's service had been set to do piecemeal work on the road, but no scientific survey had been made, and for this purpose the Durbar asked for the services of an experienced Government Engineer. In regard to the settlement it was said that about 10 per cent. of preliminary measurement had been done. Meanwhile arrangements entered into with the zemindars in 1880 were kept in force. These arrangements were briefly as follows:—A rough guess was made of the outturn of each village in recent years and a *theka* or lease for the year was then offered to the zemindars, many of whom accepted the *theka* in principle, though a considerable number preferred paying the Government share, i.e., the amount of the *theka*, in kind to payments in cash. Where the zemindars refused the *theka* altogether, the villages were either farmed to contractors or held *amani*, or as we might say by "direct management;" and in both these latter cases the old plan of dividing the crops on the ground and weighing off the State share had been maintained. Thus the State still held stocks of grain and still adhered to the vicious system of selling grain by retail sale, through its own officers. Those zemindars, however, who accepted the *theka* had gained this much at any rate, that while the *theka* lasts, they knew the quantity of grain or coin which they must deliver, and they escaped the innumerable exactions, abuses, and risks, attendant upon an actual division of each crop.

But all zemindars, whether *thekadars* or not, had suffered from the reactionary proceedings of the Durbar in imposing a tax* upon sales of produce at the centres of population. The Maharaja's Dewan, in conversation with Mr. Henvey, referred to this tax as a *chungi* or octroi such as is levied in Indian municipalities upon articles of food; but there is a marked difference between the two cases; for while the octroi duties in India are imposed by the Municipalities themselves, and the money derived therefrom is expended on local objects, the *chungi* in Kashmir is simply a Government tax, and the proceeds go into the Government treasury. In Kashmir the State gains in two ways—*first*, by the income received, and *secondly*, by the discouragement of private sales of grain, which would otherwise compete with the Government sales; conversely, the zemindars lose by the depreciation of their property, i.e., of the share of grain left to them by the *theka*, which they cannot sell to advantage owing to the State octroi duties. The Government of India regarded† this report as satisfactory. The Durbar's request for an experienced Engineer was at once met‡ by the loan of Major Armstrong. Mr. Henvey had suggested that trained settlement officers should also be lent to the Durbar. But the Government, while admitting‡ the advantages likely to result from such a measure, were unwilling to press it upon the Maharaja; and Mr. Henvey was directed† to cautiously ascertain His Highness's views on the subject.

On the 5th March 1882 Major Armstrong‡ reported to the Durbar on the road from Mozufferabad to Baramulla. He recommended following the left bank of the Jhelum from Kohala by Chuttar, Rara, Thandoli, Gurhi, Hattian, and Chuckoti as far as the Choutic gorge. Between Baramulla and Srinagar he advised improvement of water carriage. This alignment was approved§ by the Maharaja. But soon afterwards Major Armstrong was obliged to take leave for a short time. He expressed his willingness to go back if there was any real work for him to do; but he said,|| "I don't think Government could honestly stick the Durbar with me to drive a level on Rs. 1,200 a month. The Durbar will never entertain an establishment for the road which could possibly justify my cost." The Officer on Special Duty was consulted, and reported that as Major Armstrong's alignment had been approved the Durbar thought it unnecessary to re-engage his services. The Durbar's European Engineer (Mr. Atkinson) apparently took over the work. It may be added that in order to further the scheme the Government of India agreed¶ on the 9th August 1882 to pay from imperial revenues half of the cost of the portion of the road

* Generally 4 annas per kharwar of 80 acres, worth, say, 2 British rupees.

† A—Political—E, September 1882, No. 282.

‡ *Ibid.*, No. 300.

§ A—Political—E, September 1882, Nos. 307-327, K. W., No. 2, page 6.

¶ *Ibid.*, page 4.

¶ *Ibid.*, No. 305.

from Murree which lies in British territory, the other half being defrayed from Punjab provincial revenues.

* Secret E, January 1883, No. 239. *Mr. Henvey's final report.*—On the 9th December 1882 the Officer on Special Duty reviewed* the reforms introduced since the famine in these words:—

"I need not enter into the history of the Kashmir famine, but I wish to point out once more that, as the severity of that disaster was due to mal-administration, so the occurrence of a like disaster can only be averted by indispensable reforms, of which I note the following five only, *viz.* :—

"*First.*—The introduction of a settlement of the land revenue for a term of years, ensuring to the cultivator a fair portion of the products of his industry, and guaranteeing him against enhancement of the demand until the expiration of the term fixed.

"*Second.*—The abolition of the system of State interference in the grain trade.

"*Third.*—The revision of taxes on trade.

"*Fourth.*—The regular payment of officials.

"*Fifth.*—The construction of a cart-road connecting the valley of Kashmir with the Punjab. I will now take those reforms in order, and endeavour to show how the case of each of them at present stands.

"*The revenue settlement.*—Some steps have been taken to survey the land preliminary to assessment, but the work is progressing slowly. Meanwhile the position of the cultivator is precarious. Fortunately for him the seasons have of late been so propitious and the crops so abundant that, in a country such as Kashmir is, where a bare subsistence costs little, he is tolerably at ease. But he knows not what to expect. At one time he is offered a *theka* or lease of his fields, the revenue to be paid in cash; but the assessment is based on the book accounts of previous years, merely converting rice into money: perhaps the amount is too high or he cannot find the cash, and he refuses the *theka*; then he is offered a modified arrangement, revenue to be paid partly in cash and partly in kind. Perhaps he accepts this modification, but the next day the mind of the Maharaja is changed. His Highness will have no *theka*, the system of *amari* or actual division of crops is re-introduced, the fields are examined by *nazardars* or eye-survey, after which the Government share is made over to the highest bidder among Pandit contractors; and then the best thing for the cultivator to do is to steal and hide as much of the grain as he can. The contractor and revenue officials carry off most of the remainder; but as the contractor has made a speculative bid, he generally fails to produce the quantity of grain agreed upon. He accuses the cultivator of theft, whereupon both he and the cultivator are enrolled in the *bakidar* or defaulter list, which comprises nearly every one in the State, from the Prime Minister downwards. The balances run on from year to year, and no one can see the end of them. Occasionally they come to light, when an informer whispers to one of His Highness's personal attendants that so-and-so owes the State a lakh of rupees. There follows an outburst in open Durbar; the defaulter is summoned to the presence, his beard is pulled out by *bandukchis* or musketeers, and he is publicly whipped to his home, and a bond is taken from him. But the money is rarely paid, for after a few days the Maharaja is intent upon manufacturing liquor, or importing Saligram stones from Nipal, or commanding Musalmans to learn the Hindi character, or cultivating indigo, or inventing breech-loaders, or experimenting with Yunani drugs on patients afflicted with diabetes, or on a thousand other whims and follies. So the defaulter list is never cleared, and in like manner the revenue settlement is never introduced. With so many interests engaged in the practice of dividing the crops and therefore arrayed against change, reform in this department will be difficult, but it could and would be carried out if the British Government thought fit to insist upon it.

"*State interference in the grain trade.*—The grain representing the State share of the produce goes partly in rations to the army and in *rasad* or supplies to officials, and the rest must be sold to the public. It is here that the interference with the grain trade of the country comes in. Sometimes the zemindar is forbidden to sell his produce at all until the Government stocks are disposed of. At other times he is ordered to sell at a price which will not compete with the Government rates. It is needless to say that notwithstanding such prohibitions and orders the surplus of the zemindar's produce finds a way to the consumer; and at the present moment the Kashmir officials having large stores of rotting rice on hand are endeavouring to get rid of them by auction. I would recommend that what is now being done under pressure of circumstances should be ordinarily done, and that the State, instead of playing the banyah, should sell its share by auction at convenient centres as soon as possible after the harvest, and then leave the trade and prices entirely to the people. But this reform is bound up with the preceding, and the two reforms should be worked out together.

"*Revision of taxes.*—Taxes in Kashmir are so multifarious, and the regulations under which they are imposed and exacted are so often altered, that it is hard to say with confidence, at any given moment, what are the taxes from which the commerce of the country is especially suffering. It is a palpable truth, however, that the fiscal policy of the Durbar is guided by no other consideration than that of wringing the last pice out of all possible trades and manufactures. For example, every one knows that since 1874 the disasters in France, followed by a change of fashion, almost killed the traffic in Kashmir shawls, but it remained for the Durbar to hasten the extinction of this industry by charging an export duty of 25 per cent. *ad valorem* on textile fabrics. The duty on salt has lately attracted the attention of the

Government of India, and I have brought to notice the recent act of justice to the Muhammadans of Kashmir suggested by that remarkable and ingenious financier Babu Nilambar in raising the Jammu tax to the level of the Kashmir tax. These, however, are only two striking fragments of an elaborate net work of exactions spread over every branch of commerce and industry. To lay the exactions bare, with the view of reducing the most intolerable, would demand a closer enquiry into the internal management of the State than the British Government is likely at present to undertake. The subject is therefore merely glanced at.

“Regular payments of officials.—I see no improvement here, but on the contrary a steady progress from bad to worse. Instead of being a year or so in arrears of pay, the army, police, and civil officers generally are two years or so in arrears; that is the main difference between the situation in 1878-79 and the situation in 1881-82. I do not believe there is a dearth of money, for coin is always forthcoming when wanted. It is either downright imbecility and incapacity to organise the simplest accounts, or it is a settled policy, recommended perhaps by Vazir Punnoo of chaining the Maharaja's servants to their posts * * *. On either hypothesis the consequences are alike deplorable. The idea of a control or a “joint control” may be rather displeasing just now, but there is no doubt that what the Financial Department of the Maharaja's Government needs is a Comptroller General of severe character.

“The cart-road to Kashmir.—This work is being slowly executed. About two stages are finished, but more than three-quarters of the distance from Kohala to Baramulla are still untouched. Whether the road is ever completed depends on the pleasure of the British Government. That the road is necessary no one denies, that it is practicable is not less clear; but let pressure be relaxed, and in a year or two nothing will be left of the Kohala road but a stone here and a bridge there, to warn the sanguine against attempting to accomplish anything for the benefit of Kashmir.

“Thus I can only claim that of my five cardinal points, one (the settlement) has been recognised in principle, and another (the road) has actually been taken up. But there is a third matter to which I look back with satisfaction. At least the cruel laws against emigration have been repealed. The Kashmir Government can no longer openly dare to imprison within the valley the Maharaja's starving subjects. Yet some watchfulness is still to be desired. There are no guards to stop people at the Kohala bridge, or at the Baramulla customs barrier, or on the top of the Pir Panjal Pass, and in theory, at any rate, entrance into and exit from the valley are free. But in a country where nearly every man is registered as a defaulter on the Government books, officials have means of detaining those whom it is worth while to keep. I have known emigrant cultivators from the Kamraj district forcibly brought back upon this pretext, and it would not surprise me to hear, if famine again occurred, that the *bakidar* roll had been turned to very practical use.”

Personnel of the Kashmir Durbar.—The best account of the Maharaja's administrators is to be found in Mr. Henrey's final report on Kashmir. It tallies in many respects with the opinion recorded (see Appendix 7) in 1871 by Mr. Girdlestone, and is quoted below:—

“Of the Maharaja's Councillors, the first is Dewan Anant Ram, son of the late Kripa Ram, and cousin to Dewan Gobind Sahai. Dewan Anant Ram has never been formally appointed by the Maharaja to be Prime Minister, but he takes the first seat in Durbar, and holds the reins of the Political Department. His enemies call him weak, and complain that he has little influence. At any rate, he is a most agreeable man to work with, and his professed sentiments do him credit. In an indirect way he has often represented himself to me as being opposed and thwarted by the party of Vazir Punnoo, and he has hinted that if his enemies were removed, he would accomplish wonders. I was always extremely cautious not to commit myself to any views on this point, and to the last I could not quite make up my mind as to whether the supposed division in Council was not invented for the purpose of drawing me and others out. If so, the device wholly failed with me. I mention it in the hope of throwing some light on the Dewan's character. He is not to be trusted, nor, indeed, are any of the Maharaja's officials; but he, with all his amiability, is perhaps less to be trusted than the others. A few years ago Babu Nilambar was a struggling pleader at Lahore. He is now Legal Member of Council; but he combines with the study of the law experiments of an interesting, though unprofitable, kind, upon the culture of silk and the equalisation of customs duties. He has imported into the State a curious mixture of pettifogging attorneyism and sublime theories. His favourite maxim is: “The greatest good of the greatest number;” but I have never observed that his counsel tends to the good of any number, great or small. His function is to support such measures as will bring money into the Maharaja's coffers, to manufacture mendacious articles for friendly newspapers, to debauch the vernacular press, and to raise a bulwark of quotations from Grotius and Travers Twiss against the encroachments of the paramount power. His heart is not in Kashmir, but in the vicinity of Dhurruntollah Lane, whither he proceeds in the winter months as a sort of unofficial representative of the Maharaja at Calcutta. He is too weak to be dangerous. I saw a great deal of him in 1879, and came to the conclusion that he was worthless. The third Member of Council is old Vazir Punnoo, who ruled Kashmir at the beginning of the famine, and who was turned out of his governorship in consequence of his deplorable mismanagement. He has a certain sternness of

character, and a capacity for making others obey him, which explain his influence with the Maharaja. From the native point of view he is perhaps the best of His Highness's advisers; but he poses as the leader of the Dogra Conservatives, a party distinguished by inveterate resistance to progress, by fanatical hatred of Mubammadans, and by enmity to the English. Along with him is associated Mian Laldin, who is well known to be the agent employed in secret intrigues. Vazir Punnoo is undoubtedly faithful to the Maharaja. His rivalry with Dewan Anant Ram is notorious; but, as before hinted, the quarrels of the two statesmen may have more or less in them than meets the eye.

"Dewan Badrinath, now Governor of Kashmir, is an old Pandit of courtly manners. In public affairs he is a mere figure-head, no more than an agency for registering the orders which emanate from Jammu. Thanks to the telegraph, there is no ruler in the Kashmir valley. The only man there with a shadow of power is Pandit Ramj6, a leading man among the Kashmir Pandits, well versed in revenue business, and a proficient in the French as well as the English language."

CHAPTER VIII.

INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION—*Contd.*

TELEGRAPHS: POST OFFICE: COINAGE: CENSUS: RELIGIONS.

Telegraphs. Agreement of 1878.—On the occasion of an interview * with Lord Lytton at Madhopur in November 1876, the Maharaja of Kashmir expressed his wish to construct a line of telegraph to Gilgit, so that Government might obtain early and constant information of the state of affairs on that part of the frontier. On the 1st of March 1877, Major Henderson, the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, reported that the Maharaja contemplated the immediate connection of Gilgit with the British telegraph system, and with this object had engaged the services of a Native superintendent, and proposed to give a contract for the supply of wire to Messrs. Jessop and Co. of Calcutta. It was considered that there was no objection on political grounds to the proposed line being constructed and worked by the Maharaja. Such an arrangement would save the British Government all expense, and also the chance of unpleasantness and friction between its officers and those of the Kashmir State. The Public Works Department supported the project, since the Telegraph Department would welcome any feeder to its lines which would not increase its own capital outlay, and would specially welcome an extension into Kashmir. But it was observed that the proposed line would be costly and difficult, crossing a summit level of 13,000 feet, and liable to suffer every winter and spring from frost and thaw.

* Demi-official letter from Sir A. Clarke to Mr. Thornton, dated 16th March 1877.

† Demi-official letter from Mr. Thornton to Major Henderson, dated 19th March 1877.

The usual convention would have to be entered into between the two Governments to determine a tariff of charges and empower the two administrations to collect money for one another. † Major Henderson was addressed ‡ accordingly.

On the 29th of March 1877 Major Henderson reported that the Maharaja had temporarily abandoned the project for connecting Kashmir with the British telegraph system, and intended for the present to construct a line between Srinagar and Gilgit only, with an intermediate station at Astor. His Highness had asked for aid in the provision of material and labor, and Major Henderson suggested that he should be allowed to purchase the necessary material from the Telegraph Department, and also that Government should lend him the services of an officer—a Native in preference to an European—to superintend the work, with such staff of overseers and skilled workmen under him as would be necessary for the efficient and rapid construction of the line. Major Henderson further said that the Maharaja would be obliged if the Government of India would lend him a staff of signallers until some of his own subjects had been trained to the work, and also supply him with an estimate

‡ From Officer on Special Duty, Kashmir, No.—, dated 29th March 1877.

§ No. 8110., dated 3rd April 1877.

of the establishment necessary for the maintenance of the line, and of the other expenses connected therewith. § The Public Works Department was requested || to give effect to the Maharaja's wishes and to Major Henderson's suggestions. Meantime a further communication was received from Major Henderson stating that His Highness was anxious to extend the line to Jammu, and to see both sections of it, *viz.*, that from Gilgit to Srinagar, and that from Srinagar to Jammu, commenced simultaneously and at an early date. ¶

¶ From Major Henderson, No. 184, dated 7th May 1877. General A. March 1878, No. 4.

Then followed a correspondence about the cost of the line, which resulted in the Maharaja accepting an estimate of Rs40,000 for the section between Gilgit and Srinagar, and one of Rs21,600 for the section between Srinagar and Jammu. No Native officer of sufficient experience to superintend the construction of a difficult line across the mountains between Srinagar and Gilgit could be found.

and the work was therefore entrusted to Mr. Duthy, Assistant Superintendent, Telegraph Department; and, as a second officer could not be spared, the Maharaja's wish for the simultaneous construction of both sections of the line could not be complied with.*

* Correspondence ending with endorsement from Public Works Department, No. 263T, dated 23th July 1877.

A draft agreement about the lines was sent for the Maharaja's concurrence; and His Highness suggested one or two amendments. He wished the Government of India to guarantee that the strength and quality of the telegraph materials, including the wire, would be suited to the peculiarities of the country; and to assume responsibility for the proper construction of the lines. But the most important objection was to the application of the penal section 17 of Act I of 1878 to the new lines. His Highness thought that such a provision might imply a limitation of his own jurisdiction; while it would be unnecessary, since he intended to adopt the telegraph law of India.

The Director General of Telegraphs objected strongly to the proposed additions regarding the quality of the material and the responsibility of the British Government, urging that Government had only promised the supply of material and a constructing staff, and that he could not guarantee the suitability of the material to the peculiarities of the country, or the transmission of messages between the termini, as the danger from avalanches during winter made it very doubtful whether the line between Srinagar and Gilgit could be maintained.† It was then suggested to the Public Works Department that as the lines were to be entirely within Kashmir territory, the usual convention might be conveniently postponed until the time came for the line to be actually joined to the British system, and that meanwhile the necessities of the case might be met by a simple letter expressing the readiness of the Government of India to undertake the work, to do it in the best style and as economically as possible, to hand it over in working order, and promising aid in workmen, &c. His Highness for his part should engage to pay the cost. It was, however, decided that a formal agreement should be executed, and accordingly, after further discussion, a fresh draft was prepared. It guaranteed that all the materials, including the wire, should be of the best quality used by the Government of India on its own lines, and that the new lines should be handed over to the Kashmir Government in full working order, after which no responsibility in respect of their subsequent maintenance and working was to rest with the Government of India. The penal clause objected to by the Maharaja was not thought to be essential and was therefore omitted. The revised agreement, as executed on the 9th March 1878, was as follows:—

† From Public Works Department, No. 448T, dated 10th December 1877.

No. 206G., dated 24th January 1878.
General A., March 1878, No. 96.

"Whereas His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir is desirous of obtaining the assistance of the British Government towards the construction of lines of telegraph from Jammu to Srinagar and from Srinagar to Gilgit, the following terms are agreed upon by Major Philip Durham Henderson, C.S.I., Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, on the part of the British Government, duly empowered by the Viceroy and Governor General in Council on that behalf, and by Baboo Nilambar Mookerjee, M.A., B.L., Judge of the Sadar Adalat of Kashmir, duly empowered by His Highness the Maharaja on that behalf.

"1.—The British Government agrees to construct for the Kashmir State two lines of telegraph, each consisting of one wire, to be carried on such suitable supports as are procurable in the vicinity, the one to be erected between Jammu and Srinagar at a cost of ₹21,800, more or less, and the other between Srinagar and Gilgit at a cost of ₹31,900, more or less, provided in each case the following conditions are observed:—

"(a.) That the transport of all telegraph materials from Sialkot to the Kashmir frontier and within the limits of the Kashmir State, shall be directly arranged and paid for by some duly authorised officer of the Kashmir State.

"(b.) That all laborers whom the officer in charge of the construction of the line shall require to employ, shall be engaged and paid by a duly authorised officer of the Kashmir State.

"(c.) That on due notice being given by the officer in charge of the construction of the line the Kashmir Government shall to the utmost of its power comply with requisitions for transport or labor.

"(d.) That sound seasoned deodar posts, wherever these are procurable suitable for telegraph supports, shall be provided by the Kashmir State and distributed along the route to be taken by the telegraph lines in such manner as the officer in charge of the work may direct.

"(e.) That no brackets or insulators be used in the construction of the lines, as their cost has not been provided in the estimated amounts stated above.

"II.—The British Government guarantees that all telegraph materials, including the wire supplied by it, shall be of the best quality used for its own lines, and that the lines shall be handed over to the Kashmir Government in full working order.

"III.—His Highness the Maharaja agrees to pay to the British Government, as the money may be required, the actual cost incurred by it in the construction and establishment of the lines, such cost being inclusive of—

- "(1.) The salaries and allowances of all members of the Indian Telegraph Establishment for the whole period they may be detained on duty in Kashmir; and
- "(2.) The cost of insulating the line or of any other changes in the original scheme that may be made hereafter with the concurrence or at the request of the Kashmir State.

"IV.—The salaries and allowances of all members of the Indian Telegraph Establishment will be paid to them by the Government of India through the Officer on Special Duty, and the amounts of such payments will be recovered subsequently from the Kashmir State.

"V.—On the application in writing of the Kashmir State, the Telegraph Department will supply at cost price all telegraph instruments and material required from time to time for the maintenance and working of the telegraph lines and offices about to be established.

"VI.—On the application in writing of the Kashmir State the Telegraph Department will afford such advice and instruction as may be required and desired by the Kashmir State for the maintenance and working of such telegraph lines and offices.

"VII.—On the application in writing of the Kashmir State the Telegraph Department will lend the services of any native signallers who may volunteer for the duty, and whose services can be spared for such specified periods as may be sufficient to enable the Kashmir State to train its own signallers.

"VIII.—The foregoing provisions are accepted by the British Government as a mark of friendship and good-will towards His Highness the Maharaja, but it is to be understood that after the lines are delivered over to the Kashmir Government, no responsibility whatever attaches to the British Government in respect of their subsequent maintenance and working."

It was not thought necessary to make any stipulation in the agreement for the working of the line after it had been once fairly started, as this was to be entirely in the hands of the Kashmir Government.

Progress of the work.—The line between Jammu and Srinagar was* finished in the summer of 1878, and seems to have worked well. But the section between Srinagar and Gilgit has not been completed. In 1877 the line was carried on for about 95 miles between Srinagar and Astor, but there were gaps which could only be got over by a cable line, while the winter of 1877-78 proved destructive to the work as far as it had gone. The direct route from Srinagar to Gilgit seems hopeless. Another route *via* the Zojila pass, Ladakh, and Skardo has been most unfavourably reported on. One possible line *via* the Kisbungunja valley to Astor has been suggested, but its cost would be large and it would be liable to depredations on the Chilas border.

Jammu and Sialkot.—In January 1878† the Officer on Special Duty reported that the Maharaja desired to establish telegraphic connection between Jammu and Sialkot, and wished to know what conditions would be required by the Indian Telegraph Department, and what arrangements would be proposed regarding messages interchanged between the British and Kashmir systems. The Director-General of Telegraphs reported‡ on this subject that if Kashmir were regarded as a foreign country, the rules of the international convention, in their integrity, could be applied to the interchange of traffic. But there might be objections to treating the Kashmir State entirely as a foreign country, and making the Maharaja a party to an international convention; and in this case it might be desirable, when the connection was made, to allow messages to be exchanged with Kashmir at the same rates as between any two Indian stations. This arrangement would be a boon to the British visitors to Kashmir, would encourage traffic, and might be proposed to the Maharaja as a concession which the Government were willing to make in proof of their desire to meet his wishes in the matter. Under this arrangement the Kashmir State should be treated on the same footing as a State Railway and should be credited with one-fourth of the value of all messages exchanged between its offices and the British system, of course retaining the whole of the collections on messages exchanged between its own offices. The settlement of accounts would be very simple. The Jammu office of the Maharaja and the British office at Sialkot would send to the Chief Office of the Indian Telegraph Department at Calcutta copies of all transferred messages,

* Genl. A., May 1881, No. 4, and December 1879, No. 12.

† Genl. A., December 1879, No. 42.

‡ *Ibid.*, No. 43.

and a register of such messages periodically, and the Check Office would submit, through the Director-General, to the Political Officer in Kashmir, a periodical account prepared from these returns showing the sums due to or by the Durbar.

The Maharaja objected to the Director-General's proposals, not so much because the share of the traffic offered to Kashmir was inadequate, as because complications might arise from periodical settlements of accounts. It was therefore suggested that all transferred messages between the British and Kashmir telegraph lines should be forwarded free of any further charge, and that each State should retain the entire amount received within its own borders on account of the transmission of messages. The Government agreed to this proposal experimentally, and the Officer on Special Duty was requested to submit an agreement to give effect to it. He sent the following draft* :—

* Genl. A., December 1879, No. 48.

"Whereas it is desirable to provide for the free interchange of telegraphic messages between the system of British Indian telegraphs and the telegraph within the territory of His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. It is hereby agreed—

"1. Messages presented at any telegraph station in British India for transmission to places within the territory of His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir shall, after payment of the charges usually levied in British India, be forwarded by telegraph to Sialkot, whence they shall be transmitted to Jammu and thence forwarded without further charge by the Jammu and Kashmir telegraph to the receiving station nearest to the residence of the addressee, and thence delivered free of charge by the most expeditious means of communication, that is to say, if the addressee be within five miles of the receiving station, the message will, if possible, be delivered by the Telegraph Master. If the addressee be beyond five miles, as aforesaid, the message will be made over to the Postal authorities for delivery.

"2. Conversely, messages presented at any receiving office within the territory of His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir shall, after payment of the charges usually levied on the telegraphic messages in the territory of His said Highness, be forwarded by telegraph to Jammu and thence transmitted to Sialkot and thence forwarded without further charge to the addressee according to the rules of the British Telegraph Department.

"3. Messages received at Sialkot for transfer to Jammu shall bear the signature and seal of the Telegraph Master at Sialkot, and shall be made over by him to the Jammu postal official at Sialkot, who shall grant a receipt for the same. Conversely, messages received at Jammu for transfer to Sialkot shall bear the signature and seal of the Telegraph Master at Jammu, and shall be forwarded by him to the Jammu postal official at Sialkot, who shall deliver the message to the Telegraph Master at Sialkot, and obtain from him a receipt.

"4. His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir undertakes to use every effort to ensure the punctual and correct transmission of messages transferred to his line of telegraph. But having in view the wild and mountainous character of the country, His Highness does not undertake to refund charges on messages which may not be delivered, or of which the delivery may be delayed.

"5. Each Government shall retain the entire amount received within its own borders on account of the transmission of transferred messages.

"6. Prepaid or collated messages shall be freely interchanged in the same way as ordinary messages.

"7. If the telegraphs of British India should hereafter be connected with the telegraph of His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, the above-cited arrangements shall be subject to such revision and modification as may be required. Otherwise the agreement shall remain in force for one year from the date thereof, after which period either party shall be at liberty to cancel the agreement on giving three months' notice of such intention."

The Government of India then passed orders in these* words :—

* *Ibid.*, No. 51.

"With regard to this agreement, I am directed to say that the Government of India desire that express provision be made declaring that no messages can be accepted in transfer which entail the disbursement of funds by the delivery station, such as, reply paid, deposit postage, delivery by express, &c.; also, that no messages can be transferred to telegraphs on guaranteed railways, as such transfer would also involve payment by the British Telegraph Department of charges not recoverable in any way. Further, to ensure secrecy, messages transferred between Sialkot and Jammu should be made over to the Maharaja's dak agent in sealed covers duly addressed to the Telegraph Master, at Jammu or Sialkot, as the case may be.

"With regard to the construction and maintenance of the line under consideration, I am to request that you will represent to the Maharaja that, in the opinion of the Government of India, the most suitable arrangement would be that the Kashmir State should construct, pay for, and maintain the line from Jammu to Suketgarh (the frontier village), and that the British Telegraph Department should undertake the construction and maintenance of the line from thence to Sialkot. In this case the British office at Sialkot would work in direct communication with that at Jammu, or, if the Maharaja would prefer it, there would be no objection to lend to His Highness the portion of the line from Suketgarh to Sialkot, and to grant a site for a telegraph office in the Sialkot cantonment. In this case the telegraph line between

Suketgarh and Sialkot would be constructed by the British Government, but the entire expense of maintenance would devolve on the Maharaja."

No reply was received to these proposals, and on the 5th July 1879, General A., December 1879, No. 56. Mr. Henvey was informed that further consideration had confirmed Government in the opinion that the first of the two proposals would be the more suitable, and he was asked to courteously inform His Highness that it had been finally decided on. This order was communicated to the Dewan, who replied that His Highness—

"is inclined to think that, as the present system of sending messages from the telegraph office at Ranbir Singpura* to the office at Sialkot by the hands of sowars is working well without any inconvenience to the public, there is no necessity for taking the line from Sialkot."

General A., December 1879, No. 60. But the Officer on Special Duty was informed that arrangements had been made, and it appeared undesirable to the Government of India to abandon the plan of connecting the break of 14 miles. Mr. Henvey replied that the Maharaja was prepared to carry his telegraph to the frontier at Suketgarh, but would prefer to have a separate terminal office there, on the ground that if the Sialkot and Jammu offices were in direct communication, there would be risk of disputes regarding the management of the Kashmir line. It was finally understood that the Maharaja would construct his line to Suketgarh, after which the question of joining the lines could be discussed.†

General A., December 1879, No. 61. Accordingly in January 1880 the Public Works Department ordered the early construction of a line from Sialkot to Suketgarh.‡ In November 1880§ Mr. Henvey, in reporting on the Srinagar-Gilgit line, mentioned that the Maharaja's wire had been carried to Suketgarh, but the whole question was allowed to drop at this time; and in a letter dated the 7th March 1882,|| submitting a proposal of the Maharaja to establish telegraph lines in his provinces, Mr. Henvey stated that, since November 1880, the Durbar had made no reference to him, or given him any information on the subject of telegraphs in Kashmir.

In August 1883 the Director General of Telegraphs reported that the nine miles of line which had been in 1880 constructed between Sialkot and Suketgarh had never been used. In 1880 a subordinate of the Public Works Department had, without authority, joined this line on to the Maharaja's line from Jammu and complaints had been made about his conduct; but the connection between Suketgarh and Sialkot had not been worked because the Durbar feared complications about establishments and the interchange of message and faults in working. In September 1883 the Officer on Special Duty was directed to ascertain if the Maharaja's objections could not be met. Soon afterwards the Viceroy visited Kashmir, and the opportunity was taken for working the whole line to Sialkot, and the arrangement has since then been satisfactorily continued.

So far as inland messages are concerned the British and Kashmir telegraph departments retain their respective receipts, and consequently there is no interchange.

In regard to foreign messages the following procedure was suggested in General Department letter to the Officer on Special Duty, No. 226, dated 24th January 1884:—

A—General—E., January 1884, No. 74. "The despatching office in Kashmir would signal, under the head 'official instructions' in the preamble of messages, the amount collected on behalf of the British Telegraph Department and of the foreign administrations concerned; and the British Telegraph Office at Sialkot, after checking the correctness of the sum so signalled, would strike the entry out before re-transmitting the telegram. This credit would be the full charge of the message, as defined in Part II of the Indian Telegraph Guide, and any amount imposed for the transmission of the message over the lines in Kashmir would be collected in addition from the sender. For the purposes of adjustment of accounts the Check Office of the Director General of Telegraphs would correspond directly with you. A monthly account of sums due from the Durbar could be regularly furnished to you, and after obtaining the necessary payments, you would be able to send a treasury receipt for the amount to the Check Office of the Director

General. I am to add that all correspondence between the Indian Telegraph Department and the Durbar would, as you suggest, pass through your office."

* A.—Political—E, February 1863, Nos. 233—266.

Distances of the District Telegraph Lines in Jammu territory ordered for construction.

From Jammu to	distance	Miles.
Manwar	"	82
Manwar to Nowalera	"	37
Udampur to Heasi	"	25
" to Ramnuggur	"	10
Ramnuggur to Bhudurwah	"	33
Bhudurwah to Kiswar	"	35
Jammu to Jusrata	"	48
Jusrata to Mastli	"	25
TOTAL DISTANCE		280

Other Projects.—It appears that the Maharaja contemplates making telegraph lines to Gilgit, Ladakh, and Skardo, and connecting the provincial divisions of Jammu territory by district lines.* The latter work will be undertaken first, and the Government of India have agreed to procure for the Durbar the necessary materials.

Kashmir and Ladakh.—The connection between Kashmir and Ladakh seems to be a doubtful plan. It has been described by the British Joint Commissioner at Leh in these

Political A., July 1862, No. 42.
words:—

"The plan is to have a line from Srinagar to Sonamarg; thence a break as far as Dras (39 miles) to be worked by runners, and again a telegraph from Dras to Leh by the ordinary route. Thus the Zojila pass, which is the only obstacle to the dāk runners between Leh and Srinagar at present, is to remain an obstacle, and those sections of the road which are easily worked by the runners, or by pony dāks, are to be spanned by the telegraph. The cost of the line is estimated at about a lakh of rupees, the working expenses (without repairs, &c.) at about Rs150 a month, and the receipts at about Rs2-8 a month. The effect on the country through which the line will pass will be to denude it of the greater part of the carefully cultivated building wood it now contains, and as there are no political or military ends to serve by running a telegraph to Ladakh, it is difficult to see what object can be gained by it."

Ibid, No. 41.

Mr. Henvey's comment was as follows:—

"I agree that the line is not wanted for military or political purposes, but the object of the Durbar is, it can hardly be doubted, to bring the Ladakh province immediately and directly under the control of the Jammu authorities, just as the Governor of Kashmir has been controlled from Jammu, since the Jammu-Srinagar line was made, with very questionable results."

POST OFFICE.

Early arrangements.—In 1851 and 1853 proposals were made for establishing a British Post Office in Kashmir, but they were negatived because the Maharaja Golab Singh was averse to them.

The want of proper postal arrangements in Kashmir having led to complaints from visitors, the Post Master General of the Punjab personally visited Jammu in December 1865 and conferred with the Maharaja on the subject. He obtained permission to open an Imperial Post Office at Srinagar as part of the office of the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, on the understanding that the Maharaja, who bore the cost of the carriage of the mails through his own territory, should get some share of the postage on the correspondence thus carried.

System of 1867.—These negotiations resulted in the issue of the rules contained in the Punjab Government Notification, No. 673, dated 16th March 1867:—

"The following arrangements for postal communication with Kashmir during the ensuing season have been made in communication with the Kashmir Government and the Post Master General of the Punjab:—

"I.—All letters from Srinagar and the valley of Kashmir will be forwarded *via* Murree."

"II.—At Murree the letters will be placed in a sealed bag and made over to an official of the Maharaja of Kashmir, who will convey the bag to the civil officer on duty at Srinagar.

"III.—The bag will be opened, and the letters sorted, by an official attached to the office of the civil officer.

"IV.—All letters for visitors at Srinagar and their followers will be distributed through the agency placed at the disposal of the civil officer; other letters will be made over to the Dewan of the Maharaja at Srinagar for distribution.

" V.—In addition to the English postage, a fee equal to half the English postage will be levied on all letters delivered at Srinagar.

" VI.—A Post Office will be opened at or near the residence of the civil officer for the convenience of visitors to Kashmir and their followers, and letters for British territory will be despatched in a sealed bag to Murree and made over to the postal authorities at that place.

" VII.—All covers intended for despatch from Srinagar to British territory by the above dāk, which, for convenience, will be designated the " Resident's dāk," should be marked with the words " per Resident's dāk " in English, and signed at the lower left-hand corner by the sender. They must further bear in addition to the English postage a Kashmir postage stamp of half the value of the English stamp required; otherwise they will be made over to the Dewan to be returned to the sender if known, or otherwise disposed of according to the rules of the Kashmir Post Office."

Changes in 1870-71.—In 1870 the direct connection of the Srinagar Post Office with the office of the Officer on Special Duty was severed; but the

* Letter from Financial Department to Director General of the Post Office, dated 19th May 1870.

† Letters from Financial Department to Director General of the Post Office, No. 1477, dated 16th March 1871.

Srinagar Post Office has always since been maintained by the Imperial Post Office during the Kashmir season of each year. At first the sanction was experimentally given[†] in 1870; but it was continued[†] permanently in 1871. The establishment

is as follows :—

	R
1 Deputy Post Master on	100 per mensem.
1 Clerk	30 "
1 Munshi	10 "
2 Peons	14 "
Stationery	6 "

Leh.—An office was opened at Leh experimentally on the 1st June 1875; it

Letter from Financial Department to Director General of the Post Office, Nos. 488 and 2368, dated 25th January and 23rd August 1876.

was continued on the 1st January 1876; and was made permanent in August 1876. It is open throughout the year.

Levy of postage.—In regard to the levy of postage the system in force is that non-official correspondence coming from India is subject to ordinary Indian rates of postage; but additional postage equal to half the Indian postage is levied on behalf of the Kashmir Durbar; while correspondence originating at Srinagar and destined for delivery in India is subject to the Kashmir postage in addition to the inland Indian rates.

‡ E.—General D. September 1832, No. 23.

at Leh. But the system

This arrangement applies[‡] also to the Post Office between the Imperial Post Office and the Durbar's Post Office. "These appear," writes[§] Sir O. St. John,—

§ Letter No. 291, dated 13th July 1833.
[A.—Political E., October 1833, No. 26.]

" to be such as might exist between two sovereign States having no mutual postal convention. Prepayment of a letter to Kashmir or Jammu in Indian stamps or cash is impossible, and the Kashmir postage is at least equal to, not half, the Indian. For instance, a letter weighing one tola, and addressed to Jammu from India, is charged one anna British and one anna Kashmir postage, the latter payable either by being stamped beforehand with Kashmir stamps, or in coin at Jammu. A letter weighing one tola sent from any part of Jammu and Kashmir to India must be stamped with Kashmir stamps to the value of one anna, the Indian postage being prepaid in British stamps or left bearing at pleasure. Indian stamps are of course readily procurable at Srinagar and Jammu, while the Maharaja has a Post Office at Sialkot, where his stamps are sold, and to which letters for his State are transferred by the Indian Post Office at that place."

Unsatisfactory state of affairs.—The whole of the postal arrangements with Kashmir are extremely unsatisfactory. It has been suggested to the Durbar that the proper solution of all difficulties would be a convention including letters, post-cards, money-orders, and all branches of postal business. A scheme is under consideration.

COINAGE.

Political A., August 1880, Nos. 1 & 2.

On the 13th July 1880, Mr. Henvey submitted the following memorandum about the coinage of the

Kashmir State :—

" There is at present much confusion in Kashmir, and considerable excitement among the trading people, with reference to the various silver coins in circulation.

First.—The old Hariasinghi rupee worth eight annas. These were introduced during the Sikh Raj by Sirdar Hari Sing. They are few in number, and are for the most part of full weight and good metal.

Second.—The old Chilki rupees, issued by Maharaja Golab Singh, and valued originally at ten annas. In consequence of the dishonest practice of the Kashmir officials in charge of the Mint these old Chilki rupees were greatly debased, and some years ago the Durbar found itself forced to lower the value generally to eight annas; but the quantity of alloy differs to the extent of many annas, and, moreover, the device being rude and easily imitated, the Kashmir silversmiths have freely used their own coins along with the Government money, and mixed in them they form the general circulating medium for petty trade.

Third.—The new Chilki rupees, issued by the present Maharaja about ten or twelve years ago. They are of full weight and good metal, and are taken at the value of ten annas.

Fourth.—The English or double rupee, rarely imitated and freely taken.

Now when the new Chilki were brought in, no attempt seems to have been made to recall the obsolete coins, and further, the negligence of the Government and of the police has suffered the operation of the coiners to go unchecked, though coining is of course forbidden by the laws of the country. From these causes it happens that, as before stated, the old and debased or counterfeit Chilki are current in vast quantities. A recent theft of pa-hmina was traced to certain goldsmiths of Srinagar, whose premises were searched, and there the police discovered coining implements. The matter being reported to the Maharaja His Highness awoke to the loss which both the State and its subjects sustained by the continuance of the existing state of affairs, and he passed an order directing all who possess old Chilki to present them for examination. If the coins be recognised as from the Government mint, the holders will receive full value in new Chilki; if otherwise the bad money is to be broken. This measure has given rise to loud and wide-spread complaints. The people say that the coins are only distinguishable from one another by the varying quantity of alloy. The old Chilki were notoriously debased by the officers of the Mint: and as the practice of private coining has been winked at or at least overlooked, the Government ought not to make its subjects suffer for the bad coinage which has resulted therefrom. The case is difficult: on the one hand it is clear that a debased coinage which owes its origin to the facts herein described ought to be recalled; on the other hand, the Durbar is between the horns of a dilemma. Either the bulk of the population must suffer loss from the rejection and destruction of the bad coin, though issued from the mint itself or passed wholesale by coiners under the nose of the Government, or the State must take the loss on its own shoulders. I am afraid the latter horn is not one upon which the Durbar is likely to impale itself."

It may be added that in 1871-72 complaints were received from the Joint Commissioner at Leh about the depreciation of the Chilki rupee in Ladakh. A little before this the Maharaja had asked the Government to enable him to get coining machinery. It was suggested that he should make use of the Calcutta Mint, but he objected that to give up coining would be detrimental both to his revenue and his dignity. The Government then ordered the Roorkee workshops to comply with the Durbar's incidents; and at the same time offered to supply blanks from the Calcutta Mint.

CENSUS.

The Officer on Special Duty was called upon by Foreign Department circular No. 743P., dated the 30th March 1878, to report whether the Kashmir State was likely to co-operate with the British Government in securing a complete census of India. He replied on the 17th April 1879 in the affirmative, assuming that no very detailed information would be required. Then came the Kashmir famine, and on the 30th March 1880 Mr. Henvey deprecated the inclusion of Kashmir in the general census. He thought that the results would be most untrustworthy, partly because the Durbar would endeavour to minimise the mortality of the famine, and partly because the system of allowing State rations according to the numbers of families would tend to exaggeration. On the whole he thought that it would be "not only undesirable but also impracticable to make a census of the Kashmir valley for some time to come." Accordingly Kashmir was excluded from the census operations.

Political A., October 1871, Nos. 139-144; March 1872, Nos. 42-48; April 1872, Nos. 213-215; also Financial A., November 1870, Nos. 3-27.

General A., May 1870, Nos. 10, 21, and October 1870, Nos. 1-2.

General A., January 1880, No. 7.

Ibid., No. 10.

General A., September 1880, No. 1, and K. W.

RELIGIONS.

* "Jammu and Kashmir territories," pp. 492, 493.
words :—

Mr. Drew's account.—Mr. Drew has described the religions of the Kashmir State in these

"There are four religions. Only three, indeed, are of much importance as regards this country. These are three widespread religions of Buddhism, Hinduism, and Muhammadanism. The fourth is the Sikh sect of the Hindus, which is very sparingly represented.

"The Buddhists comprise two out of the three Tibetan races—the Champas and the Ladakhis. They comprise also the inhabitants of several Dard villages who, while retaining certain rites of their own, have adopted Buddhism. It should be noted that not only those Dard villages follow this religion who, it was shown, have acquired the Tibetan tongue and lost their own, but several others also who retain their own Dard speech.

"The Muhammadans include the Baltis who, as before said, are but Ladakhis converted to Islam, nearly all the Dards, the Kashmiris (taking them generally), and the Chibhalis.

"Of the Hindu faith are the Paharis and Dogras.

"Of Sikhs but very few are to be met with in these territories. There are some villages of comparatively old colonisation in the Jhelum valley, and there is a Sikh temple and *grantha* or book on the banks of the Chenab.

"It is the case that within the Hindu area are many Muhammadans, not only colonies from other races, but also natives of the same part who have at different times been converted; this is especially the case in the towns. On the other hand, in every town in the Muhammadan country Hindus are settled, chiefly as traders; and again, in Kashmir, a proportion of the inhabitants retain their old Hindu faith; these are the Kashmiri Brahmins."

Muhammadan fanaticism in Srinagar.—In September 1872, a serious riot occurred in Srinagar between the Muhammadan sects of Shias and Sunnis. The cause was religious fanaticism. Great loss of property was inflicted. There was a long investigation made by Babu Nilambar Mukerji and Vazir Pannoo. The Maharaja punished a number of Sunnis severely, and warned both sects.

The affair is worth mentioning, partly because it formed the subject of a report to the Officer on Special Duty, partly because it attracted the notice of the Shah, who begged the Government of India to protect the Shias, and principally as evidence of the fanatical spirit prevailing in Srinagar at the time. The Officer on Special Duty said that—

"the animosity between the two sects has on many previous occasions caused tumults and bloodshed in the city."

The police were reorganised, it was said, in Srinagar in consequence of the affair. The Shah was informed that the Government of India saw no reason to doubt that substantial justice in the matter had been done by the Maharaja.

Hindu rule over Muhammadans in Kashmir.—It has been shown that the Maharaja and his advisers are bigoted Hindus, and the history of the famine of 1878-79-80 is full of passages which indicate that the Mussalman population of Kashmir suffers peculiarly at the hands of a Hindu administration.

MISSIONARIES.

Alleged persecution in 1867.—In 1867, the Bishop of Calcutta complained to the Viceroy that converts to Christianity in Kashmir were subjected to persecution, and he observed that such conduct on the part of the ruler of the State was a breach of the Queen's proclamation of 1858. The following reply was sent to the Bishop :—

"The Governor-General in Council, while deeply regretting the pressure to which Christian converts are said to be subjected in Kashmir, is unable to take any action under the proclamation by which Her Majesty the Queen assumed the direct government of India, because the terms of that document apply only to territories included within the limits of British India. In the case of a Tributary State like Kashmir all that His Excellency in Council can do is to discourage persecution by expostulation and indirect influence.

"A copy of Your Lordship's letter will be forwarded to the Punjab Government, and the Lieutenant-Governor will be requested to bring the matter to the immediate notice of the British Resident, in view to the Maharaja being addressed in as earnest a tone of remonstrance as the political relations of the Queen's Government in India with the Kashmir Durbar may warrant."

Renewed complaints.—In the following year similar complaints reached the Government of India through the Church Missionary Society, but they could not be substantiated, and it was ascertained that no obstructions had been recently offered to the attendance of the sick at the Mission's dispensary.

Mr. Clark's case and the protest of the Church Missionary Society.—It will be seen from Chapter VI that the question of allowing Europeans to remain in Kashmir during the winter was taken up in connection with Missionary work.

Mr. Girdlestone's opinion in 1871.—Mr. Girdlestone did not think much of the prospects of Mission work in Kashmir: the following remarks are quoted from page 27 of his "Memorandum on Kashmir and some adjacent countries":—

"The Mussulman is obstinate and obstructive by reason of dense ignorance, and, whilst submissive in most things, proves the exception to the rule by taking the opportunity of insulting a Christian Missionary if he attempts to preach in the streets. Repeated efforts have been made towards the conversion of Kashmiris; but judging by results I expect that till education has become much more general, and there is no speedy prospect of this, Missionary enterprise will have little chance, except when associated with medicine."

Missionaries in the famine.—Mr. Henvey's account of the famine in Kashmir shows what good work the Missionaries at Srinagar did then.

Moravian Mission in Ladakh.—The Maharaja has recently consented to the permanent establishment of a Moravian Mission in Ladakh. His Highness was reluctant at first, because he was afraid of hurting Tibetan susceptibilities, but the Government of India observed that they would not object if they were in the Durbar's place, and His Highness eventually gave way.*

* Vol. A, Jan. 1851, Nov. 149—162.

CHAPTER IX.

MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE KASHMIR STATE.

Political aspect of the Kashmir army.—The sixth article of the treaty of Amritsar binds the Maharaja of Kashmir—

“to join with the whole of his military force the British troops when employed within the hills, or in the territories adjoining his possessions.”

One object of the treaty was to establish a strong Rajput power in Jammu and Kashmir, which would relieve the British Government of the defence of a difficult country. And clearly the army of the Kashmir State does cover an important part of the frontier of India. On the east and north it touches the fringes of the Chinese empire: on the north-west its influence is felt among the small States south of the Hindu Kush reaching almost to the extreme eastern limit of the Afghan dominion; while on the west it holds in check for about a hundred and fifty miles the turbulent tribes of the Indus Valley, and affords some support to the British power in the mountainous country of Hazara.

Services.—The eminent services rendered by the Kashmir army in the mutiny have been described. In 1868 a contingent from Kashmir co-operated with Brigadier General Wilde's force against the Black Mountain tribes; and the Maharaja has on several occasions offered his troops to the British Government. In the last Afghan war His Highness was informed with grateful acknowledgments that it would be reckoned as valuable aid if his own frontiers were efficiently guarded.

The best known independent exploits of the Kashmir army are the capture of Chilas in 1854-55; the expedition against Yasin in 1863, and the defence of Gilgit in 1866-67.

Description of the Kashmir army.—Major Biddulph wrote a note about the Kashmir army in January 1880, which was supplemented by Mr. Henvey in December 1882. The results arrived at are reproduced below. It must be understood that the accuracy of the figures is

* Some early notes will be found in Political A. July 1863, Nos. 73 to 75. Secret E. October 1882, Nos. 345 to 349.

not vouched for.

Organisation.—The Kashmir army, as at present constituted, is the outcome of several different systems which have been unskillfully grafted one upon the other, and which still exist side by side instead of forming one harmonious whole. In addition to the usual divisions of artillery, cavalry, infantry, &c., there are three distinct forces in existence, besides special corps, viz., the *Khola Fauj*, the *Jungi Fauj*, and the *Nizamat*.

In the Jungi Fauj, again, certain administrative changes have taken place which have not been thoroughly carried out, thereby leaving the force in an inchoate condition.

The Nizamat and special corps are localized, and are entirely separate from the army for general service, which, since 1877, has been divided into four small *corps d'armees* under the name of columns. Each column is composed of—

	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 4 \text{ Regiments of Infantry.} \\ 1 \text{ Regiment of Cavalry.} \\ 3 \text{ Batteries of Artillery.} \\ 4 \text{ Companies of Sappers and Miners.} \end{array} \right.$
Jungi Fauj .	
Khola Fauj	

These represent a total (on paper) of 5,612 men.

In each column there is a Sanadis or General, and a Bukshi who is also styled “Officer Column.” The latter is a civilian, whose appointment is due to private influence, and has the whole administration of the column in his hands. Everything connected with the pay, equipment, clothing, and warlike supplies for his column are under his charge, but the weakness of the central authority

allows him to interfere in matters of drill and discipline; and consequently there is a constant conflict of authority between him and the higher combatant officers. To assist him he has a Naib. The office of "Officer Column" is considered one of the most important under the Kashmir Government.

Infantry.—*The Jungi Fauj* was originally formed by General Ventura under Ranjit Singh, and consisted formerly of twenty-six battalions of infantry, each of four companies, and containing 430 men of all ranks under a Colonel. In 1877, when the column formation was introduced, a small reduction of superior officers was effected by brigading two battalions together to form one regiment, and placing a Colonel in charge of two regiments, so that the Column Officers consist of—

	Pay ¹ .
	₹
1 Bukshi	from 200 to 300 per month.
1 Bukshi's Naib	50 "
1 Sanadis	312-9 "
2 Colonels, each at	125 "

In practice, however, the Sanadis and Colonels identify themselves entirely with the regiment with which they happen to find themselves quartered, and exercise little authority over regiments at a distance, which are nominally under them. The connection of the battalions also has not been thoroughly carried out, and the battalions, though linked together nominally, are still to all intents and purposes separate regiments. The regiments are not numbered, but have special names, and each, with slight exceptions, contains men of a single class only.

They are—

1st Column.—Bukshi, Wazir Chund; Sanadis, Jowahir Singh—

Shib Regiment	Dogras.
Sheonab "	"
Bisessur "	"
Futich "	"

2nd Column.—Bukshi, Juri Mulla (?); Sanadis, Mian Chatroo—

Brijraj Regiment	Dogras.
Gowerdun "	"
Rooder "	Poorbeahs.
Mabeer "	Sikhs and Dogras.
Rugbir "	Dogras.
Gobind "	Dogras and Sikhs.
Hanooman "	Goorkhas.

3rd Column.—Bukshi, (?) ; Sanadis, Labbah—

Kuggur Regiment	Baltics.
Devi "	Chibhalis.
Rugghonath "	Dogras.
Bulpada "	Poorbeahs.
Narsising "	Dogras.
Ramghol "	"
Gudhatar "	Poorbeahs.
Soorij "	Dogras.

4th Column.—Bukshi, Ram Kishen; Sanadis, Hoshiyara—

Bijli Regiment	Dogras.
Runbeer "	"
Gopal "	Goorkhas.
Ram "	Dogras.
Narsain "	"
Pertab "	Goorkhas.
Luehman "	Dogras.
Jagirdar "	Punjabi Mus- sulmans and Chibhalis.

The 1st column only had two regiments of the old organization assigned to it, as there was not a sufficient number to double all columns, so two new

¹ All computations are in English money.

regiments are being formed out of the Nizamut, and the four regiments have been raised to a sufficient strength to equal one of the two battalion regiments in the other columns. A regiment is now spoken of as the Narain-Pertab, &c., both the old names being retained. A battalion consists of —

	Pay.
	R
1 Commadan	62 8 0 per month.
1 Adjutant,	
1 Woordi-Major, } each at	31 4 0 ,,
1 Major,	
4 Subadars, each at	15 10 0 ,,
8 Jemadars, ,,	11 4 0 ,,
12 Havildars, ,,	8 12 0 ,,
4 Sargens, ,,	8 12 0 ,,
12 Naibs, ,,	7 2 0 ,,
4 Koorias, ,,	7 2 0 ,,
400 Sepoys, ,,	5 10 0 ,,

The Adjutant is *ex-officio* second in command, and takes command in the absence of the Commadan.

The Woordi-Major fulfils the duties of an Adjutant in a British regiment.

The Major acts as a Regimental Paymaster and Quartermaster combined.

The battalion contains four companies, each of which is under the charge of a Subadar.

The Sargen acts as Pay Havildar, keeps the rosters, and does the whole of the writing of his company, in which he is assisted by the Kooria.

Goorkha and Mian Rajput sepoy get ten annas a month extra pay, the former on account of the bravery displayed by a Goorkha regiment in 1862 during the war on the Gilgit frontier, and the latter on account of their being caste-fellows of the Maharaja.

The Jagirdar battalion gets no pay. It is composed of the sons or substitutes of men who hold jagirs from the Government along the foot of the hills near Jammu, in return for which they are bound to furnish a man for military service. In some cases they themselves serve instead of providing a substitute. They are almost all Mussulmans, and form one of the finest looking regiments in the army, in which they bear a high reputation. If the family fails to furnish a soldier or substitute, the jagir is resumed by the State. Each man receives ten annas monthly in cash, and his uniform free; he is subject to no deductions. The jagirdar system is falling into disuse.

A certain number of enlisted camp-followers are borne on the strength of each battalion as follows:—

	Pay.
	R
1 Armourer	9 6 0 per month.
1 "	6 4 0 ,,
2 Armourers, each at	5 0 0 ,,
8 Langris, ,,	3 2 0 ,,
8 Bhistees, ,,	3 2 0 ,,

They wear no uniform, and are not subject to deductions like other sepoy. The duty of the Langri is to receive and serve out the grain rations of his company, and on active service to cook for the company if required.

Uniform.—There are several kinds of uniform:—

Full-dress, consisting of scarlet tunic and white trousers, given by the State every four or five years.

A suit of white drill given by the State every second year.

A snuff-coloured suit (nuswaree) of thin puttoo, which was formerly supplied every second year and charged to the sepoy. It is now given yearly, the price being included in the monthly deduction from the sepoy's pay.

A thick puttoo coat every third year, for which the sepoy is charged R 4-8 at the time of issue.

Two years ago a uniform of French grey felting with red facings was introduced into some regiments, and it is intended to clothe the whole army with it

for ordinary wear, reserving the scarlet for use on special occasions only. It is thick, warm, and very serviceable.

Though definite periods are prescribed for the issue of uniforms, they are always greatly exceeded. The men strive to delay as long as possible the issue of those articles for which they pay, and are often in a state of rags long before the issue is actually made.

Officers are supplied with uniform as required at their own expense. That of a Sanadis costs about ₹ 300.

The *Khola Fauj*, or *Kushada Fauj*, which now consists of infantry only, is the representative of the Kashmir army as it existed under Afghan rule before the conquest of Kashmir by the Sikhs. It is composed of Sikhs, Dogras, Poorbeahs and Pathans, but the latter predominate, and till a few years ago the force was almost entirely Pathan. Of late years it has fallen into disfavour, and has been allowed to fall below its normal strength, while a greater number of Hindus has been admitted to counterbalance the Pathan element. It now consists of less than 4,000 men, who are organised into *Bradris* or brotherhoods. A *Bradri* consists of—

		Pay.
		R
1 Jemadar		6 4 0 per month.
1 Havildar		4 0 0 "
1 Nislauchi		4 4 0 "
22 Sepoys, each at		4 1 0 "
1 Mashki		3 2 0 "

Four *Bradris* constitute a *Dusteh*, which is commanded by a *Dustehdar*, who receives R15-10 a month.

Three *Dustehs* form the command of a *Sirdar*, who receives R37-8 a month. A large proportion of the *Sirdars* are now Rajputs or Sikhs.

Each column has three *Sirdars* with their men attached to it, and a *Major* who acts as *Regimental Paymaster* to the nine *Dustehs*. At first there was a *Sanadis* of the *Khola Fauj*, as well as a *Sanadis* of the *Jungi Fauj* to each column: now this is the case in two columns only, which looks as if it is intended to allow the appointment to lapse and gradually change the relative status of the *Khola Fauj* altogether. The pay of a *Khola Fauj Sanadis* is R125 a month. The *Sanadis* are *Radha Kishen* (of the 1st column) and *Sunt Ram* (of the 4th column).

The men of the *Khola Fauj* are supposed to supply their own arms, but in practice the arms are generally supplied by the State and charged to the men. Two men in each *Bradri* carry a *jezail* between them, the rest are armed with matchlocks, and each man carries a sword. All are undrilled. They hold many small outposts on the frontier, for which work they are well suited, especially when brought into contact with Mussulman tribes on the western frontier. They are much used for escort work and odd jobs of any description. They are, however, wanting in discipline, and have several times given trouble by mutinous conduct. On one occasion a *Bradri* with its flag deserted to the enemy when in action on the *Gilgit frontier*. Uniform is supplied by the State every five or six years. It is of dark blue cloth with scarlet turban breast *purdah* and cummerbund.

The force forms a refuge for most of the military waifs and strays in Northern India. Pathans from Swat and Buner, who have had to leave their homes on account of blood-feuds, men who have been discharged for misconduct from British regiments, all find a home in the *Khola Fauj*. Besides these are many Kashmiri Pathans, who are a fine soldierly race. A considerable number of men travelling down-country to enlist in the British army are waylaid at *Jhelum* and inveigled into the *Maharaja's* service by promises which are not carried out. The ordinary attraction held out is higher pay than that given by the British Government. Too late the recruit learns to his sorrow that a rupee in Kashmiri coinage is worth only half a British rupee, and is still more hardly earned by being withheld for months after it has become due.

Cavalry.—Until 1877 the cavalry was organized as part of the *Khola Fauj* in squadrons of 120 of all ranks. On the formation of the army into columns, the whole were formed into four regiments, one of which was attached to each

column, by whose number it is distinguished. Each regiment is composed of four troops, and contains—

	Pay. R
1 Commadan on	62 8 0 per month.
1 Adjutant,	
1 Woordi Major, } each at	37 8 0 ,,
1 Major,	
4 Ressaldars, each at	31 4 0 ,,
12 Havildars, ,,	25 0 0 ,,
4 Sargens, ,,	? ,,
12 Duffadars, ,,	? ,,
12 Kote Duffadars, ,,	? ,,
250 Sowars, ,,	15 10 0 ,,

The horses are the property of the men, who are supposed to feed them, but the practice is for the State to feed them and deduct the price from the men's pay. After all deductions a sowar is estimated to receive R6-14 a month in cash.

There used formerly to be a squadron of cuirassiers armed with lances, but on the institution of the column organization the squadron was incorporated in one of the regiments, and the cuirasses taken into store. It is intended to make sufficient to equip a whole regiment.

Artillery.—Three batteries of different calibres are attached to each column:—

1 10-pr. ^l of 6 guns.		1 4-pr. ^l of 6 guns.
	1 mountain battery of 4 guns.	

The field batteries consist of brass smooth-bore pieces of the old pattern, drawn by six horses. The mountain guns are made in imitation of those presented to the Maharaja by the British Government in 1877. With the exception of that particular battery which is mounted on mules, the mountain guns are carried on men's backs, and are sometimes called "Dasti Top." Thirty-six men are allowed to each gun. Part carry the gun itself, another set the limber, a third set the wheels, and a fourth the ammunition. Mr. Henvey saw the guns of a battery put together and got ready for action in a minute and a half.

A field battery consists of—

1 Commadan.		1 Sargen.
1 Major		12 Naibs.
4 Jemadars.		1 Kooria.
6 Havildars.		71 Golundazis.

The mule battery has four Havildars, eight Naibs, and forty-eight Golundazis, and the "Dasti Top" batteries have 14½ Golundazis. There are also artificers, such as leather-workers, cloth-workers, smiths, &c., attached to each battery.

The pay is the same as that of corresponding ranks in the Jungi Fauj. The men are all Rajputs or Punjabi Mussulmans.

The full-dress uniform is a dark blue tunic, braided in front with yellow lace like the British Horse Artillery.

According to the above, the number of field and mountain guns is sixty-four, but in an estimate given to Mr. Henvey by the Dewan Anant Ram in September last, the total was stated to be sixty-six.

The guns mounted in different forts are calculated by Mr. Henvey at 222. There is no means of estimating what number is in store.

Sappers and Miners.—The Sappers and Miners consist of four regiments one of which is attached to each column. Each regiment contains four companies, and consists of—

	Pay. R
1 Adjutant }	20 0 0 per month.
1 Major }	
4 Jemadars, each at	9 6 0 ,,
12 Havildars, ,,	7 8 0 ,,
4 Sargens, ,,	7 8 0 ,,
400 Sappers, ,,	5 0 0 ,,

The calibres here given are only approximate.

They are all low caste men, and their physique is inferior to that of the ordinary rank and file. They are employed in menial offices and receive no instruction. They are skilful in building bridges, but are unable to perform the simplest work without extra supervision. Tools are served out to them when any work has to be executed, but they keep none as part of their equipment. Their Adjutant is generally a Mussulman.

The Nizamat.—This is a local force of infantry which was formed about 1871, and is distributed among the seven zillahs of Jammu. Each zillah contains one regiment under a Commandant of the same strength, officered and equipped in the same way as a battalion of the Jungi Fauj. The men are the sons of zemindars, and are employed within the limits of their own zillahs on revenue and tehsil work. They are a drilled force, and are armed like the Jungi Fauj. The whole force is commanded by a Colonel, and is administered directly by the Wazir of Kashmir and the Chief Dewan. The men spend four or five months in every year at their own homes. The Nizamat is largely drawn on from time to time to fill up gaps in the Jungi Fauj, to which it acts as the principal source of supply for recruits.

Body-Guards.—The Maharaja's body-guard consists of a regiment of infantry about 600 strong, composed of Dogras, Sikhs, Goorkhas and Pathans. They are under the immediate supervision of the Maharaja, and many of them are sons of lumbers and other minor officials. They receive higher pay than the rest of the army; they are fed from the Maharaja's kitchen, and are always about his person. Favor is shown to them in many ways. The men are appointed by the Maharaja, and are personally known to him, and have the privilege of addressing him whenever they may desire it. Some of the sepoys receive as much as R 50 a month, each man's pay being fixed arbitrarily.

There is also a mounted body of Mian Rajputs, the caste to which the Maharaja belongs, about 300 strong, called Ghorcheras. They are not drilled, nor do they wear uniform. They receive no pay, but hold jagirs in recompense for service. Many of them are related to the Maharaja's family.

The Heir-apparent's body-guard is also known as the Ruggoo-Pertab Regiment, and consists of about 600 men. Its composition is similar to that of the Maharaja's body-guard, and the Heir-apparent has the entire management.

The younger sons of the Maharaja, Ram Singh and Amar Singh, have body-guards of fifty and thirty men, respectively.

The Punch Force.—Raja Moti Singh of Punch has an infantry force of about 1,000 men, mostly Dogras and Chibhalis.

Fort Guards and Outposts.—Certain posts are held by special bodies of men who are engaged for this duty only. A number of small outposts on the frontier between Astor and Gilgit are held by Kashmir Pathans, mostly from Muchipooria, where they enjoy jagirs on condition of furnishing a guard to the posts, for which they receive no other pay. They are bound to maintain 160 men for this service, who are changed yearly. They are undrilled and are armed like the Khola Fauj. There are altogether three reliefs of them, making a total of 480 men, but as they are not under adequate supervision, and their numbers are not fully maintained, they may be estimated for practical purposes at 400 men.

In Ladakh there is a "Dusteh" of the Khola Fauj (one hundred men) which has become localised, and is not included in the column establishment. It is, however, proposed to relieve them regularly, and absorb the Dusteh into one of the columns.

A special body called "Kilwallahs" also exists. It is composed of men who are too old for field service, but are still considered capable of doing service in the ramparts. They are all over sixty years old, and are put on reduced pay on being relegated to this duty. The number of Kilwallahs scattered through the different forts in Jammu and Kashmir territory is variously estimated at from 500 to 3,000 men. It probably does not exceed half the latter number.

Total Strength.—To sum up, the total force at the disposal of the Kashmir Government is as follows:—

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	ARTILLERY.		Sappers and Miners.	HUMAN.
			Men.	Cods.		
Jungi Fauj	14,936	1,192	1,532	64	1,688	Enlisted camp-fol- lowers are not taken into calcula- tion, nor any offi- cers above the rank of Com- mandant.
Khole Fauj	3,896	
Nizaraut	3,136	
Maharaja's Body-guard	600	300	
Mian's Body-guards	680	
Fauch force	1,000	
Fort and Outpost guards	1,900	222	...	
TOTAL	24,648	1,492	1,632	286	1,688	

There is also a police force of 2,000 men, half of whom are kept at Jammu, and half in Kashmir.

The above figures are Major Biddulph's and show a paper strength of about 30,000. Mr. Henvey's information at the end of 1882 was much the same. And these two officers agree also in putting down the actual strength at about 20,000 men.

Distribution.—Mr. Henvey at the end of 1882 described the distribution of the troops thus:—

Kashmir	5,648 men.
Jammu	12,730 "
Aslor	1,604 "
Gilgit	3,116 "
Mozufferabad	300 "
Various forts	4,595 "

Armament.—The armament is of the most heterogeneous description, and there are not less than six or seven kinds of fire-arms employed. Those now being made are of fair quality, of Enfield pattern. The ammunition is of bad quality and no care is taken in the storing of it.

Magazines.—**JAMMU.**—The principal magazine lies 2 miles north of the city, and is under the management of Mian Laldin. It is capable of producing 1,000 maunds of powder per annum. The **Jammu** arsenal is reported to contain as many as 300 brass guns of light calibre.

RIASI.—There is a small magazine here producing 200 maunds of powder per annum.

KANACHAH.—Eight miles from Jammu; saltpetre is manufactured here.

SRINAGAR.—Near the fortress of Hari Parvat; it produces 250 *kharwars* of powder yearly.

MOZUFFERABAD, ASTOR, AND GILGIT.—Are usually supplied from Kashmir, but it is said that powder can be locally made.

Arms Factories.—**JAMMU.**—This is the principal factory. Two foremen and 150 workmen are employed; muzzle-loading rifles are turned out at the rate of a dozen in two months, but the workmanship is bad. Small mountain guns (probably the "dasti top") are manufactured. Shells are made in large quantities, but the quality is bad. Matchlocks, blunderbusses, bayonets, swords, are freely made; and there are experiments constantly going on with Martini-Henry rifles, Gatlings, and so forth, but local artisans are not capable of efficient work of this sort.

SRINAGAR.—There is a factory near the Chaoni; 60 workmen are employed, and rifles and carbines made.

ZAINAGAM.—On the road to Gulmarg; 25 blacksmiths and 10 workmen are engaged in the manufacture of muskets and swords.

Besides the above it must be borne in mind that there are many private gunsmiths in Kashmir, who are exceedingly skilful in imitating European weapons. It is believed they can convert muzzle-loading into breech-loading rifles, and the Maharaja perhaps makes use of them as contractors for the manufacture of arms.

Presents of Arms to the Maharaja.—In 1877-78 the Government of India presented the Maharaja with a complete mountain battery of four rifled 7-pounder guns, four thousand Enfields and one thousand Snider rifles, with 200 rounds of ammunition for each rifle. The Maharaja then requested that some troops might be taught to use the rifles, and 21 men were accordingly instructed at Sialkot, being attached for the purpose to the 15th Native Infantry.

Powder Factory.—In 1877 the Maharaja asked permission to obtain the services of "a native versed in the manufacture of gunpowder to superintend the powder factory in this country." No objection was made, but it was said that the man's employment must be "strictly limited to superintending the manufacture of powder only."

Cost of the army.—The expenditure on the army, exclusive of the expenses connected with guns and small-arm factories, is estimated to be about twenty-six lakhs (Kashmir coinage) yearly, which is equal to ₹ 16,25,000 English. Till recently a number of charges were mixed up with the military expenditure; but of late a more correct system of accounts has been introduced.

Composition of the army.—The bulk of the army consists of Dogras, a term that is generally used for hill Rajputs in the Punjab, but which properly denotes neither caste nor religion, and is applied to all the inhabitants of the province of Dugar, the tract of lower hill country lying between the Chenab and the Ravi. In point of fact there is a considerable proportion of Mussulmans among the Dogras, though the greater number are Hindus. Those that take military service are mostly Rajputs, who are divided into two classes, *viz.*, Mian Rajputs and ordinary Rajputs.

The Sappers and Miners are composed exclusively of low caste men, such as Meghs and Doms, whose touch is defilement to a Rajput. Dogra Mussulmans are the descendants of Hindus forcibly converted to Islam, and still retain their caste names and many of their caste customs. Chubbal contains great numbers of Muhammadanized Rajputs.

In person the Dogras are small men, averaging about five feet four inches, of slight make, and somewhat weak physique. Though wanting in muscular power and deficient in stamina, they are of a wiry and active nature, excellent marchers, and able to undergo great and prolonged fatigue where great muscular exertion is not required. In the Punjab they have acquired the character of being excessively stupid, which has given rise to a proverb—"the Dogra only wants horns and tail to be a bullock." They have the reputation of being faithful to those they serve, and are not without a certain dogged tenacity, which renders them excellent material as soldiers.

Good as is the material to be found among the rank and file, as much can hardly be said for their officers, and several instances are known of a Dogra force fleeing panic-stricken from a contemptible enemy. As a class, the Rajput officers are very inferior to the Sikh, Pathan, and Punjabi Mussulman officers, of whom there are a considerable number. They are proud, lazy, and ignorant, few of them being even able to write, and their reputation for courage does not stand high. Like all Dogras they are great misers, and lose no opportunity of making money out of their subordinates. As a body the officers are a great deal too old, at least half of them being of an age which would incapacitate them for prolonged hard work. The jealousy of authority being exercised by subordinates, which is visible in every phase of Kashmir administration, causes the superior officers to interfere in every petty detail, thereby depriving officers in the lower grades of all influence and authority.

Foreign recruits. (1) Kukas—In the course of 1870 the Maharaja raised

two companies of Kukas, of one hundred men each, with the intention of making them the nucleus of a regular Kuka regiment. His orders to the recruiters whom he sent into the Punjab were to obtain men of good family and fine physique. The two hundred Kukas were kept at Jammu for some little time. Thence they were transferred to Srinagar, where they were made much of. Presents were often bestowed on them, irrespective of their pay, and a prominent place was assigned to those who like to go to the Wazir's Durbar. It was no common occurrence for a party of them to attend Durbar after morning parade. Suddenly in the end of the year they were all removed to Mozufferabad. This hasty departure is attributed to the desire of the Kashmir Government to conceal the fact that it was employing men whom the British Government would not have in its ranks. After this the Kukas were treated with less

consideration, and within a short time they were dismissed.

Political A., February 1872, Nos. 39-49.

Political A., April 1871, No. 54.

(2) *Africans*.—At the end of 1878 the Maharaja expressed* a wish to have an African body-guard. Nothing came of the idea, but the Officer on Special Duty was told to discourage it should any further allusion be made to it, since the scheme seemed likely to be unnecessarily expensive and open to other obvious objections.

* Political A., June 1869, Nos. 41-43.

(3) *Goorkhas and Pathans*.—Recent reports † have stated that both Goorkha and Pathan recruits are being enlisted for the Kashmir army. The attention of the Officer on Special Duty has been particularly directed to the matter.

† Secret E., July 1883, Nos. 65-60 and 61-63.

Secret E., October 1883, Nos. 338-341.

Military Administration.—The whole army is nominally administered by the Maharaja's second son, Mian Ram Singh. He is aided by a Musahib, Dewan Luchman Das, and a Superintendent of the War Office, Lala Danpat Rai. The former really manages everything. The pay of the Musahib is R187-8 monthly, and he has several assistants.

Appointments and promotions are made by parwanas from Mian Ram Singh under orders from the Maharaja, but all candidates have to secure recommendation by money payments to their superior officers.

The lot of the ordinary sepoy is no enviable one. Badly clothed, badly fed, and subjected to a life often of great privation, in a service from which death is the only release, it is wonderful that men should be found to serve in any numbers. The feeling that military service is a duty owed to the State, and the Hindu's ready submission to constituted authority, form the best recruiting agents. The Dogra recruits are often mere boys, who have been induced by want and persuasion to enter the ranks in which they are retained by a feeling of comradeship and the difficulty of escape from the situation. The scanty pay is subject to numerous deductions for rations, clothing, carriage when marching, and the income-tax or "tambol," which is paid by every Government official from the highest to the lowest. Under this latter head a Sanadis is subject to a deduction of R6-4 a month, besides which he is charged about R4 for rations. Officers on lower pay are charged in proportion. The total deductions in the case of a sepoy of the Jungi Fauj being R2-13, or 50 per cent. of his nominal pay. In addition to this a month's pay is deducted from each Government servant on every occasion of a birth, marriage, or death in the Maharaja's family. The scanty pittance left after these deductions is still further reduced by the dishonesty of the Bukshi. The sepoy's pay is withheld so as to be always from four months to a year in arrears, and it is occasionally as much as eighteen or twenty months overdue. At intervals, according to the Bukshi's inclination, it is announced that four or five months' pay will be issued on a certain day. The Bukshi, accompanied by the Sanadis, Colonels, and Commadans, sits on a carpet, while each sepoy advances in turn. His accounts are rapidly read out to him by the Bukshi's

clerk, and the small sum shown to be due is handed to him minus the odd annas, which are retained as the Bukshi's perquisite. Should he attempt to complain, he is hustled out or made a prisoner, and in any case will find his remonstrance will result in his having to wait till next pay day, several months, before he gets anything. The impossibility of redress, and the recollection that he has still several months' pay due to him in the Bukshi's hands, compel him to content himself with whatever is offered him.

In Jammu, under the eye of the Maharaja, the rations issued are of good quality. In distant garrisons they are often very inferior, and much sickness and occasional deaths, arising chiefly from dyspepsia, are the result. It may happen that all the mills in a place are owned by the Governor, no grain being allowed to be ground by the zemindars at any mill not belonging to him. Payment for grinding being always made in kind, a quantity of different grains is accumulated. This is all mixed together, charged to Government as fine wheat, and issued to the sepoy. A single handful of such stuff often contains wheat, barley, millet, peas, dal, and maize mixed up together. After sifting this mixture the sepoy has to take it to be ground, for which he has to pay, and then he has to collect fuel for himself, which in some places is a matter of considerable difficulty.

It sometimes happens that a sepoy, when at a distant station, is desirous of going on leave to his home. This, though not permitted, is arranged by payments to the Commadan and the Bukshi. Or it may happen that he is desirous of quitting the service altogether to take up land on the death of some of his family. As there is no recognized arrangement by which a sepoy can get his discharge, he is obliged to purchase the consent of his Colonel, who allows him to provide a substitute, whom also he is obliged to pay. The five or six months' pay due to him is forfeited to gain the assent of the Bukshi.

Under such circumstances, the discipline of the army is not of a high order, but the Dogra is naturally patient and uncomplaining, and cases of insubordination are rare. With scanty food and scantier clothing he travels across the high snow passes north of Kashmir at all seasons without complaining, though often despatched on the most frivolous errands by his thoughtless superiors. Not a year passes in which a number are not lost altogether, and others rendered cripples for life from cold and exposure. Some years ago an entire regiment was thus lost in the snow, upwards of twelve hundred men, including their baggage coolies, perishing together.

FORTS.

In December 1862 Mr. Henvey furnished a list of 71 forts in the Kashmir

State containing an aggregate garrison of 4,530
Secret E., October 1863, No. 319. men, and a total of 88 large and 100 small guns.

One half of these forts are in Jammu territory; twelve are in Punch, sixteen in Kashmir, five in Gilgit, and three in Ladakh. The best known forts have been described, and the accounts given of them are reproduced below:—

The Fort of Bau.—The fort at Bau near Jammu on the opposite side

of the river Towce to the city and palace. The
See Mr. Girdlestone's memorandum of the 5th February 1872. approach, consisting mainly of stone steps, is steep.

The height of the fort is about 600 feet from the bed of the stream. In shape it is an irregular pentagon, one side of which overlooks the river. In one of the angles facing to the south are the apartments reserved for the use of the Maharaja, who occasionally visits the fort for the sake of enjoying the purer air which he finds there. The ramparts are constructed on the side which overlooks the river. Between the single gateway and the ramparts is a temple, which has a considerable reputation in the surrounding country. To the right of the main road which leads to the temple is the gunshed, where Mr. Girdlestone saw eight guns with limbers and ammunition wagons complete; all the guns were of brass and appeared to be very old; there were none but smooth-bores and muzzle-loaders, the largest of them were no bigger than nine-pounders. There are no casemates or bomb-proof chambers. The garrison on ordinary duty in the fort amounts to about fifty men, and is supplied from the regular infantry; the detachment was armed with long matchlocks arranged so as to be fired by means of a lighted cotton fuse. In time of peace, the water is

obtained from below. There is in the fort only one tank, about fifteen cubits broad, fifteen cubits long, and thirty cubits deep, the amount of water in which depends upon the rainfall. There is not any accommodation within, and only moderate space without, the fort for a large defending force. The powder-house is small. The entrance and the internal arrangements are not such as to present any difficulties to an attacking party. The fort could easily be shelled from the hills behind it on the south-eastern side, which could be reached from Sialkot without crossing the Towee. Were the fort taken, the city and palace of Jammu would be at the mercy of the captors.

The Fort of Hari Parbat—The fort of Hari Parbat at Srinagar stands on the hill of that name, between the River Jhelum and the City Lake. The hill on which it is situated and that known as the Tukt-i-Suliman, may, in fact, be regarded as the two portals of the lake. The fort commands the whole of the city. In the event of rifled cannon of long range being used it would itself be commanded by batteries placed on the western side of the Tukt-i-Suliman. A little to the left of the fort, as it is approached by the usual road from the Dul Durwazah, are seen the four minarets of the Jumma Musjid, and at no great distance on the right is the jail. The last half-mile of this approach lies through waste land, dotted here and there with the ruins of garden walls and of houses formerly occupied by the chief officials of the Court, who in old days specially affected this locality, and with other signs of past occupation in the shape of dry wells. It will be understood from the above description that the ground in this direction is favourable to skirmishers. The approach on the southern side lies through the narrow and crowded streets of the city. From the western and north-western sides it would be difficult, if not impossible, to scale the hill owing to the abruptness of the ascent and the absence of any path. The only entrances to the wall, which runs all round the foot of the hill, and sometimes at some distance from it, with a circumference of about two miles, are on the eastern side. Of these, one is near the Jumma Musjid, and a second is near the jail. Between them are two small postern gates. The road from the Jumma Musjid is too steep for any animal. The other leading upwards from the neighbourhood of the jail is quite practicable for ponies as far as the foot of the slight of steps at the outer entrance of the fort. Within the encircling wall already referred to are barracks in which the majority of the garrison resides and about fifty houses for the accommodation of the soldiers' families. The usual strength of the whole garrison is about 600 men, all of whom, with the exception of some 100 irregulars who occupy the fort itself, are kept below. This arrangement is due to the difficulty of supplying any large number of troops on the top of the hill with water. The length of the road from the neighbourhood of the jail to the outer entrance of the fort is about a quarter of a mile. From the outer entrance, which is loop-holed, runs a road constructed partly as an incline and partly in steps numbering about thirty and protected by a loop-holed wall on its eastern side. This road is a newly made adjunct to the fort and runs parallel to it. The fort on Hari Parbat is quadrilateral in shape, and built to suit the irregularity of the ground on which it is placed; there is no attempt whatever at a parapet, the wall being simply loop-holed at the top to enable the defenders to fire through. There are two rows of loopholes, the smaller row being at the top and evidently intended for muskets, and the lower row, at a distance of about two feet from the upper row, are larger in size and may be designed for a small species of cannon. The fort on the Hari Parbat is almost without value as a protection against artillery. The position which it occupies, however, being on the top of a steep hill, is a strong one and, if properly defended, would cost a great deal of labor to force. The fort itself is similar to those made before the invention of gunpowder, the strength of which was due to the height of their walls, and to their inaccessibility. Since the invention of artillery the walls can be breached from a distance; this is the more especially the case with the fort at present under consideration, as it is constructed on the principle of a Faussebraie. The thickness of the top of the walls of the fort being only about four feet, they could easily be breached by artillery, and there are no parapets. There being no ditch in front of the fort, the operations of a storming party would be facilitated. In consequence of the row of houses along the inside

See Mr. Girdlestone's memorandum, dated the 5th February 1872.

of the walls of the fort, as well as room taken up by the tank, the interior space is cramped. From the prolongation of the longer fronts coming on a side of the Hari Parbat, which is not the steepest slope, batteries might be established which would enfilade them. The water-supply for the garrison is obtained by means of tanks inside the fort, and these tanks would have to be filled by bheesties. Were the garrison taken by surprise, the bheesties would be obstructed in their work; and were the tanks filled beforehand, in the event of the water getting bad or being exhausted there would be no opportunity of refilling them.

Colonel Tanner has furnished* the following accounts of forts which he visited in 1881:—

* Political A., August 1881, No. 642.

Astor.—"At Astor I saw about 100 men on parade. They were fairly well clothed, and were armed with matchlocks converted into flints, very poor weapons indeed. The powder (unglazed) was in their powder-horns, and the bullets, of many sizes and shapes, they carried in cartouches. It would take about five minutes to load one of these flint muskets, if the bullet with its inequalities did not happen to stick in the barrel. There were about thirty-five men of the garrison unable to appear on parade on account of sickness. Dr. Duke attended them. The fort of Astor is situated on the left brow of an exceedingly deep ravine, and is quite unassailable on that side. The Bunji face is almost without flanking defence, but the walls are sufficiently high and strong. On the west face there is a bastion with embrasures, and this is the weakest part of the fort, for the ground outside is very high there, and the garrison have built their houses within a hundred yards on a ridge, and these houses once in possession of an enemy would render the manning of the bastion a difficult and dangerous matter. Besides, the embrasures are cut very low down in the wall. The armament of the fort consists of one 6-pounder (?) brass gun, one very thin 6-inch (?) mortar, and two *sh-r-bachas*, or wall pieces. I was told that 8,000 maunds of grain were stored in the fort. The troops at Astor live in huts on the west and north face of the fort, a guard of twenty-eight men being kept on duty inside. I suggested to the Commandant that this number might with propriety be increased during such times as the present."

Bunji Fort.—"The fort of Bunji is situated on the right bank of a deep ravine, and is very strong on that side. A curtain runs across the fort dividing it into two unequal portions, the greater number of the garrison living in huts in the southern part, the northern being chiefly occupied by a large water tank. There is a bastion on the north-east corner, embrasured, and there is mounted a 3-inch brass gun.* The fort is

altogether a strong one, and has more flanking defence than that of Astor. The western face, with several bastions, overlooks the Indus at a distance of several hundred yards. The forts of Astor and Bunji are both built of rubble and mud, and strengthened with beams built horizontally into the walls. The garrison of Bunji consists of 150† men, of whom some seventeen were sick at the time of my visit. The men were fairly dressed, and armed like those at Astor. In both garrisons there were many veterans who have seen much service, and though, perhaps, too old for mountain climbing, are still to be preferred to younger and more robust men who have been tried."

Duian Fort.—"Duian fort was built to protect the old Hatu Pir road, which is now not used. I cannot see the use of keeping up the small garrison here, which should either be removed 2,000 feet down to the new road, or dispensed with altogether."

Ramghat.—"At Ramghat, where the Gilgit road crosses the Astor streams by a bridge, are two towers with a garrison of fifteen men of each in ordinary times, but now temporarily increased to thirty. It is an important point, and the towers, which are in fair repair, are well placed about 300 feet above the stream, one on each bank. The guard of sixty men is kept up by certain Rajas in Kashmir."

Sai Fort.—"I inspected the fort at Sai and the garrison of fifty irregulars. Everything was in good order. The fort, which is on the right bank of the Indus, and about 200 feet above it, commands the ferry on that side. Opposite, on the other bank, is an isolated tower newly built; intended to protect the approach on that side, but the twelve (regular) sepoy who guard the boat live on a sand-bank in the bed of the river, where the tower ought to have been built. Sai is a most important place, and once fell into the hands of the enemy, but the present guard and fort are quite strong enough to hold the place for a short time. There are two boats here, only one of which is of any use. After the floods have subsided, the boat, which holds some twenty men besides the crew, can make ten or twelve passages in our day, but when the Indus is at its height, not so many. From May till October the passage of the furious river is a serious matter, and it would be safer to employ mussuck rafts."

Gilgit.—"The Gilgit fort is on the right bank of the Gilgit river at the edge of the cultivated plain of the Gilgit village, where a steep cliff of some forty feet in height bounds the plain. The river, which is unfordable, flows at the foot of that cliff. As the fort is built to the very edge of the cliff it is well protected on the northern side.

Mr. Girdlestone's memorandum of the 5th February 1872.

In 1870 the fort consisted of three parts :—

- 1st*—The inner fort of Gaur-Rahman, which he built during his second rule in Gilgit. This is a high-walled fort forty or fifty yards square with eight towers. It is a strong work of its kind, calculated to hold out against an attack in the usual style of warfare practised in Yagistan.
- 2nd*—The Dogra fort, which was erected by the Kashmir Government after the second conquest of Gilgit. It is built round the old fort with twenty yards or so intervening between the walls of the two. It has low walls, some parts of which are no higher than 12 feet, and is consequently very open to an attack by escalade. It has two "dumdummas" or towers on which a gun can be mounted at opposite corners. One tower commands the river and the opposite bank, the other sweeps the plain.
- 3rd*—The Sanga, a mere make-shift, which detracted from the strength of the place. It probably originated in the building of huts outside the walls to accommodate sepoy. These huts were enclosed in the war of 1866 by a flimsy stone wall from 6 to 8 feet high.

It may be added that water can never be cut off from the fort, as the river is accessible by a covered way. There is no ditch of any consequence round the fort. An earthquake destroyed part of the fort in the spring of 1871. A new plan was then drawn up to clear away the old Sanga and all the buildings which it enclosed, and to make a triangular walled enclosure, lying to the west along the river cliff edge, the other side of the triangle and its base being plain straight walls of fourteen feet high, but flanked by one of the existing dumdummas and by a new tower to be built at the edge of the cliff on a point where the base of the triangle and the river side of it join. The object of the walled enclosure was to afford room both for the extra garrison, the troops being always more than can be accommodated in the fort proper, and for the Gilgitis themselves if an attack should be made, for if they are not thus protected, they must in self-defence join the enemy. The disposition of the enclosing walls was to be such as to give the largest amount of space with the smallest length of line to be defended, and such that if this enclosure or outwork should be taken by assault, or if the Gilgitis sheltered in it should join the enemy, the fort itself could be held, and the guns from one of its towers, and also the guns on the new tower, could sweep the whole area. This latter tower was to be separated from the fort, and by being separately provisioned and garrisoned, was expected to be strong enough to hold its own. It is believed that these arrangements have been carried out.

Chaprot.—Twenty-four miles from Gilgit, where the roads to Hunza and Nagar diverge, is the small district of Chaprot. The fort of Chaprot is situated some three miles from the village of Chellat, and has the reputation of being impregnable. It stands at a point where the territories of the three States Kashmir, Hunza, and Nagar, meet. The place is important as an outpost protecting Gilgit from raids on that side.

Construction of new cantonments and fortifications between Jammu and British territory.—In May 1880* it was brought to notice that the Maharaja was building new cantonments and fortifications between Jammu and Sialkot.

Enquiry was made because, it was said, "the Government of India are not disposed, on principle, to pass unnoticed the construction of any military works upon the Kashmir frontier towards British territory." But it was found that the cantonments were not new and that there were no fortifications.

* Confidential semi-official correspondence, packet Nos. 742 E. and 909, and connected papers.

CHAPTER X.

LADAKH AND THE COMMERCIAL TREATY OF 1870.

Political interest in Ladakh is connected chiefly with its commerce: early accounts.—Captain Strachey, one of the Tibetan Commissioners, wrote* an elaborate account of the trade of Ladakh in 1851. In this mention is made of the heavy transit duties levied by the Kashmir Durbar.

* Foreign Consultation, 12th September 1851, No. 156.

† It is also described in Mr. Elias' memorandum on the Maharaja of Kashmir's *rajir* in Chinese Tibet, *vide* Chapter XI; also in Captain Strachey's report of 1851. Foreign Consultation, 12th September 1851, No. 156.

Trade with Tibet. The "Lapchuk" or commercial embassy.—The oldest commercial institution in Ladakh is the mission headed by the "Lapchuk," of which Mr. Girdlestone gives the following account in his "Memorandum on Kashmir and some adjacent countries:"—

"The Lapchuk or commercial embassy from Ladakh to Lhasa is believed to be of very old standing, and before the Dogra conquest it was probably the means of transmitting tribute as well as of keeping up trade, but now-a-days it has no political significance. It was established on its present footing in A. D. 1842, when a treaty between Ladakh and Lhasa was made which determined the existing north-east frontier of Ladakh and began the peaceful relations between the two States which have subsisted ever since. The arrangement is that every three years a *kafila* should leave Ladakh for Lhasa consisting of 270 horse or yak-loads of goods, and conducted by a representative of the Maharaja chosen by the Governor of Ladakh. For just that number of loads is carriage provided by the Lhasa authorities from Gar to Lhasa on the outward journey, and from Lhasa to the first villages or encampments in Ladakh on the return journey. The Maharaja's representative is always taken from a Ladakh (Tibetan) family of eminence, as no other person, not even a Dogra of high rank from the Maharaja's own Court, would be welcome, probably indeed would not be received into the Grand Lama's Capital. The post of leader of the Lapchuk, though held only for one turn, is much valued, as it generally enriches the family, between whom and the Maharaja's Government the profits of the trade are divided. The goods sent from Ladakh are dried apricots, which constitute the most bulky part of the consignment, currants, saffron, kootzechin, and textile fabrics from European and Indian looms; on the return the chief goods are shawl, wool, and tea. Complimentary letters signed by the Governor of Ladakh are sent to the Grand Lama, and his ministers, and to the heads of certain of the monasteries, and with each of them goes a small present, the nature of which laid down and does not vary. The embassy, which is absent nearly a year, brings back corresponding letters and gifts. The leader transacts his business with the ministers, but pays ceremonial visits to the Grand Lama. It appears that he is always well treated, and that the arrangements for his journey are carefully made. Besides this triennial embassy, of which the last set out from Ladakh in 1871, and the return compliment by Lhasa, there is a yearly *kafila* from Lhasa, consisting also of 270 loads for which carriage is found by the Maharaja's Government within his border, the reason for this additional party being that as only about a quarter of the whole route lies in the Maharaja's territories, and as the cost of carriage falls heavier in proportion on the Tibetan Government, the latter looks to reimburse itself by a more frequent venture. The same formalities are observed on either side in regard to this as to the triennial embassy."

Kashmir duties on imports from Chinese Tibet in 1873-74.—In 1873; it was reported that traders entering the Maharaja's territory from Chinese Tibet had complained of exactions levied by the Durbar's officials.

It appeared that a transit duty in money and kind was taken at Dumti near Nyuma and at Puga, both of which places are in Ladakh. The matter was brought to the Maharaja's notice, and he was at first willing to abolish the duties, observing, however, that they were customary, and that their levy violated no treaty. Similar duties were taken by the Chinese in Rudokh, and His Highness endeavoured to secure a mutual remission. The attempt, however, failed. The Chinese said‡ that the duties were levied under an

§ Political A., May 1874, Nos. 82-83.

old treaty, and that therefore no change was desirable. Moreover, there was reason to doubt whether the duties did any appreciable harm, so the matter dropped. The

treaty referred to by the Chinese is probably that of 1842, which ended Zorawar Singh's expedition. Or possibly, it was one which was supposed to exist when the Tibet Commission was despatched, but in which Captain Strachey^a did not believe.

^a Secret Consultation, 27th May 1848, No. 73.

It is rather remarkable that the Government of India should have taken up this question at all, for Captain Strachey's report[†] shows that the system of transit duties on this line of traffic was thoroughly established, even in 1861.

[†] Foreign Consultation, 12th September 1861, No. 166.

Trade passing through Kashmir territory to British India: High duties levied by the Maharaja.—The trade of Ladakh was brought prominently to notice in 1862 in an elaborate review published by the Punjab Government of the trade and resources of countries on the north-western frontier of India. One of the matters to which special attention was drawn was the high rate of customs duties levied by the Maharaja on goods passing from the Punjab to Central Asia.

Negotiations.—In 1863[‡] the Lieutenant-Governor proposed that a reduction of the tariff should be negotiated for on the basis of compensation. He observed that the treaties of

[‡] Revenue A., July 1864, Nos. 77-78.

Lahore and Amritsar did not restrict the Durbar's right to levy such duties. Sir Henry Lawrence, when Resident at Lahore, had registered an agreement with the Kashmir Dewan whereby the levy was limited by "ancient custom." But this term was so vague as to be practically useless; and the Durbar had as a fact exercised the right of taxation unchecked for many years. The Lieutenant-Governor had discussed the matter with Dewan Jowala Sahai, and had suggested that the Durbar should be guaranteed in half its annual loss accruing from a reduced tariff, pointing out at the same time that the trade would doubtless increase and that the loss would thus disappear. This view the Dewan did not share. He urged, moreover, that the Maharaja would much prefer a territorial reward in the shape of the Bijwat portion of the Sialkot district. The concession would be accepted by the Maharaja as recognition of his services in the mutiny, which had not been substantially rewarded, as liquidation of the loan, amounting, with interest, to eight lakhs, advanced by him during the mutiny, and as compensation for the reduction of the customs tariff. The Lieutenant-Governor considered the proposal to be worthy of attention;[§] and Lord Elgin thought^{||} so too; but his death checked its development. Sir John Lawrence, when Viceroy, a little later, emphatically rejected the idea of territorial compensation.[¶]

[§] The principle of compensation had been recognised in similar negotiations with Cis-Sutlej States in the Punjab.

^{||} Political A., May 1864, No. 12.

[¶] Political A., September 1866, No. 53.

Reduction of duties in 1864.—Apart from this proposal the Lieutenant-Governor continued to urge on the Durbar the desirability of reducing the tariff, and in April 1864 he was able to report^{**} that the following important modification had been made:—

^{**} Revenue A., July 1864, Nos. 79-84.

- (a) Import duties formerly taken by weight or mule-load had been converted into an *ad valorem* rate, chargeable according to the value stated in the invoice, on goods proceeding *via*—

Jammu and Bunnihal	} to Srinagar and Ladakh.
Ukhuoor, Budhil and Sumot	
Bhimbar	
Gobalan	
Mozufferabad	
Jammu and Kishtwar	to Ladakh direct.

- (b) The import rates on the Kulu route to Leh, whether from Bussahir or the Punjab, had, it was observed, always been "pretty reasonable," and were still generally below the revised rates on the routes just mentioned. But here, too, exceptionally heavy rates had been reduced.

- (c) Export duties on goods leaving the Maharaja's territories for British

- India, whether by the Bunnihal, Budhil, Samot, Bhimbhar, Gohalan, or Mozufferabad routes had also been lowered.
- (d) So too duties on exports from Yarkhand to the Punjab and Kashmir and Jammu through Leh.
- (e) Formerly it made no difference in the import rates whether goods were sold at Srinagar or passed on to Leh and Yarkhand: this checked the trade *via* Srinagar, and practically confined it to the more difficult Kulu route. But now a uniform transit duty of 6 per cent. had been fixed for goods going on to Leh from Srinagar.
- (f) The duties were to be levied not on the frontier but at the principal towns, and the amounts varied with distances. The import and export rates at Jammu had been fixed lower than those at Srinagar.

The Punjab Government observed that these were material improvements in spite of the defects that the Maharaja intended to retain his monopoly of fine 'Turfance' wool, and that the omission to revise rates on the trade from Yarkhand and Leh to Srinagar indicated a desire to restrict this commerce to the Kulu route. The Maharaja's revision of the tariff was announced* by notification in the *Gazette of India*, and was cordially acknowledged in a 'kharita' † from the Viceroy.

* Proceedings, Revenue A., July 1864, No. 87.
 † *Ibid.*, No. 85.

Revision of the question in 1866.—In 1866, † however, Mr. (now Sir D.) Forsyth reported that he had "received many complaints of the heavy exactions levied on British traders by the Ladakh authorities." In his opinion "the reduction of duties professedly made by the Maharaja is in reality little more than a sham." He supported this view in the following note‡—

‡ Political A., September 1866, No. 60.
 § *Ibid.*, No. 62.

"In 1864 an agreement was entered into between the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and the Maharaja of Kashmir for the reduction of the tariff on English goods imported into Kashmir. The intention of the Punjab Government was that the reduced scale should be applied to all goods sent into Kashmir by any route. But it has not been applied to articles of trade passing by way of Lahoul on which the old heavy rates are still levied.

"Some of the most important articles are taxed as follows:—

"*Opium.*—The average value is ₹ 133 per maund, on which the following dues are levied:—

	R. a. p.
Customs	2 8 0
Choongee	0 13 2
Nuzzur Bhattee at 1½ annas per rupee	12 7 6
Brokerage 2 per cent.	0 2 11
TOTAL	18 8 2* about 14 per cent.

"*Sugar.*—Value of a maund ₹ 16—

	R. a. p.
Customs dues	1 4 0
Choongee	0 1 7
Nuzzur Bhattee	1 8 0
Brokerage	0 5 2
TOTAL	3 2 4=18 per cent.

"*Spices.*—The same.

"*Cloths.*—Value varies.

Customs dues	1 4 0
Choongee and other taxes at a percentage on the value. } same as above.	

* The arithmetic appears to be wrong. The total should have been ₹ 15-15-7 and the percentage about 12.

"Iron.—Value of a maund R 8 :

On this Customs dues are R 2-0-0=25 per cent.

"Churrus.—Value of a *Bhar* varies from R 100 to R 200.

"On this a tax of R 20 is taken without weighing the goods, besides all other customs due.

"The above rates are taken in Ladakh on all goods passed through Ladakh, whether they are opened or not. No distinction is made between goods in transit and goods taken into the Leh market."

* Political A., September 1866, No. 61.

Moreover, Mr. Forsyth showed* that the Kashmir Durbar exacted tribute from the district of Lnhoul. The Government of India thereupon sent instructions† to the Punjab Government pointing out that the rates mentioned by Mr. Forsyth exceeded those agreed upon in

1864, notably the uniform transit duty of 5 per cent. *ad valorem* on goods intended for Yarkhand and Turkistan. The Lieutenant-Governor was requested to ensure strict adherence by the Durbar to the rates of 1864. It was also observed that the Maharaja of Kashmir had no rights whatever over Laboul by treaty or otherwise.

Deputation of a Special Officer to Leh.—The Punjab Government in reply Political A., January 1867, Nos. 125 and 126. stated that the Maharaja had promised to make a searching enquiry as to the alleged exactions, and solicited authority to depute a specially selected officer to remain at Ladakh during the next hot season and rains, protect the interests of traders, and report upon the measures which would best be calculated to develop trade between Leh and British India. The appointment was sanctioned as an experimental measure for one year; and its duties were defined as follows:—

"The officer selected must be cautioned against any interference in the internal administration of the country. The primary object he will have to keep in view will be the maintenance of the tariff fixed by the Maharaja in 1864. Any infraction of this tariff, which his remonstrances on the spot may be unable to prevent, should be promptly reported to the Punjab Government. Another and very important branch of his duties will be to enquire closely into the nature and extent of the traffic, as it at present stands, between India and Central Asia, and to report the measures which he would recommend to secure a further development of this trade. Lastly, he will pick up and sift all the political information that comes in his way, especially as regards the progress of events in Chinese Turkistan.

In January 1867 the Punjab Government submitted a further communication from Mr. Forsyth regarding the exactions of Kashmir officials on British trade at Ladakh as affording additional grounds for the appointment of an European officer during the ensuing season. In September 1867 the Lieutenant-Governor remarked that "unless it is known that the appointment will be continued or renewed, little or no permanent good will result;" and suggested that in the event of the Supreme Government being willing that the deputation of an Agent to Ladakh should be repeated each season, the Maharaja might be informed of the arrangement. This proposal was sanctioned in Foreign Department letter Political A., October 1867, No. 82. No. 1034, dated 14th October 1867.

In July 1868 Dewan Kripa Ram begged for the withdrawal of the British Agent at Ladakh, on the ground that his presence was not only damaging to the Maharaja's authority, but created an impression in the minds of the people at large that His Highness was deemed incapable of administering his country, and was thereby incurring the displeasure of the British Government. The Lieutenant-Governor rejected the application, and the Viceroy approved of his action. Political A., August 1868, No. 109.

Again in November 1868, Dewan Jowala Sahai, the minister of the Maharaja, waited on Sir John Lawrence, then Governor-General, and on behalf of his master pressed for the removal of the British Agent at Ladakh. The Government of India then reviewed the correspondence about the appointment of an Agent at Ladakh, and asked for the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor as to the advisability of with-
Political A., November 1868, No. 82.

drawing the British Agent from that place. The Punjab Government in reply earnestly deprecated the removal of the Agent on the following grounds:—

- (1) that an assurance had been publicly given in 1867 to the European and Native traders at the fair of Palampore that the Agency would be maintained; and

- (2) that on receipt of the letter from the Supreme Government, No. 802, dated 24th July 1869, the Punjab Government had authorised Colonel Cracroft* and Dr. Cayley† to contradict a rumour which had got abroad regarding the withdrawal of the British Agency from Ladakh.

It was observed that in order to secure the confidence of traders at

* Representative or Consul appointed in 1869 (Political A., November 1868, No. 1—4).

Yarkhand, something more was required than a flying visit paid by the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir; while the presence of an Aksakal* at Yarkhand, so far from rendering the Agency at Leh unnecessary, was an additional argument for its retention, because the Aksakal would thereby be enabled to carry sufficient weight with the authorities to counteract the adverse influence of Kashmir officials in that quarter. In short, the Lieutenant-Governor considered that, if the development of friendly intercourse with Eastern Turkistan, the opening out of new markets for products of Indian and English industry, and scrupulous adherence to past pledges were matters of importance, it was essential that the deputation of an English officer to Ladakh should be continued. The Government of India agreed to retain the Agent in Ladakh; but ruled that his appointment should be regarded as a question for periodical consideration, and that care should be taken to avoid anything being done or said which would hereafter compromise the Government of India, should it at any time determine to withdraw its Agent from Ladakh.

Political A., January 1869, No. 354.

† The Secretary of State thought the language used too strong. Political A., March 1868, No. 159.
‡ Political A., August 1868, No. 335.

This order † of 1868 had some effect. In that year Mr. Forsyth when describing an interview with the Kashmir Dewan wrote ‡ thus:—

“I began by explaining to the Dewan that as the Maharaja had now completely altered the system of government in Leh, and had removed all cause of complaint, and, moreover, had compensated some of our traders for losses incurred through the acts of his agents, my feelings personally and officially were those of gratitude.”

Three years later the Maharaja abolished § all duties still leviable at Leh.

§ Political A., February 1872, No. 58.

Duties on exports from Kashmir itself to Ladakh were retained, but were levied in Kashmir; and thus all traders from British India, whether doing business only with Ladakh or through that district with Central Asia, were freed from duties entirely. The Government of India thanked || the Maharaja for this liberal measure.

|| *Ibid.*, No. 54.

Further discussion: Trade routes to Eastern Turkistan.—Mr. Forsyth was the first to strongly advocate the development of trade with Eastern Turkistan. He urged that if the Kashmir Durbar could be induced to forego its heavy imposts on through traffic *via* Ladakh, and to do something towards improving roads, the best exports of British India might command the Central Asian market to the north of the Himalayas. He recommended¶ the Kulu route through British India to the Ladakh frontier by the Baralacha pass, and thence the Chang Chenmo route passing through Ladakh, *via* Puga on the Indus, the Pangkong Lake and the Chang Chenmo valley into Khotan, and thus avoiding Leh. From the Baralacha pass into Khotan he estimated the journey at twenty-three marches; and from Khotan to Yarkhand he put it down at sixty-three.

Mr. Forsyth observed further that the rulers of Yarkhand and Khotan were both anxious for commercial intercourse; and begged to be deputed to Khotan for the purpose of establishing the Chang Chenmo trade. The Punjab Govern-

* Political A., May 1867, No. 144.

† *Ibid.*, No. 146.

than it was worth. The ruler of Khotan was asked‡ to help in developing the Chang Chenmo route; and thus the matter dropped for a while.

‡ *Ibid.*

In 1869 the Kashmir Durbar reduced§ the duties (import and export) on traffic with Yarkhand *viâ* the Chang Chenmo route alone to 4 per cent. *ad valorem*. On other routes a 5 per cent. rate was retained.

§ *Punjab Gazette* of 3rd June 1869, and Political A., July 1870, No. 74.

A little later in the same year Mr. R. B. Shaw drew up a memorandum|| at Lord Mayo's request embodying the results of travels on, and enquiries into, trade routes leading to Yarkhand and Central Asia. He compared principally the existing main route with the Chang Chenmo route, having travelled over both.

The former may be said roughly to run due north from the Baralacha pass on the Lahoul frontier, through Leh to the Karakoram pass, and thence to Shadula.

The latter makes a détour eastwards. Its line may be marked as far as Shadula by the following stages :—

- (a) the Rotang, Lachalong, and Baralacha passes;
- (b) the salt lake lying about half-way between the Lachalong pass and the Indus;
- (c) Chumathang or Puga and Niama, all places on the Indus;
- (d) Chushal at the south-eastern elbow of the Pangkong lake;
- (e) the eastern shore of the Pangkong lake to its northern extremity at Lookong;
- (f) a stretch east-north-east *viâ* Masnik and Gogra to Nischu;
- (g) another stretch almost due north, across the Lingzhithang and Kuenlun plains, and amongst salt lakes *viâ* Lokhzhung, Thal-dat, and the Soda Plain to Brangsa on the Eastern Karakash river and the Kuenlun range;
- (h) the Karakash river westwards to Shadula.

At Shadula the two routes meet, and, excepting détours (quite beyond the Kashmir border) eastward and westward, may be said to run due north to Yarkhand. Between the British frontier of Lahoul and Shadula Mr. Shaw put the journey by this route down at 46 marches and 456 miles.

Lord Mayo agreed with Mr. Shaw¶ in preferring the Chang Chenmo route, especially since the Kashmir Durbar was inclined to favor it. He also thought that the prospects of opening up trade with Central Asia were most important; and it was determined that negotiations should be entered into with the Maharaja for the attainment of this object.**

** Political A., July 1870, No. 74.

the business. He took presents and a *kharita* from His Excellency to the Maharaja. His official †† instructions ran thus :—

“The following are the objects which His Excellency in Council desires to attain at the present time :—

“To intimate to the Maharaja the wish of the British Government that, in continuation of former operations, one or more British officers should examine and survey the routes already described by Mr. Shaw, and to procure an assurance from His Highness that no interference should be allowed on the part of subjects of the Durbar with any officer or officers who may be entrusted with this duty and with the work of demarcating whatever route is eventually chosen; that the road when once marked out, shall be a free highway to all comers; and that no combination amongst subjects of the Durbar against the free use of this road shall be suffered to take place.

“To obtain the Maharaja's consent to the appointment of Joint Commissioners, whose business it will be to superintend, and if necessary maintain, the road in its entire length through His Highness's territories; to decide civil and criminal cases of a petty nature, such as breach of contract, assaults, and the like, within limits to be agreed upon, amongst carriers and traders, and any others who may avail themselves of the road; and to see that all regulations hereafter to be made and agreed upon between the British Government and His Highness are perfectly fulfilled. In the event of such Commissioners being appointed, it would be

¶ Mr. Shaw was warmly thanked and presented with £340 for his services and information. (Political A., July 1870, Nos. 77—78.)

†† Political A., July 1870, No. 83.

most desirable to stipulate that no other official of the Durbar should be allowed to reside or to exercise power of any kind within the limits to which the Commissioners' jurisdiction may be determined to extend, which should be a line drawn at a certain distance from the general course of the road. By this means the possibility of any clashing of authority would be avoided from the beginning.

"To induce the Maharaja to renounce the transit duties of 4 per cent. for the Chang Chenmo route and 5 per cent. for other routes, which he now levies on goods passing from British India to Turkistan, and *vice versa*. In return for this concession, the British Government is ready to allow such articles of European manufacture liable to duty as may be intended for the through trade to pass in bond from the port of entry into the Maharaja's territory. Such a course, His Excellency in Council considers, is preferable to granting a drawback in money. If, however, notwithstanding the endeavours of yourself and the Lieutenant-Governor, His Highness declines to accept this condition, His Excellency in Council would not, in the last resort, refuse a drawback of the duties levied at the port of entry on goods of European manufacture, and intended for exportation to Central Asia, at such a place or places within British India, as, for example, Amritsar and Ludhiana, whence they are usually taken by traders for exportation.

"To procure His Highness's leave for independent persons, as well British subjects and Yarkhandis as subjects of the Maharaja, to provide, keep, and maintain at different stations the means of carriage and transport for the purposes of trade, and, if thought desirable, to be entitled to receive supplies at rates to be fixed yearly by the Joint Commissioners, and to establish depôts for such supplies at such places as the Joint Commissioners may agree upon.

"Such are the main points in which the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council trusts that the Lieutenant-Governor may be successful in enlisting the cordial co-operation of the Maharaja of Kashmir. In every way that you can, it will be your duty to assist His Honour, referring to him for advice and instruction in all matters of doubt and difficulty. It is possible that objections which cannot here be foreseen may be raised; but His Excellency in Council believes that, with patience and judgment, and by a courteous yet firm bearing, the object which the Supreme Government has so much at heart may be achieved. To this end no effort on your side should be spared.

"It is the wish of the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council that the result of the negotiations should be embodied in a memorandum showing the course of the deliberations with His Highness, and detailing accurately and clearly the conditions to which the Maharaja is willing to consent for the improvement of the trade with Eastern Turkistan. It will then be for the Supreme Government, after considering the views of His Highness and the suggestions and recommendations of the Lieutenant-Governor, to decide, in what form the arrangements agreed upon by the British Government and the Durbar should be recorded and ratified."

Negotiations were accordingly opened by the Lieutenant-Governor and
 Politien A., July 1870, No. 90. Captain Grey at Jammu. The results are set forth
 * Appendix 12. in a memorandum* submitted by the latter at the
 end of 1869. They may be summed up thus:—

(1). The Maharaja agreed to the survey operations proposed, but he restricted them to the Chang Chenmo route; whereas the intention of the Government of India had been to examine all the routes mentioned by Mr. Shaw, and to select the best, which, it was anticipated, would be the Chang Chenmo.

(2). The Maharaja stipulated that the surveying officers should accept the Kashmir boundaries on the north-east as they might be pointed out by the Durbar's officials.

(3). The Maharaja agreed generally to the appointment of Joint Commissioners, and to the proposed scope of their authority. Nothing definite was settled, however, regarding the exercise of their powers. The Maharaja wished to be allowed to issue rules for their guidance. Some minor points were also raised, *e.g.*, the disposal of stamp duties realised within the jurisdiction of the Joint Commissioners, the place of imprisonment of offenders sentenced by them, and the residence within their limits of the Durbar's revenue officials.

(4). The Maharaja also wished to limit the period of the Joint Commissioners' operations to "the hot weather."

(5). He laid particular stress on their jurisdiction being exclusively and perpetually confined to the Chang Chenmo route.

(6). The arrangements proposed for supplies and the comfort of travellers were satisfactory.

(7). In regard to the abolition of duties, the Maharaja agreed to do what was asked, *viz.*, to remove the 4 per cent. duty on through traffic *via* the Chang Chenmo route, and the 5 per cent. duty on other routes.

(8). By way of compensation for this concession, the Maharaja was anxious to get a grant of territory in the Bijwat tract which has already been mentioned. Captain Grey refused, however, to entertain this suggestion.

(9). Then the Maharaja urged that the practical effect of freeing the through trade would be that he would be forced to abolish his Kashmir import duties; and he begged that exports from his country passing to or through British India might be freed from British duties, more especially the shawl exports. Captain Grey thought this request reasonable, and he went so far as to offer the exemption from British duty not only of the *through trade to Central Asia* entering Kashmir from British India, but of *all* goods so entering the Maharaja's territories. This last concession was manifestly in excess of the original intentions of the Government.

(10). Another matter which the Maharaja had at heart was the withdrawal of the Special Officer who had been deputed to Leb.

(11). Lastly, His Highness wished for a formal guarantee that the arrangements made should be declared to be final.

On the whole the negotiations were successful. It must, however, be noted that they were not obtained without considerable pressure. The entire business was transacted in three days.

A draft treaty was then drawn up on the basis of the negotiations in the terms quoted in the foot-note¹ :—

The further negotiations were entrusted to Mr. (now Sir) T. D. Forsyth and Captain Grey, subject to the instructions set forth below :—

"Articles I and II of the draft treaty require no remark.

"Article III makes provision for the appointment of Joint Commissioners to enforce the regulations regarding the traffic and settle petty civil and criminal cases that may arise, and for the framing of rules for their guidance. His Excellency in Council requests that on the conclusion of the treaty, Mr. Forsyth will, in consultation with the Maharaja, draw up a code of rules for the consideration of Government. At the same time I am to indicate

¹ Wherein, in the interests of the high contracting parties and their respective subjects, it is deemed desirable to afford greater facilities than at present exist for the development and security of trade with Eastern Turkistan, the following Articles have, with this object, been agreed upon :—

"ARTICLE I.—With the consent of the Maharaja, officers of the British Government will be appointed to survey the trade routes through the Maharaja's territories from the British frontier of Ladakh to the territories of the Ruler of Yarkhand, including the route via the Chong Chueno valley. The Maharaja will depute an officer of his government to accompany the surveyors, and will render them all the assistance in his power. A map of the routes surveyed will be made, an attested copy of which will be given to the Maharaja.

"ARTICLE II.—Whichever route shall, after examination and survey as above, be declared by the British Government to be the best suited for the development of trade with Eastern Turkistan, shall be declared by the Maharaja to be a free highway in perpetuity and at all times for all travellers and traders.

"ARTICLE III.—For the supervision and maintenance of the road in its entire length through the Maharaja's territories, the regulation of traffic on the free highway described in Article II, the enforcement of regulations that may be hereafter agreed upon, and the settlement of disputes between carriers, traders, travellers or others using that road, in which either of the parties or both of them are subjects of the British Government or of any foreign State, two Commissioners shall be annually appointed, one by the British Government, and the other by the Maharaja. In the discharge of their duties the Commissioners shall be guided by such rules as may hereafter and from time to time be laid down by the joint authority of the British Government and the Maharaja.

"ARTICLE IV.—The jurisdiction of the Commissioners shall be defined by a line on each side of the road at a maximum width of two stades for except where it may be deemed by the Commissioners necessary to include a wider extent for grazing grounds. Within this maximum width, the surveyors appointed under Article I, shall demarcate and map the limits of jurisdiction which may be decided on by the Commissioners as most suitable, including grazing grounds; and the jurisdiction of the Commissioners shall not extend beyond the limits so demarcated. The land included within these limits shall remain in the Maharaja's independent possession; and subject to the stipulations contained in this Treaty, the Maharaja shall continue to possess the same rights of full sovereignty therein as in any other part of his territories.

"ARTICLE V.—The Maharaja agrees to give all possible assistance in enforcing the decisions of the Commissioners and in preventing the breach or evasion of the regulations established under Article III.

"ARTICLE VI.—The Maharaja agrees that any person, whether a subject of the British Government or of the Maharaja, or of the Ruler of Yarkhand, or of any foreign State, may settle at any place within the jurisdiction of the two Commissioners, and may provide, keep, maintain, and let for hire at different stages, the means of carriage and transport for the purposes of trade.

"ARTICLE VII.—The two Commissioners shall be empowered to establish supply depôts and to authorize other persons to establish supply depôts at such places on the road as may appear to them suitable, to fix the rates at which provisions shall be sold to traders, carriers, settlers, and others, and to fix the rent to be charged for the use of any rest-houses or serais that may be established on the road. The officers of the British Government in Kulu, &c., and the officers of the Maharaja in Ladakh shall be instructed to use their best endeavours to supply provisions on the indent of the Commissioners at market rates.

"ARTICLE VIII.—The Maharaja agrees to levy no transit duty whatever on the aforesaid free highway; and the Maharaja further agrees to abolish all transit duties levied within his territories on goods transmitted in bond through His Highness's territories from Eastern Turkistan to India, and vice versa, on which bulk may not be broken within the territories of His Highness. On goods imported into, or exported from, His Highness's territory, whether by the aforesaid free highway or any other route, the Maharaja may levy such import or export duties as he may think fit.

"ARTICLE IX.—The British Government agree to levy no duty on goods transmitted in bond through British India to Eastern Turkistan, or to the territories of His Highness the Maharaja. The British Government further agree to abolish the export duties now levied on shawls and other textile fabrics manufactured in the territories of the Maharaja and exported to countries beyond the limits of British India."

generally a few principles which should, as far as possible, be followed in framing the rules, so far as they relate to the judicial powers to be exercised by the Commissioners.

- "(a)—The Joint Commissioners should not interfere in cases other than those which affect the development, freedom, and safety of the trade, and the objects for which the treaty is concluded, and in which one of the parties or both are either British subjects or subjects of a foreign State.
- "(b)—In civil disputes the Commissioners should have power to dispose of all cases, whatever be the value of the property in litigation.
- "(c)—When the Commissioners agree, their decision should be final in all cases. When they are unable to agree, the parties should have the right of nominating a single arbitrator and should bind themselves in writing to abide by his award; should the parties not be able to agree upon a single arbitrator, each party should name one, and the two Commissioners should name a third, and the decision of the majority of the arbitrators should be final.
- "(d) In criminal cases, the power of the Commissioners should be limited to offences such as in British territory would be tried by a Subordinate Magistrate of the first class, and as far as possible, the procedure of the Criminal Procedure Code should be followed. Cases of a more heinous kind should be made over to the Maharaja for trial if the accused be not a British subject; in the latter case, he should be forwarded to the nearest British Court of competent jurisdiction for trial.
- "(e) His Excellency in Council has no objections to crediting to the Maharaja's treasury fines imposed in criminal cases and stamp duties in civil suits, should it be decided to levy such.
- "(f) Persons sentenced to imprisonment should, if British subjects, be sent to the nearest British jail. If not British subjects, the offenders can be made over for imprisonment in the Maharaja's jails.
- "(g) Article I of the draft treaty provides that the road shall be open to traders at all times. But as it will be impossible to retain the Commissioners throughout the year, the rules should stipulate for some definite period during which the Commissioners will exercise authority on the road; care being taken to leave an ample margin for the accident of the passes being early open or closing late. Some provision should also be made for cases that may arise before the Commissioners commence their work in the spring, and after they leave in autumn. With respect to the residence of Kashmir officials within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Commissioners, His Excellency in Council leaves the settlement of this to Mr. Forsyth's discretion, and should he think it necessary a clause can be added to article IV of the draft treaty that any authority which may be exercised by Kashmir officials within the demarcated limits shall be in subordination to the Commissioners. The Commissioners who may be appointed hereafter to fix the limit of jurisdiction will receive instructions to be careful to include within the boundary of the road good grazing grounds and places suited for rest-houses and encampments of merchants, &c.
- "As the boundaries of the Maharaja's territories to the north and east have never been accurately defined by survey, Mr. Forsyth will be careful to commit Government in no way as to the boundaries of the possessions of the Maharaja in any direction."

Conclusion of the treaty.—The draft treaty was accepted almost altered. Only two important additions were made, *viz* :—

- (a) in Article II "towards the Chang Chenmo valley" were inserted to limit the choice of routes, so that none through Kashmir should be taken;
- (b) the Maharaja wished the period of the Joint Commissioners' annual deputation to be defined in the treaty instead of in subsidiary rules. Such a course, however, seemed to Mr. Forsyth to be inconvenient, and finally article III of the treaty was added to thus :—

"In the discharge of their duties, and as regards the period of their residence, the Commissioners shall be guided by such rules as are now separately framed, and may from time to time hereafter be laid down by the joint authority of the British Government and the Maharaja."

* Appendix 14. Political A., July 1870, No. 118.

With these slight changes, and one other, the treaty* was signed, sealed, and ratified, and published in the *Gazette of India*.

Rules under article III.—Mr. Forsyth submitted the following rules to give effect to the 3rd article of the treaty, which he had framed with the concurrence of the Durbar.

Political A., July 1870, No. 102.

" I.—As it is impossible, owing to the character of the climate, to retain the Commissioners throughout the year, the period during which they shall exercise their authority shall be taken to commence on 15th May, and to end on 1st December.

" II.—During the absence of either Commissioner, cases may be heard and decided by the other Commissioner, subject to appeal to the Joint Commissioners.

" III.—In the months when the Joint Commissioners are absent, i.e., between 1st December and 15th May, all cases which may arise shall be decided by the Wazir of Ladakh, subject to appeal to the Joint Commissioners.

" IV.—The Joint Commissioners shall not interfere in cases other than those which affect the development, freedom, and safety of the trade, and the objects for which the treaty is concluded, and in which one of the parties or both are either British subjects or subjects of a foreign State.

" V.—In civil disputes the Commissioners shall have power to dispose of all cases, whatever be the value of the property in litigation.

" VI.—When the Commissioners agree, their decision shall be final in all cases. When they are unable to agree the parties shall have the right of nominating a single arbitrator, and shall bind themselves in writing to abide by his award. Should the parties not be able to agree upon a single arbitrator, each party shall name one, and the two Commissioners shall name a third, and the decision of the majority of the arbitrators shall be final.

" VII.—In criminal cases the powers of the Commissioners shall be limited to offences such as in British territory would be tried by a Subordinate Magistrate of the first class, and as far as possible, the procedure of the Criminal Procedure Code shall be followed. Cases of a more heinous kind should be made over to the Maharaja for trial if the accused be not an European British subject; in the latter case he should be forwarded to the nearest British Court of competent jurisdiction for trial.

" VIII.—All fines levied in criminal cases and all stamp receipts levied according to the rates in force for civil suits in the Maharaja's dominions, shall be credited to the Kashmir treasury. Persons sentenced to imprisonment, shall, if British subjects, be sent to the nearest British jail. If not British subjects, offenders shall be made over for imprisonment in the Maharaja's jails.

" IX.—The practice of cow-killing is strictly prohibited throughout the jurisdiction of the Maharaja.

" X.—If any places come within the line of road from which the towns of Leh, &c., are supplied with fuel, or wood for building purposes, the Joint Commissioners shall so arrange with the Wazir of Ladakh that those supplies are not interfered with.

" XI.—Whatever transactions take place within the limits of the road shall be considered to refer to goods in bond. If a trader opens his load and disposes of a portion, he shall not be subject to any duty, so long as the goods are not taken for consumption into the Maharaja's territory across the line of road. And goods left for any length of time in the line of road subject to the jurisdiction of the Commissioners shall be free.

" XII.—Where a village lies within the jurisdiction of the Joint Commissioners, then, as regards the collection of revenue, or in any case where there is necessity for the interference of the usual revenue authorities on matters having no connection with the trade, the Joint Commissioners have no power whatever to interfere; but to prevent misunderstanding, it is advisable that the Revenue officials should first communicate with the Joint Commissioners before proceeding to take action against any person within their jurisdiction. The Joint Commissioners can then exercise their discretion to deliver up the person sought, or to make a summary enquiry to ascertain whether their interference is necessary or not.

" XIII.—The Maharaja agrees to give R 5,000 this year for the construction of the road and bridges, and in future years His Highness agrees to give R 2,000 per annum for the maintenance of the road and bridges. Similarly, for the repairs of serais a sum of R 100 per annum for each serai will be given. Should further expenditure be necessary, the Joint Commissioners will submit a special report to the Maharaja and ask for a specific grant. This money will be expended by the Joint Commissioners who will employ free labour at market rates for this purpose. The officers in Ladakh and in British territory shall be instructed to use their best endeavours to supply labourers on the indent of the Commissioners at market rates. No tolls shall be levied on the bridges on this line of road.

" XIV.—As a temporary arrangement, and until the line of road has been demarcated, or till the end of this year, the Joint Commissioners shall exercise the powers described in these rules over the several roads taken by the traders through Ladakh from Lahoul and Spiti."

The Government of India suggested the omission of Rule IX, prohibiting cow-killing. They also thought that the annual period of the Joint Commissioners' duties should not be strictly limited to dates, seeing that the passage of the traffic might require their presence beyond them. The rules were altered accordingly, and were then finally approved by the Governor-General in Council and published in the *Gazette of India*. It is noteworthy that British subjects not being Europeans can be tried by the Maharaja for offences beyond the cognizance of the Joint-Commissioners.

Appointment of a British Joint-Commissioner.—The first British Joint-Commissioner was Dr. Copley, who had been already deputed on special

duty to Leh. He was selected at the Maharaja's request. His colleague was Pandit Bakshi Ram.

*General B., April 1872, Nos. 233-36.
Political B., February 1871, Nos. 85-86.

General B., January 1873, Nos. 237-238.

General B., August 1874, Nos. 146-150.

General B., May 1877, Nos. 130-133.

Political A., January 1882, No. 242.

A., Political E., June 1889, Nos. 85-90.

Political position of the British Joint-Commissioner: orders of 1870.—The position of the British Joint-Commissioner was defined† in 1870 by the Government of India in these words:—

“Dr. Cayley and his successor in office from time to time will be guided generally by the provisions of articles I, III, IV, and VII of the treaty, and by the subsidiary rules framed under article IV. He will see generally that the provisions of the treaty and the rules are fully and fairly carried out, and be guided in all his proceedings by the most scrupulous respect for the dignity of the Maharaja and the integrity of his authority within his dominions. He will carefully abstain from all interference in political questions or disputes, and consider as his proper sphere of duty only such matters as affect the development, freedom, and safety of trade on the new free highway. At the same time it will be his duty to obtain such information regarding events in Kashmir, Yarkhand, and Central Asia, as may be in his power, and to forward it from time to time for the information of Government through His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor. He should also submit through the Lieutenant-Governor, for the information of His Excellency in Council, a weekly or monthly diary of his proceedings and abstract of correspondence, and a general report at the conclusion of the season. Any point on which he may be in doubt, or in regard to which he may desire advice or instructions, should be referred by him to the Lieutenant-Governor, who will, if necessary, take the orders of the Government of India.”

Change in 1873.—The first important change made in the political position of the British Joint-Commissioner came in 1873‡. It has been shown that in that year the attitude of Russia, in respect of Central Asia, induced Lord Northbrook's Government to resolve on appointing a permanent British Resident at the Kashmir Court. The Maharaja suggested as a compromise *inter alia* that the British Joint-Commissioner should be allowed to remain at Leh throughout the year. And Lord Northbrook accepted this compromise as likely to answer all immediate purposes. The Joint-Commissioner has since then been free to remain uninterrupted in Ladakh.

Change in 1877.—The next important change followed in 1877. When the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir was placed directly under the orders of the Government of India, it was determined that the British Joint-Commissioner should correspond through, and be in subordination to, him.

Views of the Kashmir Durbar.—It has been observed that the Maharaja expressed a wish that after the appointment of the Joint-Commissioners, the deputation of a Special Officer to Ladakh should cease.

On this point a *kharita* from the Viceroy, announcing Mr. Forsyth's mission, remarked thus:—

“With regard to the presence of a British officer in Ladakh, I entertain the hope that the appointment of the Joint-Commissioners will render unnecessary the retention of such an officer in the interests of trade, and, should this prove hereafter to be the case, he will be withdrawn.”

Mr. Forsyth in reporting on the conclusion of the treaty spoke of it as “an arrangement which does away with the presence of a British officer in the capital of Ladakh.”

† Political A., July 1870, No. 104.

‡ Secret, March 1873, Nos. 19-22, K. W.

§ Political A., July 1870, No. 100.

The Punjab Government thought* that this remark went too far, though no doubt a special officer would no longer be required.

No orders were passed on the subject by the Government of India; but as a matter of fact no Special Officer has been deputed to Ladakh since the establishment of the Joint-Commissionership.

† See Sir A. Lyall's note in K. W. Secret, R., March 1853, No. 86. It can hardly be doubted‡ that these arrangements were altogether most distasteful to the Maharaja.

Survey and selection of a trade route.—In accordance with article I of the treaty, the Joint-Commissioners proceeded to examine and report upon the trade routes with the aid of an Assistant Surveyor. One conclusion at which they arrived immediately was that the eastward divergences suggested by Mr. Shaw as routes just above the Baralacha and Lachalong passes were unsuitable, partly because they were difficult, and chiefly because they were long. Putting them aside they recommended that the old road should be followed northwards as far as Marshalong on the Indus 25 miles south of Leh, and that here the route should cross the river and strike off eastwards, joining Mr. Shaw's Chang Chenmo route at Lookong at the northern extremity of the Pangkong lake.

Another point on which the Joint-Commissioners laid stress was that the new route should, until at least its whole length should have been thoroughly developed, pass through, or close to, some *entrepôt* of trade like Leh.

They also discussed the boundaries of the new route, the camping grounds to be selected, and the improvements to be made.

Major Montgomerie's opinion.—The report of the Joint-Commissioners was reviewed first by Major Montgomerie, R.E., of the Great Trigonometrical Survey. He agreed with the Joint-Commissioners on the two points noted above. But as to the first he believed that the Lahour route would never hold ground against the road through Kashmir. And as to the second he thought that no attempt to avoid or supersede Leh would answer. The Chang Chenmo line he regarded as doubtful. The traffic had settled down in the old Karakoram route, and would not forsake it readily for an undeveloped new one. He therefore advised that some attention should be paid to the former, and that the Joint-Commissioners should have jurisdiction over both until the traffic should show a decided preference for one or the other after a trial of both.

Experiences of the Yarkhand Mission of 1870. Mr. Shaw's Chang Chenmo route proved a failure on the northward journey.—In the meantime the Chang Chenmo line had been more fully explored. Sir D. Forsyth‡ travelled on his first mission to Yarkhand in 1870 by the route suggested by Mr. Shaw, *viz.*, *via*

the Lingzhithang and Soda Plains, through Nischu, Luksang, Thaldat, and Brangsa. His party suffered severely from the climate, and want of provisions and fodder, and lost a very large number of baggage animals. In fact, their experience thoroughly discredited Mr. Shaw's Chang Chenmo line.

Dr. Cayley's Chang Chenmo route.—At the same time Dr. Cayley discovered another and more direct Chang Chenmo route. This left Mr. Shaw's at Gogra in the Chang Chenmo valley and turned off to the north-west, after which it ran parallel with Mr. Shaw's about half-way between it and the old Karakoram road, till it joined the latter at Malikshah, which again is half-way between the Karakoram pass and Shahdulla Khoja. Sir D. Forsyth made the return journey of his first mission by this route, and found it vastly superior in comfort and supplies to Mr. Shaw's, except as regards climate, which was much the same in both. He considered that this new route was a remarkably easy one, particularly suited to camels, and that it could not fail to be a success if a few stores of provisions and rest-houses were built on it.

The two lines can be easily followed with the aid of Sir D. Forsyth's itineraries and a map which will be found in Political A., June 1871, Nos. 560—597.

Views of the Kashmir Durbar about Chang Chenmo routes.—It must be added that Sir D. Forsyth expressed a decided opinion during and after his first Yarkhand mission

* Political A., July 1870, No. 99.

† See Sir A. Lyall's note in K. W. Secret, R., March 1853, No. 86.

‡ Political A., January 1871, No. 382—386.

Political A., January 1871, No. 368, Secret, December 1872, No. 376.

to the effect that the Kashmir Durbar was strongly opposed to the development of the Chang Chenmo route. He attributed, indeed, to this feeling most of the hardships suffered by his party on their journey to Yarkhand.

Mr. Shaw's opinion.—The report of the Joint-Commissioners was next criticised by Mr. Shaw.* He quite agreed with them and Major Montgomerie as to the route from Lahoul through Ladakh, and as to the importance of its touching or approaching Leh. "The town of Leh," he said, "is a compulsory point." As regards the Chang Chenmo lines he agreed with Sir D. Forsyth in preferring Dr. Cayley's. This, in his opinion, offered much greater natural facilities for traffic than the old Karakoram route. But the latter had at present artificial advantages in being well known, and in being well supplied with carriage by the country people. These might be equalised in time, and then the traffic would have a fair choice, but which it would ultimately prefer could not be foretold. He therefore suggested that the selection should not be made immediately. The Joint-Commissioners should be stationed at Leh where they would have the best opportunity of judging of the tendency of the trade. In fact the gist of Mr. Shaw's opinion lay in his last words which are quoted below:—

"In short, it seems that we have the choice between an inferior but frequented road, and a superior but undeveloped and (at present) unfrequented route. If the Joint-Commissioners are confined to the former, the trade loses the prospective advantages promised by the adoption of a better line. If the latter exclusively is chosen, their jurisdiction would (at least for some years) be confined to an empty tract, while the trade would be flowing unprotected through a parallel channel. One horn of the dilemma is entirely avoided, and the other partially, by fixing on a line which, while taking in the whole of the better route, also includes the terminus or a most important point of the old and usual road. At the same time it will probably be wise to reserve liberty of changing on to the other road, if at a future time it be found that the greatest of traffic withholds its sanction for the new route."

Dr. Aitchinson's opinion.—The next opinion taken was that of Dr. Aitchison, Joint-Commissioner in 1872. He despaired of the Chang Chenmo lines, but agreed in Mr. Shaw's suggestion that the Joint-Commissioners should have jurisdiction in Leh and over the several trade routes passing thence to Yarkhand temporarily in virtue of the 14th rule framed under the treaty. He thought, too, with Major Montgomerie that the Lahoul-Ladakh route would be superseded by the one *via* Kashmir, seeing that the latter had been freed by the Maharaja from transit duties. And he therefore recommended the improvement of the latter, especially by the construction of a covered way over the Zojila pass, which lies some 45 miles east of Srinagar, about one-fourth of the way thence to Leh.

Opinion of the Punjab Government.—The Punjab Government concurred with Major Montgomerie and Dr. Aitchison, and promised to refer to the Kashmir Durbar about the Zojila Pass.

Sir D. Forsyth's opinion.—Sir D. Forsyth then saw all the papers again, and arrived at conclusions similar to those of the officers who have been mentioned. He explained particularly that the Kashmir Durbar had pressed for the insertion in article II of the treaty of the words "towards the Chang Chenmo valley," not with a view to insisting on the adoption of a route through that valley, but to exclude routes to Yarkhand which passed through the Maharaja's dominions other than Ladakh. He doubted, however, whether the treaty as it stood could be permanently read as including the Karakoram route. Being then about to start on the second Yarkhand mission, he proposed to get fuller information by travelling over the latter road.

Orders of the Government of India.—The Government of India passed the following orders:—

1st—That Leh was "an obligatory point" on any trade-route that might be chosen.

2ndly—That from Leh onwards the route need not, under the treaty, pass through the Chang Chenmo valley.

3rdly—That in fact the choice lay between Dr. Cayley's Chang Chenmo line and the Karakoram route.

* Political A., May 1872, Nos. 126—130.

Political A., August 1873, Nos. 215—218.

(Keep-With Political A., August 1878, Nos. 215—219.)

(Political A., June 1871, No. 606, Political A., May 1872, No. 129, Political A., August 1873, No. 218.)

4thly—That there was no sufficient evidence so far to guide a choice between these two.

5thly—That the decision should be “left entirely open” till after the return of the second Yarkhand mission.

6thly—That pending such decision the powers conferred on the Joint-Commissioners over all trade-routes through Ladakh should, “as a temporary expedient” only, continue to be exercised.

Reversal of the question.—The second Yarkhand mission went and returned *via* the Karakoram route. Apparently no difficulty was experienced except* from glaciers and floods.

* Secret, August 1874, No. 50.

But Sir D. Forsyth’s reports contain no special account of the route. Since then the Karakoram seems to have been used as a matter of course by Mr. Shaw in 1874 and 1875, the Yarkhand envoy in 1876, and Mr. Elias in 1879.

The treaty question has been mooted only once, in 1878. In that year Mr. Elias, the British Joint-Commissioner, showed that the Chang Chenmo route did not really compete with the Karakoram; and that from Leh quite two-thirds of the trade passed southwards *via* Kashmir rather than *via* Kullu. He accordingly proposed that the treaty of 1870 should be revised, and that the more frequented routes should be placed formally under the jurisdiction of the Joint-Commissioners. With this view he also recommended that the Maharaja should be asked to improve the Zojila pass. Mr. Henvey (the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir) thought that the direction which the traffic had taken was only natural. He was also of opinion that to raise the treaty question would—

“excite feelings of irritation and suspicion in the mind of the Durbar, quite out of proportion to the value of the commercial advantages gained.”

He agreed § with the Joint-Commissioners in thinking that it was useless to spend any more money on the Chang Chenmo route.

The Government of India ascertained that the Maharaja had not done, and was not anxious to do, anything for the Zojila pass. Beyond this no orders were passed.

There has been no further correspondence on the subject, but it may be mentioned that at the end of 1882, Mr. Henvey mentioned || hints which had recently been thrown out by the Durbar to the effect that the *raison d’être* of the treaty of 1870, and especially of the Joint-Commissionership, had disappeared with the overthrow by the Chinese of the Muhammadan kingdom of the Atalik Ghazi.

Value of the trade: Most recent accounts.—Mr. Dalgleish, a Scotchman trading in Yarkhand has written notes ¶ in the last two years on the Chinese rule which has succeeded the Atalik Ghazi in Central Asia. He represents the trade with India as considerable. Lately the Chinese, who in many ways show themselves to be well disposed towards the British Government, have freed it from duties. But from both a political and a commercial point of view it is necessary that there should be a British representative at Kashghar, while it is desirable that the “no man’s land” of Kanjut should be occupied, as it easily could be, by Kashmir.

“It must be clearly understood,” Mr. Dalgleish writes:—

“that it is not so much at Leh but at Yarkhand that our representative is wanted. Mr. Elias at Yarkhand, with his thorough knowledge of the Chinese character and language, would be a power: where he is, he can do comparatively little.”

Rules to give effect to Article IX.—The ninth article of the treaty requires separate notice. It comprised two concessions, *viz.*:—

(a) The Government agreed to abolish the export duties levied on shawls and other textile fabrics manufactured in the territories of the

† Political A., July 1878, No. 399.

‡ *Ibid.*, and Political A., September 1878, Nos. 45—60.

|| A. Political E., October 1882, Nos. 18—193.

¶ Secret E., November 1882, Nos. 94—96, Keep-With, and note dated 29th July 1883.

Maharaja and exported through British India to countries beyond its limits.

(b) The Government agreed to levy no duties on—

“goods transmitted in bond through British India to Eastern Turkistan or to the territories of His Highness the Maharaja.”

In regard to the first concession, the Punjab Government presumed* that the Government of India would frame rules—

* Political A., July 1870, No. 99.
“regulating the remission of export duty on shawls and other articles referred to in article IX.”

The Government of India in the Financial Department remarked,† however, that no orders seemed to be necessary on this point, seeing that—

† Political A., July 1870, No. 110.
“by the late Customs Act the export duty on all shawls has been removed; and it is not known what ‘other articles’ are exported from Kashmir which would be subject to export duty under that Act.”

As to the second concession, Mr. Forsyth wrote‡ thus:—

‡ Political A., July 1870, No. 100.
“The only point remaining for discussion was the manner of giving effect to the liberal remission of duty granted by the Government of India in article IX of the treaty.

“If the remission be held strictly to apply to goods purchased out of India and merely transmitted in bond through India, thus little advantage will be gained by the traders, as no such purchases are at present made. Goods intended for Kashmir or Turkistan are bought in the Calcutta and Bombay, Benares or Amritsar markets, and when they reach the foot of the hills, bulk is obliged to be broken to enable the traders to adjust the loads for carriage on horseback.

“As the intention of the Government apparently is to free from all transit duty goods *bonâ fide* exported from British territory to Kashmir and Turkistan, it would seem to be a matter of indifference whether the duty be remitted at the port where such goods are landed in India, or at the point where they leave the country; and considerable convenience to traders without any corresponding loss to the Government revenue will accrue from the adoption of the latter arrangement. Certain towns might be named, as, for instance, Amritsar, Lahore, Rawalpindi, and for the Turkistan trade Palampore and Simla, where goods might be declared for re-export and be sealed in packages convenient for carriage on horse or mule back. The trader would then receive a pass indicating the weight and character of the goods with the amount of drawback to which he is entitled on passing the frontier post, which, in the case of Kashmir, might be fixed at Bhimbar and Jammu. At Khylung in Lahoul, the Customs or Revenue Officer would examine the seal of the package, and then certify on the pass that the seal had not been tampered with, and then on this certificate the trader could be able to recover from the revenue authorities at Amritsar, or elsewhere, the drawback. The possibility of fraud in the case of traders taking goods for instance to Jammu, and after obtaining the drawback, re-importing them into the Punjab, would be guarded against through the Maharaja's officials, as no goods are allowed to pass out of Jammu territory without the knowledge of the customs authorities, and they should be directed to allow no goods from the Punjab to be re-exported thither without paying the full duty.

“In the case of Turkistan, the cost of carriage as far as Lahoul is sufficiently heavy to prevent any trader from taking his goods so far to re-import them again merely for the sake of the drawback.”

The Punjab Government approved§ generally of these proposals, remarking, however, that—

§ Political A., July 1870, No. 100.
“the rule by which drawbacks are to be given on duty-paying goods exported to Kashmir territory, even though they may have broken bulk between the sea-board and the frontiers, goes somewhat beyond the provisions of article IX, and concedes to the Maharaja more than he concedes to the British Government in article VIII.”

The Lieutenant-Governor made two suggestions; that Sultanpur in Kullu would be a better place for declaring goods for export than Palampore; and that the treasuries authorised to refund drawbacks should be specified.

On these proposals the Government of India in the Financial Department recorded the Resolution||, quoted below:—

|| Political A., July 1870, No. 116.
“The Governor-General in Council observes that there is no doubt that this proposition is for a more liberal concession than was contemplated. To remit the duty on all goods which cross the Kashmir frontier for Turkistan is a far greater boon to the trade than to allow their export in bond. The principle, however, is the same in both cases, and there can be no doubt of the wisdom of a thoroughly liberal policy in this matter. Accordingly, His Excellency in Council is pleased to authorise the adoption of the suggestions of Mr. Forsyth as modified by

the Government of the Panjab upon the condition that that Government will take all proper securities for the revenues of the British Government. Rules should be submitted for approval giving effect to these orders."

The Punjab Government accordingly submitted* draft rules, of which the Kashmir Durbar had approved.

The rules are printed as Appendix (15). Their scope may be stated thus:—
Places were agreed upon between the Punjab Government and the Maharaja where goods might be declared and sealed for transmission in bond, and where refund of duty might be claimed. These places were Calcutta, Bombay, and Amritsar. Goods intended for Turkistan might be so declared and sealed both at these three places and also at Sultanpur in the Kullu tehsil of the Kangra district. The Collectors of Customs in Bombay and Calcutta, and the Deputy Commissioners of Amritsar and Kangra, were empowered to seal packages declared for transmission and to grant invoices of their contents. The Kashmir Customs Officers, or a Government official at Sultanpur, were to certify on the invoice the fact of the goods having crossed the border, or reached Sultanpur, with the seals unbroken, and in full weight. On production of this certificate refund of the customs duty which had been levied would be granted, but only to the owner of the goods or to his agent.

In forwarding the draft rules the Financial Commissioner of the Punjab remarked that he did not consider it practicable to devise any safe plan by which the payment of duty in the first instance could be avoided.

The Government of Bengal on being consulted doubted† the expediency of going beyond the provision‡ of the treaty itself. They observed that the small duty levied at the port of importation could hardly make any appreciable difference in such a distant and difficult export trade. Moreover, they apprehended that the British revenue might suffer from over-valuations for drawback. Assuming, however, that the principle of the rules had been accepted, the following suggestions were made for minimising the risk of loss:—

(a). The officers appointed to grant certificates should be furnished with the tariff of fixed values, and with regard to *ad valorem* goods, should be cautioned to investigate the claim as to drawback or the actual value of goods as laid down, say at Amritsar or Sultanpur, which would include the cost of carriage from the sea-port to those places. Drawback should not be given on more than the value at port of importation, approximately calculated.

(b). As duty on *ad valorem* goods is charged§ on the amount which represents the market value, less the duty and two per cent. commission, this principle should be adopted in calculating the drawback.¶

The Government of India in the Financial Department sanctioned|| the rules, subject to the amendments proposed by the Bengal Government but only as an experimental measure. It was remarked—

"It should, however, be made quite clear from the outset that if experience shows that the drawback plan cannot be worked without serious risk of loss to the revenue, the British Government will fall back upon the precise letter of the treaty."

The rules were accordingly published¶¶ in the *Gazette of India*, with a note that—
these rules are only intended to be of a provisional character, and are liable to revision at any time."

A copy of this Resolution was furnished to the Kashmir Durbar. The Maharaja then asked** what was meant by the allusion to the "precise letter of the treaty." He asserted that he had fully carried out the treaty, had even gone further by remitting entirely the duty on goods sold in the town of Leh. He, therefore, hoped that the concession to him would be made in a manner which should admit of no change. The Government of India replied as follows:—

"The meaning of the phrase referred to by His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir, and used in the Resolution of the Government of India in the Financial Department, No. 801, dated 31st January 1872, is unmistakable. By article IX of the treaty of 1870 the British Government agreed to

* Political A., September 1871, Nos. 244—47.

† Political A., March 1872, No. 221.

‡ This, as has been shown, contemplated the remission of duty only on goods transmitted through India in bond. The rules also allowed packages of duty-paid goods which had already broken bulk in India to be made up and sealed at certain specified places in India, and provided for the payment of a drawback thereon when their crossing the frontier had been certified.

§ *Fide* Section 180 of Act VI of 1863.

|| Political A., March 1872, No. 220.

** Political A., October 1872, Nos. 367—369.

'levy no duty on goods transmitted in bond through British India to Eastern Turkistan, or to the territories of His Highness the Maharaja.' In the rules published under Notification No. 1470P,* dated 5th July last, for giving effect to article IX of the treaty, a further concession was made by His Excellency in Council, *viz.*, to permit packages of duty-paid goods that had already broken bulk in India to be made up and sealed at certain specified places in India, and to grant a drawback of the duty paid on such goods when certified to have crossed the Kashmir border. The fact that this was a concession not contemplated in the treaty was clearly acknowledged in paragraph 11 of †Political A., July 1870, Nos. 99-102. Mr. Forayth's letter, dated 9th March 1870, to the Punjab Government, and in paragraph 6 of your office letter No. 101—368, ‡ dated 21st March 1870, to the Government of India, and the plain meaning of the Resolution of the 31st of January was that if the rules there approved could not be worked without leading to frauds on the imperial revenues, the British Government would limit the concession to that which was contemplated in the treaty."

Alleged infraction of the treaty.—In 1872-73 Messrs. Meakin & Co., of London, complained to the Secretary of State that goods which they had consigned to their agent at Jammu had been detained on arrival at Bombay, because the agent there had not received the invoice, and because the customs authorities claimed a deposit to cover the duty leviable under the Customs Act VI of 1863. They urged that these proceedings were harsh and in contravention of the ninth article of the treaty of 1870. It was ascertained, however, that the action of the Bombay authorities had not been in contravention of the rules regulating the drawback system, and the Secretary of State rejected Meakin & Co.'s claim for damages.

Revision of the rules in 1875.—In 1874 the Punjab Government reported § Political A., June 1874, Nos. 25-27. that not a single application for refund under the rules had been received. Mr. R. B. Shaw, then Joint-Commissioner, explained this fact partly by showing that the drawback system was not known to the traders of Central Asia. It was determined therefore to publish the arrangement by notices at the principal *entrepôts* of the trade.

Mr. Shaw also pointed out two other difficulties which arose under the rules.

In the first place a refund on goods passing through Kashmir to Eastern Turkistan was obtainable only after procuring the attestation of the Kashmir customs officials on the British and Kashmir frontier. But these officials were merely agents or sub-lessees of the farmer of the Durbar's customs: they were not servants of the Maharaja, nor men of character or position. Hence two dangers: on the one hand a dishonest trader could take advantage of the impossibility of testing the certificate for refund: on the other hand honest traders were subjected to extortion before they could get the necessary attestations. To obviate this evil Mr. Shaw proposed that the signature of the British Joint Commissioner should take the place of that of the customs officials of Kashmir in respect of the Central Asia traffic. Secondly, under the rules as they stood, a trader having crossed the border and obtained the requisite certificate could obtain a refund only at Calcutta, Bombay, Amritsar, or Sultanpur. This concession was practically no boon. For the trader could not himself leave his goods, and he might have no agents. Mr. Shaw's remedy here was that the British Joint-Commissioner should be authorised to grant refunds.

The Punjab Government was asked to revise the rules completely on the basis of these proposals. A draft was submitted|| Political A., September 1874, Nos. 306-310. accordingly. The language in this was clearer than that of the original rules. One chief change was that refunds were declared to be payable on certificates attested by either the Kashmir customs official on the frontier, or the British Joint-Commissioner. Another change was that refunds should be claimable either at Leh or at the place where the goods might have been sealed, delivered, and certified for transmission.

The Government of India thought that the Kashmir customs officials should be more precisely defined. They also suggested a system whereby certificates attested and refunds granted might be registered.

A fresh draft was then submitted* and approved*, subject to two slight modifications. The rules as published* are printed in Appendix (16). The changes were made with the concurrence of the Kashmir Durbar.

Revision of the rules in 1877.†—It was found that inconvenience was caused by the omission in the rules to provide for the attestation of certificates and grant of refunds at Leh during the absence of the British Joint-Commissioner. The ninth and tenth of the revised rules of 1875 were accordingly modified by authorising the Kashmir Joint-Commissioner to act in these respects for his colleague.

Revision of the rules in 1879.‡—The Collector of Customs in Calcutta reported that considerable advantage had been taken of the drawback system. He doubted whether the mere attesting signature of the Kashmir customs official afforded a sufficient safeguard against fraud. He suggested that a formal endorsement should be adopted, and also that he should be supplied with the signatures and seals of the Kashmir officials. The first suggestion was adopted with the concurrence of the Durbar; the endorsement being as follows:—

“I (name and title) hereby certify that the whole of the goods enumerated in the certificate have been received in the territory of His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir.”

The second suggestion would, it was thought, afford no protection against fraud.

In 1881 Karachi was § added to the list of places where goods might be declared and sealed for transmission in bond to Kashmir or to Central Asia *via* Kashmir.

The Tariff Act of 1882.—In 1882|| the introduction of the present Tariff Act (XI of 1882) gave rise to a question. The sixth of the revised rules of 1875 defined the refund claimable to be of the customs duty specified in the schedules of the Indian Tariff Act for the time being. The present Act does not specify duties on a number of articles comprised in the schedules of its predecessor. Consequently, certificates for refund presented after the new Act came into force could not strictly be honored. But the Punjab Government thought that refunds should in such cases be made under the provisions of the former Act. This proposal was accepted.

The Tariff Act of 1882 has otherwise an important bearing on article IX of the treaty and the rules framed thereunder. According to this Act the only goods liable to duty are—

- (a) arms, ammunition, and military stores;
- (b) spirituous liquors;
- (c) opium not covered by a Government pass;
- (d) salt.

The trade in these goods to and through Kashmir is unimportant. Consequently the concession made to the Kashmir Durbar in article IX of the treaty no longer confers a peculiar privilege. And the rules framed under that article have practically become a dead letter.

The Punjab Government recently drew ¶ attention to these circumstances, and suggested that the Maharaja might be asked to exempt the four classes of goods liable to duty from the ninth article of the treaty. By this means the trade to and through Kashmir would be entirely freed from the drawback and refund system. The proposal, it was shown, would be of some advantage to the Government, seeing that the refund system was to a certain extent abused, although the unimportance of the trade in articles liable to duty prevented serious loss.

The Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir was averse to the Punjab proposal. In the first place he thought that the Maharaja might answer a request for the modification of article IX of the treaty by a corresponding request for the modification of article VIII, which embodies the Kashmir concession. More-

over, the reasons for a change did not appear sound to Mr. Henvey. If the trade in the articles liable to duty were important, to exempt them from the operation of the ninth article of the treaty would give the Maharaja a just claim for compensation. If it were unimportant, the exemption would merely save a little trouble to the sealing, certifying, and refunding officers, and relieve the Government records of obsolete rules. The matter was dropped.

CHAPTER XI.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE KASHMIR STATE.

The Kashmir State is in contact with Tibet on the east, Eastern Turkistan on the north, Hunza and Nagar on the north-west, and Yaghistan on the west. It has thus happened that the Maharaja of Kashmir has been concerned at various times with China, with the politics of Central Asia, and with the group of independent Chiefships which separate the western border of his State from the eastern limits of the Afghan dominion.

Kashmir and China: the Maharaja's jagir in Tibet.—Under the treaty of 1842, which ended the expedition led by Golab Singh's general, Zorawur Singh, against Ladakh and Tibet, the district of Min Sar was made over by the Tibetan authorities to Golab Singh and his heirs as a *jagir*. Min Sar, or Misar Tarjuni, is a tract of grazing grounds lying about two marches north-west of the Mansarwar lake on the road to Gartok, and about 17 marches distant from Leh. An account of the *jagir* will be found in two memoranda written in 1880 by Mr. Elias, the British Joint Commissioner at Leh. Its pecuniary value is insignificant. The small revenue is collected annually by a Kashmir official deputed by the Maharaja's Wazir at Leh. Mr. Elias states that Mr. Johnson, when Wazir, tried to visit the *jagir*, but was prevented by the Chinese officials in Gartok.

Some political significance attaches to the *jagir*, because there is reason to doubt whether the Maharaja does not pay tribute on account of it to the Chinese.

The Lap Chuk.—Under the treaty of 1842, a commercial caravan goes every third year from Ladakh to Lhassa, under the charge of an agent, who is a Kashmir official, and is known by the name of "Lap Chuk." He takes and brings back presents and letters to and from the Ladakh and Tibetan authorities.

"But in addition to the . . . presents," writes Mr. Elias, "taken by the Lap Chuk from Ladakh, he is also provided with the following, which he pays to the Treasurer of Lhassa:—

	Co.'s R
" 10 lags gold dust, value Rs. 5 each	80
" 1½ seers of saffron	50
" 5 pieces native cloth, each of a separate colour, value about R 1 each	5
	<hr/> 135

"These three items are known as *saktal*, or ground-tax, and a receipt is given for them by the treasurer, which the Lap Chuk brings back to the Wazir of Ladakh.

"It is difficult to estimate precisely how far the *saktal* paid or presented to the treasurer of Lhassa is regarded by the Tibetan authorities as *nazar* or tribute; but by the Government of Kashmir it is certainly looked upon in the light of a present of ceremony only, and as a return for the provisions, &c., with which the agent and his party are supplied during a part of their stay in Lhassa. Further, the last of my informants on this subject (the man who acted as Lap Chuk to Lhassa in 1877-78) says that no mention is made of the Min Sar *jagir*, either in presenting the *saktal* to the treasurer or the presents to any of the other authorities. The treasurer is a servant of the Native Government, and is appointed by the Deva Jung, or Great Lama, not by the Chinese officials, and his receipt sets forth that the *saktal* has been paid into the Deva Jung's treasury.

"The facts (1) of the treasurer giving a formal receipt, while the other recipients of presents give none; (2) that he sends no return present; and (3) that the word *saktal* means literally 'land-tax,' would be reasons in favour of regarding the present or payment made to the Lhassa treasurer as tribute paid by the Maharaja's Government to Chinese Tibet. But against this must be placed the following considerations:—(1) that so far as those best acquainted

with the contents of the agreement of 1842 are aware, no mention is made of tribute in return for the Min Sar *jagir*; (2) that *saktal* of similar value, &c., was given by the Lap Chuk for many years before the agreement was made; and (3) that in those (third) years when no Lap Chuk goes to Lhasa, no *saktal* is paid by the Maharaja's Government, though the revenue of the *jagir* is collected as usual.

"The distinction between presents of ceremony or friendship on the one hand, and tribute as a sign of dependence or vassalage on the other, is frequently very loosely drawn by Asiatics, and the names of their taxes, duties, &c., do not always designate accurately the purpose for which they are levied. Thus, as far as I am able to judge from such enquiries as I have made, I am inclined to think that neither the presents nor the *saktal* sent by the Maharaja's Government to the Lhasa authorities can rightly be regarded as tribute (or *uszar*) either for the Min Sar *jagir* or for any other consideration; and further, that the Min Sar *jagir* is viewed by the Lhasa authorities as a local matter concerning the Gartok province only, and entirely separate from the agreement regarding the Lap Chuk."

Mr. Henvey, the Officer on Special Duty, however, remarked—

"Whatever the Kashmiris may think of the *saktal* and presents, I have no doubt that the Chinese regard them as tribute."

The Maharaja's opinion of the Chinese.—It is said that the Maharaja does not disregard his intercourse with the Chinese. In 1880 Mr. Henvey wrote*—

"The Maharaja always speaks of China with much reverence as a power quite on a par with us in civilisation."

* Secret, August 1882, No. 320.

Mr. Elias' diary† for the last week in December 1880 contained the following entry:—

† Political A., February 1881, No. 187.

"The money for the Lhasa Agent (Lap Chuk) having arrived from Jammu, the mission will go forward at once and in spite of the lateness of the season. It appears that the Maharaja attaches great importance to keeping up the Lhasa missions. The person appointed as Lap Chuk is the head Lama of a large monastery near Leh."

Kashmir and Central Asia.—The Maharaja of Kashmir received several communications from the Atalik Ghazi. The first seems to have occurred at the end of the year 1867. The Punjab Government then reported that an envoy from Yarkhand had arrived at Jammu, bringing a letter from Yakub Beg to the Maharaja. His Highness forwarded a copy of the letter to the Lieutenant-Governor. It acknowledged a letter and presents sent by His Highness to the ruler of Yarkhand, and contained expressions of friendship. The Lieutenant-Governor considered that the Maharaja had acted properly in acquainting him with this transaction, and he proposed to take the opportunity to explain to the Envoy the nature of the relations between Kashmir and the British Government.

Shortly afterwards Mr. T. D. Forsyth went on his first expedition to Yarkhand. The arrangements made for his passage through Kashmir territory were not as good on this occasion as they were a few years later when the Yarkhand mission was despatched.

Political A.—January 1868, Nos. 76 and 77.

Political A.—January 1871, Nos. 351—361, and Secret, December 1872, No. 876, and January 1874, Nos. 175—182.

The Atalik Ghazi's Envoy, Saiyad Yakub Khan Tora, brought in 1873 a friendly letter to the Maharaja and received a similar reply.

In August 1873, the Punjab Government reported that the Maharaja had been sending a certain Abdulla Khan for political purposes to Yarkhand, though nominally he had gone as a horse-dealer: it was further not clear that the object of his mission was favourable to the British Government.

The connection between the Maharaja and the politics of Eastern Turkistan in 1873 was regarded by the Government of India with some anxiety, and led, as has already been mentioned, to proposals for altering the position of the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir.

Secret, August 1873, Nos. 185—88.

Political A.—January 1873, Nos. 101—110; Secret, March 1873, Nos. 135—138, and January 1874, No. 169.

Secret, March 1875, Nos. 19—29.

Saiyad Yakub Khan Tora.—The last transaction which need be noticed in regard to the relations between Kashmir and the Muhammadan empire in Turkistan, is the grant of a *jagir* by the Maharaja to Saiyad Yakub Khan Tora. This man was the nephew of the Atalik Ghazi, and was the Envoy employed by

him in negotiating a commercial treaty with the British Government. In the course of these negotiations the Envoy brought forward his own claim to a *jagir* in Kashmir in the following words:—

“That his ancestors had possessed three villages in Kashmir since the days of Saiyad Ali, of Hamadan, to the time of the Sikh conquest, or about 200 years. Last year, when he was in Jammu, he showed the Maharaja a document (produced) proving his title to the villages. The Maharaja replied that if the Governor-General expressed his written consent, he would be happy to meet the Envoy's wishes. The Envoy subsequently represented the matter to the Governor-General, and a letter was sent from the Foreign Office at Calcutta. The Maharaja thereupon agreed to give half the value of the villages in land and half in cash. A *sanad* (produced) was accordingly forwarded to the Envoy in Calcutta. The Envoy soon afterwards wrote to ask for the revenue of the current year, and Dewan Kirpa Ram sent him in Calcutta Rs. 11,000, promising to pay up the balance thereafter.

“When the Envoy returned to Kashmir on his present visit to India, he wrote to Dewan Kirpa Ram, begging him to appoint some one to make over the land which is situated in the *ilqa* of Kamraj. The Dewan replied that he had a private communication to make on the subject. The Envoy then repaired to Jammu and had a private interview with Kirpa Ram, who informed him that there was no objection on the part of the Durbar to give the land, provided the English expressed a desire that this should be done. As the Envoy knew that Lord Northbrook had already written to give his consent, he was forced to conclude that the Kashmir people were playing some trick (*shaitani*, literally devilry). When the Envoy enquired whether he should repeat Dewan Kirpa Ram's words on arrival at Simla, the Dewan replied that he had made the above communication to the Envoy as a secret, and that he (the Envoy) was to say that the Maharaja was suspicious on account of Mr. Shaw's return from Yarkhand, and for that reason had discontinued the arrangements for the grant of the *jagir*.

“What the Envoy now wanted was that a written communication from the Foreign Secretary should be sent to Kashmir, to the effect that there was no ground for suspicion, and that the English Government would be glad to see the *jagir* granted.

“The Envoy added that in point of fact the Kashmir people viewed with disfavour the intimacy between Kashgar and India. When he got back to Kashgar from Russia, residents of that city had spread a report that an English army was being prepared to take the country. One of these persons was named Jafr, and the Envoy caused him to be imprisoned.”

The Foreign Secretary replied in these words:—

“With regard to Your Excellency's representation regarding the *jagir* in Kashmir territory, I am to observe that the British Government intimated to His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir that, if His Highness should be disposed to accede to your request, no objection would be raised by His Excellency in Council.

“The Governor-General in Council had no intention to put pressure upon His Highness the Maharaja to confer any such gift against his own free-will, and His Excellency in Council is not prepared to do so at the present time; but the Viceroy is about to proceed on a visit to His Highness the Maharaja at Jammu, and will make enquiry upon the subject, after which a further communication will be conveyed to you.”

The Maharaja expressed his readiness to re-grant the *jagir* upon receiving a written assurance that his act would be counted among the other services he had rendered to the British Government. Accordingly, in a *kharita* from the Viceroy, the Maharaja was told—

“that the grant of the *jagir* to Saiyad Yakub Khan, who is the Envoy of an ally of the Government, is much appreciated by me, and will be at all times regarded by the British Government as a most friendly act on Your Highness' part.”

The Maharaja replied:—

“Your Excellency's kind letter has reached me, and has been the cause of honour and exaltation to me. Through it I am informed that Major Henderson had communicated to Your Excellency my readiness, according to previous correspondence, to grant an annual sum of Rs. 21,000, of the Srinagar coinage, in cash, together with certain lands, to Saiyad Yakub Khan Tori, the Envoy of the Ruler of Kashgar; and that Your Excellency has kindly appreciated this grant to the Envoy of an ally of the British Government.

“I need not mention further that I gave my consent to the valuable grant to the above-named Saiyad only on the recommendation of the British Government, and in furtherance of my desire to serve it, and also on the consideration that the Saiyad is a well-wisher of the British Government. It is my predominant desire to possess the good opinion of the Government.

“When at Delhi I gave my promise to Major Henderson that this State would never, as it has never, fall short of performing those actions which would conduce to its holding the good-will of the British Government.

“I beg to offer my thanks to Your Excellency for your kind approval of the grant, and I am sure that this act will be considered for ever by the Supreme Government as done by me

with the expectation that I may enjoy the good-will of the Government. Nothing can pre-
dominate over the orders of Your Excellency."

The Viceroy replied thanking the Maharaja for his friendly act in having re-granted this *jagir* to the Saiyad, and acknowledging His Highness's professions of good-will.

Excerpt, dated 28th May 1877.

The Kashmir Durbar has now been relieved of this charge, and the Saiyad receives R 10,000 per annum from the British Government. His claims on the Maharaja have been completely settled.

Secret, February 1881, Nos. 67, 99;
May 1881, Nos. 472 & 473; and A. Political E., October 1882, Nos. 7-25.

Hunza and Nagar.—These are Dard States, lying on the extreme west of the northern limits of Kashmir. Hunza is bounded on the north and east by the Karakoram range, on the west by mountains which separate it from the Karambar valley of Yasin, and on the south by the Hunza river.

Nagar on its north and north-west joins on to Hunza, on the south-west it is separated from Gilgit by the Rakiposhi mountains, while on the east and north-west the Karakoram range furnishes the boundary.

Hunza and Nagar are not in themselves States of importance. Major Biddulph (who visited the country in 1876) gave the following account of them in 1881:—

* K. W. Secret, July 1881, Nos. 314-389.

Hunza.—"The State of Hunza, though occupying an extensive tract of territory, has but a small population, owing to the small extent of cultivable ground. The people, though nominally belonging to the sect of Maulais, whose followers are styled heretics by all orthodox Mussulmans, observe but loosely even the lax tenets of that sect, and can scarcely be termed Muhammadans at all.

"The present Mir, Ghazan Khan, a man of about 45 years of age, is of drunken and dissolute character, without either nerve or genius for intrigue; he does not rise in his dealings above the level of ordinary deceit common to all barbarians. On the north and north-west he entertains friendly relations with the Mirs of Wakhan and Sirikol; to the north-east he maintains correspondence with the Chinese Governors of Yarkhand, who rather tolerate than encourage his advances. He has an overweening belief in the power of the Chinese Empire, to whom he desires to tender allegiance in return for protection. Similar tenders of allegiance were made to the Atalik during his rule in Yarkhand; but in 1875 force was sent from Sirikol by Yakub Beg's orders to inflict punishment and enforce restitution for a raid on the Kirghiz tributary to Yarkhand: the only occasion that I am acquainted with on which the Kanjuts have been punished for their many robberies. During the former Chinese occupation of Yarkhand the Mir of Hunza held a *jagir* from the Chinese in return for assistance given in suppressing a rebellion, and the robbery of caravans between Yarkhand and Leh was winked at, if not connived at, by the Chinese officials. Since 1869 Ghazan Khan has been in receipt of a yearly subsidy of Rs. 2,000 from Jammu, nominally in return for allegiance, but it is really paid as black-mail to prevent him from making raids into Gilgit territory. The people are badly armed and unwarlike, and their unassisted efforts do not rise above occasional raids for plunder and slaves. They are disliked and little trusted by all the other tribes on the frontier, with whom they hold little intercourse. Owing to the difficult nature of their country they have successfully resisted every attempt to subdue them by the Kashmir Government."

Nagar.—"The State of Nagar, occupying a much smaller extent of territory, has a larger population than Hunza. The people, who are Shias, are, as a rule, unwarlike, not to say cowardly, and peaceably disposed. They entertain a strong dislike for the people of Hunza, which is reciprocated to an extent that does not exist between the rulers of the two States, who are connected by close ties of marriage. The Mir, Jaffir Khan, is a man of about 60 years of age, and of a cunning and intriguing nature. He had much to do with the establishment of the Dogra power in Gilgit, and is believed by the Maharaja to be entirely devoted to his interests. His friendship does not, however, go beyond the retention of the Hindu power in Gilgit as a check on Hunza, and any attempt on the independence of that State would be covertly opposed by him.

"Shut in between Hunza and Gilgit the people of Nagar are entirely dependent on the latter place for all manufactured articles, and a temporary stoppage of trade is enough to insure their submission. A yearly subsidy of R 3,000 has been paid for many years to Mir Jaffir Khan. Mir Ghazan Khan of Hunza exercises considerable influence over Muhammad Khan, who is his sister's son."

Chitral.—This State is bounded by the Hindukush on the north, the Indus, Kohistan, the Laspur range, and the Kunar district on the south, Hunza, Gilgit, and the Punjab on the east, and the Hindukush and the mountains of Kauristan on the west. The State is divided into two departments,—Lower Chitral or Chitral itself, and Upper Chitral, or Mastuj and Yasin. Their boundaries are not clearly defined.

Passes.—The interest of Chitral centres in the passes by which the range of the Hindukush can be crossed. Of these, the principal are the Baroghil, the Darkot, and the Karambar or Iskaman, which lead from Wakhan respectively in the valleys of Mastuj, Yasin, and Karambar. The capabilities of the above three passes may be summed* up as follows:—

* See Gazetteer of Afghanistan by the Quarter Master General's Department.

Baroghil.—Practicable for wheeled artillery for ten months in the year, but closed on the south side by an easily defensible gorge. Of first rate importance.

Darkot.—Open for horse and foot traffic for ten months in the year, but permanently impassable for artillery, on account of a glacier that has to be crossed. Of secondary importance.

Karambar.—Only open in winter. Practically of no importance, but liable from physical causes to become important for a time, and therefore to be watched.

There are also minor passes practicable only for men on foot, such as the Yur and the Vost between Mastuj and Wakhan; but these are entirely closed for several months in the year. From information gained in Wakhan in 1874, it is pretty certain that from Osk in Khokand to within 35 miles of Sarbad-i-Wakhan, no road-making whatever is required, and that a trifling amount of labour would make the whole distance from Khokand to the Chitral valley, *à la* the Baroghil pass, practicable for wheeled artillery.

Chitral is connected with Badakshan by the Nuksan, Agram, and Dora passes, the first two being very difficult, fit only for travellers on foot, the road lying through perpetual snow, whilst the Dora pass is easy, practicable for laden horses, and closed by snow only in the depth of the winter.

History.—The two divisions of Chitral were for many years ruled by two different branches of the same family, descended from a common ancestor—Kathor; the Khushwaktia branch ruling in Upper, and the Shah Kathoria in Lower, Chitral. Genealogical tables of the two families are printed in Appendix 17. The names to be remembered are Aman-ul-mulk and his sons, Nizam-ul-mulk and Afzal-ul-mulk of the Kathoria branch; and Gauhar Aman (deceased) and his sons, Mulk Aman, Mir Wali (deceased), and Pahlwan* Khan of the Khushwaktia line.

* His real name is Ghulam Mohi-ud-din.

The history of Upper and Lower Chitral is closely connected with that of Gilgit, and it may be convenient to recapitulate here the principal† facts down to the year 1876.

Gilgit had recently been conquered by the Sikhs when the treaty of Amritsar was made, and it was therefore transferred by that engagement to the Maharaja Golab Singh. In 1852 it was reconquered by the people of Yasin under their Chief, Gauhar Aman, and was held by them till 1860, when Gauhar Aman's death and local intrigues enabled the Maharaja to recover it. The Kashmir troops advanced for a short time into Yasin, and it has been asserted‡ that the Maharaja granted a *sanad* conferring the province upon Gauhar Aman's son, Mir Wali. Desultory hostilities continued till, in 1863, the Maharaja invaded Yasin, and subdued it with

great cruelty.

In 1870, Mir Wali obtained possession of Yasin from his brother Mulk Aman. This success he owed to the help of Aman-ul-mulk of Chitral, to whom he then became tributary, or at least subordinate. Shortly afterwards Yasin

acquired an evil notoriety for the murder§ of an English traveller, named Hayward. It is almost

certain that the crime was committed under the orders of Mir Wali. About the same time this Chief was expelled from Yasin by his brother Pahlwan aided by Aman-ul-mulk. Mastuj was also given to Pahlwan by Aman-ul-mulk, and the relations between these two Chiefs, who were closely connected too by marriage, became intimate. Mir Wali was killed in 1875, and at the end of the year 1876 Aman-ul-mulk was firmly established in Lower Chitral, and Pahlwan in Yasin and Mastuj. By this time these Chiefs had begun to make friendly overtures to the Maharaja of Kashmir.

Chitral and Afghanistan.—For some years before 1876 Aman-ul-mulk had been concerned with the affairs of Badakshan, and through them with the Amir Sher Ali, who frequently asserted his own suzerainty over Chitral.

Political A.—January 1872, No. 78.

About the year 1870 Aman-ul-mulk married a daughter to the son of Mahmud Shah, the Afghan

† Secret L.—1870, Nos. 191-200, K. W.

‡ Mr. Girdlestone's memorandum, page 43.

§ Political A.—December 1872, Nos. 542-663. Appendix (18.)

Governor of Badakhshan, and entered into something like an offensive and defensive alliance with him. In 1872 Aman-ul-mulk visited Naib Muhammad Alam Khan, the Governor of Afghan Turkistan. Then followed some negotiations about Jehandar Shah, the ex-Mir of Badakhshan, who for a while took refuge in Chitral. Aman-ul-mulk offered to give him up to the Amir, and practically did compel him to leave his country. Lastly, in 1874, proposals were made by Naib Muhammad Alam Khan for a marriage between one of the daughters of Aman-ul-mulk and the heir-apparent (Abdulla Jan) of Sher Ali; and in connection with these the Chitral Chief's son, Nizam-ul-mulk, waited upon the Governor of Afghan Turkistan.

Dir.—To the south of Chitral, separated from it by the Lahori range, lies the Chiefship of Dir. The ruler is Rahmatulla Khan, and he is closely connected by marriage with Aman-ul-mulk.

Relations between Dir, Chitral, and Kashmir.—The following account was given by Captain Cavagnari in 1877 of the political relations between Dir, Chitral, and Kashmir:—

Lieutenant Temple's précis Part II, Section VII.

Enclosure to demi-official letter from Captain Cavagnari to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated 11th October 1877.

"After the final conquest of Gilgit and Payal (or Panial) by the Kashmir troops in 1860, the Maharaja made friends with Rahmatulla Khan in order to obtain his help to keep Aman-ul-mulk in check and prevent him from assisting the Rulers of Upper Chitral (Mir Wali and Pahlwan Khan, their father Gaur Rahman having died just before the advance of the Sikh army into Gilgit) from opposing the Sikh Governors in Payal and Gilgit.

"Ghazan Khan, the former Chief of Dir, had ten sons by the sister of Faiztala Khan, the father of Aman Khan, the present Khan of Jandul (Dajaur). The principal of these were Rahmatulla Khan, Sultan Muhammad Khan, and Jamdad Khan. The latter, owing to the absence of the eldest son at Bibiaur, seized the government on the death of Ghazan Khan, and as he was married to a daughter of Aman-ul-mulk, the Maharaja of Kashmir, to whom he offered his services, declined to have anything to say to him, and sent to Rahmatulla Khan through Mukesar Shah Minn, and offered him aid to recover the Chiefship which his younger brother had usurped during his absence.

"Rahmatulla Khan at once sent his eldest son, Muhammad Sharif Khan, in company of Mukesar Shah, to Kashmir. Malik Marchakai is not aware of what terms were entered into at that time, as he was then in the service of Jamdad Khan, but shortly afterwards Rahmatulla Khan sent a special messenger to the Maharaja for help, and received about Rs. 9,000, and with the aid of this he was able to gain supremacy over Dir.

"Some 13 or 14 years ago, Mukesar Shah visited Rahmatulla Khan at Dir, on the part of the Maharaja of Kashmir, bringing a message also for Aman-ul-mulk of Chitral. The latter sent an invitation to Rahmatulla Khan to meet him, so that they might in consultation together send a reply to the Maharaja. The meeting took place at Ashruit on the boundary between Dir and Chitral, and the two Chiefs swore eternal friendship with one another, and they both agreed to enter into alliance with the Maharaja and be guided by his wishes.

"At that time the Maharaja was very anxious about the rumoured encroachments of the Amir of Kabul in the direction of Badakhshan, and Mukesar Shah was instructed to explain to the Chiefs that only a single ridge separated them from the rule of the Afghans, and that as the Maharaja had no desire to see Chitral and Dir absorbed in Afghanistan, he would willingly assist them to withstand any aggressive designs on their country by the Amir of Kabul, and he promised to supply them with money, arms, and ammunition as necessarily occasioned.

"Rahmatulla Khan and Aman-ul-mulk received these proposals with great satisfaction. Mukesar Shah returned *via* Peshawur, and Malik Marchakai on the part of Rahmatulla Khan, and Bahadur Shah as the representative of Aman-ul-mulk, were deputed to Kashmir *via* Gilgit.

"The Maharaja was very pleased at hearing of the union between the Chiefs of Dir and Chitral, and fully confirmed all the promises made by Mukesar Shah as to assistance being given when such was required.

"The Agents were detained at Jammu for about a month and were dismissed with suitable presents for themselves and also for their respective Chiefs. Some time after this Mukesar Shah and Jemadar Jalad Khan were deputed to Dir by the Maharaja, and after some consultation with the Chief and also with Aman-ul-mulk, Malik Marchakai and Sher Ali, son of the Vazir Maufat Khan, together with Bahadur Shah, left for Kashmir *via* Peshawur. The Maharaja made all three representatives swear on the Koran, and he himself assured them, that in the event of the Chiefs of Dir and Chitral abiding faithfully by their promises to remain on friendly terms with the Kashmir Government, he would assist them against all external aggression, and would in no way interfere with their country. The assistance promised was only as to arms, ammunition, and money: no troops were promised. Handsome presents were sent by the Maharaja to Rahmatulla Khan and to his son, Muhammad Sharif Khan, and also to his half-brother, Sultan Muhammad Khan. Similar ones were also sent to the ruler of Chitral and to his son Nizam-ul-mulk. The deputation returned *via* Gilgit.

"About two years ago Malik Marchakai was again sent to Kashmir on a summons conveyed by Mukesar Shah and Jemadar Dindar Khan. Niat Khan went on behalf of Aman-ul-mulk. The agents were detained at Jammu for about two months, the Maharaja explaining that he had made a reference to the British authorities. At the expiration of the above period, the Maharaja sent for the agents, and informed them that the British Government approved of the connection between Kashmir, Dir, and Chitral, and that the Maharaja had been advised to continue his kindness and support to the Chiefs of those countries who had allied themselves with him.

"The Maharaja, on dismissing the agents, made over to them 600 gold coins (Russian) for the Dir Chief and the same amount for Aman-ul-mulk, and suitable presents were also sent to Muhammad Sharif Khan and Nizam-ul-mulk.

"Mukesar Shah was instructed to deliver the coins to the Chiefs for whom they were intended. He entrusted the duty to his son Mukarab Shah, who kept back some 60 or 70 of the coins which were sent for the Chief of Dir, and in reply to an enquiry from the latter, he stated that his father had retained the missing sum in liquidation of a debt due to him by the Chief. Rahmatulla Khan was very much annoyed about this, denied owing anything to Mukesar Shah, and turned Mukarab Shah and his party out of Dir.

"On hearing of this, Mukesar Shah, accompanied by the Maharaja's Jemadar, Dindar Khan, went to Dir and apologized to Rahmatulla Khan, and begged him to again send an agent to Kashmir, and that further presents would be given, but the Chief was still angry and would not listen to him, and the deputation returned *vid* Gilgit.

"Nizam-ul-mulk and Pahlwan Khan accompanied Mukesar Shah on his return through Chitral, and held a meeting at Puyal with the Governor of Gilgit.

"Renewed friendly assurances were exchanged and presents were given by the Kashmir authorities. Aman-ul-mulk did all in his power to induce Rahmatulla Khan to take part in this meeting, but failed. Up to the present time, the coldness between the Chief of Dir and the Kashmir authorities has continued, and Malik Marchakai thinks it unlikely that Rahmatulla Khan will make any advances towards a reconciliation.

"From the above resumé of matters relating to Dir, it appears that in consequence of the injudicious act of Mukesar Shah's son in retaining a portion of the present of money sent by the Maharaja of Kashmir to Rahmatulla Khan, the Chief got annoyed and expelled the Mission from Dir, and the friendly relations which had been progressing favorably between him and the Kashmir authorities were somewhat thrown back, and communication between the two parties ceased. On account of this, Rahmatulla Khan at once accepted the overtures made to him by the Amir of Kabul through the Kunar Saiyad, and deputed his eldest son to Kabul in the hope of getting a treaty of alliance from the Amir. Beyond obtaining the title of Nawab and a few thousand rupees, none of the promises held out to him by the Kunar Saiyad have been realised.

"Rahmatulla Khan then made overtures through Rahat Mian Kakakhel to obtain friendly relations with the British Government. A verbal message was sent through Rahat Mian to the effect that the British Government was desirous of cultivating friendly relations with the independent Chiefs in the vicinity of the British frontier, and if the Chief of Dir thought proper to send an agent with definite proposals, they would receive due consideration. A message of the same nature was sent to Sherdil Khan of Alladand (Swat) who made similar propositions in consultation with the Chief of Dir.

"The result was the arrival at Peshawur of Malik Marchakai on the part of Rahmatulla Khan, and the son of Sherdil Khan on behalf of his father."

Overtures made by Dir to the British Government in 1877.—In a demi-

Lient. Temple's précis, Part II, Sec. official letter to the Viceroy, dated the 11th October 1877, Captain Cavagnari described the following

propositions which had been submitted for the consideration of the British Government in a letter from the Chief of Dir presented by Malik Marchakai:—

"1st.—Rahmatulla Khan desires a friendly alliance with the British Government, recognition as Chief of Yusufzai, Chitral, and Bajor, and protection from all external aggression.

"2nd.—A grant of suitable allowances, so that he may be independent of all other assistance, and may also be enabled to extend his influence and power and attain a position which will render him capable of performing any services that the Government may require of him.

"3rd.—The Nawab requests that any arrangements entered into with him may be kept secret for a time, and he concludes his letter by mentioning that Malik Marchakai has received full instructions to discuss all necessary details.

"Malik Marchakai explained that Rahmatulla Khan fears aggression on the part of the Amir of Kabul and the Maharaja of Kashmir, but that he is much more apprehensive of the designs of the former than of the latter, and that he trusts to an alliance with the British Government to protect him from either or both. He does not fear any of his internal rivals, of whom the most important are Mian Gul, the son of the Akhund of Swat, and Dilaram Khan, the Chief of Khahr (Bajor) as he considers himself sufficiently strong to hold his own against them. The undermentioned Chiefs are partizans of the Nawab of Dir, and he is sure of support from them whenever he requires their assistance:—

"(1.)—Aman-ul-mulk of Chitral.

"(2.)—Pahlwan Khan, Ruler of Mastuj and Yasin.

"Rahmatulla Khan is connected by marriage with both the above Chiefs.

"(3).—Ghulam Haider Khan of Nawagai, whose daughter is betrothed to a younger son of Rahmatulla Khan.

"(4).—Hazarat Ali Khan of Asmar (Bajaor).

"(5).—Aman Khan of Jandul (Bajaor), whose eldest son is betrothed to a daughter of Rahmatulla Khan.

"(6).—Sherdil Khan of Alladand (Swat), whose daughter is betrothed to Roshan Khan, a younger son of Rahmatulla Khan."

"Rahat Mian Kaka-Khel, who accompanied Malik Marchakai, and who has been the principal agent employed in corresponding with Rahmatulla Khan, states that although the Chief of Swat, it would only be necessary for a short time to conceal whatever arrangements the Government was pleased to make with him, and that if material help with troops were to be given, he would openly defy the religious feeling which the Akhund would stir up against him. Rahatulla Khan to strengthen his position over the districts which are less amenable to the Akhund's influence; and having done so, there would be no occasion to conceal the fact that he was receiving assistance from the English, though he could do nothing against that portion of Swat which is directly under the spiritual influence of the Akhund until the latter's death.

"The advantages that the British Government is supposed to ultimately derive from entering into an alliance with and giving aid to the Chief of Dir are, that by having a firm and trustworthy ally in the ruler of the intermediate districts, the Government will have free access from its own frontier to the Hindu Kush boundaries of Badakshan.

"It was pointed out to Malik Marchakai that unless Rahmatulla Khan was prepared to subjugate, or extend his power over, the country at present not under his control, and lying between Dir and the British frontier, it would be impossible for him to guarantee the advantages he alluded to. The agent replied that the subjugation of this tract would not be difficult after the Akhund's death, and that without active aid were promised he did not think the Nawab could dare the odium he would incur if he thus openly attempted to extend his territory for the interests of the British Government.

"The agent was then assured, in accordance with the orders received from the Viceroy, that the Government would view with satisfaction any alliance or friendly relations entered into between the Chief of Dir and the Maharaja of Kashmir. Malik Marchakai replied that there had been some slight misunderstanding between Rahmatulla Khan and the Kashmir authorities, and that it would be difficult for him to make any advances for a renewal of the friendly relations which had existed for some years."

Captain Cavagnari replied that he would refer the questions raised for orders, and advised Rahmatulla Khan to strengthen his relations with the Kashmir Durbar. The Chief then explained that although his relations with the Maharaja had been strained, they had not been definitely severed; but that nevertheless—

"without the intervention of Government, it is not possible for me to revive our former relations. The Maharaja for years has continued to me special favors, and I for a very trifling matter suspected him. Afghan honor precludes the possibility of my now making any advances.

"If your Government desires my honest and devoted services in its interests and grants me a written treaty taking me under its special protection, then Government is at liberty to call upon me to render services through the Maharaja or otherwise.

"At present relying upon the truth of Mian Rahat's representations, commending myself to the protection of God, and relying upon the fidelity of the British Government, I am prepared to form a bond of friendship, believing my own and the interests of Government to be identical."

Captain Cavagnari's opinion.—In the same letter (dated the 11th October 1877) Captain Cavagnari made the following comments about Rahmatulla Khan's advances:—

"One of the principal difficulties is, as was pointed out to Malik Marchakai, that the countries ruled over by the Chief of Dir do not immediately border on the British frontier. Could Rahmatulla Khan extend his power over the intermediate country now occupied by the Utman-khel and Ranizai tribes, and in conjunction with Sherdil Khan of Alladand increase his influence over Swat and Bunar, some advantages might be hoped for in the interests of the British Government; but it is very clear that neither of the two Chiefs are disposed to interfere with the countries under the immediate spiritual influence of the Akhund of Swat, unless they were assured of considerable material support. On the death of the Akhund—an event which, in all probability, judging from his rapidly increasing debilitated condition, cannot be far off—Sherdil Khan will put forward his claims to the Chieftainship of Swat, and if he was then supported with some pecuniary aid, he would most probably be able to overcome all other rivals.

"Sherdil Khan and Rahmatulla Khan have a common enemy in Mian Gul, the son of the Akhund of Swat, but they do not consider him a very formidable rival, and although the influence of the Akhund prevents Sherdil Khan from acquiring ascendancy during the occa-

sional struggles between the two parties in Swat, Rahmatulla Khan's party has invariably worsted that of Mian Gul, notwithstanding that the latter has now a much stronger faction in his favour than would be the case if his father were dead.

"At the present time, there are no direct advantages to be gained by entering into the secret treaties the Chiefs wish the Government to engage in. If the chances of ultimate advantages at some future time are considered worth trying for, it might be advisable to grant some pecuniary aid to these Chiefs, attaching to the gift certain stipulations which, according as they were acted up to or not, would indicate whether it was advantageous or not to keep up the connection.

"In the case of Rahmatulla Khan, the conditions might be that his relations with Kashmir should be placed on the same footing as they were prior to the misunderstanding which took place owing to the action of Mukarab Shah, and that he should give some evidence of his ability to extend his power towards the British frontier. A grant of ten thousand rupees would be an appropriate sum to give him for this purpose.

"As regards Sherdil Khan, a present of a thousand rupees would be sufficient to encourage him to hope if his action in future showed that he possessed the necessary ability for rendering service to the Government. If it is desired to extend British influence over the countries to the north of our present border, the proposals made by Rahmatulla Khan and Sherdil Khan appear to offer a favourable opportunity for paving the way to such a result. In treating with men of this kind, with whom we have never yet had any dealings, any attempt to cultivate friendly relations, with the view to permanent advantages, can only be regarded as an experiment, and it is almost entirely a question as to whether it is advisable or not to risk the expenditure of a certain sum of money on the chance of its succeeding.

"With reference to the renewal of relations between Kashmir and Dir, information has been received (*vide* Confidential Report No. 116, paragraph 7, dated 8th October 1877) of negotiations having been opened between the Maharaja and Mian Gul, and this should be discontinued if the connection with Dir is desired to be renewed.

"It is believed that the visit of Rahmatulla Khan's agent to Peshawar has become known. The late letters sent by the Kunar Saiyad to the Chief of Dir indicate such a desire to conciliate him, that it may be inferred that Saiyad Mahmud is apprehensive that Rahmatulla Khan is about to ally himself with the British authorities—a state of things which would probably be followed by similar overtures from the lesser Khans in Bajaur, and would be very injurious to the interests of the Amir of Kabul for whom the Saiyad has been exerting his influence."

The Dard Republics of Yaghistan.*—The States of Darel, Tangir, and

* See Lieut. Temple's *précis*, Part II, and Major Biddulph's memorandum in K. W. Secret, July 1881, Nos. 314—329.

Chilas are the only important representatives of this class; the remainder, Gor, Thalicha, Harban, and Hudar being little more than villages.

Darel lies on the right bank of the Indus, and consists of a valley separated by mountains on the north from Yasin and Gilgit, and bounded on the south by the Indus. Its fighting strength is about 2,000 men. The most important fact in the history of Darel is that in 1866, the Maharaja sent an expedition into the country by way of punishment for raids. The people made no resistance, but fled to the hills and were not subdued. Since then Darel has paid a nominal tribute of gold dust to the Maharaja. The people are no friends of Kashmir, but are obliged to behave well because parts of their summer pastures lie on the Gilgit side of their northern boundary. Darel is on good terms with Yasin, and possibly in some degree subordinate to its Chief.

Tangir is the eastern boundary of Darel, the two being divided by mountains. No direct relations exist between the Kashmir Durbar and Tangir. The State is on friendly terms with Yasin, and the Chief of the latter claims its allegiance, but his authority is not admitted. Since 1870 Mulk Aman, a son of Gauhar Aman Khushwaktia, and formerly ruler of Yasin, has found a refuge in Tangir.

Chilas.—This is perhaps the largest of the Yaghistan republics. It lies on the left bank of the Indus, and is bounded by the Nanga Parbat range on the east, the Black Mountain and the British district of Khaghan on the south, the Tor valley on the west, and the Indus on the north. Though the most fanatical and warlike of all the Dards, the Chilas, who are Sunnis, are chary of giving offence to Kashmir, owing to the number of routes by which they are open to attack. These routes lead from the Lolab valley, the Kishengunga valley, the Aator valley, and the Indus valley. The pass entering Chilas from the Kishengunga valley is an especially easy one. Chilas is also accessible from Khaghan in British territory by the Laloosar pass. The Chilas seem, however, ready enough to join in any combination against Kashmir that promises success.

Chilas was conquered by Kashmir troops in 1850-51. The records* of the Foreign Department give the following account of this expedition. It appears that in the year 1850, the people of Chilas raided on the Kashmir border near Hazara. The Maharaja proposed to punish them, and asked leave to use the Khaghan district of Hazara as a base of operations. The Deputy Commissioner of Hazara was averse to this proposal, but the Board of Administration anticipated good, rather than harm, from the conquest of Chilas by the Durbar. The Maharaja, however, changed his plans, and marched on Chilas by the direct route due north-west of Srinagar, at the same time summoning Raja Jowahir Singh from Punch to Mozufferabad to keep in check the Khakka Bamba Chiefs. The attack on Chilas seems to have been quite successful. In October 1851, the Maharaja informed the Board that he had captured the fort after a siege, had ordered it to be dismantled, and had arranged for the country to be administered as a part of the Gilgit districts. The Board congratulated His Highness on this success. The strength of the Durbar's force was estimated at 8,000 men. Its losses were said to be 2,000 killed and 1,300 wounded, and they were probably severe, although these figures were no doubt above the mark. Since then Chilas has paid a small yearly tribute of gold-dust to the Maharaja; but the country is not really subject to the authority of the Kashmir Durbar.†

* Consultation Secret, 29th November 1850, Nos. 50 & 61.
25th July 1851, Nos. 22-24.
29th August 1851, No. 30.
26th September 1851, Nos. 10 & 11.
7th November 1851, Nos. 67-70.

† See Mr. Girdlestone's memorandum on Kashmir, and K. W. Secret, July 1881, Nos. 314-309.

VIEWS HELD BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA FROM TIME TO TIME REGARDING THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE KASHMIR STATE.

The foregoing sketch may serve to render clear the views which have been taken from time to time of the policy to be followed in dealing with the foreign relations of Kashmir, but before going further it will be well to repeat the treaty provisions which bear upon this subject.

Treaty of Amritsar.—The articles to be considered are the fourth, fifth, ninth, and tenth:

the fourth article provides that—

"the limits of the territories of the Maharaja Golab Singh shall not be at any time changed without the concurrence of the British Government;"

the fifth—

"Maharaja Golab Singh will refer to the arbitration of the British Government any disputes or questions that may arise between himself and the Government of Lahore or any other neighbouring State, and will abide by the decision of the British Government;"

the ninth—

"The British Government will give its aid to Maharaja Golab Singh in protecting his territories from external enemies;"

and the tenth—

"Maharaja Golab Singh acknowledges the supremacy of the British Government."

Policy in 1848 and 1849.†—In 1848, in consequence of encroachments made on Gilgit by Gaubar Aman, Sir J. Lawrence, then Resident and Agent to the Governor General, asked the Maharaja for information as to the arrangements he had already made, or proposed to make, for the protection and tranquillity of the Gilgit frontier. The Maharaja replied that he intended to send a force to Gilgit to chastise the enemy. The Agent then asked if the Maharaja meant to take possession of the forts in that direction, or to chastise the enemy only, and what troops he would permanently locate in the country. The Agent reminded the Maharaja that—

"under articles IV and V of the treaty, he was bound to obtain the consent of the British Government before carrying out any arrangements in connection with his frontier, and that neither he himself nor his troops could cross over the same."

† Pandit Munphool's Account, p. 13.

[This is taken from Part I of Lieutenant Temple's précis. See also K.-W., Secret 1, 1870, Nos. 101-200.]

§ Pandit Munphool's Account, p. 14.

Pol. A.,—May 1868, Nos. 8-0.

The Maharaja replied that—

"he did not wish to make any alteration in his boundaries in that direction; but as the enemies in question have without cause encroached on and plundered his territory, and carried away the people and cattle of his five villages, he must chastise them and obtain the release of his people."

In the year 1849, Golab Singh sent another force of 2,000 men to Gilgit. These proceedings drew forth a letter from the Board of Administration of the Punjab, requesting that they might be informed beforehand of the movements of the Maharaja's troops. In reply the Maharaja stated*—

* Pundit Munphool's Account, p. 16. "that by sending troops to Gilgit, he did not intend to advance beyond his own boundaries."

Attack by Kashmir on Chilas in 1850-51.—The Maharaja indirectly obtained the consent of the Board of Administration to his expedition against Chilas. The correspondence* shows that the Board considered their consent to be necessary.

Views of the Government of India in 1868.—When reporting the arrival of a Yarkhand Envoy at Jammu in 1867, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab raised a question as to the degree of control which should be exercised by the British Government over the diplomatic relations of the Kashmir State. The Lieutenant-Governor's opinion was expressed thus:—

"The correspondence which resulted in the conclusion of the treaty of 16th March 1846 with Maharaja Golab Singh is not in this office. But the records of the Foreign Office will, in all probability, show why it was thought necessary to omit from that treaty the clause, which exists in nearly all the treaties concluded between the British Government and its feudatories, prohibiting the subordinate State from diplomatic intercourse with foreign powers, except through the British Government. The Lieutenant-Governor is inclined to think that the peculiar position of Kashmir, as a State beyond our own frontier, probably necessitated the omission. But whatever the reason for it may have been, there appears to be nothing in the treaty of 1846 to prevent the Maharaja from having direct political relations with foreign powers, provided these relations be of a friendly character, and not inconsistent with the allegiance which the Maharaja owes to the British Crown.

"At the same time, as the Maharaja is under the supremacy of the British Government, and as the British Government are the arbitrators in all disputes with other States, and are bound to protect his territories from foreign invasion, it is essential, in the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor, that the British Government should exercise a direct control over the diplomatic intercourse of their feudatory with other powers. The Lieutenant-Governor is, therefore, of opinion that the Maharaja has acted with propriety in informing this Government of the arrival of the Yarkhand Envoy, and proposes to take the opportunity of establishing a direct interchange of friendly communications with Muhammad Yakub Beg, whose position as a powerful Chief on the Maharaja's immediate frontier, renders it desirable that the relations subsisting between the British Government and Kashmir should be explained to him."

† Poll. A.—January 1868, No. 78. To this the Government of India replied† as follows:—

"It is, as observed in your 3rd paragraph, very true that the treaty with Maharaja Golab Singh in 1846 differs from our engagements with our feudatory States, inasmuch as, unlike them, it contains no clause prohibiting independent diplomatic intercourse with foreign powers. The clause was, as the Lieutenant-Governor surmises, omitted owing to the peculiar position of Kashmir as a State beyond our own boundary. The British frontier did not, at that time, even touch that of the Maharaja, nor was there any prospect of the war at the close of which our territories came to march with his.

"That notwithstanding this omission, the British Government should exercise a direct control over the diplomatic relations of the Maharaja is held by the Lieutenant-Governor to be an essential inference from the obligation under which His Honour thinks that Government lies to protect the territories of Kashmir from foreign invasion.

"But the Governor-General in Council is not prepared to admit that the obligations of the Amir of 16th March 1846.

1 See article IX of Treaty of paramount power go so far as this. They are, as a matter of fact, limited to a promise† that the 'British Government will give its aid to Maharaja Golab Singh in protecting his territories from external enemies.' And the nature and extent of the aid thus promised would, of course, depend, in each instance, on the aspect of the case and the circumstances of the times.

"Nor is it, in the opinion of His Excellency in Council, expedient—still less necessary— that the British Government should insist on the exercise of a direct control over the diplomatic relations of the Maharaja. The treaty does not, as has been shown, prescribe, and in the practice that has prevailed since 1846 there are no precedents to warrant, such a course. A requisition of the kind would be distasteful to the Maharaja, and any attempt to enforce it

would probably be found nugatory. Although, however, there is no intention on the part of Government of insisting on the right to supervise the diplomatic relations of Kashmir, the Maharaja may well be encouraged to refer to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab his dealings with other powers when involving any point of importance; and may, in fact, be accustomed to feel such references to be a matter of course."

Pol. A.—January 1868, No. 79, and June 1868, No. 5.

This decision was reported to the Secretary of State, and was concurred in by him.

Lord Mayo's advice to the Maharaja in 1870.—“His Excellency went on to say that in respect to the States beyond the Kashmir frontier he would give the same advice as he had repeatedly given both verbally at Umballa and afterwards in writing to the Amir of Kabul, and which he had also recently given to the Ruler of Yarkhand, both of whom were independent, and not feudatory, States. This advice was that the Maharaja should carefully abstain from all interference in the political affairs and quarrels of States beyond his frontier; that he should commit no aggressions on his neighbours, and make no attempt to extend his authority beyond the limits of the territories which had been conferred on his father, Maharaja Gulab Singh. The Maharaja replied that this had been his invariable policy; that the present limits of his State were identical with those of the territories which had been conferred on his father, and that in no case had he extended his frontier. He added that he was most anxious to live at peace with his neighbours, but that on his remote frontier of Gilgit the foreign tribes were very unruly; that they were in the habit both of inciting his people to rebellion and of making inroads into his territories for the purpose of plunder and of kidnapping women and children and selling them into slavery; that he had been compelled several times to repel those inroads; but that on these occasions his action had been purely defensive, and had never resulted in the annexation of any territory to his State.

Secret I, 1870, Nos. 101-200, K.-W.

“To this course he expressed his determination to adhere.

“His Excellency again particularly and strongly impressed on the Maharaja the necessity of not committing any aggressions beyond his own borders, and remarked that the wisest and safest course which His Highness could pursue was to confine himself to the improvement of his own State, and to have nothing to do with affairs beyond his frontier; that whatever might have been the policy of the British Government in past years, that Government was now determined that, if possible, no annexations should be made to its dominions, and that its present frontier should not be extended; that the Maharaja would find his greatest security to lie in adopting a similar policy, and that so long as he shaped the conduct of his administration to that of the British Government in India, he might rely with confidence on their protection and support.”

Opinions of Sir Henry Durand and Lord Mayo in 1870.—In connection with the murder of Mr. Hayward by Mir Wali (then Chief of Yasin) the Maharaja of Kashmir professed his readiness to invade Yasin. Sir Henry Durand commented on this proposal as follows:—

Secret I, 1870, No. 397.

“I think it a doubtful policy allowing the Chitral Chief to establish himself in the Gilgit valley, which the occupation of Yasin virtually amounts to. As a mere matter of policy, it is more to our interests, that the head of the Gilgit valley be in the hands of Kashmir than in the hands of Chitral, for a glance at the map shows the value of a friendly and substantive hold by an adequate force up to the watershed between Gilgit and Chitral valleys; it would be an immense curb on the triangle, or more strictly speaking, the quadrangle between the Kunar or Chitral rivers, and the Indus; the Chitral, Swat, Bunsair rulers, could hardly ever dream of anything like a hostile combination, such as has at times been apprehended, when the Kabul and Kashmir rulers being friendly, the Government of India had at command such a grasp of the accesses to those valleys, at their summits, and at their debouchures.”

The Lieutenant-Governor suggested that the Maharaja might be told, in harmony with former instructions, that he should repel aggression from the Chitral side—

“and take all necessary steps for maintaining his supremacy unquestioned in the Gilgit Valley up to the watershed between the Chitral and Gilgit valleys. * * It should be strictly forbidden to overpass the limits of the watershed line into the Gilgit valley.”

The Lieutenant-Governor added:—

“This proposal amounts simply to sanction to repel aggression, but in so doing not to pass over the boundary which divides the aggressive territory from that endangered by the aggression.”

This policy, it was remarked—

“would not entangle the Government of India, and would yet work out its permanent object of security on the frontier by bridling the fanatics of Chitral, Swat, and Bunsair, and that in a way they would all feel, and look to us to control, for they hate the Dogra more than they do the Christian.”

* Secret I, 1870, No. 895.

In reply, Lord Mayo wrote* :—

"I can come to no other conclusion than that the suggestion of the Maharaja of Kashmir amounts to a proposal for the conquest, under our sanction, of Yasin which, as far as we know, lies beyond his boundaries.

"We cannot be quite positive, perhaps, on this latter point; but, so far as the information in our possession is to be trusted, it seems that Yasin forms a part of Chitral, and has been governed by a branch of the same family that governs in Chitral. It is related to Chitral also by race and religion; and although it is possible that Kashmir may possess some shadowy claims over the territory, yet its annexation to that State with our full sanction and permission might lead us into endless difficulties. Should a conquest be made, and occupation effected, we should inevitably be obliged, if necessity arose, to assist the Maharaja in maintaining his authority over the territory so acquired.

"When I saw the Maharaja at Sialkot, I told him that he should carefully abstain from all interference in the political affairs and quarrels of States beyond his frontier; that he should commit no aggression on his neighbours, and make no attempt to extend his authority beyond the limits of the territories which had been conferred on his father, the Maharaja Golas Singh.

"We have also informed the Chitral Chief of the fact of our having given this advice, and of the Maharaja having promised to act on it.

"If we now allow the Maharaja to annex Yasin, the Chitral Chief will think either that we are insincere, or that we have neither power nor influence enough to restrain the Maharaja. It is true that the Maharaja may look with jealousy on the occupation of Yasin from Chitral. But there are many reasons why that may be done without meaning any menace to Kashmir, whereas it is difficult to imagine any reasons for the occupation of Yasin by the Dogras which do not imply a menace to the neighbouring valleys.

"There are certain advantages in the existence of a belt of independent territory between Kashmir and Wakhan or Badakshan.

"We know that the Kashmir Government has shown a great tendency to intrigue in that direction, and that the Maharaja has carried on communications which we know he has concealed from us.

"In a recent despatch to the Secretary of State we defined the Kabul territories as extending to the point where the Hindu Kush merges in the Pamir Steppe. If Kashmir annex Yasin, the two countries will be continuous, and we might find it difficult to control the Maharaja's diplomatic action in that direction.

"It is not quite clear to me that the occupation of Yasin by Kashmir would be any great curb on the triangle, or rather the quadrangle, between the Kunar or Chitral rivers and the Indus, Chitral, Swat, and Bonair. I am inclined to think that Kashmir in that direction could hardly have much influence over the wild tribes to the south, bordering our frontier on the western side of the Indus.

"The Maharaja has great difficulty in holding Gilgit as it is, and there are dismal stories prevalent as to the loss which his troops constantly experience even in those districts to which he has probably a legitimate right; indeed, it is said in Srinagar that an army once despatched to those territories never returns.

"On the whole, therefore, I am inclined to think that it would not be desirable to give any answer to the Maharaja at present with regard to his application.

"A certain amount of obscurity still hangs over poor Hayward's fate. But, whether or no, I am not disposed to give any encouragement to the Maharaja towards aggression on the pretext of avenging his death."

Further discussion in 1872.—The question came up again in 1872 on a reference from the India Office. Some of Mr. Hayward's relations asked for pecuniary assistance. While admitting that they had no claims on the Government Sir H. Rawlinson expressed the following opinion :—

"At the same time, it is a crying scandal to the British Government, and very discreditable to the power and influence of the Maharaja of Kashmir, that a British officer should be murdered by a brigand Chief like Mir Wali, of Yasin, at a distance of only two marches from the Sikh frontier, and that not only should no retribution be exacted, but the murderer, who fled the country at first, should be reinstated in his government, and should now rule over Yasin in defiance both of Sikhs and English; it is well worthy of consideration whether the Kashmir Durbar should not be counselled by us to demand, and, if necessary, to employ force in exacting redress. The capture of the person of Mir Wali is hardly to be hoped for, since, on the approach of danger, he would take refuge in Chitral, where, under present circumstances, he is secure; but the Maharaja of Kashmir might very well impose a fine of £500 on the district of Yasin for the outrage on a subject of his British ally, and a demonstration in force from Gilgit would probably be sufficient to secure the realization of the money without a recourse to actual hostilities. The fine, if realised, might then be made over to Mrs. Bell as compensation for the loss of her brother's property, to which she is the heir.

"I would further venture to predict that sooner or later it will be found necessary, in the interests of peace and order, to form a tripartite treaty between the

Indian Government and the Rulers of Kashmir and Kabul, in order to subjugate the robber tribes of Swat and Bajor, Chilas and Darel, Hunza, Nagar, and Yasin, Chitral and Kafirstan, whose mountain seats are almost enclosed by the territories of the three great powers above named."

The Government of India did not concur in this opinion, as the following extracts from their reply will show :—

"With respect to Sir H. Rawlinson's suggestion, that the Maharaja of Kashmir should impose a fine of £500 on the district of Yasin, and levy it by a demonstration of force, we are unable to advise the adoption of such a course. We enclose, for Your Grace's information,

* Quoted in the preceding paragraph.
 copy of a letter,* dated 21st September 1870, from the late Viceroy, to the late Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir H. Durand, which will show the reasons which induced Lord Mayo to discourage the proposal of the Maharaja that he should move a force against Yasin to avenge Mr. Huyward's death. In these reasons we generally concur.

"An intimation from the British Government that the Maharaja might have made a demonstration in force from Gilgit against Yasin, would, perhaps, not be unwelcome to him. He is precluded, however, by the treaty of 1846 from undertaking such a measure without our consent. The moral responsibility for the results of such a demonstration would, therefore, devolve upon us almost as much as if the operations were directly undertaken by us. With reference to this it must be borne in mind that there is some reason to believe that the proceedings of the forces of His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir in a former war with Yasin were such as we should not desire to be concerned in. We could not control the proceedings of the Maharaja's army, while in counselling hostilities we should be really responsible for their acts, and in the possible event of the Maharaja's defeat and an invasion of his territories from Yasin, we might be called upon, under the treaty of 1846, to aid with our own troops in the hostilities we had advised.

"It appears to us, moreover, that the course suggested would hardly be consistent with the advice we have given during the last few years, not only to the Maharaja of Kashmir, but to the rulers of all the Native States on our northern frontier, including the Khan of Chitral himself, to pursue a policy of peace. It would probably be difficult to justify hostilities undertaken by our advice to avenge the death of a gentleman for whose safety we had previously warned him, after the maturest consideration, that we could accept no responsibility whatsoever."

Aman-ul-mulk's application for aid in recovering Payal and Gilgit from Kashmir. Reports about the Maharaja's dealings with Foreign States. Views of the Government of India, 1870.—It appears that in

Secret I, 1870, Nos. 191—200.

1866, Aman-ul-mulk asked the Commissioner of Peshawar for assistance in taking Gilgit from the Kashmir Durbar. Nothing came of the matter at the time; and the Commissioner merely replied that the Maharaja was a friend of the British Government. But early in the year 1870, Aman-ul-mulk renewed his request. The Commissioner and the Punjab Government proposed to send a civil reply similar to that which had been given in 1866, but the Government of India did not concur in their opinion.

Just at this time a news-letter had been received from F. B. (described by Mr. Aitchison as "an exceedingly important and valuable letter"), which reported that the Maharaja of Kashmir was encroaching on Yasin, and was in secret negotiation or correspondence with the Mir of Badakshan and others. Thereupon a discussion followed about the power of the British Government to control the foreign relations of the Kashmir Durbar, and the views expressed by the Government of India in 1868 were considered with reference to the provisions of the treaty of Amritsar. Lord Mayo recorded a minute which may be quoted :—

Ibid., K. W.

Ibid.

"It is certainly difficult to reconcile the letter of the Government of India of 25th January 1868, and the reply of the Secretary of State of 23rd April 1868 in approval, with the terms of the treaty of March 1846.

"It is therein provided that the limits of the territories of Kashmir shall not be changed without the concurrence of the British Government; that the Maharaja shall leave any disputes or questions that may arise between himself and the neighbouring States to be settled by the British Government and will abide by their decision.

"He also acknowledges generally the supremacy of the British Crown, and in token thereof is bound to offer annual presents. In return the British Government is pledged to give its aid to the Maharaja in protecting his territories from external enemies.

"How this treaty can be carried out without exercising direct control over the diplomatic transactions of the Kashmir State I cannot understand, and, indeed, it so appeared to the

Government of India in 1868, because, in the 3rd paragraph of their letter, it is said that it will serve every purpose if the Maharaja be habituated to refer to the Lieutenant-Governor all points of importance which, if it means anything, means that no diplomatic transactions are to be conducted or concluded without reference to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

"I do not, however, think it at all desirable to raise this question now, and I think that the intentions of the framers of the treaty can probably be carried out by constant watchfulness over the diplomatic proceedings of the Maharaja without making any specific communication to him.

"Sufficient influence over all the Maharaja's diplomatic proceedings could be exercised without any formal communication or any apparent reversal of the decision of 1868, which appears to me to be rather obscure, and does not really settle anything."

The Punjab Government was accordingly addressed in these words:—

Secret L. 1870, No. 105.

"The facts regarding Payal and Yasin cannot be certainly gathered. It seems clear, however, that at the time of the treaty of 1846, Gilgit was under the government of the Sikhs, and was included in the territories formally ceded to the Maharaja by the treaty. This fact, respecting the possession of Gilgit, should be pointed out by the Commissioner of Peshawar to the Khan of Chitral, who should be informed that the British Government cannot help him to recover any territory the right to which has been acknowledged to be vested in the Maharaja in the treaties concluded with him by the British Government.

"The Khan should also be informed that at an interview with the Maharaja at Sialkot His Excellency the Viceroy pressed strongly upon His Highness the necessity of abstaining from all aggression and encroachment on his neighbours; that the Maharaja promised to act upon this advice; and that His Excellency in Council has every reason to believe that the Maharaja will restrain his local governments from interfering with any of the territories that are now in the possession of the Khan, and from giving the Khan any reasonable ground of complaint.

"During the earlier stages of his transactions in the Gilgit valley, the Maharaja appears generally to have referred to the British Government for advice, and the continuance of that practice is, in the opinion of His Excellency in Council, both advisable in the interests of the Kashmir State, and necessary for the maintenance of tranquillity on the Maharaja's borders. Opportunity should therefore be taken from time to time to carry out the instructions conveyed in paragraph 7 of letter from this Office, No. 24, dated 10th January 1868, and to encourage the Maharaja to consult with the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, as a matter of course, as to his dealings with foreign powers when involving any point of importance. The letter of the 10th January 1868 indicates in a general way the line of policy which, in the opinion of His Excellency in Council, seemed sufficient to meet all requirements at the time, and which, if the Maharaja communicates freely and unreservedly with the Lieutenant-Governor regarding his diplomatic relations, may probably still be considered sufficient. But in view of the rapid march of political events in the countries beyond the northern and western frontiers of Kashmir, there is a strong necessity for constant watchfulness over all diplomatic proceedings in which British interests are directly or indirectly involved. His Excellency in Council entertains no doubt that the Maharaja will see that his safety mainly depends on keeping the Lieutenant-Governor informed of his dealings with other powers, and His Excellency in Council hopes that he will readily seek his counsel and act on his advice."

Views of the Government of India in 1873.—

Secret. March 1875, Nos. 19—29.

Government of India received information from the Maharaja that the Russians were trying to establish themselves at Sar-i-kul; and that they had made overtures to one of his subjects who had been trading in Yarkhand designed apparently to open negotiations with the Kashmir Durbar. Just at this time affairs in Eastern Turkistan were attracting much attention, and the Government of India thought it desirable to obtain, through a political officer resident in Kashmir, more accurate news about the course of events in Central Asia. The situation was thus reviewed in a letter* addressed to the Punjab Government:—

* Foreign Department No. 2107 P., dated the 12th September 1873.

Secret, March 1875, No. 23.

"Whatever truth there may be in the story of Khalikdar, the Maharaja has adopted the proper course in communicating the statements to His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor. His Highness is doubtless aware that communications with Russia are matters of imperial concern, which are conducted by the Government of Her Majesty the Queen; and that direct correspondence between Russia and Kashmir would not be in keeping with the relations which subsist between the British Government and His Highness, and would give rise to complications of an inconvenient and even serious character. His Excellency in Council accordingly commends the action which His Highness has taken in the present instance.

"On account of the business connected with the Mission despatched to Yarkhand for the conclusion of a commercial treaty, and the strengthening of the good understanding that

at present subsists with His Highness the Atalik Ghazi, His Excellency in Council has resolved to instruct Mr. Wynne* and Mr. Shuvt† to remain in their respective posts for the whole of the year, and in view of the important position of His Highness' territories on the north-western frontier of British India, the increasing importance attached to political affairs in Central Asia, the necessity of obtaining early and reliable information of all that takes place beyond the Himalayan passes, the mischief caused by the circulation of false or exaggerated rumours from those quarters, and the closer relations which will, His Excellency in Council trusts, be established with Yarkhand, it appears to His Excellency in Council to be advisable that a British Resident should remain permanently at the Court of His Highness.

"The Resident will be appointed by the Government of India, but no change is contemplated in the conduct of the political relations of the Government of India with Kashmir, which will be conducted as heretofore through the Lieutenant-Governor, to whom the Resident in Kashmir will be subordinate; and in communicating to the Maharaja the intentions of His Excellency in Council, the Lieutenant-Governor will take special care to explain to His Highness that the alteration of the present arrangements has been made entirely for reasons relating to the external relations of British India, and that the Viceroy has no intention of interfering more than heretofore in the internal affairs of Kashmir.

"The foregoing communication should be made by the Lieutenant-Governor to the Maharaja either in person or by letter, as may be most acceptable to His Highness, and the opportunity should be taken to convey to him the cordial thanks of the Government of India for the hearty assistance which he has given to Mr. Forsyth and his party, and for all that he has done to facilitate the progress of the Yarkhand Mission."

It has been shown (Chapter V, pages 54 and 55) why this policy was not carried out.

The policy adopted in 1876-77. The Gilgit Agency.—The close of the year 1876 was marked by a new departure in the policy of the British Government towards the external relations of the Kashmir State. It was determined to acquire through the Maharaja of Kashmir "an efficient control over the passes of the Hindu Kush between the eastern confines of Afghanistan and the north-western frontier of Kashmir." It was observed that the people of Dardistan "regard with deep concern the advancing pressure from Afghanistan, and are in sore need of a friendly protector." It was therefore anticipated that the Maharaja, supported by the British Government, would be able to acquire in this country influence and control which would enable the Government of India "in course of time to make such political and military arrangements as will effectually command the passes of the Hindu Kush."

A despatch, addressed by Lord Lytton's Government to the Secretary of State some two years later, describes this policy as follows:—

"On the other hand, the greater part of the territory interposed between Sirikol and Wakhán and the border of India proper, is well within the reach of our effective influence. There can be no doubt that the movement of events in this quarter, though at present indeterminate and complicated, is so far significant that it should place us on our guard. The petty Chiefs who own the wild country below Sirikol and around Kashmir are evidently in much perplexity. They have been recently tendering, more or less surreptitiously, their allegiance alternately to Kabul, Kashmir, and China—the Chief of Hunza (for example), though disavowing political disloyalty to Kashmir, has undeniably made overtures to Tashkungan; and the Chief of Chitral endeavours to trim between Kabul and Kashmir. They are all, in fact, doubting to which quarter they should look for the safest barter of their allegiance in return for protection by some paramount power. Meanwhile, to these Chiefs belong the southern openings of the only passes which give direct passage through the mountain ranges up to Sirikol on the Pamir steppes—the district which the dilapidation of the Kashgar dynasty has left politically masterless, and which the Russians are not unlikely to occupy. And we have to remember that the remarkable depression or break in the great mountain barrier of the Hindu Kush, where it is crossed by the Iskaman and Baroghil passes, occurs just where a section of our frontier with Central Asia is held by a Native Indian State.

"All these facts and tendencies, reviewed collectively, have confirmed our impressions of the importance of making out, as definitely as the nature of the country and our knowledge of its condition will permit, the territorial limits up to which we should extend our indirect authority, and within which the encroachments of foreign influence should be anticipated. Throughout the zone of quasi-independent territory which this limit would include, it may be sufficient for a long time to come that our political supremacy shall be tacitly accepted, to the exclusion of other similar claims or assertions. We may thus succeed in adjoining, upon the border of India beyond Kashmir, that contact between the recognized territories of England and Russia in Asia to which some may look forward as ultimately inevitable, but which it is not our concern in India to facilitate or expedite. It is true that upon this section of the Hindu Kush range the whole country is so difficult, remote, and ill-populated, that there is little to attract

advance or occupation from the northern side of the mountains, either on political or on military grounds. Nevertheless, all our experience in Asia points to the inconvenience of an undefined frontier, and to the expediency of laying down some general political demarcation where debatable border lands interpose between the necessarily converging forces of two powerful States. The line which we may at first adopt as defining the sphere of our political influence, should coincide generally with the geographical outline of the position which, if need be, we may be ready to maintain actively. Assuming, therefore, the probability that, in spite of physical difficulties, the Russian border may somewhere in these mountains eventually touch territory under the protection of India, our plan is to choose and settle for ourselves the point of contact, while this can be done gradually, without interruption, and without attracting attention. If we are enabled thus deliberately and at leisure to examine and select our ground, and by degrees to accustom the people to a political connection with India, we shall the more certainly avoid committing ourselves to the occupation of any position, military or political, from which we might afterwards find ourselves obliged to withdraw.

"Upon these general principles we have examined carefully the strategical features as well as the political aspect of our frontier beyond Kashmir, with the object of settling this line of political demarcation. In this direction the natural boundary of India is formed by the convergence of the great mountain ranges of the Himalayas and of the Hindu Kúsh which here extend northward up to their junction. The Mustágh range, running up from south-eastward to the Baroghil pass, marks the water parting between the Taghdunbush Pamir and Sirikol on the north, and the Upper Indus Valleys southward. From the Baroghil pass south-west the Hindu Kúsh divides the watershed of the Oxus and the Indus. Within the angle thus formed lie the territories of Chitral, Darel, Yasin, Hunza, and other petty dependencies. From Hunza, on the slopes of the Mustágh, westward to Chitral under the Hindu Kúsh, these States occupy the valleys which run up to the skirts of the ranges, and are drained by the uppermost tributaries of the Indus river system. And the only passes through these ranges from the Pamir are, as we have said, in the hands of these semi-independent Chiefs. If a strong, independent, and hostile power were established to the north of these mountains, the passes might become lines of a demonstration against Kashmir, which might at least be useful as a diversion to facilitate and support the flank of more serious operations in Afghanistan. If, on the other hand, we extend, and by degrees consolidate, our influence over this country, and if we resolve that no foreign interference can be permitted on this side of the mountains, or within the drainage system of the Indus, we shall have laid down a natural line of frontier which is distinct, intelligible, and likely to be respected.

"We purpose, therefore, to follow out consistently the policy of which the first steps were reported and explained by our letter of the 11th June 1877. Our object, as there stated, is to acquire, through the Ruler of Kashmir, the power of making such political and military arrangements as will effectually command the passes of the Hindu Kúsh. With this object, we shall take every opportunity of strengthening our control over the country lying south of the mountain slopes which have been traced, roughly, in the foregoing paragraphs, and of attaching the Chiefs, through Kashmir, to British interests. * * * Our officers in Kashmir will be instructed to discourage and counteract all tendencies of the Kunjod Chiefs towards acknowledgment of any superior authority other than that of the Kashmir Ruler; * * * We may thus succeed in retaining and settling down within our political system all the country which falls inside our geographical frontier. And although we desire to realise our plans gradually, by pacific means, we shall nevertheless consider it from the first incumbent upon the Government of India to prevent, at any cost, the establishment within this outlying country of the political preponderance of any other power. Nor do we anticipate that any such interference with our legitimate supremacy will be attempted in earnest, so soon as it shall have become known that we have marked out a clear and consistent frontier, and that we intend to maintain it."

Negotiations with Kashmir.—In furtherance of this policy, it was thought expedient to post a political officer of the British Government at Gilgit, "for the purpose^a of obtaining information as to the progress of events beyond the Kashmir frontier."

A favourable opportunity for commencing negotiations with the Kashmir Durbar was furnished by a letter† addressed by Aman-ul-mulk to the Maharaja, in which the allegiance of Chitral and Yasin was tendered to His Highness. The subject was then discussed by the Viceroy and the Maharaja at Madhopore on the 17th and 18th November 1876. The result was that—

"while the Maharaja undertook to endeavour by peaceful negotiation to obtain political control over Chitral and Yasin, the Viceroy promised to aid the negotiations by all the means in his power, and assured His Highness that, in the event of his action involving him unexpectedly in military operations, the British Government would, if necessary, afford him countenance and material aid."

The upshot of the negotiations can thus be summarised in a few words, but it is important to follow their course closely. For this purpose the memo-

^a Secret Despatch No. 17, dated 11th June 1877.

^b Secret, July 1877, No. 60.

† *Ibid.*, No. 42.

* Secret, July 1877. Nos. 36, 39, & 40.

randum* about the interview at Madhopore and two *kharitas** which passed between the Viceroy and the Maharaja are reproduced below :—

" His Excellency commenced the conversation by a brief review of the present position of affairs in Europe as regards the Eastern question, noticing the attitude of England and Russia in regard to it. He proceeded to show how the interests of the British Government and its Indian feudatories were involved in it, and how the rapid march of events had made it necessary to take into consideration the adoption of measures for ensuring the peace

and security of the Indian borders. Among those measures His Excellency observed that the strengthening of our frontiers claimed primary importance; and it was with reference to that portion of the frontier which is adjacent to the Maharaja's territories that he wished on the present occasion, in continuation of conversations which he had already had with Dewan Gobind Sahai at Simla, to consult His Highness. As His Highness was well aware, the country beyond his frontier was inhabited by a rude and barbarous people who own allegiance to various Chiefs in no respect more advanced than the populations over whom they exercise suzerainty.

" It was essential, the Viceroy said, that such States as Chitral and Yasin should come under the control of a friend and ally of the British Government like His Highness, rather than be absorbed, in the course of events, by powers inimical to Kashmir; this became the more necessary from there being certain passes through the mountain range bounding these territories on the north, which passes, it is believed, are, more or less, practicable, or can be made practicable, for the passage of troops.

" It was in order to examine one of these, the Iskaman pass, that Captain Biddulph had been deputed during the present year by the late Viceroy: and here His Lordship took occasion incidentally to acknowledge, in suitable terms, the cordial assistance afforded to that officer by the Maharaja and his officials. His Excellency continued that, though the result of Captain Biddulph's observations had not been entirely confirmatory of the reports that Government had previously received regarding the practicability of this pass, still there could be little doubt that other passes exist, close to and in connection with it, the command of which, for the sake of the safety and peace of Kashmir, should be in the Maharaja's hands, or in those of the British Government. In order to attain this end, it was necessary, His Excellency thought, to obtain full control over the countries lying between them and the Kashmir frontier, and His Lordship invited the opinion of the Maharaja as to the best means of carrying out that object. His Excellency observed that in the above remarks he had frankly expressed his views and opinions to the Maharaja, and he begged His Highness to reciprocate that confidence and speak with the same frankness.

" The Maharaja cordially thanked His Excellency for this signal mark of confidence, and then proceeded to recount briefly the circumstances under which interchange of communications had originally commenced with Chitral and Yasin in the time of the late Gholab Singh up to date of receipt of a communication from the Mir of Chitral, of which the vakils of Chitral and Yasin, now at Madhopore, were the bearers. The substance of this communication was to the effect that the Mir wished to renew friendly relations, which had ceased since the death of Mr. Hayward at the hands of Mir Wah, and to receive an envoy from the Maharaja whose dependent he professed to be, and whose protection he sought. The allegiance of Yasin also was offered in the same letter. His Highness added that there were three methods of securing the objects pointed out by the Viceroy, *viz.*, either (1) to take advantage of the internal dissensions which so frequently occur in those countries and use the opportunity so offered, according as circumstances may arise, for annexing the State; or (2) to endeavour by negotiation to obtain political control in those States; or (3) to reduce the country by force of arms. Either of these three courses His Highness was prepared to adopt if the British Government desired it.

" The Viceroy expressed a wish to be favoured with the Maharaja's opinion as to the particular course which appeared to him most suited to accomplish the desired object, but wished, in the first place, to explain his own views on the matter, which were, that peaceful negotiation was the best and most effectual means of bringing Chitral and Yasin under the control of Kashmir. His Excellency expressed his readiness to aid such negotiation by any means in his power, and added that in the event of the Maharaja's action ever involving him in military operations (which was not very probable), the British Government would be prepared to give him countenance and material assistance. His Excellency hoped that it might be possible to set on foot the negotiations above suggested at once, and he thought that the Chitral and Yasin vakils should be present at the Imperial Assemblage to be held at Delhi, in order that having already entered into friendly negotiation with the Maharaja, they might be also made acquainted with the strength and resources of the Government on which Kashmir relies. The Maharaja expressed himself as quite concurring in these views, and stated his readiness to open at once negotiations with the Mirs of Chitral and Yasin. The vakils would, in the meantime be detained in order to attend the Imperial Assemblage. His Highness, however, begged the Viceroy to favor him with a written authority to commence negotiations, in order that it may not be in the power of evil-disposed persons hereafter to accuse him of entering into relations with foreign States for his own ends.

"The Viceroy expressed his willingness to furnish the Maharaja with the requisite authority in such form as might be most satisfactory to him. United by identity of interests, as well as by ties of friendship, it was the sincere desire of Government to see the Maharaja's State prosperous and his frontier well protected.

"As a practical proof of the sincerity of this sentiment, His Excellency offered for the Maharaja's acceptance as a gift from the British Government 5,000 stand of rifles for his army, either Snider or Enfield. The Maharaja, in acknowledging with gratitude this mark of favor and confidence on His Lordship's part, left it for His Excellency to determine which description of arms would be most suitable.

"The Viceroy proceeded to say that, having communicated to the Maharaja his views on the peaceful absorption of Chitral and Yasin, which he believed to be a subject near to the Maharaja's heart, there was one additional measure which Government thinks it necessary to carry out for the further security of the Kashmir frontier, and the transmission of regular and reliable information regarding the condition of that frontier, viz., to station a British officer at Gilgit who would be specially charged with these duties.

"His Highness the Maharaja expressed his readiness to consent to the appointment of an officer in Gilgit, should circumstances ever occur to render such a measure necessary, but in the meantime he preferred to construct a telegraphic line to Gilgit, so that Government may obtain immediate and constant information regarding the frontier.

"His Excellency observed in reply that Government considered the necessity for the stationing of a British officer in Gilgit to have already arisen in consequence of the Russian annexation of Khokand, and the present attitude of the Amir of Kabul towards Chitral. His Lordship proceeded to explain that the duties of this officer would be confined to external frontier relations, and that he would exercise no interference in the internal administration of Kashmir. His Excellency added that he wished to refrain from exercising any direct control over the States adjacent to the frontier, but would prefer in all cases that the influence of the Maharaja's Government should be directly brought to bear on them. It was with this special view that the Chitral and Yasin vakils had not been given a direct invitation to Delhi; and that His Highness had been requested to invite their attendance.

"The Maharaja observed that the idea of a British officer at Gilgit being entirely new to him and unexpected, he would beg His Lordship to allow him time to weigh fully the arguments for and against the measure.

"His Excellency acceded to this request.

"On the day following the date of the conversation above recorded, His Highness the Maharaja took an opportunity of continuing the conversation. He observed that having carefully considered the proposal made by the Viceroy regarding the establishment of a British officer at Gilgit, he was now desirous to express his perfect willingness to meet the wishes of the British Government in this respect. His Highness, however, begged permission to address the Viceroy in writing regarding certain assurances which he was anxious to obtain in connection with the proposed measure."

Accordingly, on the 26th November 1876, the Maharaja addressed the Viceroy in these words:—

"With reference to the most important conversation I had with Your Excellency about the present necessity of appointing a military officer at Gilgit in view to the importance of managing the affairs of the frontier, I beg most respectfully to submit to Your Excellency that having fully weighed the probable consequences of the measure, I expect one great advantage and apprehend several disadvantages likely to result to my Government from the arrangement in question.

"The advantage is that the information, which the officer so appointed would be able to supply from time to time to Your Excellency's Government about matters relating to the frontier and the countries beyond, would lead to a very efficient protection of the frontier; and it is a source of great pleasure to me that, in securing this important object, my services should be availed of, and that I should thus have an opportunity for shewing my loyalty to Her Majesty's Government.

"Some of the disadvantages on the other hand are as follows:—

"1.—The measures which Your Excellency's Government would have to adopt for protecting the frontier in consequence of reports furnished from time to time by the officer so appointed, might, I apprehend, cause some harm to my Government and my position.

"2.—Though to remove my fears Your Excellency has given me words assuring that the said officer shall in no way interfere in the internal administration of my territories, I fear the officer may do something like what was done by Dr. Cayley at Ladakh. * * *

"Though I apprehend many more disadvantages, I think I should not mention them here, as my object is anyhow to please Your Excellency's Government. I am heartily thankful to Your Excellency for having kindly given me words fully assuring me that the officer to be appointed shall not in any way interfere in my internal administration, and that the Supreme Government shall never appoint in any way any Resident or Political Agent; and I declare openly to Your Excellency that the inevitable necessity in the matter, the strong sense of my duty to give every satisfaction to Your Excellency, the outspoken manner in which Your Excellency condescended to explain to me the real intentions of Her Majesty's Government of

India, and Your Excellency's kind words graciously assuring the continuance of the dignity and integrity of my Government and position, have induced me to waive my objections to the measure proposed, at present. But I beg to inform Your Excellency that the people of the frontier are very turbulent, and no reliance whatever can be placed in their words; and it is a fact that on several occasions they fought with my troops in defiance of the solemn engagements into which they had entered by swearing on the Koran.

"I hope, therefore, that Your Excellency will favour me by giving me a written sanad containing the words of assurance alluded to above and the points mentioned below, so that it may be of use to me in the future:—

"I.—No interference should ever be made in any affair affecting trade or my administration, or any matter regarding my subjects, officials, and servants.

"II.—The British Government should ever respect the condition of my sanads, the proclamation by Her Majesty, and the established usages and customs in force within my territories.

"III.—The duties of the officer to be appointed should be specified, so that I may have a clear idea of the business he will have to do.

"IV.—Rules should be framed defining the powers of the officer and the manner in which he will exercise them, and I should be favoured with a copy of the same before the officer is appointed.

"V.—The powers of the officer should be confined to matters affecting countries beyond my territories.

"VI.—The said officer should never issue any order on my officials without taking my opinion and consent.

"VII.—Persons in the employ of, or subordinate to, the said officer should remain subject to the laws of my State.

"VIII.—The appointment of this officer should not be made a precedent.

"IX.—The consequences of this arrangement should never be made occasions for impairing the integrity and dignity of my State.

"X.—I think it would not be unreasonable on my part to request Your Excellency to take my opinion and consent in the selection of the officer.

"XI.—If any misunderstanding should occur between the said officer and my officials (God forbid it), I hope Your Excellency will take into serious consideration any representation I may have to make on the subject.

"XII.—False reports by interested persons about my relations with the frontier States, or any reckless adventure by the officer in penetrating the frontier, should never be made grounds for ruining my reputation."

Lord Lytton's reply is quoted below:—

"In the important conversations which took place between Your Highness and myself, at our late meeting at Madhopore, on the subject of the joint interests of the British and Kashmir Governments in securing to Your Highness political control over the frontier territories of Chitral and Yasin, Your Highness, while declaring, in frank and friendly language, your concurrence in the views of the British Government, and your readiness to adopt any measures necessary for the above-mentioned purpose, expressed a wish to be furnished with a written authority for entering upon negotiations with the Rulers of those States.

"In fulfilment of Your Highness's desire, I have now the pleasure to repeat, in writing, what I have already expressed to you in words.

"It is my wish that, at as early a date as may be practicable, Your Highness will endeavour, if possible, by peaceful negotiation, to bring the States of Chitral and Yasin—the Chiefs of which have already sought Your Highness's protection—under your own control and suzerainty.

"In these negotiations I will gladly render, if required, such assistance as may be in my power; and I am further in a position to assure Your Highness that should the Kashmir State be at any time hereafter unavoidably involved in military operations, either for the defence or maintenance of the friendly arrangements which Your Highness is hereby authorised to conclude with the Chiefs of Chitral and Yasin, the British Government will be prepared to afford you countenance and material aid.

"I avail myself of the present opportunity to acknowledge the receipt of Your Highness's friendly letter of the 26th ultimo on the subject of the proposed location of a British officer in Gilgit, and I beg to offer you my cordial thanks for the full and frank expression of Your Highness's views in the matter. You will have learnt from Your Highness's confidential agent, Dewan Jowala Sahai, who presented the above communication to me at Lahore, that I regard the requests contained therein as in every way reasonable and worthy of consideration; I have much pleasure therefore in conveying herewith the assurances desired by Your Highness. The officer stationed at Gilgit will be strictly bound by the most explicit instructions to abstain from all interference in the internal administration or trade of Your Highness's territory, in the affairs of your subjects, or in the conduct of your official servants. His functions will be confined to collecting information regarding the frontier, and the progress of events beyond it, accompanied by such advice to Your Highness and to the British Government as his military experience may enable him to offer in regard thereto, and assisting, should occasion require it, the organisation of any military measures on the border which may have previously received the free assent and full approval of Your Highness. In the performance of all those

'duties he will be instructed to communicate with Your Highness no less freely and confidentially than with the British Government.

"Should he fail to carry out strictly the conditions of his appointment, as set forth in this letter, of which he will be furnished with a copy, he will be at once recalled.

"With reference to the desire very naturally expressed by Your Highness to be consulted in the selection of the officer, I have to state that I will most gladly avail myself of Your Highness's advice and suggestions in a matter which so deeply concerns both Governments.

"I do myself the honour of forwarding herewith, for Your Highness's information, notes of our conversations at Madhopore, and also a record of what passed at my interview with Your Highness's confidential agent at Lahore on the 29th ultimo.

"In conclusion, I beg frankly to re-assure Your Highness that the appointment of a British officer at Gilgit has been proposed by me solely with a view to extend the influence and strengthen the power of Your Highness's Government on the frontier, and in no wise to weaken the authority, or lower the dignity, of your rule, which it is the wish, as well as the interest, of the British Government to support and uphold; nor is the present measure intended to form a precedent for enlarging or altering the arrangements that now exist in respect to the position of the 'Officer on Special Duty' at Srinagar."

Appointment* of Captain Biddulph to the Gilgit Agency.—The Viceroy selected Captain J. Biddulph of the 19th Hussars to be the "Officer on Special Duty at Gilgit." The Maharaja of Kashmir concurred in this choice. With the special sanction of the Secretary of State, Captain Biddulph was admitted into the Bengal Staff Corps, and was excused from a year of probationary service with a Native Regiment.

* Political A., February 1878, Nos. 117—187.

† Foreign Department Notification, No. 2683G., dated 22nd September 1877.

The nature of the appointment.—On the 22nd September 1877, the following instructions‡ were sent to Captain Biddulph about his position and duties at Gilgit:—

‡ Secret, February 1878, No. 1.

"The object of your appointment is fully explained in the accompanying extracts from the Proceedings of the Government of India and correspondence with His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir; but it may be here briefly stated that the duty with which you are primarily charged is to endeavour, with the co-operation of His Highness and His Highness's officials, to collect and furnish reliable intelligence of the progress of events beyond the Kashmir frontier, together with such information as may be obtainable regarding the topography and resources of the localities in your vicinity.

"You will also endeavour, in consultation with the Kashmir authorities, to cultivate friendly relations with the tribes beyond the border in view to bringing them gradually under the control and influence of Kashmir; but you will on no account interfere with the internal administration of the Maharaja's territories or encourage complaint against his Government. In the event, however, of any hostile movement of tribes in the vicinity rendering it necessary for Kashmir troops to cross the frontier, you are authorised to accompany them and assist the Officer Commanding with your advice and experience.

"You may, at your discretion, interdict and prevent British subjects, English or Native, from proceeding beyond the Kashmir frontier whenever you deem such a course desirable in the interests of your personal safety or on grounds of political expediency.

"You will be furnished with an escort of 1 havildar, 1 naik, 12 sepoy, and provided at the expense of Government with a Yarkhand tent and six pals, a medicine chest, and such instruments for survey and observations as the Surveyor General may consider suitable.

"You are further allowed a credit of Rs. 2,000 per annum for ordinary presents and secret service, and authorised to entertain two orderly chuprassies on Rs. 6 (each) per mensem. His Excellency in Council will also be prepared to consider favourably, with the concurrence of the Maharaja, proposals for the construction of a residence and the establishment of a dispensary.

"Subject to the approval of the Secretary of State your salary has been fixed at Rs. 1,500 per mensem, to which is added a local allowance of Rs. 500 per mensem to be expended, at your discretion, in the entertainment of Native visitors and on other matters of a political character without rendering an account.

"The above salary and allowance will commence from the date on which you leave Simla en route for Gilgit. You will further be entitled to travelling allowance at Rs. 5 per diem when marching.

"You will furnish a weekly diary of intelligence and proceedings in the annexed form through Major Henderson, the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, who will be the channel of your communications with the Government of India. The above arrangement does not, however, prohibit your addressing the Foreign Secretary directly on occasions of urgency; but in such case, a copy of any communication you may address directly to the Government should be forwarded to Major Henderson.

"Should a favourable opportunity present itself for your proceeding on a friendly visit to Yasin, Hunza, Nagar, Darel, Tangir, Chilas, Gor, Talicha, Harband, or other similar localities, you are permitted to avail yourself of it without further reference, provided the Kashmir authorities concur and your personal safety is not unduly risked."

Secret, July 1851. Nos. 814-899,
K. W.

Captain Biddulph reached Gilgit at the end of
November 1877.

Progress of negotiations between Kashmir and Chitral.—The Viceroy's *kharita** of the 22nd December 1876 (which has already been quoted) referred to negotiations with Chitral in these words:—

"It is my wish that on as early a date as may be practicable, Your Highness will endeavour, if possible, by peaceful negotiation, to bring the States of Chitral and Yasin, the Chiefs of which have already sought Your Highness's protection, under your own control and suzerainty. In these negotiations I will gladly render, if required, such assistance as may be in my power; and I am further in a position to assure Your Highness that, should the Kashmir State be at any time hereafter unavoidably involved in military operations, either for the defence or maintenance of the friendly arrangements which Your Highness is hereby authorised to conclude with the Chiefs of Chitral and Yasin, the British Government will be prepared to afford you countenance and material aid."

These arrangements were explained † to the Vakils of Chitral and Yasin on the 4th January 1877, and they professed to accept them most cordially. Some time elapsed, however, before anything like a definite arrangement was made. During the spring of 1877 frequent correspondence passed between Jammu and Chitral, and there were some curious features in it. First, it suggested the inference that the Chitral and Yasin Chiefs had really not come to any understanding at all with the Durbar. Then it mentioned Aman-ul-mulk's fear of an attack from Kabul, while it also reported that his daughter was about to be betrothed to the Amir's heir-apparent, Abdulla Jan.

In June 1877, there was a meeting between Aman-ul-mulk's eldest son, Nizam-ul-mulk, Pahlwan Khan of Yasin, and the Governor of Gilgit. The ‡ Secret, July 1877, No. 41. Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir reported § on the 22nd June 1877 that the meeting had been "most satisfactory." Both Nizam-ul-mulk and Pahlwan (the latter of whom had been evincing a tendency to be obstructive) "were profuse in their protestations of obedience to the Maharaja's wishes and of their willingness to enter into any such arrangements as may be desired." After the meeting a Vakil from Aman-ul-mulk arrived at Srinagar with a ¶ letter § from the Maharaja. In this Aman-ul-mulk asked for instructions as to the policy to be pursued towards Kabul, and expressed a hope of getting money and arms (not troops) from the Maharaja. But it was also said :

"I have of my own accord entered into an alliance with, and tendered my allegiance to, you."

And a half promise was made that Nizam-ul-mulk would be deputed to Srinagar.

The Maharaja stated to the Officer on Special Duty that he believed in the sincerity of these professions. His Highness was not || at first convinced of the necessity for a formal engagement with Aman-ul-mulk, but on further consideration he thought ¶ it would be well to draw up one which should require from Aman-ul-mulk an acknowledgment of the suzerainty of Kashmir and bind the Maharaja to pay a subsidy of money, but not to give aid in arms or troops, to the Chief. His Highness then consulted the Viceroy about the terms of such an engagement, and the following reply was sent in a

*kharita*** , dated the 2nd August 1877:—

"I beg to express my satisfaction at the progress of the negotiations thus far, and my best thanks for the trouble Your Highness and Your Highness's officials have taken in the matter, and for the valuable suggestions offered by you.

"With regard to the course to be pursued in reference to the letter of Aman-ul-mulk, I fully concur with Your Highness that it will be well to secure the allegiance of the Chitral Ruler by the promise of a yearly payment of such amount as Your Highness may consider suitable, and that, for the present at any rate, no arms should be supplied to him.

"With regard to the conditions of allegiance, I share Your Highness' opinion that they should be as brief and as little onerous as possible consistently with the main object to be secured; with this view it will suffice, in my opinion, if the document embodying the conditions contain—*first*, an express recognition by the Chitral Chief of Your Highness's suzerainty;

secondly, an agreement for the exchange of representatives; and *thirdly*, an agreement by Your Highness to grant the Chitral Chief such annual subsidy as may be determined, so long as he faithfully carries out the terms of his allegiance.

"No stipulations regarding the grant of free access to travellers, nor engagements regarding trade or duties, need be included therein, but at the same time there should be nothing in the document prohibitory of future arrangements on this subject.

"The engagement, when drawn up, might, as suggested, be sent for the signature of Aman-ul-mulk by the hands of the Vakil now present at Srinagar, and the son of the Chitral Ruler might appropriately be invited to bring the ratified copy in the ensuing spring.

"From the letter of the Chitral Chief and the verbal representations of his messenger, it appears that Aman-ul-mulk desires a reply to two important questions, *vis.*, what course he should pursue, under present circumstances, in view of the threatening attitude of the Ruler of Afghanistan; and in particular, what action he should take in the matter of the proposed betrothal of his daughter to Abdulla Jan, the heir-apparent of the Amir.

"Speaking generally, it appears to me advisable that the Chitral Chief should on no account disavow his allegiance to Your Highness, but at the same time should avoid precipitating a conflict with Sher Ali Khan or the Chiefs who have joined his standard; and I advise this course for two reasons, *first*, because at present the defence of Chitral from aggression is a matter of some difficulty, and *secondly*, because it is not improbable that time may come to his assistance and remove or greatly lessen the difficulties which now beset him.

"For the same reasons it appears desirable that Aman-ul-mulk should, in the matter of the betrothal of his daughter, maintain, if possible, a temporizing policy, but on this, as on the other point, Your Highness's opinion is of a greater value than my own, and I confidently leave the reply to both enquiries to Your Highness's own judgment and discretion.

* * * * *

"In conclusion, I have to suggest to Your Highness that although for the present it appears unnecessary and undesirable to send troops into Chitral, yet, inasmuch as events may happen which may render such proceedings necessary, it may be well for Your Highness to cause a careful examination to be made of the passes leading to Chitral, and full information to be collected as to the character of the roads, the supplies available, and other matters likely to be of use, in the event of military operations in those parts becoming unavoidable."

Secret, November 1877, Nos. 75, 76.

On receipt of this reply the Maharaja drafted a treaty which he forwarded to the Viceroy on the 5th September 1877, and which was "fully approved" of by His Excellency. It contained these words:—

'True translation of an Engagement (made by the Aman-ul-mulk, Ruler of Chitral, with His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir, no date.)

"With the sincerity of purpose and the cordiality of will, I (the Aman-ul-mulk) do hereby execute this deed on my own part and on the part of my children, consisting of the following articles:—

ARTICLE I.

"I engage that I will always sincerely endeavour to obey and execute the orders of His Highness the Maharaja, the Wali of Jammu and Kashmir, that I will overtly and covertly consider His Highness's well-wishers and friends as my friends, and the enemies of his Government as my enemies, that I will present the following "nuzzarana" to His Highness annually as an acknowledgment of his paramount power:—

"Three horses.

"Five hawks.

"Five tezi dogs (hounds).

ARTICLE II.

"One confidential agent of His Highness shall always reside in Kashkar (Chitral), and another at Yasin. Due attention and consideration shall be paid to them.

"In the like manner a confidential agent of mine shall reside at the Maharaja's Darbar, and another on the part of the Ruler of Yasin shall remain at Gilgit for the purpose of carrying out His Highness's orders.

ARTICLE III.

"I shall receive a yearly mawajib (subsidy) of Rs 12,000, Srinagar coinage, from His Highness's Government, on condition of my acting upon the above articles, and giving satisfaction to His Highness in every way.

"If one of my sons be appointed in the place of one of the agents (above mentioned), His Highness's Government will assign him an extra allowance.

	R
To self	10,000
To Sardar Nizam-ul-mulk	2,000

The Chitral Vakil was sent back with this draft and a first instalment of R12,000 (Chilki) of the subsidy about October 1876, but he was delayed on the road.

In January 1878 it was brought* to notice by the Maharaja that Aman-ul-mulk seemed to contemplate an attack on Badakshan, and had asked for the aid of Kashmir troops, a request which His Highness was unwilling to comply with. On this point the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Maharaja as follows :—

“With reference to Aman-ul-mulk’s appeal to Your Highness for troops, I am directed to say that His Excellency the Viceroy is still of the same opinion as when he had the pleasure of writing to Your Highness on the 2nd of August 1877, viz., that under present circumstances it would be unwise to assist the Mir with troops and arms. His Excellency considers that the grant of money provided for in the treaty to be concluded between the Kashmir and Chitral States is all that need be given to Aman-ul-mulk, and His Excellency is further of opinion that the Mir shall on no account be encouraged in any aggressive designs he may entertain either against Badakshan or the Siah-poh Kafirs.”

† Secret, October 1879, No. 316.

Conclusion of the Treaty.—On the 7th January 1879, the Officer on Special Duty forwarded† a copy of “a document said to have been brought to Jammu by Bahadur Khan, confidential agent of Aman-ul-mulk.”

This document (which is quoted in the foot-note*) almost reproduces the treaty drafted by the Kashmir Durbar in 1877. It appears† that the document was never formally executed. Indeed, Aman-ul-mulk did not even sign it. He wrote to the Maharaja on the subject thus :—

“I have perused the draft of the treaty and approve of it. I beg to state briefly that I will never depart from the path of devotion and loyalty to Your Highness and will always act as Your Highness will direct me.”

‡ Secret, July 1881, Nos. 314–399, K. W.

Major Biddulph, in his memorandum‡ of the 31st March 1881, wrote of the treaty as follows :—

“The so-called treaty was in fact only a one-sided engagement on the part of the Chitral Ruler to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with the Maharaja, to whom he promised to render nominal allegiance in return for a yearly subsidy. It was said at the time that the ratified treaty with Aman-ul-mulk’s signature was to be brought to Jammu in 1878 by the Chitral Ruler’s son, but no son of Aman-ul-mulk has yet visited Jammu, nor has the Durbar again alluded to this intention.

* * * * *

‡ Aman-ul-mulk. “On my alluding on one occasion to the treaty he§ has just executed with the Maharaja, he refused to discuss it impatiently, not to say contemptuously, showing that it possessed no importance in his eyes.”

§ Secret, February 1880, Nos. 99 and 100.

Nevertheless Aman-ul-mulk has frequently|| mentioned the treaty and professed fidelity to it.

¶ Secret, January 1880, Nos. 1–59, E. W., page 2.

Perhaps the document is best described by the following unofficial utterance of the time :—

“We want to establish priority of political influence over, and connexion with, all that region, and for the purpose of warning off intruders, the engagement with Kashmir is as good a red flag as any we can set up just yet.”

¶ Translation of a treaty between His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir on one side and Aman-ul-mulk, the Ruler of Chitral, on the other.

Secret, October 1879, Nos. 316–318.

At this time with true intention and good faith this treaty has been executed, with the following articles, on behalf of myself and my descendants :—

Article I.—I agree that I will always sincerely (i.e. from the bottom of my heart) endeavour to be in subordination and obedience to His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. I will inwardly and openly consider the friend of the Maharaja as my own friend, and the enemy of His Highness as my own ill-wisher. In recognition of the superiority and greatness of His said Highness, I will present annually the following articles as azeradna :—

Horses	2
Hawks	2
Hunting Dogs	3

Article II.—A confidential agent of the Sirkar shall always remain in Kashmir and one at Yasin, and one respect and regard will be shown to them. Similarly, an agent on my behalf shall always be present at the Durbar of His Highness and (as Agent) on behalf of the Ruler of Yasin shall remain at Gilgit to carry out orders.

Article III.—On condition of my abiding by the above-cited articles and doing every act in accordance with the pleasure of the Sirkar, I shall receive an annual stipend of R12,000, Sringar currency, from the Sirkar. If, instead of an agent, my son attends the Durbar, he shall receive a separate stipend from the Sirkar.

MAJOR BIDDULPH'S WORK AT GILGIT.

It is difficult to give any condensed account of the Gilgit Agency. Vakils from all the petty Chiefs in the neighbourhood used to come and go, carrying on a brisk exchange of petty presents and unimportant letters. And in a few weeks Major Biddulph found himself surrounded with a net-work of local intrigues the nature of which can be best learnt from summaries of the principal transactions with which the Political Officer was concerned.

The case of Bhai Ganga Singh.—Early in the year 1878, a serious misunderstanding arose between Major Biddulph and Bhai Ganga Singh, the Governor of Gilgit, and his son, Bhai Gurbaksh Singh. Major Biddulph accused them of various charges which cannot be formulated precisely, but of which the general effect was that the Governor had been thwarting him by spreading disquieting rumours, exciting intrigues, and setting the people of Gilgit and the neighbouring Chiefs against him. In short, it was alleged that the Governor had done his best to make Major Biddulph's position intolerable and even personally dangerous.

The evidence upon which these accusations were based did not stand the test of impartial examination; but it was thought desirable to request the Maharaja to enquire into the matter thoroughly, so that the honour and safety of a British officer might be secured. His Highness did not admit the justice of the charges, but he recalled the obnoxious Governor and his son, and the Government were content to accept this solution of a troublesome affair.

Major Biddulph's visit to Yasin and Chitral.—When the Gilgit Agency was established it was said that one of the principal duties of the Political Officer was to endeavour, with the co-operation of the Maharaja of Kashmir and His Highness's officials, to collect reliable intelligence of the progress of events beyond the Kashmir frontier, and to cultivate friendly relations with the tribes, in view to bringing them gradually under the control and influence of Kashmir. Should a favourable opportunity present itself for his visiting Yasin, Hunza, Nagar, or Darel, he was permitted to avail himself of it without further reference, provided the Kashmir authorities concurred, and his personal safety was not unduly risked.

Accordingly, Major Biddulph, early in 1878, communicated to Aman-ul-mulk and Pahlwan Bahadur his wish to visit Chitral and Yasin. Aman-ul-mulk replied in a letter written^{*} about the 1st February 1878. He said that Major Biddulph's wish to visit Chitral was pleasing to him, but asked him to remain at Gilgit till the summer, and then to bring a *parwana* from the Maharaja.

* Enclosure in letter from Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, dated 8th April 1878. (Diary No. 2517.)
Secret, July 1878. Nos. 63—64.

"According to the orders of the Maharaja," he said, "I and Raja Pahlwan Bahadur will send you letters and men. . . . But do not bring many men and things with you, because the warlike collection of the Kabul sepoys is near. There should be no noise or garrulity. You know well the delicacy and thinness of the thread and arrangements that may involve war."

† *Ibid.*

Pahlwan† of Yasin also replied, expressing his pleasure at the proposed visit.

Niamat Khan, the Chitral vakil, who brought Aman-ul-mulk's letter, also gave a verbal message from the Chief, to the effect that an attack on Gilgit had been planned by Hunza, Darel, Panyal, and Yasin during Major Biddulph's visit in 1876, and also in September 1877, but that he (Aman-ul-mulk) had prevented it on both occasions; that Ghazan Khan of Hunza, and Pahlwan Bahadur had arranged to kill Major Biddulph during the visit; and in fact that Pahlwan Bahadur was not to be trusted. The accusations against Pahlwan Major Biddulph did not believe. He said it had long been rumoured that Aman-ul-mulk was seeking an opportunity to oust Pahlwan, as he had ousted his two brothers, and to place his own sons in Yasin. Aman-ul-mulk was known to be intriguing with Dir and Badakshan, and his letter showed that he wished to keep Major Biddulph's visit to Chitral secret, so as to be able to say that he had come as a traveller and not as a representative of the British Government.

On the 17th April another letter* arrived from Aman-ul-mulk, written jointly to the Governor of Gilgit and Major Biddulph. In this letter he spoke of Pahlwan Bahadur in a most friendly manner. He said that no suspicion or distrust should be entertained towards him, that he was his son, and would in no way show hypocrisy towards him. Major Biddulph asked† for instructions whether, in replying to Aman-ul-mulk, he should notice the Chief's deceit in sending a false message, and whether he should take any further steps regarding his visit to Chitral during the summer of 1878. He suggested that, should the visit be thought advisable, some allusion should be made in his reply to the remark about bringing a parwana from the Maharaja, and that the visit should be as public as possible. The Government of India,§ however, considered that Major Biddulph, in answering the letter, should say nothing about the false message; and the question whether he should visit Chitral was left to his own discretion. Before these orders reached Gilgit, Niamat Khan had asked leave to return to Chitral; and Major Biddulph gave him a letter|| for Aman-ul-mulk, in which he remarked upon the discrepancy between the letter and the verbal message about Pahlwan Bahadur. He also asked the Chief why he wished him to bring a parwana from the Maharaja. With regard to the visit, he said he would write again as soon as orders from Government reached him.¶ Major Biddulph was at this time of opinion that his journey to Chitral this year would be a mistake. The whole country, he said, was too unsettled. He looked upon Aman-ul-mulk as "a man of untrustworthy character altogether," and anticipated no political advantage to be gained beyond that of acquiring information. He also thought that no good was to be got out of political relations with Chitral, and that Aman-ul-mulk only intended to keep up a show of allegiance so long as it suited him. In the event of his not going to Chitral, he intended to arrange a trip to Hunza, if Ghazan Khan would give him an open road into the upper part of Kunjut. Failing that, he intended** to try Darel, where he was likely to be well received. He accordingly sent word to Aman-ul-mulk that he had, on account of the famine, deferred the visit to Chitral. He was, nevertheless, still desirous of visiting Yasin, Pahlwan Bahadur having written to him several times about it, and consented to send a hostage.††

Lalla Ram Kishen, the Governor of Gilgit, reported to the Maharaja Major Biddulph's intention to travel towards Darel; and His Highness pointed‡‡ out to Mr. Henvey that that part of the country was unsafe, and that the Gilgit themselves the responsibility involved by the visit. The Maharaja also asked§§ Dewan Gobind Sahai to represent to the Foreign Secretary that no reliance could be placed on the people of Darel, that since Bhai Gunga Singh had left Gilgit, the state of affairs had altered. Mr. Henvey||| reminded the Maharaja that the Government of India attached much importance to the collection of accurate information regarding the frontier tribes, and hoped that the Gilgit officials would manage the affair better than the previous Governor. He at the same time reminded¶¶ Major Biddulph that, under the standing orders of Government, he could not visit Darel unless the Maharaja withdrew his objections. Mr. Henvey's action was approved***; but it was added that the Viceroy understood that if he considered Major Biddulph's visit desirable and not imprudent, the Maharaja would not, without special reasons, withhold the necessary permission. The Durbar was addressed accordingly, and His Highness in reply said that he

* Enclosure in letter from Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, dated 2nd May 1878. (Diary No. 3203-E.)

† Pahlwan Bahadur is nephew of Aman-ul-mulk, and has married one of his daughters.

‡ Letter from Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, dated 2nd May 1878. (Diary No. 3203-E.)

§ Secret, October 1879, Nos. 160—231.

¶ To Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, No. 1124 P., dated 4th June 1878.

|| Secret, October 1879, Nos. 255—266.

||| Enclosure in letter from the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, dated 2nd June 1878. (Diary No. 4017-E.)

¶¶ Enclosure in letter from the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, dated 15th July 1878. (Diary No. 5084.)

§§ Secret, October 1879, Nos. 232-252.

||| He was too unsettled.

¶¶ Failing that, he intended** to try Darel, where he was likely to be well received.

†† He accordingly sent word to Aman-ul-mulk that he had, on account of the famine, deferred the visit to Chitral.

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††† The Durbar was addressed accordingly, and His Highness in reply said that he

** Enclosure in letter from the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, dated 28th June 1878. (Diary No. 4683.)

§ Enclosure in letter from Dewan Gobind Sahai, dated 2nd July 1878. (D. R. No. 1174E.)

|| Enclosure in letter from the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, dated 26th June 1878. (Diary No. 4683.)

¶ Enclosure in letter from the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, dated 28th June 1878. (Diary No. 4683.)

*** To the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, No. 1431P., dated 16th July 1878.

* Enclosure in letter from the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, dated 8th July 1878. (Diary No. 6001-E.)
Secret, October 1879, Nos. 232-252.

that he thought it his duty and experience of the people made him feel. He urged that arrangements should be made, and hostages obtained,

† Enclosure in letter from the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, dated 8th July 1878. (Diary No. 6001-E.)

from him, and take proper Highness was thanked† for this ready compliance.

Major Biddulph, however, abandoned the idea of visiting Darel and re-

‡ Demi-official from Mr. Henvey, dated 30th August 1878. (D. R. No. 1804-E.)

§ Enclosure in letter from the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, dated 2nd September 1878. (Diary No. 6478-E.)
Secret, October 1879, Nos. 267-310.

dealings with these tribes,

|| Enclosure in letter from the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, dated 27th August 1878. (Diary No. 6353-E.)
Secret, October 1879, Nos. 252-254.

that he would allow Kashmir agents to be posted at Chitral and Yasin, and send a Chitral Vakil to the Maharaja's Court. His Highness suggested that Major Biddulph should wait and see these matters carried out; but eventually, in compliance with Mr. Henvey's wishes, instructed¶ the Governor of Gilgit to render every practicable aid in the journey, by providing money or guards, or by detaching any of the local officers whom Major Biddulph might select. The Maharaja also addressed** letters to Aman-ul-mulk and Pahlwan Bahadur, stating that as Major Biddulph was one of the high officers of the British Government, and a friend of the Maharaja, they should in no way hesitate to show respect and regard to him.

¶ Enclosure in letter from the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, dated 2nd September 1878. (Diary No. 6478-E.)
Secret, October 1879, Nos. 267-310.

** Enclosure in letter from the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, dated 19th September 1878. (Diary No. 6942-E.)

of the high officers of the British Government, and a friend of the Maharaja, they should in no way hesitate to show respect and regard to him.

Major Biddulph's report.—Major Biddulph left Gilgit on the 7th October and returned on the 22nd December 1878, having spent nearly all his absence of about two months in journeying to and from Chitral *via* Yasin and Mastuj: in Chitral itself he remained only about a week. He submitted a report†† which is interesting, because it throws light on the character and policy of the Chiefs of Chitral and Yasin. It is well reviewed in the following extracts from Mr. Henvey's letter‡‡ of the 11th January 1879‡‡:—

† Secret, October 1879, No. 300.
(Printed as Appendix 19.)

‡‡ Secret, October 1879, No. 299.

"Major Biddulph believes in the sincerity of Pahlwan Bahadur, while he describes Aman-ul-mulk as 'unscrupulous and deceitful to an uncommon degree.' The reputation of the two Chiefs for truth and fidelity is considered in Kashmir to be on a level. It is probable that they thoroughly understood one another and were acting a common part. Both evidently expected Major Biddulph to produce some new treaty, which should make them dependents of the British Government. Both were alike in contemptuous disregard for existing engagements with Kashmir. Both were in complete accord in their desire to get money in return for empty promises. Pahlwan Bahadur, after feigning reluctance to accompany Major Biddulph to Chitral, proceeded thither in time to join in the discussion with Aman-ul-mulk. After boasting of his independence of Chitral and denouncing the treachery of Aman-ul-mulk, he made himself a party to a joint letter, the object of which is to induce the British Government to subsidise Chitral and Yasin for the purpose of a conditional alliance against Kabul and Russia. Finally, he remained behind in Chitral after Major Biddulph's departure, and though Major Biddulph thinks this was a trick on the part of Aman-ul-mulk to prevent another meeting with Pahlwan in Yasin, it is at least as likely that Pahlwan was detained to concert measures, of which the nature may be inferred from the immediate despatch of a vakil to Kabul.

"The policy of Aman-ul-mulk is clearly perceptible. He is afraid of every one all around, and he is anxious for money. He fears the Maharaja of Kashmir, so far as possible encroachments on the frontier are concerned. He also likes the Maharaja's money; and however slightly he may have spoken of Jammu, his letter shows no want of respect and no desire to cast aside the Maharaja. He fears Kabul, and desires to maintain friendly relations with the Amir unless attacked. But he also fears the Russo-Kabul alliance, and if threatened, he would permit a British agent or two to reside in his territory, but no troops, no doubt, appreciates and admires the example given him by the Amir Sher Ali of the uses to which our liberality might be turned. In other words, he would take money and gifts from every quarter, keep himself perfectly free, give no effectual guarantees, and, as Pahlwan has predicted, neither be our friend, nor the friend of the Amir, but the friend of whichever is the strongest. I have come to the above conclusions, partly from what the Maharaja of Kashmir has told me, partly from Major Biddulph's report of his conversations, and partly from the terms of the letter from Aman-ul-mulk, which I have translated as literally as I could.

"Major Biddulph has not on this occasion recorded his advice and opinions as to the manner in which the overtures of Aman-ul-mulk should be received. From his general views of the man's treacherous disposition I gather that he would agree with me in regarding those overtures as absolutely worthless. He, however, expressed to Aman-ul-mulk a hope that he would be able shortly to give such an answer that Aman-ul-mulk should not repent his coming. And I am surprised to find a suggestion in paragraph 54 of the report that Aman-ul-mulk might be induced to remain true to an engagement, if Pahlwan Bahadur were made a responsible party to it. Pahlwan Bahadur and his uncle are men of precisely the same stamp. The sole way of influencing them is to appeal to their combined fears and interests. If Chitral be menaced from Badakshan, Aman-ul-mulk will, I doubt not, consent to receive not only British officers but strong guards of British troops, who would preserve his fidelity as well as his independence. Such are the guarantees which he would understand, and which we must have, if Chitral is worth keeping on our side. Aid in money and arms might in that case be added.

"On this point I wish to state respectfully my opinion that it would be inadvisable to suggest that the Maharaja of Kashmir should increase his donations to Chitral and Yasin. The expectations of Pahlwan Bahadur seem to tend towards such an increase; but neither the present state of affairs nor the prospect for the future would appear to justify it. The undisguised contempt with which both Aman-ul-mulk and Pahlwan spoke of their relations to the Maharaja, the insolence which suggested the ostentatious slaughter of bullocks in welcoming an officer believed to be in some measure representative of the Hindu Maharaja as well as of the British Government, Aman-ul-mulk's refusal to liberate the Maharaja's subjects whom he detains in slavery, the scarcely concealed audacity with which the same Chieftain maintains and upholds his own subservience to Kabul, are all facts showing clearly enough that the Dogra Government has no real power beyond the borders. Indeed, it can hardly be otherwise, for, in the actual condition of Kashmir, the whole resources of the State seem insufficient to cope with the calamity of famine which has desolated the valley. Garrisons on the line of Astor and Bunji are dependent for their supplies to a considerable extent on the valley of Kashmir. Accordingly, since the famine began, I have heard of projects for diminishing the strength of the garrisons in the neighbourhood of Gilgit. Certainly it would be almost impossible to reinforce them now, and my own experience tells me that the Durbar cannot even manage to supply them with a few rifles and cartridges: such is the depopulation of the country and the consequent want of coolies. The Chiefs of Yaghistan have not been slow to perceive and appreciate the weakness of the Durbar. Hence their attitude. In short, they take the Maharaja's money, but His Highness gets nothing in return, either by way of strength or of reputation.

"The relations of Chitral with Kabul give rise to some grave questions. It has hitherto been understood that the avowed subordination of Aman-ul-mulk to the Maharaja involved the severance of his connection with Afghanistan. The Amir Sher Ali has been warned of Chitral, and Aman-ul-mulk himself is not ignorant of the expectation of the British Government that he would break off his communications with the Amir. Nevertheless, it is perfectly clear that Aman-ul-mulk has not broken off and does not intend to break off those relations, unless it be to his own interest to do so. The project of a marriage with the late Sirdar Abdulla Jan seems to have been renewed in another shape, and vakils come and go with the utmost freedom."

The principal question raised by the report seemed to Mr. Henvey to be the intercourse which was maintained between Chitral and Kabul. He considered that this deflected one of the main objects of the convention between Kashmir and Chitral, and he recommended that Aman-ul-mulk should be warned that his subsidy would be withdrawn if he continued to correspond with the Amir.

Views of the Government of India.—Major Biddulph's report was not

Secret, October 1879, No. 305.

reviewed in detail by the Government, but it was thought to be valuable, and the Kashmir Durbar was thanked for the assistance given in respect of his visit.

As to the relations between Chitral and Kabul the Government were disposed to hold that injunctions laid upon Aman-ul-mulk would probably not be obeyed; and that disobedience would be difficult to detect or punish; while it might not be quite fair to require him to break off all communication with Kabul.

Intercourse of Kashmir and Chitral with Shignan and Wakhan.—

Early in 1877, it was reported that the Chief of Shignan had verbally tendered allegiance to the Maharaja. His Highness asked for advice from the Government, and in reply was informed that it was not expedient that he should encourage or receive such overtures.

In January 1879, the Kashmir Durbar enquired what steps should be taken in the event of Pahlwan of Yasin applying for aid to repel an Afghan incursion from Wakhan. The Government answered that such a contingency seemed improbable, but that the aid should certainly be given if required, and that meanwhile the frontier might be watched.

In May 1881, a letter was received in which the Ruler of Chitral advised the Maharaja to send presents through him to the rulers of Shignan and Wakhan. The Government remarked "it is understood the Kashmir Durbar have no relations with those countries;" and the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir replied that this fact was fully recognised by the Maharaja.

Designs of Chitral and Kashmir upon Badakshan.—

In May* 1879, news reached Gilgit that Mir Baba had established his power in Badakshan, and desired to claim allegiance from Chitral. Major Biddulph warned Aman-ul-mulk against entering into engagements with the Mir. Towards the end of the same year a good deal of correspondence passed between Shahzadā Hassan, then the principal Mir of Badakshan, and Chitral, Gilgit, and Kashmir. The Mir was related to Aman-ul-mulk, and during his contest with his rival Mir Baba, the Ruler of Chitral seemed disposed

to interfere, alleging that his own country might be attacked. Shortly afterwards the Maharaja of Kashmir expressed† a strong desire "to undertake some military expedition, especially towards Badakshan, where he felt confident of success." The Government of India approved‡ of the advice given by the Officer on Special Duty that "Aman-ul-mulk should refrain from active interference in Badakshan, though he should keep up friendly communications

with Shahzadā Hassan, and should obtain and transmit intelligence of passing events and of the state of the country." And Mr. Henvey was instructed to discourage "any project which the Maharaja may seriously entertain of moving troops towards Badakshan." When Shahzadā Hassan failed (early in 1880) to oppose Abdur Rahman's entry into Badakshan, he was driven across the Hindu Kush to take refuge in Gilgit. It was thought that he might be useful, so he was detained there for a while; but about July 1880, he was allowed to cross the frontier again.

It was thought that he might be useful, so he was detained there for a while; but about July 1880, he was allowed to cross the frontier again.

Hunza and Nagar.—Major Biddulph was in constant communication with the Chiefs of these States.

Hunza and the Chinese.—As regards the relations between Hunza and the

Chinese, the Gilgit diaries§ of April and May 1878 show that Ghazan Khan did send letters and the "customary tribute" to Kashgar. Major Biddulph pointed out that Hunza being a dependant of Kashmir could not owe allegiance to the Chinese. To this Ghazan Khan replied that he acknowledged the supremacy of Kashmir only, and that his dealings with China were merely friendly. In June 1880 the Joint-Commissioner at Leh reported that communications still went on between Yarkhand and Hunza. Mr. Henvey remarked that such correspondence might become important in the event of any other power being established in Yarkhand, and he proposed to induce Ghazan Khan to stop the correspond-

Secret, July 1877, Nos. 72—81.

Secret, October 1879, Nos. 330—343.

Secret, May 1881, Nos. 182—186, and July 1881, No. 48.

* Secret, June 1879, Nos. 84—89.

† Secret, January 1880, No. 11.

‡ *Ibid.*, No. 12.

§ *See* Secret, October 1879, No. 330.

Secret, August 1880, Nos. 110—116.

§ Secret, July 1878, Nos. 53—54.

Secret, October 1860, No. 123.

ence. The Government of India did not, however, think it necessary to take any notice of Ghazan Khan's action.

It is noteworthy that this was not the view taken by Lord Lytton's Government in 1879. The correspondence between Hunza and the Chinese was one of the texts upon which

Secret Despatch* No. 40, quoted on p.p. 160 & 161, dated the 28th February 1879, was written.

The Hunza subsidy.—In a letter of the 13th July 1860, Major Biddulph gave the details of the subsidy paid by Kashmir to Hunza as follows:—

† Secret, October 1860, No. 125.

	R
" Mir Ghazan Khan	3,000, old coinage.
" Wazir Fazi Khan	543 "
" Wazir Asadoollah	420 "
" Wazir Dowlat Shah	120 paid in Gilgit.
" Muhammad Nafiz on condition of his visiting Gilgit	1,000 "
TOTAL	<u>5,003</u>

A few weeks later Mr. Henvey mentioned that the Hunza subsidy had been suspended owing to the Chief's unsatisfactory conduct; but it was soon restored.

Secret, October 1860, No. 127.

Nagar.—Major Biddulph's relations with this Chief were limited; mostly to protest against his impertinent style of correspondence. Mr. Henvey was inclined to remonstrate about this to the Kashmir Durbar, but the Government of India thought that the matter was one which Major Biddulph might settle as best he could.

Chaprote.—The transaction which brought the Officer at Gilgit specially into correspondence or conflict with the Chiefs of Hunza and Nagar was the occupation by Kashmir troops of the fort of Chaprote. The main facts of the affair may be summarised thus:—

The fort of Chaprote is situated some 3 miles from the village of Chellat, at a point where the territories of the three States of Kashmir, Hunza, and Nagar meet, and has the reputation of being impregnable. The possession of it gives the holder command of the road from Hunza to Nagar, and of the revenues of the adjacent villages of Chellat and Búdlas. It was formerly in the possession of the Gilgit State, then of the Sikhs, and then of Kashmir, but was taken from the Dogras by the Hunza people, in whose possession it remained till the winter of 1875-76. Then the Chaprote inhabitants, being dissatisfied with the rule of Ghazan Khan, the Mir of Hunza, invited Jafir Khan, Mir of Nagar, to take possession of the place; which he accordingly did. Fearing, however, his inability to hold the place against Hunza, Jafir Khan applied to the Governor of Gilgit for a garrison of Kashmir troops. The expediency of acceding to this request was discussed at the interview between the Viceroy and the Maharaja in November 1876, and His Highness agreed, with the Viceroy's approval, to occupy Chaprote. On arrival at Gilgit in December 1877, Major Biddulph found that the fort was held by 53 sepoy, belonging to the Kashmir Durbar, who, at the request of the Mir of Nagar, had been sent there and placed under the orders of the Fort Commandant, Azar Khan, son of Jafir Khan, Mir of Nagar.

In January 1878 Mir Ghazan Khan of Hunza wrote to Major Biddulph requesting aid in recovering possession of Chaprote. He was, in reply, informed that the Government of India, in consultation with the Maharaja of Kashmir, had determined that Chaprote should in future be permanently garrisoned by Kashmir troops, so that disputes between the Mirs of Hunza and Nagar regarding its possession might be stopped. Thereupon, Ghazan Khan began to intrigue with the States of Yasin and Chilas and Darel, and reports were frequently received of arrange-

Secret, July 1878, No. 62.

ments having been made for a simultaneous attack on Gilgit and Chaprote by Hunza, Yasin, Chilas, and Darel.

A small disturbance occurred in February 1878, when some men, supposed to be emissaries of Hunza, were found at Chaprote inciting the people to rise, kill Azar Khan, and seize the fort. These men were seized and deported to Gilgit, and order was restored, though Azar Khan remained in dread of an attack being made on his fort, which, moreover, he considered to be insufficiently garrisoned. In June 1878, Ghazan Khan, despairing of getting back Chaprote, and reluctant to see it held by Kashmir on behalf of Nagar, made a formal request that it might be taken over entirely by the Maharaja, and at the same time offered to send one of his own sons to Gilgit as a hostage.

Major Biddulph on learning this wrote:—

"The present arrangement is extremely unsatisfactory, as the Maharaja has made himself responsible for Chaprote by it to Jafir Khan, and reaps no corresponding advantage, as he does not hold complete possession of the place, as it was certainly contemplated he should do, when given permission by His Excellency the Viceroy to occupy Chaprote.

"The garrison consists of 50 men of the Maharaja's troops, who are fed by Jafir Khan; but instead of the fort being properly provisioned, a practice is made of doling out 10 days' supplies at a time, so that at any time pressure can be brought to bear to make the men evacuate the fort by withholding provisions. The opportunity now offered by Ghazan Khan's demand should not, I think, be let pass. . . . I most strongly recommend that this should be acted on, as it will give a hold over Hunza, and help to keep Ghazan Khan steady in his allegiance, which is at present very shaky. Jafir Khan will most probably dislike any alteration in present arrangements; but his enmity is as little to be feared as his friendship is to be valued."

Acting on this advice, Mr. Henvey, the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, spoke to the Maharaja on the subject, but found the Durbar averse to doing anything which would seriously offend Nagar. His Highness represented that, so long as the Kashmir famine lasted, it would be exceedingly difficult for him to undertake any warlike operations beyond Gilgit; and he added that Jafir Khan of Nagar had not given such cause of offence as would justify the expulsion of his people from Chaprote. Mr. Henvey was of opinion that the position at Chaprote was a matter—

"which would probably be better managed by the Durbar than through the intervention of the British Agent at Gilgit, and which would certainly not tend to a happy issue if pushed by us contrary to the wishes and policy of His Highness's Government."

At the same time, it appeared that the Governor of Gilgit, acting under the orders of the Kashmir Durbar, had informed Jafir Khan of Nagar that the Maharaja desired to increase the strength of the Chaprote garrison from 50 to 100 sepoy. But Jafir Khan had replied that he had no apprehension for the safety of Chaprote, and was therefore averse to an increase being made in the garrison. He urged scarcity of provisions as an additional reason for refusing to receive the increased garrison.

Nothing further was heard till about May 1879, when Major Biddulph, taking offence at the tone of Jafir Khan's letters, requested the Governor of Gilgit to stop Jafir Khan's pay and expel his people from Chaprote. Thereupon the Maharaja referred to the Government of India for advice, and pointed out that in case of complications, it would be impossible to send reinforcements to Gilgit from Kashmir; that no provisions were obtainable in Nagar; that hostilities might be prolonged; and further, that the attitude of the several frontier Chiefs was doubtful. Mr. Henvey reported that Jafir Khan had undoubtedly misbehaved both to Major Biddulph and to the Maharaja. The Government of India arrived at the conclusion that the Kashmir Durbar could not be pressed to take steps which the Maharaja considered inexpedient; and Mr. Henvey was accordingly informed in August 1879 that,—

"while agreeing that the Khan's behaviour may be open to censure, and may even be deserving of punishment, the Government of India cannot, under the circumstances, press upon the Kashmir Government a measure which His Highness considers, for the reasons which are set out in your letter, and upon grounds which must be admitted to be not without weight, to be at present inadvisable and not opportune.

"I am accordingly to request that you will communicate this decision to Major Biddulph, and that you will, at the same time, desire that officer to keep you fully informed as regards any hostile demonstration that may be threatened by the neighbouring Chiefs against Chaprote."

Shortly afterwards Major Biddulph ceased to hold any correspondence with Jafir Khan, beyond simply acknowledging letters, as the Mir's insolence continued undiminished. Friendly communications were, however, maintained with the Mir of Hunza.

Matters were in this position when, in August 1879, it was reported that Jafir Khan of Nagar had suddenly abdicated in favour of his son Muhammad Khan. Muhammad Khan was nephew of Ghazan Khan of Hunza, who had married Jafir Khan's sister; he was also son-in-law to Ghazan Khan, having married his daughter. It is not certain what reasons Jafir Khan had for abdicating; but apparently Muhammad Khan, who had long been discontented, had, at the instigation of his uncle, made an attempt on his father's life. Muhammad Khan was not formally recognised by the Kashmir Durbar as successor to his father.

In the meantime Major Biddulph wrote again about Chaprote answering the objections of the Maharaja to its occupation. He considered that Chellat, which commands Chaprote, was the real key of the country, and that it could be held easily by 50 men. He did not think that the Nagar Chief would offer serious opposition, nor that there would be any great difficulty about food. He further reported that Azar Khan, the Commandant of Chaprote, who was a younger brother of Muhammad Khan of Nagar, and had also married a daughter of Ghazan Khan of Hunza, had promised, in the event of a rupture, to sever all connection with Nagar, and to throw in his lot with Kashmir. Indeed, Azar Khan was obliged to look to Gilgit and Kashmir for protection, for his occupation of Chaprote was unpalatable both to his brother Muhammad Khan and to his uncle Ghazan Khan.

The Government of India, in their letter No. 40A., 1879, replied to Mr. Henvey, that when Major Biddulph and the Hunza and Nagar Vakils arrived at Jammu, the opportunity might be taken to explain the case again to the Maharaja; but if after hearing all Major Biddulph had to say, His Highness should still prefer that the situation in Chaprote should remain unchanged, the Government of India was willing to leave the decision to His Highness.

In February 1880, Muhammad Khan of Nagar, acting on the advice of the Chief of Hunza, wrote to Azar Khan at Chaprote, stating that Nagar was a small country, and that the supply of grain to the garrison of Chaprote was a heavy burden, which could be borne no longer, and begging him to send away all, or nearly all, the Kashmir soldiers. Azar Khan replied that he could not dismiss any part of the garrison, and then referred for orders to the Governor of Gilgit, who sent him grain, and directed him not to trouble the Nagar people, as arrangements could be made to supply Chaprote from Gilgit.

In April 1880, as the road between Chaprote and Nagar was in a dangerous state, the Durbar determined to repair it. On hearing that a good road was being made, Muhammad Khan was displeased, and evidently regarded the improvements with the greatest suspicion.

In May 1880 Major Biddulph wrote to Dewan Anant Ram expressing his opinion, for the information of the Maharaja, that the position of the Chaprote garrison was precarious; that formerly mutual jealousy had prevented the Chiefs of Hunza and Nagar from combining to attack the fort, but that now a close friendship existed between these two Chiefs (through Muhammad Khan), and some overt act of hostility might be expected at any time. Major Biddulph considered that the strength of the garrison should be increased, and that a three months' supply of food should always be kept in hand. Just then a fugitive from Hunza took refuge in Chaprote. A Hunza Wakil demanded his surrender. Azar Khan refused to give up the refugee, and told the Wakil that he had come as a spy, and sent him away with a message of defiance to Ghazan Khan, challenging him to attempt an attack on Chaprote. Three weeks later, it was reported that Hunza and Nagar were increasing the strength of their frontier posts, and Azar Khan asked for a reinforcement for Chaprote; and it was generally thought that an attack on Chaprote was imminent. On hearing

of this state of affairs the Government of India, on the 5th June 1880, wrote to the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, and asked what steps the Kashmir Durbar intended taking for the safety of the Chaprote garrison. In reply, Mr. Hevey forwarded a copy of a letter, dated 12th June 1880, addressed to him by the Maharaja to the following effect:—

"I hasten, in the meantime, to inform you in a few words, that, from the papers received from Gilgit, an attack upon Chaprote seems to me probable. From these papers it appears that of the several causes which may have combined to make an attack probable, the most important are the repairing of the road to Chaprote, and the arrival at Gilgit of General Hoshiam, who has gone simply to inspect my force there. These circumstances have aroused suspicion in the minds of Muhammad Khan and Ghazan Khan, and therefore it is likely that on increasing the garrison in Chaprote, and stationing a force in Chellat, the suspicion may gain strength, and may lead those Rajas to carry into effect what they have been contemplating secretly. Under these considerations, I am of opinion that all means should be taken to secure the position of Chellat in a manner that may not lead to open hostilities. It is clear that if only two or three hundred men be sent there, they, if left unaided, cannot be expected to fight successfully against two thousand or more men of the enemy, and it would therefore be necessary to send reinforcements from Gilgit in the event of an attack by the enemy. As the safety of the garrison in Chaprote would thus depend entirely on the timely arrival of reinforcements from Gilgit, and as Major Biddulph is fully aware of the strength of my force in that place and at Hasora, I have left all arrangements about strengthening Chaprote and Chellat to be shaped according to the opinion of Major Biddulph, who, on his arrival at Gilgit, will be able to form a correct idea of the recent events, and I shall, on being informed of his views on the subject, take such steps as will appear to me advisable under the circumstances. In short, I am of opinion that steps should be taken so as to prevent the breaking out of hostilities."

Major Biddulph wrote in a letter, dated the 4th June 1880, to Dewan Anant Ram:—

"In consultation with Lala Ram Kishen* I propose to strengthen the garrison of Chaprote sufficiently to enable them to defend themselves against any attack from Hunza. No corresponding increase, however, in the garrison of Gilgit will be necessary.

* Governor of Gilgit.

"With regard to your allusions to the people of Chellat. I think you have misunderstood my proposal. Chellat is already part of the Chaprote district, and it is as a more efficient substitute for the protection of Chaprote that I wished to see a garrison placed there, and not in addition to the force in Chaprote fort. On the establishment of a proper garrison in Chellat I should advocate the withdrawal of the garrison from Chaprote fort altogether.

"In conclusion, I trust that you will bring to His Highness's notice my opinion for the necessity of observing the following points—

"(1) The grant of a 'sanad' to Azar Khan, confirming him in the Mirship of Chaprote, with an adequate subsidy.

"(2) The withholding firmly all subsidy from Hunza and Nagar until due reparation has been made, and Muhammad Khan's position clearly defined.

"(3) The securing of the good will of Pahlwan Bahadur of Yasin in order to prevent him listening to the overtures that are being made to him by Hunza and Nagar."

On receipt of this letter the Maharaja expressed his anxiety to avoid an open rupture with Hunza and Nagar, as their country, though easy to take, would be difficult and unremunerative to hold; and he stated his intention of retaining the Hunza and Nagar Vakils on some pretext till matters were settled. He consented to recognise Azar Khan as Raja of Chaprote. He was unwilling to interfere with Chellat in any way, as the zamindars were subjects of, and sympathisers with, the Raja of Nagar; but he agreed that steps should be taken to ascertain whether Muhammad Khan, or his father, was really the Ruler of Nagar. Reinforcements appear to have been sent to Chaprote in accordance with

Secret, August 1880, Proceedings, Nos. 117—166.

Major Biddulph's recommendation; for in the month of June 1880 the Maharaja of Kashmir had 250 men at Chaprote, 200 at Sherkilla, and 750 at Gilgit; and as a precautionary measure, some hundreds of the troops then at Srinagar, who were under orders for Gilgit, in the ordinary course of relief, were ordered to proceed to Gilgit at once. General Hoshiaara repaired the fortifications of Chaprote; and soon afterwards Major Biddulph visited the place. A little later it was

Secret, October 1880, Nos. 100—120.

reported that the Maharaja had increased the subsidy of Azar Khan of Chaprote.

Meanwhile disturbing rumours about an attack upon Chaprote continued; and on the whole it is clear that the fort had been a fruitful source of discord down to the latter half of the year 1880.

Tribal rising on the Gilgit frontier.—Towards the end of October 1880,

• Secret, December 1880, Nos. 53—52.
 Secret, December 1880, Nos. 53—
 153 K. W.
 Secret, July 1881, No. 31a.

many reports were received indicating disturbances on the frontier of Gilgit; till on the morning of the 28th October 1880, Pahlwan Bahadur, aided by men from Hunza, seized Gakuch, a fort some 40 miles north-west of Gilgit on the Yasin river. He then overran the whole of the Panyal country and attacked the fort of the Sher (Cher) which is some 2½ miles north-west of Gilgit on the Yasin river. As a precaution 60 men had been despatched from Gilgit on the 27th, and 100 men on the 28th, to reinforce Sher, but both parties failed to reach the place before it was invested, though there was ample time for the first party to have done so. It was impossible to despatch reinforcements earlier, as they did not arrive from Kashmir till the 25th, and the number of men in Gilgit previous to that date was barely sufficient to hold the fort. Reinforcements were also despatched to Chaprote on the 27th.

The garrison in Sher at the time of the attack consisted of 115 Kashmir sepoy, and the people of the place under Rajas Akbar Khan and Ahat Khan assisted in the defence. The fort was then closely invested by Pahlwan. Fears were at first entertained for the safety of Gilgit, as it was not known whether the neighbouring tribes had joined the Chief of Yasin or not. Orders were sent to Astor to hurry up the troops, which should have reached Gilgit in the ordinary course of relief two months before, but with the exception of 40 men brought in on the 2nd November by Senadis Hoshiara, none arrived before the 16th. One Sirdar, who was at Astor on the 3rd November, though repeatedly summoned to bring 150 men with him, whose destination was Gilgit, disregarded the urgency of the order and took 13 days to accomplish a march of 72 miles. The same slackness was shown by the reinforcements arriving from Iskardo. After the return of the detachments which had failed to reach Sher, the garrison in Gilgit consisted of 39 officers, 775 rank and file, and 56 camp followers, who were all reported to be efficient; but it was discovered that 10 per cent. of the whole were sick, and among the rest were a large number of boys, old men, and recruits of two or three months' service only. Some slight compensation was gained by a small proportion of them being armed with Enfield rifles.

On the 3rd November 480 men started to relieve Sher. Major Biddulph and his Medical Officer accompanied them. A number of armed Gilgitis under the Wazir, Gholam Hyder, were sent in advance to seize and hold a difficult passage in the road near Sharot. This was done, but on the arrival of the main force within 4 miles of the place, intelligence was received that the Wazir, with all the small officials, had gone over to the enemy, after murdering Shahid-ul-Oman, of the Khushwaktia family. It was then thought advisable to return at once to secure the fort at Gilgit, which had been dangerously denuded of troops. A retreat was at once ordered, and after a fatiguing march the fort was regained without loss. Enquiry showed that there was reason to expect a general attack from all the tribes round, and it was reported that a Chitral force was on the way to join the enemy.

Under the circumstances Major Biddulph felt it necessary to assume the entire command of the whole force in garrison; and to this the Maharaja's officers cheerfully agreed. The next ten days were employed in strengthening defences, some of which were in a very bad state, taking precautions against possible treachery on the part of the people of the country, distributing the troops to different posts and duties, and getting in supplies, while reinforcements were awaited from Iskardo and Kashmir. Scouting parties of Yasinis, mixed with people of the country who had joined them, were very active on all the roads, and a bridge within 300 yards of the fort was destroyed, as also another bridge at an important point within 5 miles of Gilgit. Saiyads were despatched to the Indus valley tribes to rouse them to a holy war. A letter, written in the name of Pahlwan Bahadur and Wazir Gholam Hyder, addressed to all the Mussulmans of Shinaki, was intercepted near Bunji; in it they were urged to seize Bunji and Ramghat, and so cut off the communication between Gilgit and Kashmir. Intelligence was afterwards received that the people of Chilas, Harban, and the neighbourhood, were preparing to co-operate.

On the 6th November, Major Biddulph despatched Niamat Khan, the

Chitral Vakil residing in Gilgit, with letters to Aman-ul-mulk, calling on him to fulfil his repeated promises of punishing Pahlwan Bahadur for misbehaviour. Two days later the Wazir of Nagar arrived with 50 men to give assurance of Jafir Khan's loyalty, and offer assistance. Meanwhile, the Yasin and Hunza Vakils, who were in Gilgit at the time of the outbreak, were detained in confinement. They were apparently cognisant of the coming attack, and were sent purposely to lull suspicion, trusting to being able to make their escape in the first confusion.

On the 13th November, preparations were made by the Yasin force to assault Sher on the following day, when the loyalty or treacherous intentions of the Gilgitis, who had gained admission to the place, would have been made manifest. In the evening, however, a messenger from Yasin reached Pahlwan Bahadur's camp with the news that a Chitral force under Nizam-ul-mulk had attacked Yasin. This caused Pahlwan to raise the siege and fly back to Yasin without an hour's delay. On the same day an attack was made on Bar, in the Chaprote district, by the people of Hunza, but they were beaten off with the loss of 15 men.

On the 17th November, a messenger arrived with letters from Nizam-ul-mulk, who had taken possession of the whole of Pahlwan Bahadur's territory down to Roshan. The latter's force was said to be enclosed in the space, about 4 miles long, which is guarded by difficult passages at each end, between Roshan and Hupar. Nizam-ul-mulk had a body of several thousand men with him, and was accompanied by his brothers, Murid and Afzul-ul-mulk. By this time Major Biddulph was able to report that all was quiet. He went a few days later to Sher and Gakuch. Pahlwan was then allowed to go to Chitral, and the whole affair subsided, Yasin and Mastuj remaining in possession of Chitral.

The movement threatened at one time to be extremely formidable, not so much because of the strength of the invading force as of its composition. When Pahlwan left Sher he had about 2,000 men, of whom 600 were from Darel, 100 from Hunza, and the rest from Yasin. But besides these, 100 men had come up from Tangir, and the people of Chilas were said to be on the march to join Pahlwan at the time of his flight. Moreover, the invaders found support among the inhabitants of Panyal and Gilgit, while the loyalty of Nagar could scarcely be relied upon in an emergency. Major Biddulph stated* that the Baltis of the Indus valley near Bunji also meditated an outbreak; but a report by Mr. Elias (Joint-Commissioner at Leh), who wrote on the 8th December 1880, after travelling in Baltistan, contradicted this rumour altogether, and expressed much doubt as to both the will and the ability of the petty Rajas and poor inhabitants of this country to join an insurrection under any circumstances.

The Maharaja appears to have displayed zeal in sending reinforcements to Gilgit. He was urged† strongly to do so by the Government of India, and he consented to allow Colonel Tanner and Dr. Duke to accompany his troops from Kashmir.

When the disturbances had subsided Major Biddulph recommended punitive expeditions against Hunza and Darel, and various plans for the partition of Yasin. But the Government of India directed‡ him to come to head-quarters as soon as possible, making over charge to Colonel Tanner; and it was said‡ that—

“Major Biddulph should receive very clear and definite injunctions against taking or encouraging during the winter any steps likely to involve him, directly or indirectly, in fresh complications upon the Gilgit border.”

* Gilgit Diary, No. 132.

† Secret, December 1880, Nos. 28, 94, and 128.

‡ *Ibid.*, No. 146.

§ Secret, July 1881, No. 313.

¶ It soon became clear that the Maharaja was opposed to a punitive expedition, and the Government had no desire to urge him to undertake one against his own judgment and inclination.

¶ Secret, July 1881, Nos. 336, 337, and 340.

The causes which led to the rising.—Rightly or wrongly, both Mr. Henvey and Major Biddulph were of opinion that this rising was not a mere local outbreak, but that it was a plot concocted by the Kashmir Durbar and the

Ruler of Chitral for the disgrace of the British officer at Gilgit through the ruin of his protégé Pahlwan Khan of Yasin. The political situation on the frontier is reviewed in the two memoranda which are reproduced below:—

Mr. Hanvey's memorandum, dated the 16th December 1880—"The hostile proceedings of Pahlwan Bahadur and the late attack upon Gilgit are events which had been too often foretold to be believed in until they occurred.

"2. As Major Henderson remarked, in his confidential letter of 6th April 1878, rumours of disturbances were current every winter: and Major Biddulph had hardly taken up his appointment at Gilgit in 1877-78, when it was said* that Hunza, Yasin, Chilas, and Darel, under the guidance of Ghazan Khan of Hunza, were menacing Gilgit.

"3. The excitement was aggravated, if not caused, by road-making in the direction of the frontier post of Chaprote, which had been recently occupied by a small body of Kashmir troops. One object of this arrangement was to stop quarrelling between Hunza and Nagar, who had rival claims to the place, but there has been no more fruitful source of dispute and danger within the last three years than Chaprote; and it was on the pretext† that the road-making thither was preliminary to the conquest of Hunza that Ghazan Khan endeavoured to arrange the combination of 1878.

"4. Major Biddulph, however, thought that these stories were got up by Bhai Gunga Singh, Governor of Gilgit, in collusion with Aman-ul-mulk of Chitral, with the hope of frightening our officer away; and his views so far prevailed that Bhai Gunga Singh and his son, Gurbuksh Singh, were disgraced. Major Biddulph was probably right in regard to the object with which so much publicity had been given to disquieting tales; but he was too incredulous in other respects, as the sequel has shown. It is at least very remarkable that Pahlwan Bahadur, Ghazan Khan of Hunza, the Darelis, Panyalis, and their Gilgiti sympathisers, against whom Aman-ul-mulk cautioned‡ Major Biddulph in 1878, through Niamat Khan, are the conspirators of the present day, while Jafr Khan of Nagar and Rajas Akbar Khan and Atiat Khan of Panyal, whom Aman-ul-mulk praised, have vindicated his opinion of their fidelity. In fact, Aman-ul-mulk's warning, which Major Biddulph then contemned, has now been verified to the letter.

§ Diary No. 63 of 5th—12th March 1879.

¶ Diary No. 54 of 13th—20th March 1879.

|| Diary No. 55 of 21st—27th March 1879.

||| Diary No. 68 of 23rd June—1st July 1878.

|||| Diary No. 57 of 3rd—9th April 1879.

||||| Diary No. 68 of 23rd June—1st July 1879.

"6. In November 1879 news came** from Panyal that Pahlwan was collecting forces to invade Panyal; and Aman-ul-mulk renewed†† his warnings, adding: 'If Pahlwan Bahadur attempts to do any mischief in your territories, and if the people in your country show a disposition to lean towards him, I ask you to let me know in

order that I may punish him.'

"7. Pahlwan Bahadur at

||| Diary No. 67 of 21st—23rd November 1879.

|||| Diary No. 68 of 29th November—6th December 1879.

laken refuge in Gilgit territory

||| Diary No. 80 of 6th—13th December 1878.

"8. Early in 1880, there

¶¶ Diary No. 95 of 24th—31st January 1880.

rounded by British and Kashmir

taking defensive measures, and indicated the growing friendship of Chitral and Kashmir as a

ground for apprehension.

"9. During the winter of 1879-80 Major Biddulph went to India. His return to Gilgit

in the spring of 1880 was followed by measures taken, on the part of Kashmir, to reinforce

Chaprote, and by a re-kindling of local*** excitement, to

which fresh road-making between Nomal and Chellat, &c., in

the direction of Chaprote, had already contributed. Raja

Azor Khan, son of Jafr Khan of Nagar, and Chief of

Chaprote under Kashmir, openly prepared for war against

"5. In the following year (1879) there were incessant alarms§ of an impending attack on Chaprote, with counter-alarms of an aggressive movement from Gilgit. Jafr Khan of Nagar was said|| to be sending to Chitral and Yasin to incite a rising, while Jafr Khan himself drew¶ attention to the correspondence that was going on between Yasin and Hunza.

this period was, or pretended|| to be, in dread of an attack from both Chitral and Gilgit. He had called in as many men as he could from Kohistan, and had ordered the Dardok pass to be secured, in case he should be forced to fly to Badakshan. He made great efforts§§ to get hold of Pir Sayid Shah, a man of religious influence among the Panyalis, and who had four years previously owing to Pahlwan's menace: and he was negotiating||| a marriage with the family of Sayid Hassan, religious Chief of Darel and Tangir, so as to secure the help of those people.

was a Wakil from Yasin¶¶ at Hunza. Ghazan Khan of Hunza professed anxiety at the prospect of Badakshan becoming a British dependency, and pointed out to Pahlwan Bahadur that Yasin and Hunza were likely to be soon surrounded by British and Kashmir territory. Pahlwan thereupon acquiesced in the necessity of the growing friendship of Chitral and Kashmir as a ground for apprehension.

*** See Diaries—

No. 104 of 1st—7th April 1880.

" 105 of 8th—13th " "

" 106 of 16th—23rd " "

" 107 of 24th—30th " "

" 108 of 1st—7th May "

- * Diary No. 108 of 1st—7th May 1880.
- † Diary No. 110 of 14th—21st May 1880.
- Afist Khan of Panyal announced that Pahlwan had made overtures to him with the view of attacking Gilgit. This report was disbelieved, but probably it was quite true.
- “10. Simultaneously the tribes seemed to be seized with the dread of an attack from Gilgit. Pahlwan and Hunza were in a chronic state of alarm, and the former set to work collecting stores and soliciting aid from Chitral and Tangir. In May 1880, the Hunza Wakil, Fazl Khan, insisted on returning to Hunza, in order that he might disabuse the Hunza and Nagar Chiefs of the notion that Major Biddulph was proceeding to the frontier with several thousand men for aggressive purposes (see my confidential letter No. 193, dated 1st June 1880, and enclosure). The panic extended to Gor and Chilas, and Jafir Khan of Nagar actually proposed that he should join Kashmir in conquering Hunza, though doubtless the proposition was put forth merely as a feeler to ascertain how far the authorities at Gilgit were prepared to go.
- “11. It is important here to mark that Pahlwan Bahadur was believed to have applied to Chitral for aid against Gilgit. It was said that he had an understanding with Glazan Khan of Hunza and Jafir Khan of Nagar that, if the aid of Chitral could be secured, they should attack Gilgit.
- ‡ Diary No. 114 of 15th—22nd June 1880.
- “12. Major Biddulph wrote thereupon—
- “It is known that Pahlwan Bahadur has been preparing ammunition and soliciting aid from his neighbours, but there is good reason to suppose that he had done so in self-defence, through fear of an attack being made on him from Gilgit. Everything tends to show that the recent alarming reports have been set afloat by Hunza and Nagar, in hopes of creating a disturbance, under cover of which an attack might have been made on Chaprote.
- “13. Events have proved unquestionably prevailed, and the manifestation of it in the summer of 1880 is, perhaps, in great measure, attributable to the active steps which Kashmir had adopted in accordance with Major Biddulph's advice, viz., the reinforcement of Chaprote and the deputation of General Hoshiara to the border, upon a tour of inspection, not to mention the road-making at Nomal, which was the occasion of intense anxiety. Major Biddulph himself, despite his prejudices in favor of Pahlwan Bahadur, seems to have been puzzled by the menacing aspect of affairs. On the 29th of June 1880 he wrote:—‘His (Pahlwan's) warlike preparations are justified by fear of being attacked: still the tone of his letters is very cold and quite wanting in their former cordiality. He is, I know, dissatisfied as to his allowance, and is, besides, inclined to be fanatical. Echoes from Kabul may have reached Yasin. Aman-ul-mulk's ignorance as to the truth of reports is of course assumed. Nobody knows better than himself what they are worth.’ (Fide my demi-official letter of 9th July 1880.)
- “14. Aman-ul-mulk evidently knew what was going forward. Hearing that Major Biddulph desired to revisit Chitral, he drew attention to reports that the people of Gilgit, Panyal, and neighbouring States were disposed to give trouble, and he reminded Major Biddulph that Pahlwan was on the road, and ought to be bound down with full security. Secret intelligence of Pahlwan's designs was also received from Mulk Aman in Tangir; and the Chitral news-writer announced that Pahlwan had corresponded with Muhammad Umar of Budakeshan and with Abdur Rahman Khan, in the hope of securing aid in the event of pressure from Gilgit or Chitral.
- “15. Finally, Pahlwan, having vainly tried to recover possession of his sister living in Panyal, and having succeeded at last in drawing away the Pir Saiyad Shah, amused Major Biddulph by a feigned intention of visiting Chitral, and throwing aside the mask, attacked Sher Killa towards the end of October 1880.
- “16. The explanation of Pahlwan's conduct is probably as follows:—It was noticed in the beginning of 1878, that he had changed his tone since Mulk Aman's expulsion from Tangir in 1877. Mulk Aman is his brother, and has claims on Yasin. Soon afterwards he began to intrigue with Hunza, Darel, &c., and to complain of the inadequacy of his subsidy. He paraded his antagonism to Kashmir in the affair of Bhai Gunga Singh and declared his lively pleasure at the Bhai's disgrace, remarking ‘whoever is displeased at the dismissal of Gunga Singh, may God make him more angry!’—a prayer which Major Biddulph considered to be meant for Aman-ul-mulk, but which seems more applicable to the Maharaja.
- “17. What was the state of Pahlwan's mind, when Major Biddulph visited Yasin and Chitral in the autumn of 1878, may be inferred from his conversation.*** He said he owed no allegiance to the Sikhs, and ‘had met with nothing but bad treatment and
- § Diary No. 112 of 1st—8th June 1880.
- || Diary No. 113 and 114 of 9th—22nd June, and enclosure of confidential letter No. 217, dated 13th June 1880.
- ¶ See Diaries—
No. 112 of 1st—8th June 1880.
“ 113 of 9th—14th “ “
“ 114 of 23rd—30th “ “
- ‡ Diary No. 116 of 16th—22nd July 1880.
- § Diary No. 118 of 16th—22nd July 1880.
- || Diary No. 119 of 23rd—31st July 1880.
- ¶¶ Diary No. 127 of 22nd—30th September 1880.
- ‡‡ See Diaries—
No. 128 1st—29th October 1880.
“ 129 30th October to 17th
“ 130 November 1880.
“ 132
- §§ Diary No. 5 of 6th January 1878.
- ¶¶ Diary No. 35 of 1st—8th September 1878.
- *** See Major Biddulph's Report No. 110, dated 22nd December 1878.

had faith from Kashmir he wished to have no further dealings with Kashmir..... felt no inclination to send vakils to Jammu, unless he was put on a better footing than the Mirs of Hunza and Nagar, whereas at present his subsidy is smaller than theirs, pointing out at the same time that *his influence in Darel, Hunza, and Tingir made him worthy of better treatment.* At length he was prevailed upon to send a vakil, but he said that, if nothing came of it in the way of increasing his annual allowance, he would not again send vakils, and would hold no intercourse with Kashmir for the future.

"18. After Major Biddulph's visit, Pahlwan's hopes rose high. He had dreams of being admitted into direct * engagements with the Government of India, or at least of a largely increased subsidy. But these hopes were disappointed.† He bitterly bewailed that his friendship and loyalty were thought no more of than 'the slack performances and crooked proceedings of others'; and he desired ‡ to send his vakils through Major Biddulph to the Empress of India: he said 'that he had not received the slightest honor or reward from the sarkar of Jammu; there is no need to send vakils to Jammu;' § he claimed an allowance equal to that of Aman-ul-mulk, and demanded|| R10,000 instead of R3,000, otherwise he would not send his vakils, or would not let them accept anything; he tried¶ to show that R1,000 given as a special present by the Maharaja was an annual increase; but he was quickly put** right by Dr. Scully, then carrying on the duties at Gilgit for Major Biddulph. In the summer of 1880 he asked†† if an increase of subsidy proportionate to his dignity had been granted; and soon afterwards he had the mortification to learn that, while his requests were, as he thought, ignored, Aman-ul-mulk had been given‡‡ an additional R500, merely for presenting a white hawk to the Maharaja; and shortly before his set of war he despatched§§ an ultimatum to the Governor of Gilgit, saying that he would not send vakils to Jammu, because they did not receive proper treatment, and also because his annual allowance had not been increased in accordance with the promises made to him. Major Biddulph added,—'I believe no promises of an increase of allowances have been made to him.'

"19. Although no such promises were made, still the Durbar had been advised to deal liberally with Pahlwan; and, as reported in my No. 293, dated July 21st, 1880, the Maharaja ordered the Yasin allowance to be increased by R150 yearly. This increase, however, fell far below Pahlwan's estimate of what was due to him; and the revised total of R3,000 was less by R2,000 than the allowance paid to Hunza, which Major Biddulph took as a standard (see correspondence submitted with my confidential letter No. 305, dated July 26th, 1880). The same correspondence shows that the Yasin vakil had complained of the want of consideration which he had experienced at Jammu, and that Dewan Anant Ram promised to bear that matter in mind for the future. Pahlwan's offensive attitude towards the Kashmir Government, his futile attempt to open direct relations with us, and his hostile intentions as regards Gilgit, were of course known to the Durbar, and, being known, could hardly fail to be answered by corresponding treatment of his vakils. The small increase of allowance sanctioned by the Maharaja was enough to give the appearance of readiness to adopt Major Biddulph's recommendations without in the least satisfying Pahlwan.

"20. In short, Pahlwan Bahadur regarded himself as an ill-used man whose services in the affair of Mir Wali, and on other occasions, had been slighted. He only looked for an opportunity to avenge himself: and he fancied that he had found that opportunity in the autumn of 1876, when the British Government was hampered in Afghanistan and the Kashmir Government weakened by the late famine; when Hunza was hostile on account of Chappote; when the Gilgit garrison was in process of relief and more than the usual confusion reigned; and when Aman-ul-mulk had, as can hardly be doubted, promised to co-operate with Yasin, Hunza, Darel, and the ryots of Panyal and Gilgit, who have been alienated by years of oppression. I may here observe that Dewan Anant Ram has stated to me his personal conviction that Aman-ul-mulk misled Pahlwan into his foolish enterprise.

"21. Aman-ul-mulk has indeed played his cards well. He poses as the faithful keeper of treaties and the friend of the British and Kashmir Governments. He has long coveted||| Mastuj for one of his sons: and now by occupying both Mastuj and Yasin, he has attained

the beatitude of those who possess, besides placing the only powers that can disturb him under a deep obligation. His character for treachery was well enough known to Pahlwan, who denounced¶¶ him to Major Biddulph, saying that 'he brought Mir Wali to destruction by sending him four letters in one day with contradictory orders.' His dominant principle has been to prevent*** Kashmir from advancing beyond Panyal, while he claimed suzerainty over the country above Panyal, and Kashmir evinces every disposition to fall in with his projects. It is only necessary in fact to look at the position and the affair, so far as it relates to him, is easily understood. A his reputation suggests, and the policy which has enabled him to demand Yasin from the Maharaja is too complete to have

* Diary No. 62 of 26th February to 6th March 1879.

† Diary No. 72 of 23rd—31st July 1879.

‡ See confidential letter of 22nd August 1879, enclosing Diary No. 73 of 1st—8th August 1879.

§ Diary No. 74 of 8th—14th August 1879.

|| Diary No. 78 of 18th—23rd September 1879.

¶ Diary No. 87 of 21st—29th November 1879.

** Diary No. 90 of 14th—20th December 1879.

†† Diary No. 114 of 16th—22nd June 1880.

‡‡ Diary No. 116 of 1st—8th July 1880.

§§ Diary No. 130 of 17th—23rd October 1880.

||| Diary No. 85 of 4th—12th November 1879.

¶¶ Vide Major Biddulph's Report, No. 110, A, vol. 22nd December 1879.

*** See Major Biddulph's Report, No. 110 of 22nd December 1879, also Diary No. 66 of 27th March—3rd April 1879, and Diary No. 104 of 1st—7th April 1880.

been accidental (*vide* enclosure of my confidential letter dated 14th December 1880). As to whether the scheme had not still deeper foundations, I have submitted my opinions elsewhere: but a reference to my demi-official of 9th July 1880 will show that the existence of profound intrigues has been previously suspected.

"22. The conduct of Ghazan Khan of Hunza is equally intelligible. He has always abhorred* the arrangement at Chaprote, which holds him in check. Chaprote is in the possession of Rajn Azor Khan, who, though related to Ghazan Khan by marriage, is the son of Jafr Khan of Nagar. This circumstance, coupled with the fact that Nagar supplied grain to the garrison, indicated a closer connection of Chaprote with Nagar than with Hunza. Consequently Hunza has never ceased intriguing for the purpose of recovering Chaprote: he has taken every opportunity offered by road-making and the like to stir up strife; and on one occasion† he went so far as to urge that, if Chaprote were not given back to him, Kashmir should take it altogether, so bitterly did he dislike the existing settlement.

Both he and the Rajn of Nagar, Jafr Khan, were offended at the prolonged detention of their vakils at Jammu, and delay in paying the subsidy, according to Major Biddulph's advice, was another cause of ill-feeling (see enclosure of my confidential letter of 4th July 1880). In July 1880, Major Biddulph had to use 'polemical language' to the Hunza wakil, and to demand that Ghazan Khan should send his son to Gilgit (see my demi-official of 30th July 1880).

"23. Just before the outbreak, Ghazan Khan seemed in a better frame of mind, and deputed‡ his son, Muhammad Nazif, to Gilgit: but Major Biddulph unfortunately, as matters have turned out, let Muhammad Nazif go back, and arranged for the payment of the Hunza subsidy. On the whole, it might have been certainly foretold that Ghazan Khan would strike in with a powerful enemy of Kashmir, in the hope of regaining Chaprote and of plundering Gilgit. The Maharaja himself holds that Ghazan Khan's connection with China has also influenced his policy: and it is known that since the re-establishment of the Chinese in Kashgaria, communications have passed between Hunza and Yarkhand. Ghazan Khan's action was not, however, very decided, for he appears to have sent only a small detachment, under command of his Wazir's son, to join the invaders, and, strange to say he did not make a serious raid upon Chaprote.

"24. The main difficulty in the case of Jafr Khan of Nagar is to reconcile his behaviour with Major Biddulph's estimate of his character. Pir, Saiyad Shah stated§ in 1878 that Jafr Khan was the only Yagistani Chief sincerely friendly to the Maharaja. Aman-ul-mulk was of the same|| opinion. Major Biddulph, Jammu Durbar will understand in time that he is one of this country. and by no means the friend that they have been believe.' Similarly, on 15th June 1880, Major Biddulph wrote demi-officially to me—'As for Jafr Khan, the Maharaja should understand that he will be pretends to have . . . He has for years played a double game, and it is time the eyes of the Durbar were open to it.' Yet, notwithstanding constant irritation** on the subject of Jafr Khan's insolent letters to Major Biddulph and the Governor of Gilgit, his retention of Kashmiri blacksmiths, his selling a Bulti into slavery, and his mysterious proceedings in making over the administration of Nagar to his son Muhammad Khan, Jafr Khan has remained true to his salt. The fact is that the Durbar appear to have appreciated the situation, if not Jafr Khan's character, more Khan had, by the Maharaja's order, married†† his daughters into the families of Rajas Akbar Khan and Afat Khan of Panyal: and that, as he himself said,‡‡ he had four relatives, viz., Azor Khan, Kamal Khan, Alidad, and Habbi Khan in the Maharaja's power. The Durbar were also aware that there is an unconquerable jealousy between Hunza and Nagar, whether on account of Chaprote or from other causes, and feeling certain of the Hunza Chief's enmity, they concluded that Nagar would take the opposite side. It is on this assumption that much of the Maharaja's policy proceeds, and no one understands these people better than he does. At any rate, however suspicious we are of His Highness' secret motives, we may rest assured that, when he declares an opinion for or against a Yagistani Chief, he will take good care to order events accordingly.

** See Diaries—
No. 66 of 27th March—3rd April 1879.
" 76 of 23rd—31st August 1879.
" 115 of 23rd—30th June 1880.
" 126 of 14th—21st September, 1880.
" 131 of 24th—29th October 1880.

justly. They knew that Jafr into the families of Rajas Akbar Khan and Afat Khan of Panyal: and that, as he himself said,‡‡ he had four relatives, viz., Azor Khan, Kamal Khan, Alidad, and Habbi Khan in the Maharaja's power. The Durbar were also aware that there is an unconquerable jealousy between Hunza and Nagar, whether on account of Chaprote or from other causes, and feeling certain of the Hunza Chief's enmity, they concluded that Nagar would take the opposite side. It is on this assumption that much of the Maharaja's policy proceeds, and no one understands these people better than he does. At any rate, however suspicious we are of His Highness' secret motives, we may rest assured that, when he declares an opinion for or against a Yagistani Chief, he will take good care to order events accordingly.

†† Diary No. 49 of 3rd—11th February 1879.

‡‡ Diary No. 112 of 1st—8th June 1880.

§§ Diary No. 29 of 7th—16th July 1878.
|| See Major Biddulph's Report, No. 110, dated 22nd December 1878.
¶¶ Panyal cannot do anything without me.' If, therefore, Aman-ul-mulk encouraged the invasion for his own purposes, the Dardis would naturally be among his dupes. Almost immediately before the disturbance there was a quarrel between Gilgit and Darel about tribute, but the dispute was settled ¶¶ on the 28th October 1880.

"25. The participation of the men of Darel was probably due to Pahlwan's personal influence. They were in the combination of 1878, when they pretended§§ to be in fear of an attack from Gilgit. They are also connected with Chitral. As Aman-ul-mulk observed||| in 1878,—'The men of Hunza, Darel, Nagar, and Panyal cannot do anything without me.' If, therefore, Aman-ul-mulk encouraged the invasion for his own purposes, the Dardis would naturally be among his dupes. Almost immediately before the disturbance there was a quarrel between Gilgit and Darel about tribute, but the dispute was settled ¶¶ on the 28th October 1880.

¶¶ Diary No. 130 for 17th—23rd October 1880.

¶¶¶ Diary No. 131 for 24th—29th October 1880.

"26. The foregoing is the best explanation which I can give of a movement that threatened to be extremely formidable. Pahlwan Bahadur, besides his own followers, could dispose of Hunza with a population of 6,000, Darel with 3,000 fighting men, and apparently also Chilas, with 3,000 men capable of bearing arms, for the Chilas are stated to have been on the march at the time of Pahlwan's flight. Darel is tributary to Kashmir, but both it and Chilas are practically independent, since no Kashmir official dares exercise authority in either. That Chilas, though strong in position, can be subdued, is proved by Maharaja Golab Singh's successful campaign of 1851.

"27. The inability of the ordinary garrison at Gilgit to cope with such a confederacy has been demonstrated; and having regard to the disorganisation of Kashmir in the military when reinforced, would be equal to the occasion. His officers are incapable, and his sepoya them are, from old age and sickness, unfit for active service in a mountainous country. There are eighteen hard marches, across two or more formidable passes from Srinagar to Gilgit; and the sole transport consists of impressed coolies, who are neither paid nor well fed, and whose sufferings are consequently pitiable, especially in the cold weather, to the last degree. Everything conspires to impede energetic action or even effective defence.

"28. Sensible of this weakness, the Maharaja leans rather towards diplomacy than to warlike operations. He feels that Aman-ul-mulk is in a strong position, morally and materially. He would rather not see the Chitral power established in Yasin, and this is not to be wondered at seeing that Aman-ul-mulk is said by Major Biddulph* to rule over 200,000 people, exclusive of the Yasin valley. His Highness, however, dares not break with Chitral, and prefers to temporise, leaving Aman-ul-mulk in immediate possession of the ground occupied by his troops, while a general acknowledgment of his past services is to be forwarded through Aman-ul-mulk's men, who lately came to Jammu *via* Peshawur. The Chitral vakils now on their way down through Kashmir will be kept, on one pretext or another, at Jammu, until events develop themselves.

"29. Similarly, with regard to Hunza, Nagar, and Darel. The conduct of Hunza and Darel has afforded a *casus belli*, but His Highness can undertake nothing against them now. When the spring comes, he will set the Chitralis at them if possible, or punish them himself, if his resources permit him to do so. The Nagar Chief has behaved well, and the Maharaja will encourage him, partly by way of reward, and partly in the hope of fomenting the jealousy, which already rages, between him and Hunza. The Maharaja is disposed to believe in Jafr Khan of Nagar; but a complication is introduced by the peculiar status of Jafr Khan's son Muhammad Khan, who is a sort of condutor in the State, and who is by no means so friendly as his father. If Jafr Khan should die (and his life has been threatened by Muhammad Khan), Nagar may at any moment join His Highness's enemies.

"30. The disaffected inhabitants of Panyal are to be disposed of by Ramkissen, the Governor, with Major Biddulph's counsel, but so as to avoid creating a panic.

"31. It is hard to say what else or more can be done at the present juncture, and under actual circumstances. A weak Native State cannot display much vigour at extremities, removed by hundreds of miles from the centre of administrative life, and the temporarily galvanising effect of a British officer's presence upon those extremities, irritates the patient without curing the malady."

Memorandum by Major Biddulph on the present condition of affairs in Gilgit, dated 31st March 1851.—"1. In the spring of 1851 I was despatched by the Government of India to visit Gilgit, and make certain explorations in that neighbourhood in company with Captain Grant. As the fullest confidence was reposed at that time by Government in the good faith and loyalty of the Jammu Durbar, the Maharaja was requested to co-operate. He at once expressed his willingness to do so, and made arrangements for the journey, the expenses of which he insisted

K. W. Secret, July 1851. Nos. 314—399.

on defraying. It has since become known that, while apparently endeavouring to insure the success of the expedition by smoothing all difficulties of travel in Kashmir territory, the Durbar threw obstacles in the way of travel beyond the frontier. On one notable occasion, when an unexpected chance of exploration in Hunza, which would have yielded valuable results, presented itself, pressure was placed on the Mir of Hunza to make him withdraw the offers he had spontaneously made, and he was threatened with the Maharaja's displeasure 'for daring to make friends with the English.' At the same time, when I was in Yasin territory, the Yasin vakil was taunted by the Governor of Gilgit for his master allowing me to travel safely in his country instead of treating me as Mr. Hayward had been treated.

"2. While I was in Gilgit, vakils arrived from Chitral on their way to Jammu. It was represented to me by the Governor that they had been induced to come through some pretence, but in reality to be held as hostages during my journey across the frontier. On their arrival in Jammu it appeared that they had brought an important letter offering the allegiance of Chitral and Yasin to Kashmir. This was represented by the Durbar as being unexpected and spontaneous on the part of the Chitral and Yasin Rulers, who were prompted to it by their fear of the Amir of Kabul, and their desire of protection against him. It is now known that the Durbar official deputed to fetch the vakils from Chitral in the summer

of 1876, took with him a letter, addressed by the Maharaja to the Amir Shere Ali, which was deemed of such importance that Nizam-ul-mulk, the Ruler of Chitral's eldest son, was sent in person with it to Kabul that autumn. It is therefore evident that a far more complete understanding existed at the time between Chitral and Jammu than the Durbar would have the British Government to understand.

"A reference to the Kabul Diary for August 1876 also shows that the friendly relations between Chitral and Jammu were sufficiently close to rouse the Amir's apprehensions. These apprehensions may have been assumed, but it appears more probable that they were real, and that Nizam-ul-mulk's deputation to Kabul two months later was to re-assure the Amir as to the real feelings covertly entertained in Chitral and Jammu.

"3. In November 1876, His Excellency the Viceroy met the Maharaja at Madhopore, and made known to him his wish that Chitral and Yasin should be brought under the control of Kashmir, which the Maharaja expressed his ability and willingness to accomplish by peaceful negotiation. Without making any allusion to the good understanding he already had with the Chitral Chief His Highness begged the Viceroy to favor him 'with a written authority to commence negotiations, in order that it may not be in the power of evil-disposed persons hereafter to accuse him of entering into relations with foreign States for his own ends.'

"As a proof of the confidence reposed in the Maharaja and to enable him to strengthen his Gilgit frontier, he was presented with five thousand rifles and a suitable quantity of ammunition.

"4. The Viceroy then expressed his wish to station a British officer at Gilgit. This proposal was not new to the Indian Government, as it had been first mooted in 1874 by Sir T. D. Forsyth, but to the Maharaja it evidently came unexpectedly. On the following day he signified his consent and cordial co-operation, merely raising difficulties on points of detail. A further present of a mountain battery completely equipped was then made to him. At the Delhi Assemblage, a month later, special honors were conferred on the Maharaja, and in a letter, dated 22nd December 1876, the Viceroy authorised him to proceed as quickly as possible with the negotiations for bringing Chitral and Yasin under allegiance.

"5. During the spring of 1877 frequent correspondence passed between Chitral and Jammu, the only object of which (as far as can be known from the Durbar's communications to the Government of India) seems to have been to make the British Government believe that no previous understanding existed between the two Rulers. The Durbar also laid frequent stress on the fears entertained by Aman-ul-mulk, lest he should be attacked by the Amir at the very time when friendly arrangements were on foot for the betrothal of the daughter of the Chitral Ruler to the Amir's heir-apparent, Abdallah Jan, the first proposals for this alliance having emanated from Chitral.

"6. On the 9th July 1877, a meeting took place on the Panyal frontier between Nizam-ul-mulk, Pahlwan Bahadur, the Mir of Yasin, and the Governor of Gilgit. The ostensible object of the meeting was to re-assure the Chitral and Yasin Rulers as to the extent of the allegiance required of them, and to make them a gift of money. The real object of the meeting was to enable Nizam-ul-mulk to deliver the Amir's answer to the letter he had carried to Kabul in the preceding autumn, in reward for which service he received the sum of Rs.3,000. A brief study of the letter from Aman-ul-mulk to the Maharaja forwarded to Government by the latter on the 8th July, and the letters of the Officer on Special Duty in Srinagar concerning it, will show that the meeting at Tamonashki had nothing to do with the proposed treaty. The reports submitted to Government by the Durbar of the negotiations in progress with Yasin and Chitral, also show that a considerable change took place in the relative plans of the Durbar towards the Rulers of both States about this time, which will be noted further on.

"7. A strong desire was also evident on the Maharaja's part all through 1877 to obtain the sanction of Government to his pushing his influence in Dir, Swat, and Bajaur, to which latter place he proposed sending the Sirdar, Yahyah Khan, who was then residing in Jammu, and who later played a somewhat conspicuous part in Kabul affairs.

"8. In October the Chitral wakil, who had arrived in the beginning of July, was despatched from Srinagar with the proposed treaty for Aman-ul-mulk's acceptance, of which the Durbar was so confident that, without waiting to ascertain whether Aman-ul-mulk's views had undergone any change, a year's subsidy to Chitral was sent in advance, in addition to the money already paid in July. In truth, the understanding between Chitral and Jammu was already completely established, and it is to be noted that, though the Yasin Ruler had shown himself less open to friendly advances from Jammu, and therefore requiring more conciliation, his first subsidy was not paid till the following summer.

"9. The so-called treaty was in fact only a one-sided engagement on the part of the Chitral Ruler to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with the Maharaja, to whom he promised to render nominal allegiance in return for a yearly subsidy. It was said at the time that the ratified treaty with Aman-ul-mulk's signature was to be brought to Jammu in 1877 by the Chitral Ruler's son, but no son of Aman-ul-mulk has yet visited Jammu, nor has the Durbar again alluded to this intention.

"10. Meanwhile, preparations for the coming of the British officer to Gilgit were being made. During the spring and summer of 1877 vague and contradictory reports were made to Government of threatened disturbances on the frontier. Subsequent investigation showed that there had not been the slightest foundation for them. The object of them was to

impression on Government that the Gilgit frontier was dangerous and unsafe for the residence of a British officer. The people of Gilgit were told to expect unendurable oppression from the residence among them of a British officer, and all were warned against offering service to him or speaking to him without permission from the Governor, under pain of punishment. The headmen were enjoined to co-operate in driving him from the place by alarming reports and making things uncomfortable for him.

" 11. An unexpected occurrence, however, caused these plans to miscarry. During the summer of 1877 several hundred Gilgitis went to Kashmir to appeal to the Maharaja against the Governor, and the latter was summoned down to answer the charges made against him, leaving his son, a young and inexperienced man, in charge.

" An unusually early and severe winter prevented the Governor's return before the passes became closed by snow. I arrived in Gilgit at the end of November, and the officiating Governor began to act on the lines laid down for him with more zeal than discretion. My baggage was openly plundered by an official without any attempt being made to enforce reparation or punishment, false reports of an alarming nature were made to me, a report was transmitted to Government that the Governor would not be responsible for my safety, and the assistance of the Chitral Ruler was invoked to add to my apprehensions under guise of a friendly regard for my welfare.

" 12. The Governor and his son were withdrawn by the Durbar at the first representation of this disloyal behaviour, and so complete was the confidence of Government in the Maharaja's good faith that no suspicion was entertained that these proceedings had been instigated from Jammu. The Governor appointed in place of the one removed was a man who had been a short time previously disgraced and temporarily dismissed from the Maharaja's service for mal-practices. Finding that the system of false alarms and intimidation would only arouse suspicion, a different course was pursued.

" 13. In October 1878, I visited Yasin and Chitral, my return to Gilgit being hastened by the outbreak of hostilities with Kabul. My journey was opposed by the Durbar, who have throughout shown the same desire to obstruct direct dealings of the British Government with the Chiefs on the Gilgit frontier that they manifested to our dealings with the Atalik Ghazi in former years. The difference of reception I met with from the two Chiefs was great. Pahlwan Bahadur, the Yasin Chief, told me frankly that he had not wished me to come, but having come, he would spare no trouble to make me welcome. He expressed his desire to have direct relations with the British Government, and to have nothing more to do with the Kashmir Government whom he thoroughly distrusted. It required much pressure on my part to induce him to send his vakils to Jammu for the yearly subsidy, which he evidently cared little about, while he complained of the want of ceremony with which he was treated by the Durbar. Hunting and races were got up for my amusement; I was invited to prolong my stay and travel where I pleased; no importunate demands were made of me, and everything was done to facilitate my journey to Chitral.

" 14. In contrast to this, Aman-ul-mulk, the Ruler of Chitral, while affecting to take credit for inviting me to his country, complained that my coming was calculated to prejudice him in the eyes of his people, a statement for which, I believe, there was no foundation. The presents I gave him were accepted with little courtesy, and hourly importunities were made for money and other presents; constant efforts were made to prejudice me against Pahlwan, and I was subjected to numerous small vexations about supplies. In spite of promises to break off dealings with Kabul a vakil was despatched to the Amir three or four days after I left Chitral, though it was known that hostilities had commenced. On my alluding on one occasion to the treaty he had just executed with the Maharaja, he refused to discuss it impatiently, not to say contemptuously, showing that it possessed no importance in his eyes.

" 15. After my return to Gilgit, Pahlwan adhered steadily to the course of friendship towards the British Government which he had professed to me in Yasin. He took considerable pains to give me early and accurate information of Badakshan affairs, and on one occasion sent me a letter from the son of the Akhund of Swat calling on him to join in a *jehad* against the English.

" 16. Aman-ul-mulk's conduct varied weekly, according to the progress of the war and the false rumours of British reverses that reached Chitral from time to time. Since the death of the Amir Sher Ali his conduct has been more consistent, but he has been, and is always, shifty and unreliable, and he has always shown his displeasure at the good understanding existing between Pahlwan and the British officers in Gilgit.

" 17. In March or April 1880 a sudden change took place in Pahlwan's dealings with Gilgit, which I am unable to account for, unless on the supposition that it was caused by the asylum given to his enemy, Shahzada Hassau, the ex-Mir of Badakshan.

" 18. The system of 'boycotting' is of recent introduction into Ireland, but I can testify that it has been in existence in Gilgit for a longer period. During my residence there everything was done to create discomfort in small matters. The people of the country were abused and frequently punished for rendering small services to myself and followers. Constant difficulties were raised about supplies, quarrels and discontents were fomented among my servants, and were raised about supplies, quarrels and discontents were fomented among my servants, and were raised about supplies, quarrels and discontents were fomented among my servants, and pressure was put upon them in small matters to force them to leave my service. On one occasion my followers clubbed together to induce a small trader to bring from Kashmir supplies not procurable in Gilgit. The goods were seized and sold forcibly at less than cost price, and a heavy fine was inflicted on the trader 'for daring to serve the English.'

" The slightest demonstration of good-will towards the English officers in Gilgit exposed

persons of every degree to violent abuse, threats, and punishment. During the recent disturbances in Gilgit the Governor took advantage of certain orders I had given to try and excite the people against me.

" 19. In more important matters no suggestion made by me from first to last has been attended to. In fact I have generally found it sufficient for a thing to be suggested by me to insure it not being done. So small a matter as the repair of rest-houses on the passes to facilitate winter communication between Kashmir and Gilgit, which I have urged on the Durbar for four years, has not been carried out. In the winter of 1877-78 upwards of a hundred men perished on the Trugbal pass alone, yet the arrangements on the Zozi pass, between Kashmir and Leh, show that the Durbar is aware of what is required to keep open winter communication. The rest-houses on the passes between Kashmir and Gilgit appear to have been purposely allowed to fall to ruins in the last three years. The improved arms given to the Maharaja to strengthen the Gilgit frontier have been withheld and kept for regiments at Jammu. In some cases, regiments in possession of the arms have been deprived of them before being sent to Gilgit. The friendship shown for myself by the Yasin Chief, instead of being a matter of congratulation, excited the Maharaja's barely concealed displeasure. The disturbances that have lately occurred in Gilgit were the result of intrigues, the primary object of which was to accomplish his ruin. With reference to this I would call attention to the following sentence written to the Governor of Gilgit by the Jammu news-writer in Chitral in February last:—

" 'The destruction of Pahlwan was complete on that day, when the parwana of the Maharaja of 5th Phagun 1937 = 14th January 1891, brought by the hand of his servants, was received by him (Aman-ul-mulk).'

" 20. It may be well to relate here a matter which I have not reported to Government. When Pahlwan Bahadur was on his way to Chitral with a few followers after the failure of his attack on Panyal, he was met at Terah by Mian Rahat Shah, the Agent of the Punjab Government residing in Chitral, who upbraided him with his conduct. Pahlwan replied that he had no fear for the consequences as he had a hold on the Jammu Government. He said that he held two letters, one from the former Governor of Gilgit brought by a Jammu vakil, Adjutant Sher Ali, and the other from the present Governor, brought by his own foster-brother, Mazar Hayat, both to the same effect, *viz.*, that great rewards would be given him if he would show himself to be a true friend to the Maharaja, and perform the service which would be told him verbally by the bearer of the letter. The verbal message in each case was the same, *viz.*, that he should by some artifice induce the British officer in Gilgit to visit Yasin and there kill him. Pahlwan then called up Mazar Hayat who was present, and without preparation ordered him to repeat the message he had brought from Gilgit, which he did in the same terms. Pahlwan swore to the truth of his statement on the Koran, and said that he still had possession of the letters.

" 21. It is here worth noting the change of policy pursued by the Durbar towards the Yasin Ruler, from what was at first apparently contemplated. In March 1877, vakils from Chitral and Yasin were dismissed from Jammu. The Yasin vakil took back a present of ₹5,000 to Pahlwan Bahadur; the Chitral vakil took back nothing, pending further negotiations; but Mian Mahassar Shah, the Maharaja's Agent, who visited Chitral about the same time, was instructed to suggest ₹5,000 as a suitable subsidy for Aman-ul-mulk. It is evident that Yasin was treated at this time as independent of Chitral. At the Tammaslki meeting in July, Pahlwan showed himself extremely averse to any close relations with Kashmir, in spite of his previous tender of allegiance, and in spite of the, to him, large sum of money that had been given him. He is also said to have abused the Governor of Gilgit, upbraiding him with faithlessness (*nimuk-harami*). In October, when the engagement with Aman-ul-mulk was drawn up, the Chitral subsidy was fixed at ₹15,000, and no mention was made in it of any subsidy for Pahlwan. (N. B.—All money transactions on the Gilgit frontier are in the old Kashmir coinage, of which ₹15,000 equals ₹12,000 present coinage, or ₹7,500 Calcutta coinage.) Afterwards a subsidy of ₹2,700 was paid to him, but no written agreement was given him, his position as an independent Chief has been steadily ignored, a constant policy of exasperation has been pursued, and he has been treated throughout as a subject of the Ruler of Chitral.

" Taking into consideration the charyness of the Jammu Durbar in parting with money, and contrasting the large subsidy assigned to Aman-ul-mulk with that first suggested, the small subsidy given to the Yasin Ruler with the large sum at first given to him, in addition to presents given at Tammaslki, without any adequate necessity, together with the subsequent policy pursued towards Pahlwan and the anger displayed by him at Tammaslki without apparent cause, it is evident that the Durbar must have entertained some project in the spring of 1877 with regard to Pahlwan, which they were unable to carry out. The inference that suggests itself to me is that a proposal was made to Pahlwan, whose proximity to Gilgit and rough character made him appear the most available instrument to enter into a plot against the British officer shortly expected to arrive in Gilgit, and that on his refusal to expose himself to the fate of his brother Mir Wali, the Durbar threw him over, and found a more willing instrument in Aman-ul-mulk. The first of the two letters mentioned by Pahlwan to Rabat Shah was probably sent in the spring or summer of 1877.

" 22. In further confirmation of this view it is to be noted that in March 1877 the Maharaja forwarded to Government a letter from Aman-ul-mulk, which showed that he was

apparently wavering in his mind as to the tender of allegiance to Jammu which he had made. Yet, at an interview with Major Henderson and myself in October 1877, the Maharaja said, that from the very commencement of the negotiations Aman-ul-Mulk 'had never shown any sign of wavering, but on all occasions had been ready to prove his sincerity.'

"23. The misgovernment and oppression suffered by the people of Gilgit during the last three years exceeds what they had to endure from former Governors. After the result of this had become apparent in the recent disturbances, it would be thought that some relaxation of harshness would be found advisable. During the last three months things have gone from bad to worse, and the system of desultory oppression has changed to one of wholesale plunder. I make no special mention of the torture by which extortion is enforced, because Gilgit is in no way different from other parts of the Maharaja's dominions in this respect. It is the increase of oppression to which I desire to attract attention. In the middle of January last, when wheat-sowing takes place, it came to my knowledge that no wheat-sowing was being done, in most cases for want of seed-corn, in some because the people were intending to emigrate in the spring. Finding that the report was true, I brought the matter to the notice of the Governor, which, after some delay, resulted in the Government stores being opened and seed-corn being sold at exorbitant rates to the people. Several times during last summer the wazirs and mukuddams represented to the Governor that the people would certainly leave the Maharaja's territory and settle elsewhere if the oppression continued. On each occasion they were answered with abuse and told that the people might go anywhere they pleased. In September last the Governor gave out that the Maharaja contemplated abandoning Gilgit altogether. It is my belief that for some time past a purpose has existed of producing an explosion among the people, which was to be represented as the inevitable result of the residence of a British officer. Petitions have been presented to me by the chief men of Panyal and Gilgit declaring the inability of the people to endure any longer the misgovernment to which they are subjected, and appealing to the British Government to interfere in their behalf. A similar representation has been made to me verbally by the Wazir of Astor. I have lived among the people of Gilgit for over three years, and know them well. They are quiet, peaceable, easy to govern, neither turbulent nor fanatical. Their chief defect is want of energy and enterprise.

"24. I have already reported to Government how, during the recent disturbances, the conduct of the ringleader of the disaffected was condoned and screened by the Governor, in spite of the murder of a loyal Raja. I believe the intention of this act was, that having a hold over this man he might be used in future as an instrument for misdeeds. The Governor's greed, however, caused him to overshoot the mark. A promise of a bribe, larger than he was able to pay, was extorted from the Wazir, and when, after his release, having paid all he was able to pay, he was still pressed for further payment, in despair he voluntarily placed himself in my hands.

* * * * *

"33. Yasin and the Yarkhun valley on the Chitral side of the watershed have belonged for many generations to the Khushwakti family, as the rest of the Chitral valley down to the Afghan boundary (Asmar) have belonged to the Kathore family. On the left bank of the Keshgar river the Khushwakti boundary extends to below Barenis, within 20 miles of Chitral. Though descended from a common ancestor and closely connected by intermarriage in every generation, frequent hostilities have occurred between the Rulers of the two countries. The balance of success has generally been, if anything, on the side of the Khushwakti, who have shown the greater amount of warlike skill. No permanent change of boundary has, however, followed such successes, as there seems to be a recognised understanding, which is supported by the people, that no such change should take place. The utmost that has followed on the defeat of any Ruler has been the transfer of his territory to another of the same family. On the whole it may be said that down to recent times the influence of one Ruler or the other has preponderated according to the personal qualities possessed by each for the time being. At no time has tribute been paid by any Ruler of either State to the other. During my visit to Yasin and Chitral in 1878, I took some pains to ascertain the nature of the relations existing between the two Rulers. Pahlwan said:—

"Aman-ul-mulk is my uncle, and I follow his advice in most things. It is true that he is richer and more powerful than me, but I can do as I please, and I owe him no allegiance; Yasin belongs to me and not to him."

"At a private interview I pressed Aman-ul-mulk to say if Yasin owed him allegiance, but he evaded my question, saying, 'Pahlwan is my son and can do nothing without me.' The Yasin wazirs all repudiated the idea of any obedience being due on their part to any member of the Kathore family.

"34. Owing to various causes, of late years the power of Yasin has declined, while that of Chitral has increased. The establishment of the Hindu power in Gilgit, frequent changes of Rulers, and frequent wars entailing serious diminution of population, have all contributed to lower the power of the Khushwakti. On the other hand, increased trade between Badakshan and Peshawar, consequent on the establishment of a settled government in the latter place, has largely increased the dues paid to the Chitral Ruler by merchants passing through; and Chitral produce now finds in the Punjab a market which formerly did not exist. Aman-ul-Mulk, the present Ruler, has also held unchallenged possession of power for 30 years. Though scarcely able to cope with Afghans, the large privileged class in both States forms the most

warlike portion of the population contiguous to the Gilgit frontier. The people are Sunnis, Shiaks, and Manlais, mixed.

" 35. The importance to India of the two States consists in the possession of the passes across the Hindu Kush, leading from the upper Oxus to the Punjab.

" These are—

<p>The Dorab.</p> <p>" Khatiana.</p> <p>" Nukshan.</p> <p>" Agruan.</p> <p>" Kutich.</p>	<p>The Ochili.</p> <p>" Khankon.</p> <p>" Baroghil.</p> <p>" Darkot.</p> <p>" Isbkonan.</p>
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" Two of these, the Dorab and the Baroghil, have been traversed by artillery. There is also an excellent road from Badakshan down the Chitral valley, diverging below Chitral to Jellalabad and Peshawar. The Chitral Rulers have always held close relations with Badakshan, and watch closely all that takes place there, as it is the only quarter from which they fear attack. Aman-ul-mulk is extremely averse to the re-establishment of Afghan rule in Badakshan, and is at present working to place the country under the influence of the Amir of Bokhara.

" 36. Aman-ul-mulk is a man of about 60 years of age, noted for his cunning and treacherous character among a people who are themselves adepts at deceit. Pahlwan Bahadur, when I met him in 1878, confided to me his deep distrust of his uncle, and his constant fear lest he should fall a victim to some deep-laid scheme. His fears were not misplaced. There can be little doubt that the late attack on Gilgit, and its result, as far as Pahlwan is concerned, were the outcome of a preconcerted plan between Chitral and Jammu. The heir-designate, Nizam-ul-mulk, is about 19 years of age. He is apparently not very popular, and has as yet shown little ability. His uterine brother, Afzal-ul-mulk, is said to show considerable promise of ability. The most popular of the sons of Aman-ul-mulk are Shah-i-mulk and Murid. Aman-ul-mulk's death will possibly be followed by a struggle for power between the brothers.

" 37. When I was in Calcutta last winter, 1879-80, the unsatisfactory nature of our dealings with Chitral through the Jammu Durbar was recognised by Government, and I believe it was intended to put them on a different footing. The question of the retention of Jellalabad was in suspense, and it was thought that direct communication with Chitral might be maintained from that place. In March His Excellency the Viceroy, Lord Lytton, told me that he intended to take advantage of his approaching meeting with the Maharaja at Umballa, to make different arrangements from those then existing, and I believe it was proposed to improve the position of the Yasin Ruler. The Umballa interview was, however, postponed, and in view of his shortly expected departure from India, His Excellency decided on leaving the matter in abeyance. As a step towards securing the good-will and adherence of the Yasin Ruler, the sum of Rs. 3,000 was granted to me to give to him. This I intended to have given him on my meeting him in September. The intended journey to Chitral was, however, counter-ordered, and I was only able to send him Rs. 500 through Jemadar Khan Bahadur as a proof of the friendly intentions of the British Government, trusting to be able to arrange for a meeting with him on the frontier later. Affairs, however, took the course that is known to Government.

" 38. Pahlwan is detained under surveillance in Chitral, and his territory has been temporarily partitioned out between three of the Khushwakti. Aman-ul-mulk would probably prefer to hold the whole country down to the Gilgit frontier himself, but local feeling would hardly permit this, nor would he be able to retain it long without external support. He is also inclining in his mind to restore Pahlwan, for whom Nizam-ul-mulk entertains strong personal attachment, but he can scarcely do this without laying himself open to the imputation of unfriendliness to Kashmir. I believe it is to gain support for one or other of these plans that Aman-ul-mulk has lately repeatedly expressed a wish for an early meeting with me. Were Pahlwan to be restored, his late experiences would no doubt make him subservient in future to his uncle's policy.

" 39. For many years Aman-ul-mulk has been the agent for promoting correspondence from Jammu with Kabul and Tashkend. In 1874, he forwarded a letter to Kabul. In 1874 or 1875 he forwarded a letter to Tashkend. In 1876, as above mentioned, he sent his son to Kabul with an important communication. In 1877 he sent a letter to Tashkend. Last year he forwarded to Jammu a letter from Tashkend, and was instructed not to break off communications with Kabul, and two months ago he forwarded a secret letter to some place north of the Oxus which I believe to have been intended for Tashkend. There are probably other instances with which I am unacquainted. It is evident that the relations existing between Jammu and Chitral are very different from what the Durbar desires to be believed.

" 40. Gilgit was first occupied by the Sikhs in 1841 or 1842, and passed with Kashmir to the Dogras in 1846. Though twice expelled, once for a period of eight years, the Jammu Government has retained its position without interruption since 1860. The policy and methods pursued by the Durbar have not changed from what they were 28 years ago, notwithstanding the support given by the British Government for the last three years. Writing of affairs in Gilgit between 1852 and 1860, Pandit Manphul says—

" "The policy pursued by Maharaja Gopal Singh, and his son and successor Maharaja Ranbir Singh after him, to recover and hold Gilgit and protect his frontier in that direction, has been a regular series of complicated political intrigues with foreign neighbouring powers.

Instead of adopting bold decisive measures, which he was too well able to do, to turn out a marauding invader, and strengthen his frontier of Gilgit, in conformance to the repeated wishes and advice of the Resident, or referring this matter, as well as other subsequent issues for adjudication to the British Government as stipulated in articles IV and V of the treaty, the Maharaja, simply posting a regiment at Bunji to guard his frontier in the direction of Gilgit, employed secret agents to sow or revive the seeds of dissension amongst the Chitral and Yaghistan Chiefs, with a view to bring about a combination of circumstances which might involve (Uhr Aman (the Yasin Ruler) into trouble, and promised pecuniary aid to all such as might rise against him.

"41. Of the value of Gilgit in the hands of a tributary power loyal to the Indian Government there can be little doubt. Sir Henry Dunard wrote in 1870—

"I think it a doubtful policy allowing the Chitral Chief to establish himself in the Gilgit valley which the occupation of Yasin virtually amounts to (referring to the expulsion of Mir Wali). As a mere matter of policy, it is more to our interests that the head of the Gilgit valley be in the hands of Kashmir than in the hands of Chitral, for a glance at the map shows the value of a friendly and substantive hold by an adequate force up to the watershed between Gilgit and Chitral valleys; it would be an immense curb on the triangle, or, more strictly speaking, the quadrangle between the Kunar or Chitral rivers, and the Indus."

"But if this advantageous position is to be used merely for disloyal purposes, it becomes a question whether the Maharaja's boundary had not better be brought back to the west side of the Indus, to a more defensible and, to him, less expensive line of frontier.

"42. The present uncertainty as to the future of Badakshan and the internal state of Kashmir necessitate a full consideration of the subject in relation to the whole question of our Kabul policy. The present state of things in Kashmir cannot continue much longer without a crisis of some kind. The residence of a British officer in Gilgit is, however, impossible without the loyal co-operation of the Kashmir Government and can conduce neither to the honour or interests of the British Government. Still more is this the case if the Jammu Durbar pursues a policy not passively, but actively, hostile to us. To merely withdraw the officer would, however, be to encourage the Maharaja to prosecute his intrigues to greater advantage. He has received the benefit of a valuable gift of arms, he has obtained the sanction of Government to his questionable dealings with Chitral, and he will be able to show the Native Princes of India that, following the example of the king of Burma and the Amir of Kabul, he has rid himself of the presence of a British Political Agent. It is also daily becoming more important that Government should have early and correct information of what goes on in Badakshan, Sirikol, Chitral, and Gilgit. The whole question hinges on our future relations with the Jammu Durbar."

Policy of 1861: Withdrawal of the Gilgit Agency.—The events which have been described afforded immediate reasons for examining the position of the British officer at Gilgit. It could no longer be doubted that not even his personal safety could be guaranteed efficiently either by the British Government or by the Maharaja. Mr. Henvey, the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, was entirely opposed to the retention of the Gilgit Agency; and he explained the grounds of his opinion fully in the memoranda, dated the 22nd November 1860 and 30th March 1861, which are quoted below:—

Secret, December 1860, No. 137.

Mr. Henvey's memorandum of the 22nd November 1860.
—"The crisis at Gilgit presents an opportunity for reconsidering our policy in regard to that part of the frontier.

"2. The main objects* at which Government aimed when sending Major Biddulph to Gilgit were probably as follows:—that he should (1) collect news of Central Asian affairs; (2) gain influence over the tribes of the Hindu-Kush; (3) aid Kashmir with advice in political and military affairs.

"3. Now as regards (1). I cannot call to mind a single instance† in which valuable intelligence of passing events has come from Gilgit. This place is on the wrong side of the Hindu-Kush for news: it is on the road to nowhere, and is merely an outpost pushed forward by Kashmir for military purposes.

"4. The extent of Major Biddulph's influence has been shown by late events. His special protégé, Pahlwan Bahadur, headed the attack on Panyal, and the sole loyal adherent of the Maharaja is the Nagar Chief, who insulted Major Biddulph by styling him 'the Emperor of the age,' and whose yearly allowance has been stopped on Major Biddulph's representations. Yet Major Biddulph has visited Yasin and Chitral, and has been for three years in constant communication with the vakils of the frontier tribes, and therefore he has had ample time and means for acquiring knowledge of, and influence over, the people with whom he has to deal.

"5. It is not meant by these remarks to disparage Major Biddulph personally. He is a good soldier, and an earnest and zealous officer. But it is scarcely possible for a man placed as he is, so far from the effective reach of our power and only half-supported, perhaps even opposed, by the Kashmir Durbar, to acquire any real influence across the border.

* *Vide* Secret, No. 2253†, dated 22nd September 1877.—F. II.

† Even the news of Abdul Rahman's intrusion into Badakshan reached Government in the first instance through Afghanistan.—F. II.

" 6. Major Biddulph's function as military adviser forced him, practically, to take the whole command of Gilgit into his hands, and thereby to assume a responsibility which might have led to great embarrassment. Unless checked, we shall, perhaps, hear of his ordering the Kashmir forces to march upon Yasin or Darel, and endless complications may ensue.

" 7. On the other hand, the dangerous position of our officer at Gilgit has been clearly shown. His letters describe the utter rottenness and helplessness of the Kashmir military arrangements. But for the timely demonstration from Chitral in rear of the Yasin force, he must have prepared himself, and in fact did prepare, to stand a siege of some months with the chance of being starved out. A paltry invasion of one thousand raiders forced him to abandon his house and seek humiliating refuge within the fort of Gilgit. He was compelled* to seize

* *vide* his demi-official of 20th October 1880.

and detain the vakils of neighbouring tribes, thereby doing an net which, as the Maharaja of Kashmir himself hinted to me, is unknown among civilised nations. Reinforcements could only be pushed up from Kashmir with the greatest difficulty: and had the winter set in early the troops could not have advanced at all. Again, if there had been anything like a general rising, and the Chilas men had fallen upon Bunji, while Hunza and Nagar attacked Chaprote, the advancing troops would have had enough to do to protect themselves, and Gilgit must have been left to take care of itself.

" 8. All this is the natural consequence of placing an officer among dangerous and fanatical tribes in a remote corner of a mountainous country where the British power cannot reach him and the Kashmir power can barely defend him. The same results are likely to ensue whenever Yasin, Hunza, Nagar, or Chilas chooses to take advantage of Kashmir weakness, or of the winter season, to raise disturbances. If Kashmir wishes to take the offensive, our officer can hardly stay behind in the Gilgit fort, while his accompanying the Dogras beyond the border would hamper Kashmir, bring us into awkward collision with distant tribes, and drag us no one can say how far.

" 9. The conclusion to which these remarks tend is plain enough. It may be objected that to withdraw our man would be a cause of triumph to the Kashmir Durbar, which has probably intrigued for that very purpose. I fully admit this objection, but I do not think it should prevent us from giving up a false and almost intolerable position.

" 10. Any advantage expected from the nominal allegiance of the frontier tribes can be retained by encouraging Kashmir to maintain existing engagements with Chitral and Yasin, Hunza, Nagar, &c. And if the Maharaja be cautioned that we should hold him responsible for giving us timely warning of any attempts from outside to meddle with these tribes, I think he would send us more speedy and accurate news than we now get.

" 11. In considering the above question it should not be forgotten that the passes may be expected to remain closed from December to April."

Secret, July 1881, No. 881.

Mr. Henvey's Memorandum, dated the 30th March 1881.—

"The aspect of affairs at Gilgit has not become more encouraging within the last few months.

" 2. Major Biddulph and Dr. Macartie have quitted the place, and, having been snowed up at Astor for a month, have arrived in Kashmir. Lala Ram Kisben, Governor of Gilgit, has been summoned to Jammu to confer with the Maharaja, and the duties of Governor will be carried on temporarily by General Shankar Singh and Bakshi Mulraj, the former a soldier of moderate capacity, and the latter an intriguer of some experience. Mr. Johnson, His Highness' wazir of Ladakh, has also been sent for, perhaps to be held in reserve in case the Maharaja may find it convenient to propose an English Governor for Gilgit, an arrangement which has been contemplated from time to time. Lieutenant-Colonel Tanner and Dr. Duke remain at Gilgit, and they will probably be left in peace by the mischief-makers of the locality, whether internal or external, for some months at least.

" 3. The political outlook, however, is gloomy. The discontent of the people of Gilgit and Panyal, occasioned by grinding oppression, is gathering fresh strength, and the Maharaja's officers seem incapable of profiting by the lessons of experience. Aman-ul-mulk has gained much power, but he professes to regard himself as having been insufficiently required for his latest services, and it is quite impossible to foretell what turn may be taken by his crafty mind, or what his attitude may be in the event of Badakshan being occupied by a foreign power. Hunza is sulking; Darel is excited; the Chailasis are ready to join in a raid on Gilgit, and a combination of the tribes in favour of forcibly re-establishing Pahlwan Bahadur in Yasin is talked of.

" 4. It does not follow that a crisis is imminent, for the past has shewn that rumours of such movements are more frequent than their occurrence; but certainly fresh disturbances are within measurable distance, and the bare contingency cannot, in the light of recent events, be apprehended without grave anxiety for the safety and honor of the British officers at Gilgit.

" 5. I wish to place on record my conviction that the failure of the Gilgit Agency to accomplish the objects desired by Government is due to the secret opposition and intrigues of the Jammu Durbar. If, therefore, I recommend the withdrawal of the Agency, as in present circumstances I strongly do, my opinion is not intended to convey any censure upon Major Biddulph, whose difficulties have been many and great, and whose success was hopeless from the very outset.

" 6. If, however, it be resolved, as I think it should be, to withdraw the Agency, the most important points remaining for discussion appear to be (1) in what light the determination of the Government should be explained to the Maharaja; and (2) what new measures should be introduced.

"7. The Maharaja would not be surprised to hear that the Government of India had under careful consideration the affairs of the Gilgit border, which have lately occasioned much anxiety to the Viceroy as well as to His Highness.

"8. The objects with which Lord Lytton deputed Major Biddulph to Gilgit are set forth in the enclosure of His Excellency's *kharita*, dated 22nd September 1877. Briefly stated they were, *first*, to obtain information in regard to events beyond the border; and, *second*, to gain influence among the neighbouring tribes.

"9. Owing to circumstances which need not be described, and from causes which are as yet obscure, the objects in view have not been completely obtained; for, although Major Biddulph has used every effort, in concurrence with the local authorities, to sow the seeds of friendship and confidence among the Chiefs and people of Yagistan, it is only a few months ago since many of those people joined together, and, after attacking the frontier posts, threatened to lay siege to the fort of Gilgit itself in which the British officers were compelled to take refuge.

"10. The Maharaja has often expressed much solicitude for the safety of Major Biddulph, and the Government of India has already acknowledged the alacrity with which reinforcements were pushed up from Kashmir in time of need, at the Viceroy's suggestion and request. And yet had it not been for the accidents of disunion among the frontier Chiefs, and of an extraordinarily late winter, the Gilgit Agency would probably have been reduced in November and December last to perilous and humiliating straits.

"11. It appears, therefore, to be unquestionable that, under existing circumstances, with a constantly recurring risk of disturbances, which, in the remote and isolated situation of Gilgit, may at an unfortunate moment assume formidable dimensions, even a moderate degree of security cannot be guaranteed to the British officers in that region; and that excursions beyond the border cannot be undertaken by them without imminent danger, as His Highness himself has often pointed out to the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir.

"12. In short, the British Agency at Gilgit can only be kept up at the expense of embarrassment and dangers quite disproportionate to the good which can now be expected to arise therefrom. And it is neither for the benefit of the Imperial Government, nor for the advantage of the Maharaja, that the Agency should be maintained in such conditions.

"13. For these or like reasons the Maharaja might be plainly told that the Government of India is not satisfied with the position of the officers at Gilgit, and has determined to withdraw them. But though this is unavoidable for the present, the affairs of the Kashmir frontier must still continue to be an object of concern to the Government, and one in respect to which the interests of the Empire will always demand early and accurate information.

"14. His Highness ought, therefore, to be ready to consent, if he is as loyal as he pretends to be, that a native news-writer should reside at Gilgit for the purpose of collecting and forwarding intelligence to Government through the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, who should, moreover, be recognised as the channel of communication between the two Governments upon all points connected with the external borders of the Kashmir State, whether in the direction of Gilgit, or in the direction of Ladakh.

"15. I have not lost sight of the chance that our news-writer might be immediately bought by the Durbar. But I think that, if the Punjab Government kept, as they are now doing, a writer at Chitral, and if his reports were compared with the letters from Gilgit, and with the communications of the Durbar, there would be a fair chance of gaining knowledge, more or less valuable, as to passing events. At any rate the plan might be tried for a time. It would, however, be necessary to instruct the Punjab Government that intelligence received by it or its officers relating to the Kashmir frontier should be invariably sent to the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir.

"16. The proposed change in the functions of the Officer on Special Duty would, of course, be distasteful to the Maharaja, who would doubtless contend that it is opposed to the standing orders which permit the Maharaja to approach the Government of India through his own representative. But if His Highness were given plainly to understand that the change is required by altered circumstances, and that Government is quite resolved to insist upon it, he would submit, after the usual protests and appeals to promises and assurances which he professes to have received in days gone by.

"17. But if Kashmir must be watched and controlled, the Government of India needs for that purpose local information and the advice of some one who is well acquainted with the politics and *personnel* of the Durbar. The Officer on Special Duty can furnish both, provided that he is given the means of collecting intelligence, and that his political functions are duly enlarged.

"18. Lastly, it may be borne in mind that, notwithstanding our present arms to the Maharaja and our encouragement to him to extend his dominions and influence towards the Hindu Kush, the Durbar has always disliked the establishment of our Agency at Gilgit. It will therefore gain by the withdrawal of that Agency. In compensation the Maharaja may fairly be called upon to yield a point elsewhere; and, if disposed to resist, he might be warned that a modification of present arrangements is not only indispensable for our satisfaction, but also essential to his own interests as a safeguard against natural, though, as he would assert, ungrounded, suspicions."

Orders of the Government of India.—The policy to be observed in respect of the Gilgit frontier shortly afterwards formed the subject of discussion with Mr. Harvey in person. The result was that that officer was

authorised to intimate to the Maharaja that the Gilgit Agency would probably be withdrawn before the end of the summer of 1881. On the 18th May 1881, Mr. Henvey reported* the result of a conversation which he had had with His Highness

* Secret, July 1881, No. 382.

on this subject. The Maharaja appeared to consider that the maintenance by his government of order on the Gilgit frontier, and the proper control of the tribes beyond would be a difficult and responsible undertaking, in the performance of which he relied upon the advice and aid of the British Government; and His Highness specially asked for an opinion regarding the settlement of affairs with Chitral. In the meantime Aman-ul-mulk had addressed a

† *Ibid.*, No. 385.

the British Government.

‡ Secret, July 1881, No. 383.

situation in these words :—

"In the first place, with regard to the withdrawal of Colonel Tauner from Gilgit, you have already explained to His Highness' minister that the change of circumstances since 1877 has so far diminished the importance of this post of observation, that it is not thought worth while to maintain an Agency at present at this remote and almost inaccessible station. In repeating this explanation to the Maharaja you will do so in terms reserving full discretion to send back an officer to Gilgit if this should hereafter appear desirable to the Government of India; and you will avoid any expression that might be taken as indicating any indifference on the part of the Government to the state of affairs on that frontier. The relations of the Kashmir Durbar with the States immediately adjoining its northern frontier cannot be otherwise than a matter of permanent concern to the Government of India, which has by treaty a right to arbitrate in cases of dispute or difficulty. Moreover, His Highness the Maharaja, acting under the advice and encouragement of the British Government, has contracted with Chitral (the principal of these States) a definite engagement. It is consequently of manifest importance in the interests, both of the British Government and the Kashmir Durbar, to obtain early and accurate information of the course of events throughout that region. With this object, chiefly, a British officer was placed at Gilgit, and His Excellency in Council now proposes to rely upon the Kashmir Durbar for supplying such information in future. You are requested to lay stress upon this matter in discussing it with His Highness, and to arrange that your office may be regarded as the ordinary channel of these communications between the Durbar and the Government of India.

"In the second place, the affairs of Chitral present, at this moment, various points requiring definite settlement. Aman-ul-mulk is now in full possession of the Yasin and Mastuj territory which he occupied when Pahlwan Bahadur advanced against Gilgit at the end of last year. The Yasin Chief's invasion was entirely frustrated by this movement of Aman-ul-mulk, and Pahlwan Bahadur is himself still under detention in Chitral. For his services on that occasion, Aman-ul-mulk expects, with some reason, a substantial reward. He is reported to be looking for an increase of his treaty subsidy, and to desire that his absolute right to dispose, as he may see fit, of the country which he has seized from the Yasin Chief, may be recognised. In his recent letters to the Maharaja and to the British Government, he also shows anxiety as to his future position in regard to Afghanistan; and with these apprehensions is probably connected his application§ to be admitted into direct political relations with the British Government.

§ From Aman-ul-mulk to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated 27th April 1881.

"To this last-mentioned application the answer, His Excellency in Council observes, is clear. Aman-ul-mulk has, by a formal treaty, approved and recognised by the British Government, given his allegiance to the Kashmir Maharaja; while the British Government is pledged to afford the Kashmir Durbar, if need be, its countenance and aid in maintaining the arrangement thus made. This being the recognised status of Chitral, the Amir of Kabul can have no reason to interfere with this dependency of the Maharaja of Kashmir, whose territories are by treaty under the protection of the British Government. You are therefore empowered to communicate these views of the Government of India as to the position of Chitral to the Chief of that State through his agents; but you should at the same time inform him that the British Government cannot entertain any question of modifying his existing engagements with Kashmir.

"Upon the subjects of the reward to which Aman-ul-mulk may be entitled for his behaviour in relieving Gilgit, and of the future disposition of the Yasin territory now in his possession, His Excellency in Council can form no definite opinion until the whole matter has been discussed by you with the Maharaja.

"The Government of India are as yet imperfectly informed in regard to the political considerations involved in the proposed territorial partition. It is a question upon which the views of the Maharaja will carry much weight, since any material change in the status or possessions of these Chiefships must obviously affect the management of affairs, and possibly the military as well as the political situation, upon that frontier, particularly in respect to

Gilgit itself, where it is very desirable that the position of the Kashmir Government should be secure. It should be understood, however, that as Aman-ul-mulk is considered to have served well of the British Government, it is desirable that he should be given no just cause for complaint that his services have not been properly requited; while Pahlwan Bahadur ought to pay a heavy penalty for his outbreak. On these grounds some arrangement for confirming Aman-ul-mulk in a part of his recent acquisitions seems advisable, and there will be no objection to a substantial increase of the subsidy which he now receives. With regard, however, to this latter point, it could not be expected that the whole of the additional expense should be borne by the Maharaja. You are therefore authorised in settling the amount at which the subsidy is for the future to be fixed, to propose that, while it shall continue to be paid under treaty by the Durbar, such portion of it as may seem to you just shall be re-imbursed annually to Kashmir by the British Government.

"His Excellency the Governor General in Council believes that the foregoing instructions will enable you to come to a clear and confidential understanding with the Maharaja upon the main questions now outstanding for determination. You will perceive that the Government of India feel themselves bound to adhere to the engagements entered into in 1878-77, without receding from any of the obligations then undertaken, but certainly without any intention to enlarge them.

"The withdrawal of the Gilgit Agency attests the confidence reposed in the Maharaja's power to manage the affairs of this frontier in the joint interests of both Governments. But His Excellency in Council is aware that this arrangement will probably necessitate more frequent consultation with the Government of India on the various important points of general policy that may from time to time arise. His Highness has therefore been informed, by a letter from the Viceroy, that you possess the full confidence of your Government; and he has been asked to keep you constantly informed as to the course of events beyond his northern frontier, and to consult you in taking any measures affecting the relations of Kashmir with any of the neighbouring States. You will of course report the result of your conference with the Maharaja and his minister, and you will refer for the consideration and orders of the Government, before final decision, any important question that may arise."

Supplementary to these orders were letters addressed to the Maharaja and to the Ruler of Chitral which are set forth below:—

(a) *Kharita, dated the 16th June 1881, from the Viceroy to the Maharaja.*—"Your Highness has already been acquainted by Mr. Henvey, when he was received by you at Jammu in May, that the retention of a British officer at Gilgit is not, under present circumstances, considered by me to be necessary. I have now the honour to inform Your Highness that Colonel Tanner has been instructed to leave Gilgit, with his office, before the end of this summer.

"Your Highness is aware that the main objects with which the Gilgit Agency was established in 1877, were to strengthen Your Highness's hands in the general administration of your relations beyond that frontier, and to enable the British Government to obtain early and authentic information of the course of events in the adjacent country. I trust that the prosecution of these objects, which are still regarded by the Government of India as important, will be in no way contravened by the removal, at this time, of the Agency. But there are various questions connected with the political situation in that quarter, which await settlement, and the joint interests of the two Governments require that upon these questions Your Highness should be in complete possession of my views. I have therefore directed Mr. Henvey, an officer who possesses my full confidence, to avail himself of Your Highness' presence at Srinagar as an opportunity for submitting all these matters to you in person; in order that by free discussion with Your Highness and your ministers the necessary arrangements may be determined to our mutual satisfaction and advantage.

"The principal question for early disposal relates to the affairs of Chitral, a Chiefship in subordinate alliance with Kashmir. The conduct of Aman-ul-mulk in relieving Gilgit last winter, and his claims and expectations, are well known to Your Highness. I do not desire that any service, rendered by him to the British Government, should pass without recompense; and I trust this will be remembered when the future disposal of Yasin territory now in his possession is considered. But on this subject, as on all other details, I have empowered Mr. Henvey to communicate my views to Your Highness.

"It is well known to me that Your Highness, in undertaking to administer the affairs of your northern frontier in accordance with the engagements entered into in 1876, has undertaken an important task. I shall always be ready to aid Your Highness in its discharge with my countenance and advice, and I trust that, in all questions of importance connected with your external relations, Your Highness will refer to me through my Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir."

(b) *Kharita, dated the 25th June 1881, from the Foreign Secretary to the Ruler of Chitral.*—"Your friendly letter, dated 27th April, forwarded by the hands of your trusted servant, Wafadar Khan, has been received by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India, to whom it is a matter of pleasure that you should have thus freely communicated to him your wishes.

"His Excellency desires me to assure you that services rendered to the British Government are never forgotten, and that in this case all the representations made by you will be very carefully considered. It is desirable, before any final answer can be sent to your letter, that His

Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir should be consulted, and instructions have been sent to the British officer in Srinagar in order that he may ascertain the Maharaja's views. In the meantime Wafadar Khan is sent back to you with these friendly assurances; and he has been desired to inform you in particular, with reference to the letters received by you from Badakshan, that the engagements between your State and Kashmir are recognised and upheld by the British Government, so that you need have no concern with the affairs of Afghanistan. Moreover, the Amir Abdul Rahman of Kabul is a friend of the British Government."

Arrangements effected.—On the 30th June 1881, Mr. Henvey reported the measures taken to carry out these instructions. He had delivered the Viceroy's *kharita* to the Maharaja, and had discussed with the Durbar the affairs of the Gilgit frontier, and especially the future relations between His Highness's Government and Chitral. The three matters requiring attention were—(a), the proper appreciation of the Government policy towards the frontier; (b) a reward for the Ruler of Chitral; (c) the partition of Yasin. And the arrangements made in respect of these questions are concisely stated in the following extracts from Mr. Henvey's letter:—

(a) "It is clearly understood that the Government of India reserves to itself full discretion to send back a British officer to Gilgit, if this should hereafter appear desirable; and meanwhile relies upon the Kashmir Government to supply me with early and accurate information of the course of events throughout the region immediately adjoining the northern border of His Highness's dominions.

(b) "It has now been determined to present Aman-ul-mulk immediately with Rs60,000 *khak* or Srinagar coin (British Rs25,000), and to raise his yearly allowance to Rs1,000

* The *chilki* rupee is worth ten *chilki** rupees, or the double of what he has hitherto received. anna British.—F. H.

The Maharaja would assign portions of the increased subsidy to Aman-ul-mulk's sons, Nizam-ul-mulk and Afzal-ul-mulk, in the same way as Rs2,000 out of the present subsidy of Rs12,000 *chilki* are understood to be for Nizam-ul-mulk.

"The bare mention of the wish of the Government of India to share the increased expense was so exceedingly distasteful to His Highness that I refrained from pressing this proposal.

(c) "As to the partition of Yasin the case appears to stand as follows. Aman-ul-mulk has retained Mastuj in his own hands, thereby gaining a strong defensive position, and one which is said to command an easy road from Badakshan. He has made over the central portion of Yasin known as Ghizr or Shavir to Muhammad Wali, son of the late Mir Wali, who was brother to Pahlwan Bahadur and chiefly notorious for the murder of Mr. Hayward. Yasin itself has been awarded to Mir Aman, brother of the late Gauhar Aman. These two chieftains are of the Khuskwakti family, and not directly related to Aman-ul-mulk, though they must be reckoned as his nominees and dependants. His Highness the Maharaja does not appear to look upon this disposition of the Yasin dominions as in any way open to objection; and he is quite prepared to acknowledge accomplished facts and to recognise the nominees of Aman-ul-mulk, provided that Aman-ul-mulk holds himself responsible for their behaviour, as he is willing to do, and stipulating that Pahlwan Bahadur shall not be restored to any part of the territories which he by his misconduct has justly forfeited. His Highness, however, proposes, for obvious reasons of policy, to pay the Yasin subsidy, not to Aman-ul-mulk himself, but to the actual rulers of the Yasin territories."

The Government of India assented* to these arrangements. It seems that the details of the extra allowances for Aman-ul-mulk and his sons were modified soon afterwards in consultation with Mr. Henvey. The Maharaja announced the new arrangements to Aman-ul-mulk on the 22nd July† 1881, in these words:—

"In truth the service, which you have, from motives* of loyalty, performed, gives further proofs of your devotion and fidelity. There is no doubt that those who are decked with the ornament of sense and prudence are always careful of the consequences of their actions and reap the fruit of their exertions. Therefore I have, with great pleasure, given your agent leave to depart, in order that he may inform you of my approval of your services, as a reward for which I have ordered a grant of Rs50,000 cash (Srinagar old coin) and a 'khillat' of seven pieces of cloth besides to you. Both these presents have been made over to your above-named agent, who, I trust, will deliver them to you. Besides, I have increased your annual allowance as per following detail, so that the loyalty and devotion, which have been imprinted on your mind from the first day, may grow two-fold.

"In consideration of your services I agree to your proposal to divide the Yasin territory, and I also approve of the arrangements made by you in that province. I have no reason to find fault with them. But I only wish that Pahlwan, who deserves punishment for his past misdeeds, should never be reinstated in the government of Yasin. As regards Rs3,000, which was granted to Pahlwan as an allowance for Yasin, it will be assigned by the Governo^{rs}

* Secret, July 1881, No. 392.

† Secret, January 1882, No. 763.

of Gilgit to those who have been appointed rulers in Yasin and Ghizr, conditional on service and obedience, when their agents will present themselves before him (the Governor of Gilgit):—

		R
" Former allowance		15,000
" Increase		15,000
	TOTAL	30,000
<hr/>		
" Detail of present allowance—		
" Aman-ul-mulk		25,000
" Sons of Aman-ul-mulk		2,000
{ Sirdar Nizam-ul-mulk		1,000
{ Shah Malik		1,000
{ Afzul Malik		1,000
{ Murid		1,000
	TOTAL	30,000

Report to the Secretary of State.—Perhaps the best account of the policy

which led to the withdrawal of the Gilgit Agency is to be found in the extracts quoted below from the despatch* to the Secretary of State No. 103, dated the 15th July 1881:—

* Secret, July 1881, No. 393.

"Your Lordship will see that it has been decided to withdraw the Gilgit Agency, and that the Maharaja of Kashmir has been so informed. The reasons for this step are various; but it may be briefly stated that neither the Government of India, nor, apparently, the Maharaja of Kashmir, is at present in a position to answer for the safety of a British officer at Gilgit in the event of a sudden attack upon the place by the independent and unruly tribes of the neighbourhood; while, on the other hand, the expectations formed from the establishment of the Agency have not been fulfilled. Major Biddulph was deputed to Gilgit in 1877 with the object, *first*, of obtaining trustworthy information in regard to occurrences beyond the border; and, *secondly*, of gaining influence among the neighbouring tribes. There can be no doubt that Major Biddulph, who is an active and enterprising officer, has during his residence at Gilgit added much to our knowledge of the country round, and of the tribes inhabiting it; the intelligence which he has from time to time obtained of the course of events in Chitral and Badakshan has not been unimportant, and he was well placed for observing, during our recent occupation of Kabul, the general state and tendency of affairs in the countries bordering on North-East Afghanistan. On the other hand, his position in the remote corner of a foreign State obliged him to deal chiefly with these tribes through the medium, not always trustworthy or favourable, of the local officials. Any attempts to exercise direct influence would have been met by suspicion and jealousy; while he was continually hampered by the double-dealing, intrigues, and feuds of the petty Chiefs over whom he had no real control. The late rising of the Yasin Chief, who had previously been friendly, and whose conduct is still unexplained, shows that the Political Agent had failed, probably through the inevitable difficulties of his situation, to secure any solid or durable influence over the petty chieftains with whom he has had dealings for three years past. Under these circumstances, it appeared to us that the British Agency at Gilgit could only be kept up at the expense of embarrassment and anxieties altogether disproportionate to the advantages which could be expected to result from its maintenance. We therefore decided to withdraw it, and to leave altogether in the hands of the Kashmir Durbar the local management of affairs upon the northern frontiers of the State.

"The communications made to the Kashmir Durbar upon the subject, and the instructions issued to the British officers concerned, will be found among the enclosures to this despatch. The Maharaja has not been given to understand that the withdrawal of the Agency is final. On the contrary, the Government of India has reserved full discretion to send back an officer to Gilgit if this should hereafter seem desirable. His Highness has further been informed that the relations of the Kashmir State with the chieftains adjoining its northern frontier cannot be otherwise than a matter of permanent concern to the British Government; that the Durbar will be expected to supply early and accurate information of the course of events throughout that region; and that the British officer on special duty in Kashmir should be consulted on matters affecting the relations of Kashmir with any of the neighbouring States. But Colonel Tanner, who is now carrying on the duties of the Gilgit Agency, has been directed to march down before the end of the summer, with his office establishment, and to inform the Chiefs and others with whom he has relations that the Agency will not remain during the coming winter. He will avoid all appearance of haste, and will conclude any current business or correspondence; but it is expected that he will have left Gilgit by the end of the present month.

"It will be seen from the correspondence enclosed that Aman-ul-mulk, the ruler of Chitral, by whose action the late invasion of Gilgit territory from Yasin was frustrated, has applied to be admitted into direct political relations with the British Government, and has put in a claim to a substantial reward for his services. His agent has been to Simla, and has presented a letter from his master setting forth certain definite requests. As Aman-ul-mulk has, with the approval of the Government of India, contracted engagements by which he

entered into a condition of subordinate alliance with the Kashmir State, his application to be admitted to direct political relations cannot be entertained. He has, however, been reassured in regard to his expressed apprehensions of encroachment or interference from the direction of Afghanistan, and the Maharaja's attention has been directed to his claims.

"Mr. Henvey's report of the result of his discussion, upon these subjects, with His Highness the Maharaja and his Ministers, has been received, and is inclosed with this despatch. It will be observed that the Maharaja proposes to increase the Chitral subsidy, declining the offer that a share of the expense should be borne by the British Government, and that His Highness also agrees, conditionally, to the partition of the Yasin territories desired by Aman-ul-mulk. We see no reason for demurring to the views of the Maharaja, who is principally interested in these arrangements; and we have instructed Mr. Henvey accordingly."

Views of Her Majesty's Government.—The Secretary of State (Lord Hartington) on the whole approved* of the withdrawal of the Gilgit Agency. But His Lordship made some significant remarks about the possibility of confidence in the Kashmir Durbar proving misplaced. The material parts of the despatch are as follows:—

"The result of the careful consideration which Your Excellency in Council has given to the question, consequent on the attack on Gilgit which was made by Pahlwan Khan of Yasin in the autumn of last year, has led you to the conclusion that the Agency there could only be kept up at the expense of embarrassments and anxieties disproportionate to the advantages that might be excepted from its maintenance. The Officiating Agent has accordingly been directed to withdraw with his establishment before the end of the summer, and the decision to this effect has been communicated to the Maharaja of Kashmir, although in terms which reserve to Government full discretion to send back an officer to Gilgit, should such a measure hereafter appear desirable.

"Under all the circumstances of the case, I approve of the decision at which you have arrived. The appointment of an Agent at Gilgit appears from the first to have been distasteful to the Maharaja of Kashmir, and from whatever cause, has failed to realise the expectations with which it was made in 1877. The position in which Major Biddulph was placed by the outbreak of last year, if not one of serious danger, was certainly humiliating, and only some very clear advantage would justify the permanent retention of an officer in a post so isolated, exposed to such attacks. At the same time it cannot be overlooked that the effect of the withdrawal of the Agent may possibly be practically to close a valuable channel of information as to the course of events in the countries between Kashmir and Russian Turkistan, at a moment when such information is likely to be of particular interest, as well as to diminish in some degree your knowledge of the intrigues to which that part of the frontier is specially exposed. How far this result may follow must, to a very great extent, depend upon the good faith of the Maharaja of Kashmir, in which Your Excellency in Council is no doubt justified in confiding. In the event, which I should be sorry to anticipate, of that confidence proving to be misplaced, and of the Maharaja failing to keep you fully informed of what is passing on his borders and those of his feudatory, the Mir of Chitral, it might be necessary to reconsider the expediency of deputing an officer to Gilgit, at all events, during the summer months.

"As regards the relations between the Maharaja of Kashmir and the Chiefs of Chitral, I approve of the orders which you have issued. It is desirable that the dependence of Aman-ul-mulk on His Highness, which has been recognised by treaty, between the two Rulers, should be maintained and confirmed, especially as the result of recent events has been to place the Chief of Chitral in possession of Yasin, which is on the Gilgit side of the watershed."

The Gilgit Agency was closed† in July 1881.

† Secret, November 1881, Nos. 4—11.

The course of events subsequent to the withdrawal of the Gilgit Agency.—The withdrawal of the Gilgit Agency

‡ Despatch to the Secretary of State No. 88, dated the 25th August 1882. Secret, August 1882, No. 440.

marked not so much a change of policy as a change of plan. And the gist of the new plan was—

"to leave the local management of affairs on the northern frontiers in the hands of the Kashmir Durbar, at the same time requiring them to keep us (the Government) accurately informed of the course of events in that direction, and to consult the British Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir on matters affecting the relations of Kashmir with any of the neighbouring States."

§ *Ibid.*

In explaining this plan to the Secretary of State the Government of India remarked§ that—

"although the ability of the Kashmir Durbar to control the remote and unruly tribes in question may be doubtful, still the tendency of recent events has been to increase our confidence in the eventual success of what we consider to be the only practicable policy open to us."

Attitude of the Kashmir Durbar.—One of the obstacles in the way of carrying out these revised arrangements has been the failure of the Kashmir

Durbar to refer all matters relating to external affairs to the Officer on Special Duty. The steps taken to remove this obstacle have been described in the sixth chapter (pages 59-62) of this Précis.

The policy of the Amir of Kabul towards Chitral.—Another difficulty with which the Government of India have had to deal has been caused by the Amir of Kabul. It has been shown that up to the year 1876 the connection between Chitral and the Afghan dominion was close. The Amir Sher Ali professed to regard Aman-ul-mulk as his feudatory; and although the claim was not admitted by the Chief nor recognised by the British Government, it had some foundation. Immediately after the subordinate alliance of Chitral with Kashmir had been settled in 1876-77, the Amir Sher Ali wrote to Aman-ul-mulk in language which called for a vigorous protest from Lord Lytton's Government. The Commissioner of Peshawar was instructed to warn His Highness in these words:—

"Rumours which you are reluctant to credit have reached Peshawar that he is endeavouring to assume sovereignty over Bajor, Swat, Dir, and Chitral. You deem it your duty to remind His Highness that the British Government has never recognised any claim on his part to allegiance from these territories. Any attempt to enforce it without our assent will therefore be regarded by us as an unfriendly act incompatible with existing engagements."

At the time of the withdrawal of the Gilgit Agency the Amir Abdur Rahman addressed the Ruler of Chitral in a tone indicating that His Highness was disposed to assume an attitude towards this State to which it might be necessary to take exception. And the situation was complicated by the fact that Aman-ul-mulk expressed fear of aggression from Kabul, and begged to be admitted into direct alliance with the British Government.

The status of Chitral as recognised by the Government of India.—Since the engagement of 1876-77 was contracted the Government of India have consistently maintained that the political position of Chitral has been marked by two distinctive features:—subordination to Kashmir; independence of Kabul. Thus on the 25th June 1881 Aman-ul-mulk was re-assured in a *khariyat* from the

† Secret, July 1881, No. 869.

Foreign Secretary:—

"The engagements between your State and Kashmir are recognised and upheld by the British Government, so that you need have no concern with the affairs of Afghanistan. Moreover, the Amir Abdur Rahman is a friend of the British Government."

This view is further illustrated by the subjoined quotation from instructions‡ sent to the Officer on Special Duty on the same subject:—

‡ Secret, July 1881, No. 868.

"Aman-ul-mulk has, by a formal treaty, approved and recognised by the British Government, given his allegiance to the Kashmir Maharaja, while the British Government is pledged to afford the Kashmir Durbar, if need be, its countenance and aid in maintaining the arrangement thus made. This being the recognised status of Chitral, the Amir of Kabul can have no reason to interfere with this dependency of the Maharaja of Kashmir, whose territories are by treaty under the protection of the British Government. You are therefore empowered to communicate these views of the Government of India as to the position of Chitral to the Chief of that State through his agents; but you should at the same time inform him that the British Government cannot entertain any question of modifying his existing engagements with Kashmir.

* * * * *

"His Excellency the Governor General in Council believes that the foregoing instructions will enable you to come to a clear and confidential understanding with the Maharaja upon the main questions now outstanding for determination. You will perceive that the Government of India feel themselves bound to adhere to the engagements entered into in 1876-77, without receding from any of the obligations then undertaken, but certainly without any intention to enlarge them."

§ Secret, March 1882, No. 157.

At the beginning of 1882§ the Ruler of Chitral was allowed to send an Agent to Calcutta. The objects of this mission were avowedly to obtain a further re-assurance in respect of Afghan encroachments, and to arrange for Aman-ul-mulk's son's visiting

His Excellency the Viceroy. The main and scarcely concealed purpose was to enter into a direct political engagement with the Government of India. The Agent took back with him a *kharita* from the Foreign Secretary, dated the 8th March 1882, which contained these words:—

"Since I wrote you my letter of 25th June last, His Excellency has learnt with great satisfaction from the Maharaja of Kashmir that His Highness has worthily rewarded your good services, which, as I have written to you before, will not be forgotten by the British Government. With reference to what you have written on this point, I am to say that so long as you adhere to your agreement with the Maharaja of Kashmir, you will share the favour which the British Government extends to the Maharaja and those connected with him. For this reason it is right and expedient that on all questions of State you should communicate with the British Government through the Maharaja, whose interests and your own are identical.

"You seem still to have doubts regarding the intentions of the Amir of Afghanistan towards your country, but His Excellency has already re-assured you on that point. Moreover, the communication which you have received from the Amir since you wrote your letter under reply, shows that the Amir understands and will not interfere with your relations with the British Government. However, in order to remove all doubts from your mind, the fact that your engagements with Kashmir are recognised and upheld by the British Government will be pointed out to the Amir's Agent in attendance on the Viceroy.

"In your letter to my predecessor, Sir A. Lyall, you ask that the verbal requests of Wafadar Khan may be complied with. Wafadar Khan accordingly has told me that you wish to depute your son to India. I am to tell you that it will give much satisfaction to His Excellency to receive honourably and as his guest the son of one who has done such good service. It is understood that your son will come privately as a friend, and that any representation on matters of State which you may desire to make will be made through the Maharaja of Kashmir, whom, doubtless, your son will visit on his way to India."

* Secret, April 1882, No. 363.

A copy of this *kharita* was sent to the Kashmir Durbar.* The Maharaja appeared to be "extremely gratified" by its terms.

In fulfilment of the promise conveyed to Aman-ul-mulk that his political position would be explained to the Amir, the subject was discussed with His Highness's Agent on the 2nd March† 1882, and the following note was placed in his hands:—

"Aman-ul-mulk of Chitral has expressed apprehensions of encroachment from the direction of Badakshan; these apprehensions seem to the Government of India unfounded, and they do not wish to trouble the Amir about them while he is engaged in settling his own affairs.

"But I have been desired to remind the Agent to the Amir of the position of Chitral which has always been considered independent of Badakshan by the Government of India. His Highness is aware that in 1877, Chitral entered into subordinate alliance with Kashmir, and consequently with Kashmir enjoys the protection of the British Government. These relations have been acknowledged by the Amir in his letter of July last to Aman-ul-mulk, and consequently if it had not been for the apprehensions of Aman-ul-mulk, which His Excellency believes to be unfounded, it would not have been thought necessary for me to speak to General Mir Ahmad on the subject. However, it is well that the Amir's subordinates in Badakshan should understand the position."

This communication was duly forwarded to the Amir. His reply seemed to show that he had not gained a sufficiently clear view of the situation. Accordingly a further letter, dated the 3rd May 1882, was addressed by the Foreign Secretary to His Highness' Agent. It is quoted below:—

"His Excellency the Viceroy thinks that His Highness may not be clearly informed of the views which have always been held by the Government of India with regard to the position of Chitral, and desires me to state the facts as follows:—

"Chitral has never been recognised by the Government of India as connected with the State of Afghanistan; and without going further back than the time of the late Amir Sher Ali Khan, it will be sufficient to remark that a communication was addressed to His Highness in 1877 by order of the Viceroy, in which it was pointed out that the British Government had never recognised any claim on his part to allegiance from Chitral. On the contrary, the Government of India is under a solemn engagement to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Maharaja of Kashmir over Chitral, and to afford His Highness countenance and material aid, if necessary, in defending and maintaining his rights over that country. As the British Government is invariably faithful to its engagements, His Excellency the Viceroy directs me to say that he considers himself bound to fulfil in all points the obligations of the Government of India towards the Maharaja of Kashmir."

Recent correspondence shows that the Amir has disclaimed* all intention of interfering with Chitral, while Aman-ul-mulk has adopted a submissive tone in his dealings with the Kashmir Durbar, and has been profuse in acknowledgments of the supremacy of the Maharaja.

* Secret Despatch to the Secretary of State, No. B, dated the 8th January 1894.

The internal affairs of Chitral.—A few words will serve to sum up a somewhat voluminous correspondence about the course of events in Chitral proper, Mastuj, and Yasin, since the withdrawal of the Gilgit Agency.

After the expulsion of Pahlwan in 1880-81 his Chiefship was divided (as has been shown) between Aman-ul-mulk who kept Mastuj, Muhammad Wali (son of Mir Wali), to whom was allotted the central part of Yasin, known as Ghizr or Shavir, and Mir Aman (brother of Gauhlar Aman), who got the rest of Yasin. The two latter were recognised by the Kashmir Durbar as Aman-ul-mulk's nominees, for whom he was responsible. His Highness also stipulated that Pahlwan was not to be restored to the territories which he had forfeited by his misconduct.

Secret, July 1881, No. 391.

After this partition Pahlwan wandered into exile, chiefly in Tangir, where he found enemies of Aman-ul-mulk in Mulk Aman* and Sherf Afzal.

* Pahlwan's half-brother.
† Aman-ul-mulk's brother.

Early in 1882, Mir Aman entered into an agreement with Aman-ul-mulk,

Secret, August 1882, No. 438.

renouncing in his favour all claims to the "country of Mastuj, *i. e.*, from the Sindur Pass to Mozai Buruis as far as the frontier of Chitral." Mir Aman's rule in Yasin proved unpopular, and Pahlwan stirred up intrigues in the neighbouring States. Consequently, in the end of

Secret, E., January 1883, No. 463.

1882, the Ruler of Chitral proposed to turn Mir Aman and Muhammad Wali out of Yasin and to put one of his own sons in their place. He also expressed a wish to march, with the Maharaja's aid, against Pahlwan and Mulk Aman in Tangir. The Maharaja was at first averse to these proposals, because he did not wish to see Aman-ul-mulk's power extended by the complete exclusion of the Khushwakti branch.

Secret E., April 1883, Nos. 211—226.

Later on His Highness was disposed to agree to the proposals, but in the meantime Pahlwan took the initiative and invaded Yasin with a small force from Tangir and Darel. He gained a temporary success and captured Mir Aman; but on advancing towards Mastuj he was defeated and put to flight by Afzal-ul-mulk, one of Aman-ul-mulk's sons. This son has remained in charge of Yasin. There has been correspondence about a scheme for a joint attack by Chitral and Kashmir on Tangir and Darel, but nothing has come of it, and the latest phase of the situation is that both Aman-ul-mulk and the Maharaja have shown a disposition to be reconciled with Pahlwan.

Secret E., June 1883, Nos. 218—250.

The views of the Government of India on these events have been that it would not be wise for the Maharaja to attempt to thwart Aman-ul-mulk's project of establishing his sons in Yasin; and that it would be better to co-operate with Chitral in attacking Tangir and Darel than to allow Aman-ul-mulk to annex those countries.

Aman-ul-mulk is now an old man, more than 60 years of age. His death will probably be followed by a struggle for power amongst his sons.

Secret E., November 1883, Nos. 239.

Affairs in Dir.—It has been shown that in 1876-77 Rahmatulla Khan of Dir was inclined to enter into friendly relations with the Kashmir Durbar, but that he would have preferred an alliance with the British Government. Shortly afterwards the Chief tendered allegiance to the Amir of Kabul, but he soon seemed to repent of this step, and professed*

* Secret, November 1877, No. 70.

willingness to accept the suzerainty of Kashmir. Accordingly, when the Viceroy advised the Maharaja about the nature of the Chitral convention, His Excellency alluded† to Rahmatulla Khan in these words:—

"I can give him no hope of being recognised as a protected feudatory of the British Government; but should Your Highness be willing to accept his vassalage, and deem such a

course desirable for the objects we have in view, I will gladly recommend that Chief to make a tender of allegiance to the Kashmir State."

Here the matter dropped for the time; but it came up again in 1881, when Chitral affairs were being settled after the expulsion of Pahlwan. In a letter* of the 30th June 1881 the Officer on Special Duty remarked as follows:—

"In the course of my conversations with the Maharaja, His Highness impressed upon me the importance of securing the services of the Chief of Dir. Some correspondence on this subject took place in October 1877, to the effect generally that the Viceroy did not wish the Maharaja to accept the vassalage of Dir against His Highness's will. From the manner in which the Maharaja has now reverted to the question, I gather that His Highness would, in reality, be glad to extend his influence to Dir, while affecting that his sole object is to further British interests."

† Secret, July 1881, No. 392.
"In reply Mr. Henvey was instructed † not to allude to or encourage the Maharaja's views regarding Dir." And when the arrangements for the withdrawal of the Gilgit Agency were reported to the Secretary of State, it was said ‡ that—

‡ *Ibid.*, No. 393.
"there appears to be no advantage in dealing with the Chief of Dir through Kashmir or in encouraging the Kashmir State to attempt to extend its influence in that quarter."

The Secretary of State concurred in this opinion.

Recently ¶ the Chief of Dir and his son Muhammad Sharif Khan have made overtures to the Maharaja which His Highness seems to interpret as a tender of allegiance intended to obtain pecuniary aid. The Officer on Special Duty has been informed that the Government of India are "inclined to view with favour the establishment of friendly relations between the Maharaja and the Chief of Dir"; but "would not desire to put pressure on either party with that object."

¶ Secret despatch to Secretary of State, No. 3, dated 8th January 1884.
** Foreign Department No. 2978E., dated 21st December 1883.
Hunza and Nagar.—The condition of affairs in these States has not altered materially during the last two years. Ghazan Khan of Hunza seems to be still on indifferent terms with the Kashmir Durbar.

Towards the end of 1882 †† Azar Khan restored his father Jafir Khan to power as Raja of Nagar, expelling his (own) brother Muhammad who had usurped authority. Soon afterwards Muhammad Khan ††† died.

†† Secret E., September 1882, Nos. 596 to 628.
††† *Ibid.*, January 1883, Nos. 222 to 228.
These changes have been favourable for the Maharaja, because Jafir Khan and Azar Khan are his friends, while Muhammad Khan was closely connected with the Chief of Hunza.

Chaprote continues to be a source of discord between Hunza, Nagar, and Kashmir. A small garrison of the Maharaja's troops is still there, and Azar Khan still commands the place either in person or through his brother and friend Alif Khan. Nagar has clearly more hold than Hunza on Chaprote.

When Azar Khan expelled Muhammad Khan from Nagar the Officer on Special Duty proposed §§ to remark to the Durbar, that it was—

§§ *Ibid.*, September 1882, No. 597.
"to be regretted that a fort in the Maharaja's keeping should have been utilised by a dependant of the Kashmir Government, for an aggressive movement against one of His Highness's allies."

The Government of India, however, did not think ||| that any such interference was necessary seeing that—

||| *Ibid.*, No. 608.
"under arrangements made by the Government of India in 1877, the small States Hunza, Nagar, &c., ¶¶ are not in alliance with the Maharaja, but under his suzerainty."

¶¶ *Sic* /
*** On this point see Secret E., September 1882, Nos. 566 to 628. E.-W., page 4.
It must be noticed *** here that Hunza and Nagar are not amongst the petty States which have been recognised by the Government of India as being subject to the suzerainty of the Kashmir Durbar. Nevertheless, the Government of India are concerned with the relations between the Maharaja and these States. Accordingly in 1882, when it was found that His Highness had failed

to acquaint the Officer on Special Duty fully with events in Hunza and Nagar, a remonstrance against this neglect stated the views of the Governor General in Council as follows :—

“ Under the treaty of 1846, the British Government is responsible for the protection of Kashmir ; and the Government of Kashmir, on the other hand, acknowledges British supremacy, and engages to submit to the arbitration of the British Government in cases of dispute with neighbouring powers. Moreover, when the Political Officer at Gilgit was withdrawn, it was intimated to the Maharaja, in the Viceroy's letter of 18th June 1861, that the Government of India would expect His Highness to refer to them, through the Officer on Special Duty, all questions of importance connected with his external relations. It cannot, therefore, be disputed that the Government of India has a material interest in His Highness's relations with the States on his frontier, and that the Maharaja is bound by his engagements to refer to the Governor General in Council before he adopts any line of action calculated to excite hostile feelings among those States.”

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX 1 (see p. 38).

Memorandum by Captain Arthur Broome, on Special Duty in Kashmir, enclosed in his demi-official letter of the 15th September 1846, to the Governor General's Agent on the North-West Frontier.

Kaikka-Bamba Chiefs.—The term Gökka or Kükür Bamba is applied to the petty Muhammadan tribes dwelling on either bank of the Jhelum between Baramulla and the Hazara tribes on the left bank of the Indus. Strictly speaking, the term Kükür is applicable to those on the left, and Bamba to those on the right, of the river, but generally they are all termed Kükür Bambas. Of the Bambas the three principal Chiefs are those of Kathai, Dopütta, and Mozufferabad on the immediate banks of the river.

Kathai.—The Raja of Kathai is Sultan Zabardust Khan, son of Sultan Mozuffur Khan. He used to pay a revenue of Rs. 7,000 per annum to the Governor of Kashmir, and received daily pay from the Government of Rs. 11, half in grain, half in specie. He can muster about 1,600 armed men. He is himself at present at Baramulla, but his Vizier Atta Muhammad, with 200 men, is at Kashmir with Sheikh Emam-ud-din. The Sheikh has a few Sipahis in his Fort at Kathai.

Dopütta and Doarbid.—Sultan Atta Muhammad Khan, son of Nasir Ali Khan, is the Rajah of Dopütta and Doarbid. He used to pay a revenue of Rs. 7,000 per annum and receive pay at the rate of Rs. 18 per diem. He can muster about 1,000 fighting men, and is at present in the city with 150 men.

The Sheikh has a few men in the Fort of Dopütta.

Mozufferabad.—There are three Chiefs in joint authority in this district, viz.—

1st.—Sultan Muhammad Khan, a minor aged 5 years, son of Rehmattulla Khan and grandson of Zabardust Khan. His father Rehmattulla married a daughter of Moyezuddin, late Raja of Kurush, and on her husband's death, she married Sheikh Emam-ud-din, the Governor of Kashmir. This young boy is with his step-father in the city.

2nd.—Sultan Nujuff Khan, also Raja of Kohari, son of Akbar Ali Khan, brother-in-law of Zabardust Khan. He is now at his own exclusive district of Kohari.

3rd.—Sultan Husein Khan, nephew of Zabardust Khan, now at Mozufferabad.

These three Chiefs can muster about 5,000 armed men in the district, of whom a portion are permanently paid troops. The revenue formerly paid was Rs. 9,000 annually, and the daily pay received was Rs. 24. The Sheikh keeps no troops in Mozufferabad.

The following are the principal Kükür Chiefs:—

Bunnair.—There are two Rajas of this district, viz., Abdullah Khan, son of Sirafrax Khan, and Golsheer Khan, son of Muhammad Khan and nephew to Abdullah Khan. They have about 500 fighting men, of whom 300 have arrived in the pergunnah of Bungil, north-west of the city; the remainder are with themselves at Bunnair. They have not paid any revenue, but receive a stipend of Rs. 4 per day. There are no forts or Sirkari thannas in their country.

Uri.—The Raja of this district is Mozuffur Khan, son of Sirballund Khan. He is now at Uri. His force amounts to about 700 men, of whom 300 are in Kashmir under Jubbah Khan and Attah Muhammad Khan, his sons. He pays Rs. 1,500 yearly revenue and receives a daily stipend of Rs. 7. He also has a *jaگیر* of 200 karwahs of grain in Komraj. The Sheikh has a garrison of some 30 men in the fort of Uri under Joallah Singh, son of the late Rajah Tegh Singh.

Chükär.—This district is governed by two Rajas who are cousins. Mohabut Khan and Nujuff Khan, sons respectively of Jung Khan and Pülwaha Khan, who are the sons of Yar Ali Khan. They are both at Chükär and are in alliance with Atta Muhammad Khan of Dopütta. They pay yearly a revenue of Rs. 2,000, and receive a daily stipend of Rs. 3. Their force amounts to about 1,000 men. The Sheikh has about 20 men in the fort of Chükär.

Kotees or Kote.—Futteh Khan, son of Shah Nawaz Khan, is the Raja of this district. He is now at Kote, and is in alliance with the Dopütta Raja. His force amounts to about 500 men. He pays a yearly revenue of Rs. 2,500, and receives a stipend of Re. 1 per diem. There are no forts in his country.

Dhunnee.—There are three Rajas to this district:—

1st.—Sher Ali Khan.

2nd.—Shahbaz Khan.

3rd.—
Khan, a son of Muhammad Ameen Khan and nephew of Sher Ali

They are all three at Dhunnee, and are in alliance with the Mozufferabad Rajas. Their force amounts to about 1,000 men (and is called Daleel Sowābil). They pay yearly revenue of Rs. 3,000.

The Sheikh has about 100 men in the fort of Dhunnee under Gadah Singh.

Kohāri.—The Raja of this district is Sultan Nujūf Khan, son of Akbar Ali Khan, who has also a share in Mozufferabad. He is now at Kohāri. His force amounts to about 1,500 men, a portion of which are with Sher Ahmed in Komraj. He pays Rs. 3,000 yearly revenue and receives a daily stipend of Rs. 24.

There never has been a Sirkari thanna in Kohāri.

Kāghān.—There are two Rajas to this district—

1st—Syud Anwar Shah.

2nd—Zamīn Shah.

They are now both at Kāghān; their force amounts to about 500 men, of which a portion is with Sher Ahmed in Komraj. They pay an annual revenue of Rs. 500 and receive a daily stipend of Rs. 5. There never has been a Sirkari thanna in Kāghān.

To the north of the districts of the Bamba Rajas on the Jhelum are several other Chiefs, who, though not strictly coming under the term, may be classed with the Kūkkūr Bambas. They are also called the Northern Rajas.

Kūrnah.—There are two Rajas of this district, *viz.*—

1st.—Sher Ahmed Khan, son of Munsoor Khan.

2nd.—Moyezudin Khan, brother of Munsoor Khan, and son of Sultan Nasir Ali, both Bambas.

The daughter of Moyezudin was married first to Rehmutulla Khan of Mozufferabad, and now to Sheikh Emam-ud-din. Both these Rajas are in alliance with the Mozufferabad Rajas, and lately with the Sheikh.

They have been yāglees for the last two years, and paid no tribute until within the last two months. About seven months ago their relatives, who were hostages at Kashmir, escaped (probably were allowed to escape). They used to pay a yearly revenue of Rs. 7,000 and receive a daily stipend of Rs. 5.

Sher Ahmed Khan is one of the most violent of the Chiefs; he and his uncle are now, at the Sheikh's suggestion, ravaging Komraj with a force of about 3,000 men, partly their own and partly belonging to other Chiefs. There are also about 1,000 men at Kūrnah and 200 in the city, and Nūjūf Khan son of Moyezudin.

Muchipoora in Komraj.—Rajas Hybut Khan and Mozuffur Khan, sons of Sultur Ali Khan, have or had a *jagir* in this district. They are Bambas. They have a force of about 500 men, of whom 100 are in the city, and with the remainder they have joined Sher Ahmed and gone into insurrection, and are plundering and doing much mischief in Komraj.

The daily stipends above referred to are in fact a sort of subsistence money for the hostages and small contingents always present with the Governor of Kashmir.

Memo.—The above information was chiefly furnished by Mirza Syfoodin.

APPENDIX 2 (see p. 39).

Translation of an Agreement, dated Simla, the 3rd Usouj, Sambat 1903 (i. e., the 27th September 1846), by Dewan Jowala Sahai, Dewan of Maharaja Golab Singh.

Maharaja Golab Singh Bahadur is willing to establish the following sums of Company's Rupees for the annual maintenance of the following persons and their posterity. He trusts that they will obtain the sanction of the Agent to the Governor-General.

Secret Con., 26th December 1846.
No. 1124.

These persons are at full liberty to inhabit any spot they may choose in the territories of the Maharaja, or of the British; but they are prohibited from dwelling anywhere in the Lahore possessions, though they are at liberty to serve that Government.

	Co.'s Rs.
Raja Rubimulla Khan of Rajour	16,000
Raja of Jusrouta with other Meers of Jusrouta as follows:—	
Miyān Bhooree Singh	5,000
Shumshere Singh	2,000
Sons of Miyān Bukhtawar Singh	2,000
Miyān Roop Sing	1,000
Other Miyāns	7,000
Rao Poomb Singh of Mankoto	17,000
Rām Chunder and Hur Deo of Rām Nagur	1,500
Kilyān Pal of Bissowiee	3,000
Ubtar Singh of Bludwal	5,000
Zorawur Singh and Jemul Singh of Kishwar	5,000
	3,000

Fyztullah Khan and others, for whom nothing has as yet been fixed, will, on presenting themselves at Lahore, also receive some provision.

Those to whom pecuniary maintenance has been allotted will receive it through the Kangra Treasury, where it will be remitted by the Maharaja.

ORDERED:

Approved by the Agent, Governor-General, North-Western Frontier, on the 27th September 1846. A copy of this to be given to Dewan Jowala Sahai, Dewan of Maharaja Golab Singh.

(True Translation)

H. M. LAWRENCE,
Agent, Governor-General.

From—LIEUT.-COLONEL H. M. LAWRENCE, Agent, Governor-General,
N. W. Frontier, and Resident at Lahore,

To—H. M. ELLIOTT, Esq., Secy. to the Govt. of India, with the Governor-General.

On the 27th September 1846, after the Kashmir rebellion had broken out, Jowala Sahai, the minister of Maharaja Golab Singh, signed a document before me at Simla, promising, on the part of his master, to give a fair and reasonable maintenance to the different Hill Chiefs of the Jammu territory.

I have now the honor to lay before the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General the annexed statement showing the result of different negotiations between us. It comprises the names of the different Chiefs, the allowances they are to receive, whether in *agirs* or in money, and the places where the parties desire to reside and draw their money allowances.

The whole amount of maintenance is equal to the sum of Rs. 62,200, of which Rs. 42,800 will be drawn by parties who have determined to reside in the British territory and receive their allowances from the Government treasury of the station where they may live. I have already advanced to these parties the sum of Rs. 34,813-14-7, and request sanction to charge the same in my accounts, and for the permission of Government to their pensions, as detailed in column 5, being paid from the different treasuries noted in column 8.

The allowances have been granted by the Maharaja to the pensioners and their heirs in perpetuity. I therefore propose that the laws of inheritance, laid down by the Muhammadan and Hindu rules, be applicable to each case, according to the religion of the present recipient. In the case of the heirs of Raja Rubimulla a division of the pension took place some months ago, but the Raja is since dead, and a new distribution is necessary.

The districts of Sujanpore, part of Patlankote, and certain lands between the Beas and Chukkee rivers have been annexed to the British territory in payment of these pensions. The land revenue, I understand from the Commissioner of the Trans-Sutlej territory, was estimated at Rs. 45,958, and it has actually been assessed at Rs. 38,979 by the officer in charge of the Kangra district. If we take the assessed revenue, it is a gain to Government of

Rs. 3,158; if we take the actual assessment, it is a loss of Rs. 4,821,—the last is of course the estimate at which in equity we are only bound to receive the territory. There are, however, jagirs worth about Rs. 5,000 not taken into account in the present assessment, from which some revenue in lieu of service will be derived, and the greater part of which will eventually fall in. I do not therefore consider that the British Government will suffer any loss by the present arrangement being admitted without further modification in favor of either party.

The new territory has been annexed from the last spring crop, and nearly all the revenue on that account realised by us. I therefore recommend that the transfer be considered as having taken place from the 1st of January 1847, and that Government be responsible for all pensions from that date, and that all previous payments be debited against Maharaja Golab Singh.

The delay that has taken place has been mainly owing to the difficulty of adjusting the pretensions of rival claimants. Dozens of impostors come forward; and not until late in the day, and after being repeatedly called, did some of those entitled to pensions come forward. I was, however, averse to close proceedings until I could hear every man's story. I have particularly explained to each individual that now is the time to make his choice, and that if he fixes to reside in the Maharajah's territory, he will have no further claim on the British Government. To all the others I have given letters to the zillah officers requesting their good offices in behalf of the exiles.

I have told Dewan Jowala Sahai that, on failure of heirs to any of the families, the amount of their pensions will revert to the Jammu Raj; but this must be on the extinction in all branches of those now admitted on the list. The lands will in no case be restored, but cash payment be made.

I have been for some time expecting the ex-rajah of Iskardo, who is, however, still in Kashmir; he will probably determine to reside in British territory, and will be entitled to a small pension; one or two others may yet come forward. Dewan Jowala Sahai agreed with me that for any pensions above those included in the accompanying list Maharajah Golab Singh would purchase Company's paper, so that the interest might, year by year, be taken for the required purpose. The land obtained will, however, improve in our hands, and unless the further pensions exceeded Rs. 5,000 a year, I do not think that any further demand need be made on the Maharajah; indeed, including customs and probable losses of jagirs, look on the strip of territory obtained as worth half a lakh to Government. It, moreover, improves our boundary very much; giving the Chukkee river to the Hasula Canal as the boundary, then a nearly straight line of only a mile to the Doogyanee Nuddee, up which it runs to opposite Sujanpore, whence a straight line of a mile or two takes it to the Ravi. We have thus obtained a good frontier without giving offence to the Durlar by taking a single canal village. The fort of Puthankote, however, comes within the British boundary.

Secret Com. 25th September 1947. *Statement of the fixed annual allowances to be granted in perpetuity for the maintenance of the Hill Rajas and their descendants as agreed on by Dewan Jawahar Sahai, the Minister of Maharaja Gopal Singh, and which has been paid as follows from the British Treasury and placed to the account of the said Maharaja.*

No.	Name of the Pensioner.	Date and year from which the allowance will commence.	Amount of stipend fixed for Dewan Jawahar Sahai.	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1	The wife of Raja Bahadur Uda Khan, Bahawalpur.	2nd October 1946, corresponding with the 10th Chait, Sumbat 1939.	Rs. 16,000	Rs. 16,000	Rs.	Rajah in Kangra	Kangra	From 2nd October 1946 to the end of July 1947.	10	11	12
2	Raja Bhair Singh, Jalandhar, together with his wife, Mrs. Mira.	1st March 1946, corresponding with the 10th Chait, Sumbat 1939.	17,000	3,300	13,700	Narpore in Kangra	Ditto	From 1st March 1946 to the end of June 1947.	1 3 10	4,000 3 8	The mode in which this pension will be paid is in the form of a monthly allowance of the amount stated in consequence with this pension. The 3,300 to be paid from the British Treasury is to be divided into 200 per cent. instalments of Rs. 16 1/2 per annum. British Sumbat, Jalandhar, is not to be included.
3	Rao Ursamb Singh, Muzbafwah.	Ditto	3,600	1,600	2,000	Narpore	Ditto	Ditto	1 3 16	1,800 8 8	Ditto.
4	Ramchander, Hardeo, Ram Neggarwa.	Ditto	3,000	2,000	1,000	Shahdampur.	Shahala	From 11th March 1946 to the end of February 1947.	0 11 16	2,678 0 0	Ditto.
5	Raja Kallam Pal, Shams-ulah.	Ditto	5,000	5,000	5,000	—	—	—	—	—	—
6	Raja Uda Singh, Shahd-ulah.	11th April 1946, corresponding with the 10th Chait, Sumbat 1939.	5,000	8,000	—	Narpore	Kangra	From 11th April 1946 to the end of June 1947.	1 3 30	9,111 1 8	Ditto.
7	Misra Zamora Singh, Jagan Singh, and Dinesh Singh, of Rajahmundry.	1st March 1946, corresponding with the 10th Chait, Sumbat 1939.	1,800	3,800	—	Muzbafwah Singh at Jalandhar	Muzbafwah Singh at Jalandhar	From 1st March 1946 to the end of June 1947.	1 2 10	8,275 0 0	In the following column— General Sumbat : 1,300 British Sumbat : 1,200 British Sumbat : 775
8	Hakim Ali Khan, Zambhal.	18th November 1946	1,000	1,000	—	Zambhal, Punjab	Treasury, Lahore	From 18th November 1946 to end of June 1947.	0 7 16	635 6 4	One instalment to enjoy this pension. Ditto.
9	Raja Prithabh Khan, Bahawalpur.	11th October 1946, corresponding with the 10th Chait, Sumbat 1939.	10,000	10,000	—	Shahdampur, J. & K.	Ditto	From 11th October 1946 to end of June 1947.	0 6 17	7,133 10 8	Ditto.
10	Dewan Shyam Das Khan	Two rail crops, Sumbat 1939.	1,700	—	1,700	—	—	—	—	—	Rs. 600 were paid during the year 1947 to the account of the pensioner, as ordered by the Finance authorities.
			TOTAL	69,300	26,400					95,700 15 7	(Sd.) JOHN LAWRENCE, Agent and Receiver.

LABOUR COMMISSION, 19th August 1947.

APPENDIX 3 (see p. 78).

SHAWL TRADE*.

* Quartermaster General's Compilation, Central Asia, Part VII, Section I, Kashmir.

Kashmir is celebrated throughout the world for its shawls.

An exhaustive account of this manufacture is to be found in Moorcroft's *Travels in the Himalayan Provinces*, Vol. II, Chapter III.

As the primary object of his visit to the valley was the study of the shawl trade in view to its introduction into British possessions, he may be considered a safe authority on the subject. Though he failed in the object of his visit (his premature death preventing his reaping the advantage of the knowledge he had gained), there is no doubt that the shawl trade of Europe profited largely by the information he transmitted to his friend.

The shawls which are manufactured in Kashmir are of two sorts, the loom-made, and those which are worked by hand; and different classes of people are employed in each branch of the trade. Dr. Elmslie states that the number of shawl-makers (Khándawás) has greatly diminished of late years, many having made their escape to the Punjab with their wives and families. There are now about 23,000 shawl weavers in the valley of Kashmir, who form the most miserable portion of the population, both physically and morally.

In the loom system the Kár-Khándár is the shawl manufacturer, who employs under him a number, from 20 to 300, shál-báfs or shagirds (scholars). He buys the spun thread from the *puí-wóin* or dealer, to whom it is disposed of by the spinners, and gets it dyed of different colours before it is distributed among his workmen.

There are about 100 Kár-Khándárs in Kashmir, all of whom live either in Srinagar or Islamabad, but the houses in which the shál-báfs work are in different parts of the valley, the largest number being in the towns of Pupur and Sopur. A number of overseers are therefore necessary to superintend the work, to be responsible for the *pashmina*, and to draw the pay of the workmen, &c.

These people are called *ustád* (master or teacher). There is usually one over every 25 or 30 shál-báfs. The sum realised by the shál-báfs is usually from three to five Chiki rupees (each nominally worth ten annas) a month; but as this is inclusive of the amount deducted by the Government for rice, which is supplied to the workmen at unfavorable rates through Government agency (to the limit of 11 kharwars each annually) the balance is not sufficient to support a family with any approach to comfort even in so fertile a country as Kashmir. Dr. Elmslie estimates the average earnings of a shál-báf at three pence of our money a day; a first-rate workman will earn from four pence to five pence a day.

An annual tax of R37 is levied by the Government on each Kár-Khándár for every shál-báf in his employ; previous to 1867 this tax stood at R48.

In the hand-work shawl system the *sáda-báf* is the workman who makes the plain *pashmina* from the spun *pashm*, which he buys for himself directly in the bázár. Upon this plain *pashmina* the coloured threads are afterwards worked with needles by a workman who is called a *rafúga*.

The position of the *sáda-báf*, though slightly better than his brother of the loom, the shál-báf, is stated to be very miserable, owing to the oppressive taxes levied by the Government.

Indeed, as neither of these classes is permitted to leave the valley or to relinquish their employment, even though they may become half-blind or otherwise incapacitated by disease, their position must be considered most miserable.

The circumstances of the *rafúga* on the other hand are stated to be tolerably comfortable, he being permitted the privilege of changing or giving up his trade should he wish to do so.

When pitying the unhappy condition of the shawl-weavers in Kashmir, it may be well for us to remember that it is asserted that scarcely a century has elapsed since miners and their families were absolutely sold in England with mines in which they toiled.

The shawl manufacture in Kashmir is superintended by a large Government Office at Srinagar called the Daghshálí, which is presided over by an official called the darogha of the Daghsháli. This office is farmed out by the Government, and, as it admits of immense profits, especially to the unscrupulous, it is an object of keen competition among the wealthy ruling class.

The late Raja Kák, who was over the shawl trade until about 1866, when he died, was greatly respected by the people. Dr. Elmslie says that since his death the revenue from shawls has dwindled away to half its former amount, which was R 12,000. On account of this great falling-off in the revenue, Bool Raja, son of Partab Shah, a name well known in Kashmir, was removed from the office of Dewan of the shawl department, and Badri Nath, Commissioner of Finance and Revenue, was put in his place. There are about 200 pandits attached to the Daghsháli, who are continually employed inspecting the different *kárkhánas* (manufactories) with a view to prevent the Kár-Khándár putting in hand a shawl until the necessary permission has been obtained and the preliminary taxes paid: these pandits are charged with demanding and receiving from the Kár-Khándárs illegal remuneration for their boat-hire, road expenses, &c.

The wool of which the shawls are manufactured (*til-phamb*) is found upon the goats which are pastured upon the elevated regions of Changthan, Turfan, &c. It is undoubtedly a provision of nature against the cold and killing blasts to which they are exposed, and is found not only on the goat, but upon the yak and the shepherd's dog used in the same inhospitable regions.

(Attempts to introduce the shawl-goat into other parts of the world have, as far as the production of this particular description of wool is concerned, failed; notably that made by Mr. Lavanchi in the Pyrenees, where, with the elevation and climate approaching those of their native pastures, success might reasonably have been anticipated. In 1817 the tribute of shawl-goats paid by the Maharaja as an acknowledgment of the supremacy of the British Government under article 10 of the treaty was excused in consequence of the animals dying at Dhurmsala, where they were kept.

The wool employed in the manufacture of shawls is of two kinds, the fleece of the domesticated animals, and that from the animal in its wild state; of this latter sort, which is called *Asli tas*, but a small proportion is imported.

The interests of the Maharaja of Kashmir and his manufacturers are identified in the endeavour to retain the monopoly of the shawl-wool; consequently, none of the Turfani wool from Yarkhand, which is the finest, is allowed to pass into British territory.

The Kashmiri merchants purchase the wool at Leh, between which place and Srinagar Moorcroft states the cost of transport to be R33 per horse-load, the duties collected at various places amounting to R95. Dark wool pays about half the duty charged on white wool. The same authority gives the following table of prices for shawl-wool at different periods:—

1794 to 1807 per trák	8 Kashmir rupees.
1807 „ 1813 „	16 to 20 „ „
1813 „ 1817 „	22 „ „
1817 „ „	25 „ „

and he states that it had latterly (about 1822) been as high as R40 per trák, but conjectured that this advanced price being due to exceptional circumstances would not be maintained.

Major Cunningham, R.E., states that the average price of shawl-wool in Ladakh is R 2 per seer. 128,000 lbs. of shawl-wool are annually imported into Kashmir from Ladakh.

The price of dark-coloured wool is about one-third or a half less than that of white wool. On arrival in Kashmir the wool is bought by a *pasam sarosh* or wool retailer, who disposes of it to the women, who spin it into yarn. Moorcroft states the girls begin to spin at the age of ten, and that a hundred thousand females were employed in this occupation in Kashmir.

The first task of the spinner is to separate the different materials of which the fleece consists, usually in about the following proportions:—

Coarse hair	1½ seer.
Second or Phiri	0¾ „
Dust and foreign substances	2¼ „
Fine wool	2 „
	—
	6 seers, or 1 trák.
	—

The cleaned wool is then spread on a board, and a paste composed of pounded rice and water is rubbed into it (soap is never used, as it makes it harsh) after which it is dried, teased out, and spun into thread by the women who work with little intermission the whole day. Moorcroft calculates the general earnings of an industrious and expert spinner to be only one rupee eight annas per month, and they are probably less.

The shawl thread (*phamb-pam*) is double. The finest brings one Chilki rupee for one tola weight; of a coarser kind two and three tolas are given for one rupee; and a still coarser quality called *phur* is sold at the same price for four or five tolas.

The merchants who buy the thread from the spinners sell it to the shawl manufacturers, making a profit of two or three annas on the rupee.

The yarn being divided into skeins according to the pattern decided upon is then delivered to the *rangrez* or dyer; he professes to be able to give it sixty-four tints, most of which are permanent; that called *kiram doni*, a rich crimson, being the most expensive. The art of dyeing is said to have been introduced into Kashmir in the reign of the Emperor Akbar.

When the body of the cloth is to be left plain, the *phiri* or second yarn is alone given to be dyed; being of a coarser quality, it is preferred for employment in flowers and other ornaments, from its standing higher, and being as it were embossed upon the ground.

The distribution of the colours is regulated by the thickness of the thread, the thinner threads being appropriated to the higher tints.

The *lar-sarosh* adjusts the yarn for the warp and for the weft. He receives the yarn in banks, but returns it in balls; he can prepare in one day the warp and weft for two shawls.

The yarn, which has been cut and reeled, is then taken by the *perashan*, gum or warp dresser, who dips it into thick boiled rice water, by which process each length becomes stiffened and set apart from the rest.

Silk is generally used for the warp on the border of the shawl, and has the advantage of showing the darker colours of the dyed wool more prominently than a warp of yarn, as well as hardening and strengthening and giving more body to the edge of the cloth.

When the border is very narrow it is woven with the body of the shawl, but when broader it is worked on a different loom and afterwards sewn on the edge of the shawl by the *rafūga* or fine drawer with such nicety that the union can scarcely be detected.

The operation of drawing or of passing the yarns of the warp through the heddles is performed precisely in the same way as in Europe, and the warp is then taken by the *shāl-bāf* or weaver to the loom which differs not in principle from that of Europe, but is of inferior workmanship.

When the warp is fixed in the loom, the *nakhāh* or pattern drawer, and *tar-farosh* and *gandanwool*, or persons who determine the proportion of yarn of different colours to be employed, are again consulted. They bring the drawings of the pattern (*siyāhtunāh*) in black and white; this branch of the trade is said to be confined to six or seven families. The *gandanwool*, having well considered it, points out the disposition of the colours, beginning at the foot of the pattern and calling out the colour, the number of threads to which it is to extend, that by which it is to be followed, and so on in succession until the whole pattern has been described.

From his dictation the *kitabwallah* writes down the particulars in a species of stenography, and delivers a copy of the document (*talim*) to the weavers.

The workmen prepare the *tīlis* or needles by arming each with coloured yarn of the weight of about four grains. These needles without eyes are made of light, smooth wool and have both their sharp ends slightly charred to prevent their becoming rough or jagged through working.

Under the superintendence of the *gandanwool* the weavers knot the yarn of the *tīlis* to the warp.

The face or right side of the cloth is placed next to the ground, the work being carried on at the back or reverse, on which the needles are disposed in a row, and differing in number from four hundred to fifteen hundred according to the lightness or otherwise of the embroidery.

As soon as the *ustād* is satisfied that the work of one line or warp is completed, the comb is brought down upon it with a vigour and repetition apparently very disproportionate to the delicacy of the materials.

On a shawl being taken in hand, a small piece at the edge is first completed, by which a rough estimate of its value is formed, and on which an *ad valorem* duty of 25 per cent. is levied by the Government; of this amount a portion is paid down, the shawl is then stamped, and the manufacturer at liberty to proceed with the work, the value being adjusted and the balance paid on completion.

In addition to the import duties on the materials, poll-tax on the workmen, and the *ad valorem* duty on the value of the shawl, which are paid directly to the Government, the *Kār-Khāndār* is obliged to fee liberally all Government officials in any way connected with the trade, and it is affirmed, apparently on good grounds, that this *dasturi* or illegal gratification is shared in by the highest officers of the State down to the lowest *panḍit* connected with the *Dagshālī*; these fees are stated to amount to little less than another 25 per cent.

When finished, the shawls are submitted to the *purzagur* or cleaner, whose business it is to free the shawl from discoloured hairs or yarn and from ends or knots; he either pulls them out severally with a pair of tweezers, or shaves the reverse face of the cloth with a sharp knife; any defects arising from either operation are immediately repaired by the *rafūga*.

Previous to being washed the shawl has to be taken to the office of the *daroga* of the *Dagshālī* for a permit. After registering it and collecting the tax (*lagut*) of 25 per cent. *ad valorem*, one of the *panḍits* removes the Government stamp which was impressed upon it at its commencement, by dipping the corner of the shawl into water; a receipt (*waguzār*) is then given to the owner to testify that all dues have been paid upon it.

The goods are now handed over to the *wāforush* or person who has advanced money on them to the manufacturer, and to the *mohkun* or broker, and these two settle the price and effect the sale to the merchant; the former charges interest on his advance, the latter a commission varying from 2 to 5 per cent.

The purchaser takes the goods unwashed and sometimes in pieces, and the fine-drawer and washerman have still to do their part. When partly washed, the *dhobi* brings the shawls to the merchant that they may be examined for any holes or imperfections; should such occur, they are remedied at the expense of the seller. It is necessary to wash the shawls, in order to deprive them of the stiffness of the rice-starch remaining in the thread, and for the purpose of softening them generally. The best water for this is found in the canal between the lake and the flood-gates at the Drogjan and in the cold waters of the *Tel Bel* stream near the *Shalimar*. In the former locality some ruins in large limestone blocks are lying on the washing place, and in one of these is a round hole, about a foot and a half in diameter and a foot in depth; in this the shawl is placed, and water being passed over it, it is stamped on by naked feet for about five minutes, and then taken into the canal by a man standing in the water. One end is gathered up in his hand, and the shawl swung round and beaten with great force upon a flat stone, being dipped into the canal between every three or four strokes. They are then dried in the shade, as the hot sun spoils the colours; and in ten days afterwards the coloured shawls undergo a similar process, but occupying less time.

The white ones, after being submitted to the process, on the first day are spread in the sun and bleached by water sprinkled over them; they then are again treated to the same process

as the coloured shawls, being stamped upon and beaten a second time and then bleached again till they are dry, and then for a third time beaten, stamped upon, and finally dried in the sun.

In the second time of stamping, soap is sometimes used, but is not good generally, and is never used for the coloured shawls, as the alkali might affect the colours. Sulphur fumes are employed to produce a pure pale white colour in the new shawls.

After being washed, the shawls are stretched upon a wooden cylinder for two days, when they are removed to be packed. After being wrapped in sheets of smooth-glazed paper, they are pressed; the bale is afterwards sewn up in strong cloth; over this a cover of birch-bark is laid and an envelope of wax-cloth added, and the whole is sewed up as smoothly and tightly as possible in a raw hide, which contracting gives to the contents of the package a remarkable degree of compactness and protection.

Old shawls that require cleaning—and it is said, in some instances new ones—are washed by means of the freshly-gathered root of a parasitical plant called kirtz, a species of *consinia* (*anis dioscorea deltoidea*). A pound of it is bruised and mixed with about three pints of water; and to this, should it be necessary to raise the temperature, is added a mixture of pigeon's-dung (a piece equal in size to a turkey's egg), mixed and beaten up with about the same quantity of water, and the shawl is saturated with the liquor, and then stamped upon, washed with the hand, and then well steeped in the canal. The colours of an old shawl, after it has been washed, are often renewed so well as to deceive any but the initiated by packing them in again with a wooden pin, dipped in the requisite tints.

Vigne states that the fool's-cap or cypress-shaped ornament so commonly worked on the shawls is a representation of the *jigeh* or *kankkeh* or aigrette of jewels which is worn on the forehead in the east. Others again think that the pattern was suggested by the windings of the river Jhelum in its course through the valley, as viewed from the top of the Takht-i-Suliman; but this latter supposition seems to be highly improbable.

A first-rate woven shawl, weighing 7 lbs., will fetch in Kashmir as much as £300, which price is made up of—

	£ 30	the cost of material.
	„ 150	the wages of labour.
	„ 70	duty.
	„ 50	miscellaneous expenses.
Total	£ 300	

The ordinary shawls sell for prices ranging between R 50 and 2,000, depending upon the quality of materials and richness of embroidery. Hand-worked shawls cost about one-fifth as much as loom-made shawls. Shawls to the value of about £130,000 are exported annually from Kashmir. Of this amount about 9 lakhs or £90,000 worth find their way to Europe, the remainder supplying the various eastern markets.

Of the Kashmir shawls exported to Europe—

France monopolises about	80 per cent.
United States of America	10 „
Russia	2 „
Germany	1 „
Great Britain	1 „
Italy	5 „

Of the above, about two-thirds are purchased in Kashmir by French agents and exported to France direct; the remainder is exported through native bankers and sold at London auction sales, the buyers being nearly all French.

On the breaking out of the late war between France and Germany the shawl-trade suffered a sudden and temporary collapse; the ruin of the manufacturers and merchants was only averted by the Maharaja making large purchases to the value of several lakhs of rupees. The depression then caused has already disappeared, and there seems no doubt that if existing obstructions and abuses were removed, this valuable branch of industry would be capable of extensive development. The shawl weavers at Badrawar, Doda, and Bassoli enjoy great advantages, as they are free from many of the burdens and restrictions imposed upon their brethren in the valley of Kashmir. The shawls manufactured in these localities hold a middle place in the market; while greatly inferior to the veritable Kashmir shawl, they are of superior quality to shawls manufactured at Amritsar and other places in the Punjab, which are largely adulterated with *Hakar Shahi*, an inferior wool produced at Kirman.

APPENDIX 4 (see p. 78).

Lieut. Reynell Taylor's Report of 1847.

Before leaving Kashmir, I had the honour to forward for your information a brief sketch of the position in which I was then leaving affairs, and of the recent acts of Maharaja Golab Singh; from which I was of opinion that benefit to the people and country had been or would probably be derived.

2. This I did at the particular request of the Maharaja, whom I had often told that the best offering he could make at the approaching interview of his son and heir with the Governor General, would be a simple statement of orders given and measures taken, by which the condition of his people would be improved, and his own name as a liberal and enlightened Ruler raised.

3. At the same time, I have always tried to leave the act itself, its extent and nature, to the Maharaja, as I have a great objection to the idea of forcing him to make this or that concession, which, though known by us to be for his good as well as that of his people, is yet diametrically contrary to his own ideas on the subject; and the being obliged to yield consent to which must place him in his own eyes and that of his subjects and the world in the light of anything but an independent Ruler. This is the principle, I know, I have been desirous to keep in sight, and have, I think, in spirit acted up to; but the impossibility of getting the Maharaja or his functionaries to go beyond generalities in ordinary intercourse has put me generally in the position of the proposer of schemes, in doing which I usually suggested more than one method in all, clearly showing what I thought ought to be done, but leaving the choice and decision, as also the opportunity, of striking out some new or better idea to the Maharaja and his people.

4. The result of all these negotiations has, on the whole, been satisfactory; though the extent of remission and other concessions has been less than I hoped for, and of course still less than I wished for.

5. I shall now notice the heads of the letter above alluded to, on which I have any further information to convey; adding notes and explanation of terms to enable you to fully understand the various arrangements, translations, &c., and then proceed to mention a few points that I think worthy the attention of future enquiries, but which I have not been able to pay due regard to; and conclude with a brief opinion on Maharaja Golab Singh's character and that of his Government.

REVENUE.

6. In order that you may be enabled to understand what is really the case that the Maharaja's acts, with regard to the actual cultivators of the soil, have been characterised generally by kindness and consideration, and that in no instance have his demands from them exceeded those of his predecessors, while in some they have fallen short of them, I must briefly describe the mode of revenue collection during the incumbencies of the two preceding rulers, namely, General Mian Singh and Sheikh Gholam Mohi-ud-din.

7. It will be necessary, however, before entering on a description of the mode adopted in the reign of any particular Governor, to give a short account of the generally prevailing system, and an explanation of terms which, as they are peculiar to Kashmir, would convey no intelligible meaning to any one unacquainted with the customs of that country.

8. The chief produce of Kashmir, as well as the chief staple of food, is rice. This is grown with the kharif crop, in which Indian corn is also grown.

9. The system of collection is by a species of *buttaie*, but differing from it from the fact of the estimate of the produce being made when the grain is in the sheaf and not divided in the heap after thrashing as in the regular *buttaie*. The crop, when cut by the zemindars, is collected in stacks (*goonsee*) consisting of a certain fixed number of *kharroos*,—a *kharroo* containing 28 sheaves (called *sawos* or *poolahs*). To ascertain the amount of each man's produce, a certain number of *kharroos* are taken indiscriminately from several stacks on the estate; and the grain being thrashed and measured, the amount contained in the stack and in the whole number of stacks is estimated by the result. The Government demands are then reckoned; they consist of a full half share plus *trukkee** and *aboo*† &c., which, when all is said and done, makes the Government claim up to full two-thirds of the produce, leaving the zemindar one-third. This is the dry Government account; besides this the zemindar has a *hungry kardar* with his subordinates to satisfy.

* A *trukkee* is one-eighteenth of a *kharwar*; a certain number of trucks are taken with each *kharwar* of the Government share and this is termed *Trukkee*.

† *Aboo* is a term common throughout India for the items of Government perquisite, in excess of the regular share.

The rest in *mohiyah*. The *khirwars* which are taken in kind used formerly to be made over to the zemindar to bring to the city; they were made over to him at 16 trucks, or the full *khirwar*, and required from him at the city of Kashmir at 15 trucks; this one truck which was allowed him was called the *Kanoor-i-shahi*, besides which something was always allowed as horse and boat hire which was reckoned by the distance from which the grain had been brought. This

system has latterly given place to one by which the grain of the Government share is made over to a third party called the *Tehsildar*, whose office it is to bring it to the city, and with whom Government reckons for the land and water carriage.

11. *Mobiyah* is a system by which the Government is entitled to take a certain number of trucks in every *khirwar* in money at one or more established *nerikhs*. These *khirwars* are taken at 16 trucks from the *zemindar*, and returned to him in *Mobiyah* at 15 trucks (called *Abce-shukr* which may be rendered *city-rate*; meaning the rate of grain brought to the city by water which is always 15 trucks). This one truck of *Kusoor-i-shali* being deducted, the established rate of land and water carriage from his village to the city is allowed to the *zemindars*. I despair of being able to make you understand this complicated system without giving an example to illustrate it. Say, then, that *Sut Ram* lives in the village of *Tregam* in the *pergunnah* of *Arwin*; that the established land and water carriage from his village to the city is two trucks (it seldom occurs in such convenient round numbers), and that the established rates of *Mobiyah* for his village are 6 trucks per *khirwar*, at a *nerikh* of 1 rupee 6 annas, and 4 trucks per *khirwar* at 1 rupee 4 annas; and that his land produces 90 *khirwars*, *Hardo Hissa*,* the Government claim, on which, including everything, amounts to 60 *khirwars*; † of this he will have to pay *Mobiyah* at a *nerikh* of 1 rupee 6 annas per *khirwar* for 22 *khirwars* 8 trucks; this will amount to 30 rupees 15 annas, and out of the 22 *khirwars* 8 trucks, Government will deduct 1 *khirwar*, 3 trucks, 2 *muswattas* as *Kusoor-i-shali*, at 1 truck per *khirwar*, but it will allow him land and water carriage at the rate of 2 trucks per *khirwar*, which will amount to 2 *khirwars* 13 trucks, so that giving his *khirwar* at 16 trucks, and having it reduced to 15 by the *Kusoor-i-shali*, he eventually receives it again with land and water carriage added at 17 trucks. Then come 4 trucks more, at a *Mobiyah* of 1 rupee 4 annas; this will be 15 *khirwars*, and will amount in money to 18 rupees 12 annas; 15 trucks will be deducted as *Kusoor-i-shali*, and 1 *khirwar* 14 trucks will be allowed as carriage.

12. *Sut Ram's* account, therefore, in money and kind, will stand thus—

Hardo hissa or full produce	90	Khirwars.
Sirkari hissa	45	
Trukkee, aboab, &c.	15	
Total Government Demand	60	
		Rb. Trucks.
Of which to be taken in <i>Mobiyah</i> at various rates	37	8
Leaving in kind	23	8
Deduct allowed in carriage	2	6
Total to be paid in kind	20	2

Of the above 37 *khirwars* 8 trucks 22 *khirwars* 8 trucks are to be paid for at a *nerikh* of—

1 rupee 6 annas per <i>khirwar</i> amounting to	30	15	0
And 15 <i>khirwars</i> at a <i>nerikh</i> of 1 rupee 4 annas	18	12	0
Total to be paid in money	48	27	0

While for his 37 *khirwars* 8 trucks, *Sut Ram* will receive 39 *khirwars* 14 trucks; that is, out of the full produce of 90 *khirwars* he will pay to Government 49 rupees 11 annas in money and 20 *khirwars* 2 trucks in grain; and he will keep himself 69 *khirwars* 14 trucks.

13. The above is the theory of the thing, but as may be naturally supposed so complicated a system is liable to infinite intermediate irregularities, and one item, especially, that of carriage, though allowed by Government, is said to have seldom found its way to the *zemindar*. I made many enquiries with a view to ascertaining the truth of this assertion, and received so many conflicting statements in reply that I am unable to speak decidedly on the subject; and such is the nature of the revenue system of Kashmir, that it really is a matter of positive labour and difficulty to ascertain the mode of collection, not in a district or village, but with reference to the accounts of one individual only.

14. When I say that the above *Mobiyah* rates, together with those for carriage, vary not in every district alone, but in nearly every village of a district, and that besides these regulations which apply only to the *Sirkisht* cultivation, there is a separate code in each for the *Pakisht*, it may be imagined what an Augean stable the whole thing is; without first mastering the details, it would quite confound a traveller to hear in every village a different account of the Government demand.

15. The system above described applies to the *Sirkisht* cultivation—a term applied to land cultivated by the regular ryots of a village; that ploughed and sown by the inhabitants of other villages or new comers, which is termed *Pakisht*, and no *abadees* or land newly broken up, is more lightly assessed, though much on the same principles.

16. Of the rabi crop, which is estimated in the same way as the *kharif*, and consists of barley, wheat, and turnip seed, the Government claims the half share plus 1 truck *Khurch*,

* *Hardo Hissa* signifies the sative produce of the land; *Sirkari Hissa*, the half share; *Hissa-o-Trukkee*, the half share plus the established items of extra cess.

† Four *manneethas* are one truck; 16 trucks=one *khirwar*; one *khirwar* is =36 *manneethas* Kashmiri, which are equal in weight to 80 rupees.

that is, if the zemindar sows his own seed; if he obtains an advance of seed from Government, 3 trucks are taken as *khurch*.

17. The revenue on cotton, &c., which are generally considered as *zulti* crops, is estimated in the same manner as that of the *rabi* crop, and commuted to a money payment at certain fixed rates.

18. Having thus given a general idea of the principles on which the revenue of Kashmir has always been collected, I shall proceed to describe the particular method and rates adopted during the Governorships of General Mian Singh and the Sheikh, which preceded that of Maharaja Goleb Singh.

REVENUE RATES OF GENERAL MIAN SINGH'S TIME.

Kharif Crops.

19. *Sirkisht*.—Government share—half the produce.

Trukkee.—General Mian Singh at first took five trucks per *khirwar* in *trukkee*, but afterwards reduced it to four; the whole amount of *trukkee* was taken at a *Mobiyah* of Rs. 1-8 the *khirwar*; while the Government share in grain was made over to the zemindar to bring to the city, where it was taken from him at the rate of 15 trucks the *khirwar*; and he was allowed something in addition for land and water carriage.

The Government was, however, entitled to take as much as it chose in *Mobiyah*; and if the zemindar was not required to bring the grain to the city, the *kardar* occasionally took it in *Mobiyah* at the regular rate on the district.

Besides the four trucks above-mentioned, the following items of *khurch* and *aboa* were levied, in addition to the *Sirkari* share:—

Rasdat.†—A tax on fruit trees, willows, vegetables, &c., according to the quantity contained or produced in a village, and varying from 10 to 100 rupees per village.

Tel Saak Chuhar Muatit.†—A tax on the produce of walnut trees, regulated by the bearing, amounting sometimes to 1,000 or 2,000 nuts per tree, and commuted occasionally at a *berikh* of one rupee for six seers Kashmiri 2,500 walnuts.

Rusid-i-kah.*†—A tax on straw, one rupee one *anna* per 100 *khirwars*.

Sur-i-dehee.†—For a small village, one rupee; for a large village, two rupees.

Rusoom-i-duffet.†—Rs. 5 per 1,000 *khirwars* of grain.

Darogha-i-duffet.—Rs. 150 on the whole country.

Rusid Shumagah-o-Khubbul.*†—Rs. 2 per 1,000 *khirwars*.

Thannadaree.—For a small village one rupee; for a large village two rupees.

Annee.—On the items marked thus* above one *anna* in the rupee.

Sur-i-suddee jinsee.—The amount of hire being deducted one *khirwar* per 100 was taken on the whole amount as *sur-i-suddee jinsee*.

Chungee or *Churinghee*.—The hire and *Sur-i-suddee jinsee* being deducted, four trucks per 100 *khirwars* were taken as *Chungee*.

Ghaldaree.—The Government took three *murwuttabs* in the *khirwar* from the boat *manjis* of the amount paid to them as boat hire by the zemindars in transporting the grain of the Government share to the city.

Musadah.—A sort of interest paid by the zemindar on seed advanced by Government, which amounted to 6 *murwuttabs* per *khirwar*, of which the Government took 4½ and the *kardar* 1½ *murwuttabs*.

Rusid-i-Deori and Doodkee.—Six trucks per 100 *khirwars*.

Sur-i-suddee Nukdee.—On the items marked thus † Re. 1-0 per Rs. 100.

Munwutte Tashkhanah.—One *munwuttah* per *khirwar*.

Neem Munwutte Hurkarah.—Half *munwuttah* per *khirwar*.

Neem Munwutte Quanoongo.—Half *munwuttah* per *khirwar*.

Tehseldaree jinsee.—Three-fourths of a *munwuttah* per *khirwar*.

Shikdar.—One *munwuttah* per *khirwar*.

Serazudar.—Half *munwuttah* per *khirwar*.

Suzawul.—Half *munwuttah* per *khirwar*.

Tahweedar.—One *munwuttah* per *khirwar*.

Khidmudgaree Kardar.—Three-fourths of a *munwuttah* per *khirwar*.

Additional *trukkee* on the following above-written items:—*Munwutta*, *Tosbakhans*, *Neem Munwutte*, *Hurkarah*, and the *Neem Munwutte Quanoongo*. These items were further taxed at one truck per *khirwar*.

Pakisht and Naabatee.—The Government did not take *trukkee* or *khurch* on the Government share for the first year, but after that as usual.

Cotton, mung, maash saah, maash safid, ulsee lobiyah, kunjut, tobacco, zeerah saah, usl radung, aniseed, red pepper. Of these the Government took a plain half-share and one truck *khurch*: that is to say, if the zemindar found his own seed. If, however, Government provided the seed, three trucks *khurch* were taken.

RABI CROP.

In this harvest, barley, wheat, turnips, mustard-seed, pulse, red-pepper, poppy-seed, coriander, were produced; and they were assessed in the same manner as the above; namely, half share and one truck or three trucks *khurch*, according as the zemindar found his own seed or otherwise.

REVENUE COLLECTION OF SHEIKH GHOLAM MOHI-U-DIN'S TIME.

Kharif Crop.

Government share	4 truck.
Trukkee Sirkiast	4 trucks.
Pakiast	2 trucks.

This continued till the year 1902, when the Sheikh promised the zemindars a remission of two of the trucks of the Sirkiast Trukkee on condition of their increasing the cultivation to that extent in the year 1903. Agreements were written by the zemindars to this effect, but were not in any instance (it is asserted) acted up to.

Mobiyah.—In the year 1900 Gholam Mohi-u-din reduced the rate of Mobiyah from R 1-3 per kharwar to R 1-6, which has remained the prevailing rate ever since.

Mobiyah Kandaree.—The rate of this was one rupee per kharwar; but in about 15 or 20 villages, where the General's customs remained, R 1-6 was still taken.

The rates of khurch, sboab, &c., of the Sheikh's time, were as follows; as they have been adhered to in nearly every point in the Maharaja's time, I put the two scales in juxtaposition to save useless repetition.

	Sheikh's time.	Maharaja Octab Singh's.
Rusodat	Uncertain as before; but something less taken than in the General's time.	The same.
Tel Seah Chubar Mugiz	According to produce as above	Ditto ditto.
Rusodi Kah	One rupee one anna per 100 kharwar H. & T.	Ditto ditto.
Sure dehee	Four rupees per 1,000 " H. & T.	Ditto ditto.
Thannahdaree	One rupee two annas per 100 " H. & T.	Ditto ditto.
Rusodi Shanagh-o-Khubbul	Two rupees four annas per 1,000 " H. & T.	Ditto ditto.
Rusoom-i-duftar	Five rupees per 1,000 " H. & T.	Ditto ditto.
Daroghah i-duftar	Twelve annas per 1,000 " H. & T.	Ditto ditto.
Munwuttee Toshah Khanah	One munwuttee per 1,000 " H.	Ditto ditto.
Neem Munwuttee Harkarah	Half munwuttee per kharwar; this was taken by the sarkar, the burkara receiving a separate allowance, H.	Ditto ditto.
Neem Munwuttee Quanoongo	Half munwuttee per kharwar H	The Amanee harkar took one whole truck from the zemindars and paid away 3/4 munwuttees of it to these five individuals, keeping the remaining half munwuttees himself; this made another half munwuttees from the zemindars, which is not however mentioned in the accounts.
Shikdar	One ditto ditto	
Suzawul	Half ditto ditto	
Terazudar	Half ditto ditto	
Tahweldar	One ditto ditto	
Musadah	Six munwuttees per kharwar, of which the Government took one truck, leaving the kharwar two munwuttees.	Ditto ditto.
Suri Suddee Jinsee	The Kerai being deducted, 1 kharwar per 100.	Ditto ditto.
Chungee	Mobiyah and Kerai deducted four trucks per 1,000.	Ditto ditto.
Ghat Daree	Three munwuttees on the amount of boat hire.	Taken from the Tahweldar.
Suri Suddee Nukdee	One rupee nine annas per cent. on the items before mentioned: see Code of General Mian Singh's time.	
Anee	One anna in the rupee on the munwuttees Toshakhannah, Neem Munwuttees Harkara and the Neem Munwuttees Quanoongo.	Ditto ditto.
Yek Trukkee	One truck per kharwar on the above-mentioned three items.	Ditto ditto.
Neem Munwuttee yeri markub	Half munwuttees per kharwar on the hire of horses for the conveyance of grain taken from the Tahweldar.	Ditto ditto.
Perwanah Nuvees	One rupee four annas per 1,000 H. & H. kharwar.	Ditto ditto.
Sarpurast Khazannah S.H.	One rupee eight annas per 1,000 kharwar of the sarkarae bisshab.	Ditto ditto.
Moharona	R. 2 per sarkarae 1,000 H. & T.	Ditto ditto.
Nuzerana Durbar Sahib	In General Mian Singh's time this was given out of the regular collections, but Sheikh Gholam Mohi-u-din put it on the zemindars as an extra item of khurch.	Its amount is trifling.
Boodkee	Eight annas per 100 both nicka and jurs H. & H.	Ditto ditto.
Dewannee	A sort of muzuranah hakimi not written in the duftar, and amount uncertain.	Ditto ditto.
Deoree	Ditto ditto	Ditto ditto.

H. and T. on the bissh and truckee.
 H. on the bissh or Government share.
 H. and H. on the Harid Bissh or full produce.
 R. H. the same as H.

The under-mentioned crops were paid for at certain fixed rates per kharwar:—

	R	a.	p.
Cotton per kharwar	10	0	0
Do. in some districts	9	0	0
Mong	2	0	0
Mash, black and white	1	8	0
Kanjid	8	0	0
Lobiyah	1	8	0
Kutran	3	3	3
Tobacco	6	0	0
" in Kumraj	11	0	0
Red pepper	8	0	0
Quinse seed	85	5	0
Honey	16	0	0
Rodung	75	0	0
Kalazera per four seers	1	0	0

RABI CROP.

Sheikh Gohar Mohi-u-din's time.

The Sirkar took the half share and one truck khurch, where the seed was found by the zemindar, and three trucks where it was found by Government; when the amount of Government hissa and trukkee or full demand was ascertained, it was commuted into money at the following rates:—

	R	a.	p.
Barley per kharwar	1	4	0
Wheat	2	0	0
Turnips	4	0	0
Mustard	3	3	3
Pulse	1	8	0
Vetch	1	8	0
Coriander	8	0	0
Poppy-seed	8	0	0

Maharajah Golab Singh's time.

The Maharaja did not, except in a few instances, carry out the Sheikh's promise of a remission of two trucks of the Sirkisht collection; and where it was done, it was only for that year. The excuse made for its non-continuance is that it is very doubtful whether the Sheikh meant it to continue beyond the year 1903. The Maharaja, however, reduced the rate of trukkees on the Sirkisht of the whole country to three trucks; leaving that of the Pakisht and Noabadi at two trucks as before.

The Maharaja reduced the zabti rate on cotton from Rs. 10 to 7. In all other points he adopted the rates of Sheikh Gholam Mohi-u-din's collection.

You will observe that although some of the rates of khurch, aboab, &c., of General Mian Singh's time are lower than the corresponding one of the Sheikh's and Maharaja's time, still the rate of the trukkee was much higher then, than it has been since.

You will also perceive that the Maharaja has, if anything, lowered the Government demand in comparison with his immediate predecessor. And perhaps, after the description I have given, you will be able to understand the extreme difficulty of ascertaining the truth or otherwise of a complaint of extortion or irregularity made by a zemindar, where upwards of 30 different items of trukkee, khurch, &c., had to be enquired into; besides the rates of carriage and rates and extent of Mobiyah in his village before his liabilities on one or hundred kharwars could be ascertained.

My chief exertions were therefore directed to obtaining a simplification of the system of collection. which, coupled with whatever reduction might be agreed to, would, I hope, relieve the burthens of the people, frustrate the exactions of subordinates, and pave the way for still greater improvements.

I accordingly recommended that these numerous heads, together with the trukkee, should be condensed into one or two items; and the whole greatly reduced.

After a good deal of discussion, it was decided that the following 23 heads, together with the trukkee, should be condensed into one, and the whole reduced to 4½ trucks. These comprise all regular khurch and aboab, the remaining seven items being either separate taxes, or not affecting the zemindar, as I shall afterwards explain.

List of heads of khurch, aboab, &c., which, together with the trukkee of three trucks, have been condensed into one item of 4½ trucks.

- | | |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. Thanaduree. | 13. Changee. |
| 2. Rusud-i-shamagh-o-Khubbal. | 14. Sur-i-Suddee Nukdee. |
| 3. Rusoon-i-duftur. | 15. Ane. |
| 4. Daroghah-i-duftur. | 16. Yek Trukkee. |
| 5. Munwattee Toobah Khanab. | 17. Farwanah Naweesee. |
| 6. Neem Munwattee Horkunab. | 18. Surprust Khanaswah. |
| 7. Neem Munwattee Tehildar Jinsee. | 19. Mohuranab. |
| 8. Shikhar. | 20. Nuzuramah Durbar Sahib. |
| 9. Suzawal. | 21. Boedken. |
| 10. Terozudar. | 22. Dawanee. |
| 11. Talveeldar. | 23. Deerae. |
| 12. Sur-i-suddee Jinsee. | |

Five items of the above, together with half a munwattee to the kardar, having been taken from the zemindar, and given to different public servants as before mentioned; it has been arranged that they shall receive equivalent wages from Government.

List of heads unaffected by this arrangement:—

1. *Rusurdal*, a separate tax on fruit-trees, vegetables, &c.
2. *Tel Seah Churhar Mughzan*, being a separate tax on walnut trees.
3. *Rusud-i-Kah*, being a separate tax on straw.
4. *Sar-i-Dehee*, being a sort of Nuzzur-i-Hakimi, or Nuzzur to the Government, and owner of the soil.
- 5 and 6. *Ghul danees and nema munwattee zen-i-murkul*, as affecting the tubveeldar and not the zemindar.*
7. *Musudah*, being a tax on grain advanced by Government for sowing, and depending on the quantity received by each man.

In order to elucidate the working of this new system, I subjoin the account on one hundred khirwars reckoned according to the old system and new, which will also clearly show the extent of remission, which amounts to about $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on the Government share.

I must remind you that in Kashmir revenue accounts, khirwars, trucks, and munwattees answer respectively to rupees, annas, and three pie, and they are added together to make one total.

Old System.

	Khirwars.	Khirwars, Trucks, or As.	Munwattee or 3 pie.
Hurdo hissab	100	50	0 0
Government share		9	6 0
Trukkee at three trucks per khirwar		0	2 0
1. Shumagh-o-Khubbul		0	10 6
2. Thannadree		0	4 6
3. Rusoom-i-duftur		0	0 9
4. Daroghah-i-duftur		0	0 6
5. Munwattee Toshakbaah		0	13 3
6. Ditto Hurkarah		0	6 7 $\frac{1}{2}$
7. Surisuddee Jinsee		0	9 9
8. Surisuddee Nukdee		0	4 9
9. Purwanah Nuweesse		0	2 0
10. Surpust Khuzanah		0	1 6
11. Yek Anee		0	1 7 $\frac{1}{2}$
12. Yek Trukkee		0	1 0
13. Moluranah		0	2 7 $\frac{1}{2}$
14. Boodkee		0	5 6
15. Durbar Sahib		0	3 0
16 and 17. Dewanee and Deoree, &c.		0	8 0
18. Chungee		0	2 6
19. Shikdar		0	12 6
20. Tuhveeldar		0	12 6
21. Teruzdar		0	6 3
22. Tehsildar jinsee		0	6 3
23. Suzawal		0	6 3
TOTAL		67	1 7$\frac{1}{2}$

New System.

Hurdo hissab	100	50	0 0
Government share		14	13 2
Trukkees aboab, &c., at $4\frac{1}{2}$ trucks per kharwar			
TOTAL		64	13 2

Old System.

Hurdo hissab	200	100	0 0
Government share		84	3 8
Kharwar Aboab, &c.			
TOTAL GOVERNMENT CLAIM		184	3 3

New System.

Hurdo hissab	200	100	0 6
Government share		29	10 4
Kharwar Aboab, &c.			
TOTAL GOVERNMENT CLAIM		129	10 4
Difference per cent. on the Government share			4 8 11

With regard to the system of Mobiyab, I tried in vain to hit upon some plan by which it might be equalized throughout the country without the risk of loss and injury to the cultivators of particular districts and individuals.

* Rusoom-i-patwari and neems munwattee Qanoonp. These two officials are remunerated by the zemindars whose servants they are. The Government have nothing to say to them.

I was unable myself to leave the city of Kashmir and visit the various districts of the country; and I soon became convinced that to alter the Mobiyah rates without doing so would be a measure of extreme danger, unless covered by a large remission; they having been established after a long course of years, and regulated entirely by the particular position and advantages or otherwise possessed by the cultivators of a district or village. I therefore decided that they should be merely registered in order that future doubt and confusion might not occur; and that the zemindar, in case of being hardly used, might have an established standard to appeal to.

In the case of those districts immediately in the neighbourhood of the city, it was decided, for reasons which I shall afterwards explain, that the whole of the revenue should be taken in money commutation. The established amount of Mobiyah being first taken at the usual rates, the rest to be collected at a *nerikh* of Re. 1 per *kbirwar*. This is no hardship upon the cultivators of these districts who from that position are enabled to sell their grain advantageously, and by converting it into *chaoul*, namely, by husking it, they can obtain double price for it; while the inhabitants of the *elaquas* further removed from the city do not find it worth while to bring their grain so far for sale; and on that account it is kindness to them to take it in kind.

It appeared to me to be desirable to reduce the numerous and confused rates of land and water carriage allowed to the zemindar (but, as asserted by many, seldom received by him) to some more simple and general system; but even this involved considerable risk to the zemindar, and before I ventured to do it, I was obliged to ascertain the average amount of carriage in each district.

It was at length decided that the fixed carriage for one (the most distant) *elaqua* should be three *trukks*, for 22 *elaquas* two *trukks*, and for 12 *elaquas* one *trukk*. The revenue of the three remaining districts has always been collected in money.

Thus, instead of the before-mentioned complicated system of first deducting one *trukk* for *Kussoor-i-shahi*, and subsequently allowing something for carriage in taking the *Mobiyah*, the *kbirwar* in Mobiyah will be reckoned at 16, 17, or 18 *trukks*, as the now established rate may be; and the zemindar will retain his grain without subjecting it to intermediate deductions or pilfering by subordinate officials.

In all these arrangements I particularly stipulated that, in cases where on account of want of water and other reasons the rates of taxation had been previously reduced to the standard lower than now proposed, they were not to be affected by the new settlement.

I think I have now said sufficient to enable you to understand the accompanying paper of regulations, of which English paper (1) is a translation; a copy of which is to be kept by each *kardar* who will be responsible for its production. The Persian copy in my possession bears the Maharaja's sign manual.

The remission of revenue is certainly very small; but, as I have said, I could not have obtained more without forcing the Maharaja to act directly contrary to his own wishes and feelings; he naturally looks upon the revenue as it now stands as good tangible income, presenting no difficulties of collection and, if oppressive, not made so by any act of his; and I fear he prefers clinging to this assured amount of yearly profit to relinquishing a portion for a few years. With a view to the general improvement of the country and advancement of the prosperity of his people, Pundit Raj Rak's view of the case is true enough, but not cheering; on my lamenting the comparatively small amount of remission that had been agreed to, he answered me with the Persian proverb: 'ask the lost souls in *Dozakh*, the lowest hell, and they will tell you that *Eraf*, or the state between heaven and hell, where neither punishment nor enjoyment is felt, is paradise'; and on that principle and, compared with the former state of things, I may hope that my labours may have afforded some slight relief to the cultivators of Kashmir.

Rice.

The Maharaja has promised that there shall in future be no restrictions in the sale of Government rice as to quantity; that the *nerikh* shall never exceed one rupee; and that the Government shall have nothing to say to the market.

To ensure a large amount of grain being left in the hands of his people, I recommended that the revenue of ten *pergunnahs* near the city should be collected in money. The zemindars to be allowed to dispose of their grain when and where they like, and free import and export to be allowed; the whole of the arrangement is included in translation 1, the Persian original of which is signed by the Maharaja, and is in my possession.

Shawl tax.

I enclose a copy of the new regulations for the shawl tax translated in paper 2.

The following remarks will explain the most important points, and a copy of the regulations in question would be found useful by any one visiting Kashmir on duty.

Remarks on Translation.

Art. 1.—It was formerly the custom to stamp the shawl at its very commencement, and immediately take the amount of tax upon it, by which means, if any untoward accident happened to the shawl in the course of preparation, the maker was the loser by the whole amount of the tax. The *pullah* is nearly one-third of shawl, and when so much has been done, it is good tangible property and sure to be eventually completed.

Art. 2.—According to old rules.

Art. 3.—The former rates of Chittannah were five rupees for a pair of long shawls, two rupees for a square shawl, and one anna for plain shawls. It is now made one equal rate for both descriptions of shawls and much reduced.

Art. 4.—The system of Kusoom-i-shali under the last was rather different, but the karkhandars wish to retain the system in vogue under the baj, and the Maharaja agreed to it. The Kusoor-i-shali is looked upon as an integral part of the shawl tax, and must not be considered as an oppressive system of compulsory sale on the part of Government. During the whole enquiry no complaint against the *Kusoor-i-shali* was made to me. The arrangement also has advantages in securing in all seasons a certain quantity of grain for their yearly support to the numerous class of shawl weavers.

Art. 5.—According to old rules, but last new year's day, or *no ros*, the Maharaja took nine annas per dukhan in Buzzurannah, so a rule was necessary.

Art. 6.—The Maharaja made a particular point of this, saying that it was by far the most important matter in the whole case.

Art. 8.—I have before, at considerable length, described the mode in which the increase of $6\frac{1}{2}$ annas in the rupee had been in a manner extorted by the journeymen from the master weavers. This has now been reduced by $1\frac{1}{2}$ annas, and the remaining 4 annas has, at the earnest request of the journeymen weavers, been distributed upon the threads according to the difficulty and labour attendant on each particular style of weaving.

Art. 9.—This abolished the *quaid* system so obnoxious to the Shalbhās, and under which no improvement in the trade could be expected, as the workmen preferred apprenticing their children to their own natural lines of life to introducing them to one where they were to be hopelessly bound to work for one man, and to escape from which many instances have occurred of perfected weavers maiming and injuring themselves in order to render themselves unfit for the work. A man will now be bound to work for the whole year for one master to ensure the karkhandar from great loss, through his work being left unfinished and his engagements unfulfilled. The one month's warning is required to enable master and man to clear accounts. It takes three years to perfect an apprentice in the trade; and the one year extra is allowed in order that the teacher may derive some benefit from the labours of the pupil.

I at first declined attaching my signature at all to the paper; but, at the Maharaja's especial request, eventually signed it as a witness.

Copies of both these papers, signed by the Maharaja, were made over in my presence to the mokims of the shawl stamp office. This was done at the request of the karkhandars; and the mokims were told that they would be responsible for their production in cases of difficulty.

Glossary for the shawl tax settlement.

Karkhandar.—Karkhandars are of three kinds: nukdi, jema-khurchi, and anutnagi.

The nukdi karkhandar is generally a man of property. The term karkhandar means master of a karkhanah or manufactory. He is the owner of the house, the master and tutor of the workmen. He furnishes the thread, has it dyed, pays the workmen and the Government tax.

For a full description of the position of the nukdi karkhandars on my arrival at Kashmir, I must refer you to my diary No. 7 of the 4th of July, paragraphs 12 to 21 inclusive.

Jema-khurchi.—The jema-khurchi karkhandars work on a very small scale. They have no capital of their own, but on commencing a shawl or other piece of work are obliged to obtain an advance of the amount of tax either from Government or a merchant. Jema-khurchi work has always been taxed by the piece, on the same system as that now resorted to for the whole shawl trade.

A *dukan* or shop of jema khurchi weavers consists of two men. The men work in their own houses instead of in a manufactory. Jema-khurchi work is considered much inferior to that executed in the nukdi karkhanahs.

Anutnagi karkhandars.—Anutnag is the Hindi name of Islamabad, where there are a number of shawl manufactories, the masters of which are generally styled Anutnagi karkhandars.

A *dukan* of Anutnagi weavers consists of three men, and is taxed on the money contract principle at Rs. 180 yearly, besides Kusoor-i-shali, at the same rate as the nukdi weavers of the city of Kashmir.

Anutnagi weaving is inferior to that of the capital.

I recommended the contract principle being exchanged for taxation on the piece in Islamabad, also in case of the system working well in the city.

Besides the above three great divisions there are the following:—

Beiroujat.—This term may be rendered suburban, and is applied to the manufactories in the immediate neighbourhood of Kashmir; most of the nukdi karkhandars possess a certain number of beiroujat shops.

A *dukan* of *beiroujat* weavers is rated at three men; the tax is taken on the piece.

Sndabāfs, i.e., weavers of plain work, one man per dukan, tax on the piece, but amount not taken until the work is completed.

Hashehbāfs, or men who weave the shawl borders, one man per shop, tax on the piece.

Shagrid and shalbāfs, synonymous terms for the journeymen shawl weavers.

No Amozan, apprentice to the trade.

Shawl dagh.—Shawl stamp, a common wooden stamp about five inches in length and three in breadth, bearing the words Sri Ram Sabaio; it is dipped in common native ink, and then applied to the shawl. There are three stamps—one for long shawls, one for square shawls and plain work, and one for amlakar or embroidered work.

Dukan.—The men in a manufactory, though they may amount to some hundreds, are divided into so many dukans; uukdis, at the rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ men per dukan; anutaugi three; and no on.

Kusoor-i-shali.—Is a system by which a certain quantity of grain per dukan is issued yearly to the karkhandar by Government at a merikh of Rs. 2 per khirwar. The karkhandar makes over a certain fixed portion of it to the shagrids composing the shop, and recovers from them a portion of the money. For a full description of the system, see Diary No. 7 of 4th of July, paragraphs 14 and 15.

Baft.—As applied to the mode of taxation, means the system of levying it on the piece or amount of work done, instead of taking a fixed sum per dukan yearly.

Baj.—As applied to the mode of taxation denotes the latter-mentioned system, namely, taxation by a certain fixed sum yearly, without reference to the extent of work done.

Doshallah.—Long shawls always spoken of and sold in pairs.

Kasabah.—Square shawl single jamawar.

Sada.—Plain shawls or scarfs in pairs.

Kaner.—Woven work.

Amlakar.—Work embroidered with the hand.

Seekh.—This term really denotes the shuttle or winder on which the wool is fixed, and with which, as with a needle, the weaver passes the traversing or woof threads under the straighter ones or warf; one traversing of the thread is called a *seekh*, in speaking of the wages, and 570 *seekhs* make a *war* or one-third of a *girah*.

Girah.—A girah is the sixteenth part of a yard and equal to two inches.

Khoordae is a system by which a karkhandar of small capital is enabled to complete his work by receiving an advance of the amount of tax from a merchant or third party who retains the piece of the work as completed in security and receives his money again from the manufacturer on the shawl being sold, together with a certain portion of the chittianah, the rest going to Government; if Government advanced the tax, it of course took the whole chittianah.

Moultut.—The two months' credit allowed in paying the fixed yearly tax according to the old system, and the one month allowed for making good the tax on a pair of shawls by the new system, is called Moultut.

Mokims.—The mokims are Government officials attached to the shawl office. It is their duty to appraise the shawls when brought for stamping; and they receive a slight percentage from the merchant on the sale of the shawl, which is termed the *shawl peroshee*.

Rules for regulating the shawl tax concluded in presence of Maharaja Golab Singh Bahadoor, and Lieutenant Reynell George Taylor on the 30th of the month of Har 1904, corresponding to the 12th of July 1847 A. D.

1st.—The Government having at heart the welfare of all classes, the karkhandars, master-weavers, and merchants of all countries, as well as those that are natives of Kashmir, with the mokims of the shawl establishment, have been summoned to the Durbar, and full enquiry has been made into the rights of the case with regard to the shawl tax.

2nd.—Lalla Jovahir Mulk, who formerly held for a considerable time the management of the shawl business, and other karkhandars of long standing, having been fully interrogated, have explained what was the custom in former times. With a view, therefore, to the prosperity and support of the karkhandars, and the increase of the shawl trade, the following Code of Regulations has been drawn up.

ARTICLE 1ST.

3rd.—On the completion of a *pullah* of a pair of long shawls, one-quarter of a *kusabah* or square shawl, two *vars* and ten *girahs* of a *jamawar* or the whole of a pair of *sadlah* or plain shawls of *jamawar* work, the piece is to be brought to the shawl stamp office and stamped, and its price is to be determined according to the valuation made by trustworthy *mokims*, and on a fair price being fixed upon it, that price is to be increased 40 per cent., and then taxed at the rate of 3 annas in the rupee. Thus the whole amount of tax on every Rs. 100 of the real price of the shawl will be Rs. 26-4.

4th.—A pair of *doshallahs*, long shawls, to be reckoned at eight shops; *kusabah* at four shops, and *jamawar* three shops.

ARTICLE 2ND.

5th.—The darogah of the shawl stamp office should, after the stamping of the pieces as detailed in Article 1st, allow the karkhandars one month's credit in the payment of the amount of tax; the month having elapsed he should realise the amount from them. During the month in question he will, according to custom, retain the piece stamped in his hands on account of Government.

ARTICLE 3RD.

6th.—On every doshallah, kusabnah or jamawar, whatever may be its price, 12 annas to be taken as *chittiana*.

ARTICLE 4TH.

7th.—The *kusoor-i-shahi* to remain the same as that of 1902-3,—namely, that for every dukan, each dukan being reckoned at 2½ men, 27 kbirwar 7 trucks of grain are to be made over to the kirkhandar at a usikh of Rs. 2 per kbirwar, each kbirwar consisting of 15 trucks.

ARTICLE 5TH.

8th.—Nuzzaranah and salamanah are to be taken three times in the year, a fourth occasion being left optional to the karkhandars; the whole amount, together with the duties of dewani and dukani, not to exceed Re. 1-8 per dukan in the whole year. The occasions in question are as follows:—Dusserah, Busunt, Noroz, and Bysakhee; the latter optional.

ARTICLE 6TH.

9th.—The Government officials are on the occasion of the Nuffur Shumaree (when the workmen of each manufactory are numbered and registered for the ensuing year) to select the best workmen obtainable for the manufacture of the tribute shawls for the British Government. The number of workmen thus selected not to exceed 500.

ARTICLE 7TH.

10th.—The karkhandars to pay the shalbâfe (journeymen workmen) at the same rate that has long been established, together with the additions according to written agreement, and the karkhandars are to make the shalbâfe perform their full amount of work.

ARTICLE 8TH.

11th.—From the beginning of the month of Sawan 1904, the extent of increase on the old established wages is restricted to 4 annas in the year.

ARTICLE 9TH.

12th.—From the beginning of the month of Sawan 1904, when this Code of Regulations comes into play, the shagrids are allowed ten days to select masters; after which time they will not be allowed to change until the new year's day of the year 1905; and for the future the shagrids are to remain one whole year with the same karkhandars, namely, from the first day of one year to the first day of the next. At the termination of the year, the shagrid to be at full liberty to go where he likes and select his own service. He is, however, to give his master warning one month before the termination of the year, to allow of his accounts being properly arranged.

13th.—Apprentices are to be bound to remain with their masters for four years.

ARTICLE 10TH.

14th.—The system of taking the tax on the baft (*i.e.*, on the piece in place of by fixed contract) is to commence from the 1st of Sawan 1904. The balance of the *baft* or contract for the last month to be made good.

DETAIL OF WAGES.

15th.—Wages on long shawls of the finest workmanship—

Pullah—if fine doshallah 2 kuseerabs 1½ and ½ dumri per 1,000 seekhs,—according to the old system of wages the same work was paid for at the rate of 2 kuseerabs and ½ dumri per 1,000 seekhs, making the present increase 1 dumree and ½.

Muttun—3 kuseerabs and 1½ kowrie per 1,000 seekhs. The same work formerly 2½ kuseerabs. Present increase 1½ dumri.

Hasheeh—2½ kuseerabs per 1,000 seekhs. Formerly 2 kuseerabs; present increase one dumri.


Dor—the *lukidoor* and *turedoor* is paid at the same rate as the pullah work.

16th.—With regard to work of an inferior quality, it was formerly the custom for the karkhandars to deduct one anna in the rupee on work of which the wages on 100 wazs amounted to fourteen annas; it is now, however, decided that they shall only deduct half an anna in the rupee.

Originals signed by the karkhandars and shagrids; and witnessed by Lieutenant R. G. Taylor and the Merchants of Kashmir.

Rates of wages on the seekhs for the present description of shawl weaving determined upon according to the deposition of Rusool Sheikh, who is thoroughly conversant with the whole matter, on the 32nd of Har Sumbat 1904, corresponding to 14th July 1847 A. D.

Doshalla or long shawl.



Details of Wages.

Nature of work.	New rate.	Old rate.	Difference.
Pullah.			
For the <i>girah</i> of a <i>pullah</i> of shawls of the finest workmanship.	Two kuseerabs and 14 <i>damri</i> and one <i>kowrie</i> per 1,000 <i>seekhs</i> .	Two kuseerabs and half <i>damri</i> .	One <i>damri</i> and one <i>kowrie</i> .
A war of <i>pullah</i> work contains 570 <i>seekhs</i> , wherefore 100 wars is equal to 57,000 <i>seekhs</i> , plus 50 added and 16 <i>kuseerabs</i> ,—total 67,086 <i>seekhs</i> .	One rupee four annas per 100 wars.	One rupee.	Four annas.
A <i>girah</i> contains 800 wars, and is therefore equal to 171,178 <i>seekhs</i> .	Three rupees twelve annas per 800 wars.	Three rupees.	Twelve annas.
Muttuu.			
The <i>muttuu</i> contains 12 <i>girahs</i> . The <i>masdooras</i> for a <i>girah</i> of <i>muttuu</i> work.	Three kuseerabs and two <i>kowries</i> per 100 <i>seekhs</i> .	Two and a half kuseerabs.	Half kuseerab and two <i>kowries</i> .
A war of <i>muttuu</i> work contains 880 <i>seekhs</i> , and 100 wars therefore consists of 88,000 <i>seekhs</i> .	Twelve and a half annas per 100 wars.	Ten annas.	Two and a half annas.
A <i>girah</i> of <i>muttuu</i> contains 860 wars, and is equal to 1,12,000 <i>seekhs</i> .	Two rupees eleven annas nine pie per <i>girah</i> .	Two rupees three annas.	Eight annas nine pie.
Hashkeh.			
A war of <i>hashkeh</i> contains 90 <i>seekhs</i> , and 100 wars 9,000 <i>seekhs</i> .	Two annas nine pie and one <i>damri</i> per 100 wars.	Two annas three pie.	Six pie and one <i>damri</i> .
A <i>girah</i> of <i>hashkeh</i> work contains 325 wars, equal to 89,250 <i>seekhs</i> .	Nine annas one and a half pie per <i>girah</i> .	Seven annas three pie and one <i>damri</i> .	One anna nine pie and one <i>damri</i> .
Dor.			
<i>Dor</i> work is paid for at the same rate as that of the <i>pullah</i> .			

The original of this paper was signed by the *karkhandars* and *shallafs* in *Darbar*.

APPENDIX 5 (see p. 78).

Regulations for the Parganas of the Province of Srinagar.

Art. 1.—The established amount of truckee, together with all other abwab, with the exception of the rusud-i-kah, sur-i-dehi, rusoom-i-patwari, and quanoongo, has been fixed at 4 truckes and 3 munwuttees. Every one is to demand this amount and on no account to exceed it.

Art. 2.—The system for the rabi crop remaining unchanged, viz., truckee as usual, the mobiyah remitted, and the Government demand to be collected in kind.

Trukkee of the rabi crop as follows:—Where the Government seed is used by the zemindar 3 truckes, including everything; where the zemindar used his own seed, 1 truck including everything.

Art. 3.—The cultivators are to pay rusudas and sur-i-dehi according to long established custom, and in the same manner that in past times they divided the fruit trees, vegetable produce, and other cultivation among themselves, according to the law of heirship they are to do so now. In the case of a *moabad* or newly-established village, the above taxes will be remitted for two years, after which period the rusud-i-kabe, &c., will be taken in the same manner as it is from old villages.

Art. 4.—The nuzerana of the kardar has been fixed at the following scale for the whole year:—

	R a. p.
For a vilage producing from 2 to 3,000 kharwars	5 0 0
For do. do. from 1 to 1,500 do.	3 0 0
For do. do. from 5 to 700 do.	1 8 0

Art. 5.—Since the heads of rusoom-i-shikdar, rusoom-i-suzawal, rusoom-i-terazdar, rusoom-i-lowelladar, rusoom-i-kardar (all included in the kardar's truck), formerly received by those parties, have all been included in the Government truckee, a fixed allowance is to be made by Government for these officials in lieu of it. The Government officials are on no account to demand anything in excess of the 4 truckes and 3 munwuttees above mentioned from the zemindars.

Art. 6.—With regard to the walnut trees, an estimate is to be made of their bearing when the fruit is ripe, and in case of the zemindar agreeing to abide by the kardar's estimate well and good, but in the case of his being dissatisfied, the bearing of two or three trees estimated by the zemindars and that of two or three estimated by the Government official is to be gathered and measured, and the final amount of the Government claim is to be reckoned by the result.

Art. 7.—The rates of mobiyah of the various pergunnahs are to be regulated by the following detailed scale, which is in accordance with established custom, and is various.

If on any occasion, though God forbid, a dearth should occur, and grain should be required for the exigencies of the State, the Government will be entitled to take as much as is required in kind.

In the pergunnah of Ichh the whole of what was formerly taken in mobiyah according to old custom will be taken now, namely, a portion at a nerikh of Re. 1-6 per kharwar, and another portion at Re. 1-4 per kharwar, and whatever remains will now be taken at a nerikh of Re. 1 per kharwar.

[Here follow the various rates of mobiyah in all the pergunnahs of Kashmir, which I regret that I have not time to translate, though they would only be useful to an enquirer on the spot.] I subjoin a list of the parganas from which, as in that of Ichh above mentioned, after taking a certain portion of the produce in mobiyah at the old established rates, the remainder of the Government claim will be collected at a commutation of Re. 1 per kharwar:—

Ichh. Bongul. Nagam. Sayer-i-mozub-i-Pacer.	Dynsoo Lall. Macheehawab. Khwebe Shahabad. Bumbul, and Buldaha.
--	---

Art. 8.—In these parganas, in which the assessment has previously been lightened, no alteration is to be made, the new regulation will not be applied to them, nor will the one munwattee remitted to the other parganas be allowed them.

Art. 9.—The kharwar taken in mobiyah is to be reckoned at the three rates of 16 truckes, 17 truckes, and 18 truckes. No one on any account to depart from this rule.

The mobiyah kharwar of the following 12 parganas is to be reckoned at 16 truckes:—

Ichh. Vehu. Pluk. Pwinstpoor. Zemagir Lall. Sayer-i-mouzab.	Paeen Sayer. Mouzab-i-Jaba. Dynsoo. Kobihanus. Auntaug. Orlud.
--	---

The mobiyah khirwar of the following 20 parganae to be taken at 7 trukks :—

Telagam.	Shuhderoh.
Duchuoparah.	Shuprah-i-summum.
Shamirparah.	Datoc.
Nagam.	Shukroo.
Kemruj.	Machelmahoh.
Powbar.	Dungal.
Berang.	Burrah.
Martined.	Khuse.
Derser.	Krohen.
Arwin.	Zeenapur.

In the pargana of Lollab the mobiyah khirwar to be reckoned at 18 trukks.

The parganas of Shahabad, Bamhul, and Buldah are assessed by a money settlement.

To explain the application of the above rates, suppose three zemindars of Ichli, Telagam, and Lollab, respectively, to have to pay to Government money commutation for 50 khirwars each. The Ichli man would retain his 50 khirwars, the Telagam man would retain 850 trukks of grain, equal to 53 khirwars 2 trukks, while the Lollab man would retain 900 trukks, equal to 66 khirwars 4 trukks. This simple system is undoubtedly a great improvement on the old complicated land and water carriage and *kussoori-shali* computation.

Art. 10.—Any calculator receiving *musucodah*, namely, an advance of grain for seed, is to pay the enhanced revenue on the produce of it according to former custom. In case of a man not receiving *musucodah*, the increased revenue is not to be demanded of him.

Art. 11.—The half *munwattee* for the *cir-i-murku* or horse hire and *ghafonee*, which, by custom, is included in the carriage account of the tewildars, is to be paid by them, and it is not on any account to be demanded from the cultivators.

Art. 12.—In the time of former governors the cultivators of the province of Kashmir have suffered infinite annoyance from the system of seizing men for *begari* work without any rule or method. On this account I have decided on selecting 3 men for every 100 houses to be considered as Government servants, paying them at the rate of 1 khirwar of rice per mensem per man. Should a man not be called upon for *begar* work once during the whole year, he will receive pay at the rate of 8 trukks, or $\frac{1}{2}$ khirwar, per mensem, and it is my intention by degrees to establish serais at all the stages on the roads, as such an arrangement would contribute to the comfort of travellers. In cases of particular emergency, I shall call upon others to serve as *begars*, but in such cases I will pay each man so called upon 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ annas per diem.

Art. 13.—A proclamation containing these several articles to be sent to each pargana; the thanadars of each pargana to be answerable for the above 12 articles being carried into effect in their districts with the exception of that relating to the *begari*. In the case of any disagreement on the subject of revenue, this book is to be brought with the parties to Government, and the difficulty settled according to it; any zemindar who may have a disagreement with the kardar is to give a copy of these Regulations, having first received permission from Government to do so.

Art. 14.—To whomsoever from the beginning of Sambat 1904 I may give a village or land or anything else, unless I myself sign the paper for the grant, it is not valid. No other seal or signature but my own is valid.

Art. 15.—I shall take whatever grain is required for the supply of the army and the granaries of the posts in kind as is proper.

Art. 16.—With a view to the prosperity of the country and comfort of the inhabitants of the city and villages, the sale of rice is to be left entirely to the will and option of the zemindars and kardars. No embargo whatever is to be laid upon the ghâts. Any man selling rice at a higher *nerikh* than Re. 1 per khirwar will be answerable to Government for it.

Art. 17.—In case of men exporting grain from Kashmir across the Punjab, no one is to interfere with their doing so, and in case of men bringing grain from the plains no one is to molest them.

Art. 18.—The instalments of revenue are to be taken according to the following detail, which is the established custom—

Money collections and the revenue on walnuts, cotton, moorgh, &c., in Powai.

The monee of the mobiyah of rice in Cheith and Car, according to former custom.

Written on the 23rd of the month of Bhadwan, Sambat 1904.

MAHARAJAH GOOLAB SINGH.

An Act for regulating the stamp-duty on shawls as settled by Maharaja Goolab Singh, in consultation with Lieutenant R. G. Taylor at his capital of Kashmir on the 30th of Har Sambat 1904, corresponding with 12th of July 1847.

His Highness the Maharaja's most earnest wish being to secure the welfare and interests of his subjects this day summoned to his Durbar the shawl merchants and woolen traders of Kashmir that he might institute a full enquiry into the prevailing and established mode of taxing by the imposition of a stamp and stamp-duty. Lala Jowahir Mull, who was formerly in charge of this department, was called upon for a detailed account of the previous system,

and after him other karkhandars were also examined, when the following regulations were alid down for the better protection of the trade and encouragement of all concerned in it :

Regulation 1.

When one side of a pair of shawls has been completed, or the one-fourth of a square *roomal*, or 12 *girahs* of the pattern called *jamawar*, or the whole of a piece of one colour, the article in question is to be brought to the Shawl Stamp Office and there stamped, and the price fixed by competent officers, and Rs. 100 worth of work shall be calculated as Rs. 140, and 3 annas tax laid on every rupee; in other words, Rs. 28-4 per cent. shall be the amount of duty. And for the manufacture of shawls there shall be eight shops:—

For roomals	4 shops.
For jamawars	4 do.

Regulation 2.

When the Stamp Officer has stamped the shawls or other goods mentioned above, he will allow the manufacturer a delay of one month, after which he will exact payment of the duty, and according to invariable custom the stamped goods will remain in deposit with the Crown until the duty be discharged.

Regulation 3.

On every piece of whatever price, whether shawl, *roomal*, or *jamawar*, a chittianah of 12 annas will be levied.

In Regulation 3rd, "Chittianah," when the stamp is affixed to a new shawl, a note of the amount of duty due is given to the manufacturer and another to a shroff, who ultimately collects the duty and pays it in to the Sirkar, for which he gets 12 annas as a fee.

Regulation 4.

Concerning the *Kussoor-i-Shali*, it is hereby resolved to adhere to the arrangements of Sambat 1902 and 1903, which provides that to every 2½ men in a shop 27 *khirwar* and 7½ *trukke* (15 *trukke* = 1 *khirwar*) of rice shall be apportioned at the rate of Rs. 2 per *khirwar*.

In Regulation 4th *kussoor-i-shali*, a tax so called, levied from the weavers by selling them rice at double the market value.

Regulation 5.

In commutation of the *nuzzerana* and *islamana* which used to be given annually at the three great festivals—Dusserab, Bussunt and Noroz—and which those who liked gave also at the festival of Bysack, henceforward one sum of Rs. 1-8 will be taken from each shop.

Regulation 6.

Whenever the Maharaja requires costly shawls to be prepared for the British Government the most skilful workmen from each shop, in numbers altogether not exceeding 500, shall be placed at the Maharaja's disposal.

Regulation 7.

Concerning the rate of remuneration for work still in hand, it shall be according to original agreement, and the weavers must complete the work they have undertaken.

Regulation 8.

And for the future, from the 1st Sawan 1904 or 14th July 1847, the rate of weavers' wages is raised 4 annas in the rupee.

Regulation 9.

From the 1st of Sawan (on which this new Code will be published) 1904, apprentices will be allowed ten days wherein to take service, but after choosing their master will be bound to him for the space of one year, at the expiration of which time they will be at liberty to take service elsewhere, giving one month's notice of their intention to leave in order to enable their master to make up their accounts. Thus all apprentices will be bound to one master from the Noroz of one year to the Noroz of the next, and all new apprentices on first being bound to learn the trades shall be so for a period of four years.

APPENDIX 6 (see p. 80).

Notes on Kashmir and Jammu.

This principality is composed of three large divisions :

1.—Jammu, comprising all the country on the south of Pir Panjal range and Kishtwar.

2.—Kashmir proper, containing the valley and the mountain slopes encircling it.

3.—Ladakh and Gilgit, which comprise all the high lands and mountains on the northern frontier.

Each division is administered by one of the Maharaja's chief officers, who hold a position analogous to our Commissioners, with this exception amongst others that, instead of residing in their Division, they all remain at the Maharaja's Court.

The names of these ministers are—

Dewan Jowala Sahai, *Jammu.*

Dewan Kripa Ram, *Kashmir.*

Wazir Zorawaroo, *Ladakh.*

Jammu Division is divided into four districts :

1.—Jammu proper, administered direct by Dewan Jowala Sahai.

2.—Jhupál, under Dewan Thakoordas.

3.—Kishtwar, under Wazir Zorawaroo.

4.—Jusrouta, under Miyan Bijai Singh.

Kashmir Division contains two districts :

Srinagar and the valley, under Wazir Punnoo.

Eight parganas on the slopes of the hills, under Colonel Bijai Singh.

Ladakh and Gilgit Division :

Ladakh proper, under Mungul.

Gilgit, under the Military Officer for the time being in command.

The Maharaja has lately taken possession of the fort and country of Yusin, on the extreme north-west frontier. This will be annexed to Gilgit.

The boundaries of Kashmir adjoining British and Chinese territory are clearly defined. But towards the north-west the Maharaja's definition of his boundary line is "as far as his troops can penetrate."

The inhabitants of the *Jammu Division* are chiefly Rajpools, Thakoors, Goojurs, and Chibs. The petty chieftains have been reduced to insignificance by the Maharaja, and receive small jaghires or pensions.

The inhabitants of the *Kashmir hills* are chiefly of the Bhumba and Kukka clans. In Srinagar and the valley they are chiefly Brahmias and Mussulmans converted from Hinduism. A few families of Pathans are in the Kamraj pargana, and some Sikhs near Baramulla and in the parganas of Trál and Nougam, located there by the Pathan Governors of Kashmir. There are 12 ancient Rajas or Chieftainships now in subjection :—

Kathai,	}	Bhumba.
Joputta,		
Mozaff-rabad,		
Kukoore,		
Kurnab,	}	Kukka.
Booniar,		
Ooree,		
Chukar,		
Dunna,		

The population of the capital, Srinagar, is returned at 81,153 souls :

Hindus	9,370
Mussulmans	72,836

There are 16,529 houses in the city.

The revenues of the province of Kashmir proper are shewn in detail.

The total revenues from all sources may be thus summarized :—

Revenues.	Co.'s R	Co.'s R
<i>Kashmir proper</i> —		
Land	17,73,632	
Other sources	10,63,086	
<i>Jammu</i> —		28,36,718
Land and all sources		26,68,000
<i>Ladakh and Gilgit</i> —		
From all sources		1,00,000
Total		54,94,718

The estimated expenditure is as follows:—

<i>Military</i> —	Chilkee <i>R</i>
Regular Army	19,76,772
Irregulars	9,17,310
Cavalry	3,40,428
Civil establishment	6,38,580
Kardars, cost of collection, &c.	3,20,736
Building	2,95,004
Religious and charitable grants	1,98,132
Total	46,97,863=29,36,168 Co.'s Rs.

In Kashmir proper the collections are made in both cash and kind.

The revenues are to a large extent farmed out. Where kind rates prevail the following is the apportionment of the rice, maize, and pulse produce:—

Government share.	½ gross produce.
also—Trukkee	4 trukkas per kharwar, ¹
Caosungo,	1 munwutte per kharwar,
Putwari,	1 do.,
Zafadar or Chokedar,	1 do.,
Husoom Khidmutgaroo,	6 trukkas per 100 kharwars,
Khidmutgaroo,	"
Religious Grant to Temples,	7 trukkas per 100 kharwars,

leaving a balance of about one-third to the zemindar.

Cash rates are levied on wheat, barley, mussoor, flax, oorad, til, moong, cotton, and on one-half estimated value of gross produce; and 2 trukkas and 1 munwutte per kharwar.

Tobacco rates, if converted to cash, Rs. 13 per kharwar.

The Maharaja has the monopoly of the sale of rice throughout the valley. He takes the best rice as his share from the zemindar.

This rice is sold to shawl weavers at a fixed rate of Rs. 2 per kharwar=Re. 1 per 1 maund 3 seers. To others it is sold at the current rates. Rice is also given in rations to the army.

Other taxes. Besides the land tax, there are numerous other cesses and taxes, a detail of which, for Kashmir proper, is here given.

The custom-dues for the whole country are farmed out to a contractor for Rs. 4,00,000 per annum. A detail of the rates has been already given,¹ and need not be here repeated. But the rates, high as they are, are not unfrequently exceeded, and the traders are subjected to perpetual annoyance by the contractors' agents.

This tax is farmed to Pundit Luchmunjoo, for Rs. 1,05,000. Niwara is the tax levied on boatmen. Chob Furooshee, a tax on timber and wood for fuel transported by water throughout the valley.

The zur i-lāj is a license tax levied on trades, and is farmed out for Rs. 91,000.

A special tax on saffron, for which the valley is famous. It yields Rs. 21,000 per annum to the Maharaja.

A duty levied on the "Kanee," or woven shawl fabrics. As soon as a shawl has been commenced on the loom, the contractor puts his stamp on it, and the duty has to be paid at once. This duty is about 25

per cent. of the value of the shawl. Pundit Raj Kāk has the farm of this duty, and pays the Maharaja Rs. 8,75,000 per annum.

Besides this, there is another tax on plain shawl cloth, and on border weaving, which is quite a separate trade from shawl making. This tax is farmed for Rs. 30,000.

About Rs. 75,000 per annum are made at the Royal Mint in coining the Chilkee rupee.

Very fine silk is raised from worms in Kashmir, where the variety of mulberry trees is favourable to rearing silk-worms. This tax yields Rs. 42,000 to the Raja's treasury.

Levied on vegetables grown on floating islands on the Srinagar lake; and also a tax on goods taken in boats over the lake. This yields Rs. 31,000.

A tax on goats and sheep, at 2½ annas per head per annum. Collected by the local authorities, and not farmed out. It yields Rs. 80,000 per annum.

Zur-i-Chonpan. There is a grazing tax also in Jammu, the exact amount of which is not given. Shakh Shoosmarce is a tax on buffaloes, and Zur-i-murkub a tax on ponies and mules.

¹ TABLE OF CASHMERE WEIGHTS.

1 seer 5 chs., English standard	=	1 munwutte.
4 munwuttees,	=	1 truk = 5 seers 4 chs., English standard.
16 trukks,	=	1 kharwar = 2 maunds 4 seers, English standard.

¹ In Mr. Davies' Trade Report.

There is a good breed of ponies in Kashmir, very useful for carriage purposes. This tax is collected by the local officers, and yields Rs. 15,000.

Fines levied by Judicial Courts and the police, institution fees in civil cases, tulabana, &c., bring in about Rs. 13,500 in Kashmir. The amount received under this head in Jammu is not known.

Adalat. Muzkara bushee.
Fees are taken by Kazis for registration or celebration of marriages, and this has been turned to account by the Maharaja, who farms the tax for Rs. 5,000.

Zur-i-Nikah. Lime kilns are taxed, and give Rs. 25,000 per annum.

Chorna patee. Gardens Rs. 4,500.

Beghat. Tobacco, Rs. 35,000. This is derived from a monopoly of the sale by the Government.

Tax on post-i-bhuug, or dried poppy-heads. The Government share is $\frac{1}{4}$ th, and the zemindar's share $\frac{3}{4}$ th of the produce. The churru, or extract, all belongs to Government. This tax yields Rs. 35,000.

Rice is the staple produce of the valley of Kashmir, and this tax is taken in kind by the Maharaja, who stores the rice in granaries. It is estimated that 12,35,358 kharwars, or about 25,00,000 maunds,

are yearly garnered. Of this, about 4 lakhs of kharwars are sold to the shawl weavers at the fixed rate of Rs. 2 per kharwar, and the rest is distributed to the troops in rations, or sold in the valley, or exported.

A detailed list of the Maharaja's army, and its distribution, is appended, but it is only approximate in figures.

The total number of all arms is as follows:—

Regular	{	Infantry	10,688
		Cavalry	1,891
		Artillery	5,994
Irregulars			12,810

They are distributed as follows:—

2,368 foot soldiers are employed in Gilgit and Ladakh, and in garrisoning the forts of Chilas and Hussora.

There are 16 regiments of regular infantry, one of sappers, and a Muzhube company in Kashmir, employed in garrisoning the forts of Hari Parbat, Shergurhee, and others in collecting revenue.

In Jammu—

- 19 Regiments of Infantry, Regulars.
- 2 " of Cavalry.

The Maharaja takes pride in his army, which presents a very fair appearance. The men are recruited from the Jammu hills, Punjab, Hindustan.

There are some regiments of Goorkhas, whom the Maharaja has persuaded, by grants of land, &c., to settle in his territory; and from Baltistan and the north-west frontier a very fair body of soldiers has been recruited for the army.

The standard height for natives of the country is fixed at 5 feet 7 inches, but for foreigners, who wish to enter the Maharaja's army, it is fixed at 5 feet 10 inches, and these men are not enlisted without giving some kind of security or reference.

The pay of a foot soldier, for the first year, is five chilkee rupees per mensem, but only for 11 months in the year. In the second year it is raised to 6 chilkee rupees. Old sepoye, who have done good service, are rewarded by having their pay raised to as high as Rs. 10.

Goorkha and Hindustani soldiers receive Rs. 6, chilkee, on first entering service.

Every soldier receives rations, for which Rs. 2 per mensem are deducted. A discount of 6 pie per rupee is taken by the duffree, and deductions are made from pay for clothing, and for wedding presents (*tumbol*) to the royal family.

The troops are paid up half-yearly, six months in arrears, and advances are frequently made.

The pay of the Commissioned and Non-Commissioned officers varies, but generally is as follows:—

	Chilkee Rs.
Colonel	150
Commandant	60
Adjutant	30 to 45
Subadar	25
Jemadar	15
Havildar	12
Naik	10

The Commandants of regiments can fine, flog, or imprison, for short terms, for military offences, but for heinous crimes the orders of the Maharaja are taken, and he reserves to himself the power of dismissing from the army.

Furlough is granted for 40 days in each year; or, if a regiment is on service, a furlough of one month for each year that it has been engaged is granted. Pay is given whilst the men are on

urlough. But if a soldier overstays his leave more than six months, or deserts, on his return he has to commence again as a recruit, on Rs. 5 per mensem. One anna per diem is deducted when a soldier is absent on sick leave.

There are two kinds of musket used, one with a sword, another with a bayonet. These and the belts are supplied by the Government to the soldiers.

Arms, accoutrements. These muskets are manufactured in the country. There are very clever workmen, and the Maharaja takes great pride in turning out good guns and rifles. The uniform differs in different regiments. Some are a close imitation of the British uniform in color and cut, and the hats are also like ours.

The artillery is horsed with Yarkund ponies, strong, active animals. All the trappings and fittings are in imitation of our artillery. The Maharaja has 10 troops, and 63 field pieces. Cavalry is only used at Jammu, and is of the Irregular character.

Artillery.
Cavalry.

Forts.

The Maharaja supplies grain to all his forts and troops, and for this purpose keeps up an army of 2,000 ponies, which carry rice from Srinagar to Ladakh, and to all parts of the territory, and are also used for trade.

Commissariat.

Magazines.

There are magazines, one at Jammu, another at Fort Bahoo, and a third at Hari Parbut, Srinagar.

Saltpetre is manufactured at Akhnoor, Jusrata, and other places in the Jammu territory, and a coarse kind of gunpowder is made in large quantities.

Besides the 2,000 ponies belonging to the Maharaja, the mules and ponies of the traders are seized when required, and the system of *degaree* prevails here, as in all the hills. When so employed the coolies always receive *russud*.

Carriage.

Chulkee or Raja Shahi rupees are coined at Srinagar. This coin contains 6 mashaas of pure silver, and is equal to 10 annas English standard.

Mint. Coinage.

On one side is inscribed "Sheonath Subah," and on the reverse, "Zurb-i-Sreenuggur, Sumbut (year) IIIS," with a cross.

The meaning of the letters IHS is said to be Jesus Hominum Salvator, and was inscribed by a Native Christian, son of a native pastor, Anand Masih, who took service with Maharaja Golab Sing, and had these letters inscribed, as he told the Raja they would be pleasing to the British.

Copper pice are coined at Srinagar and Jammu.

The Maharaja has lately issued a code, but it is described as being very imperfect, and it would appear that it is being gradually completed by the addition of rulings in special cases, which are adopted as precedents.

Law and Justice.

The city of Srinagar is divided into 12 police circles, called zillahs. A Kotwal presides over all. He disposes of all petty cases of assault, &c.

Criminal.

More serious cases are sent to the Adawluti, who has power to sentence in all but the most heinous crimes, which are sent to the Maharaja for final orders. Fine is seldom resorted to in case of Kashmiria. Stripes and imprisonment are the usual punishments. Capital sentences are inflicted for murder.

Trials for crimes committed by soldiers are heard and decided by a punchayet of officers. In civil cases the soldiers are amenable to the Adawluti Court.

A Court of Appeal (Sudder Adawlut) has been lately established, presided over by Pandit Bukhshee Ram, formerly Sub-Assistant Surgeon at Gujranwalla, a good English scholar, educated at the Delhi College,

Court of Appeal.

and by Gunesh Sbastrri, a Pundit of Jammu.

Stamps, &c. Civil Suits.

All petitions are given on stamp paper :

Petition of Plaintiff,	4 annas.
Other petitions,	2 annas.

But in suits between bankers 5 per cent. of the amount decreed is levied in cash, in addition to the stamp paper, and one-quarter of all decree debts realised.

In suits for inheritance or division of property, one-fourth is taken by the Court.

For every summons 2 annas is levied. It is alleged that in Kashmir Court fees often swallow up the whole sum sued for.

Bonds, deeds of sale, &c., if for sums above Rs. 50, bear a stamp of Rs. 1 ; if below Rs. 50, a stamp of 8 annas.

No marriage contract can be made the subject of litigation unless it has been registered before the Kazi on stamp paper of 3 rupees value.

There are separate Courts for different departments of trade and taxes, &c., each of which is presided over by a separate officer. These Courts are for the—

Pushmeena trade.

Wood-sellers.

Commissariat.

Rice trade.

Ferry and river trade.

Customs.

License and capitation tax.

Appeals from the decisions of these Courts lie to the *Sudder Adawlat*.

Revenue Courts.

Revenue cases are decided for the most part verbally, in the presence of the headmen and putwaris.

Kashmir Ministers and Officials.

The Maharaja of Kashmir has few of his relatives or kinsmen in high office, as he fears their intrigues.

His chief officers are natives of the Punjab, and the family of *Dewan Jowala Sahai* exercises the chief influence over his councils. This family belong to the town of *Eminabad*, in the *Gujranwalla* district, *Lahore* division.

Jowala Sahai rose with the fortunes of *Golab Singh*, his brother being a *munshi* when the late Maharaja was a petty farmer of the revenues under Maharaja *Ranjit Singh*.

The following members of the family are employed in high offices under the *Kashmir Raja* :—

Dewan Jowala Sahai,
Dewan Kirpa Ram, son,
Dewan Nehal Chund, brother,
Dewan Gobind Sahai, } sons of Nehal Chund,
Dewan Kanh Chund, }
Hari Chund, who died at Delhi, was elder brother of Jowala Sahai;

besides many other distant relatives in subordinate posts.

Dewan Jowala Sahai is an able minister, but very bigoted in adhering to the traditional policy of the late Maharaja. He is opposed to all reform, and to any advance in civilization. He has mixed but little with people of other countries, and appears to consider that, however other States may progress, the proper policy for Kashmir is a stationary one. The Maharaja is decidedly enlightened, and, in spite of opposition, introduced some reforms, and would make more, were it not for the *Dewan's* manifest antipathy. *Jowala Sahai* is well affected towards the English Government, whose subject he is.

Dewan Kirpa Ram is the most intelligent and able of all the family, but he has bad health, and is not expected to live long.

Dewan Nehal Chund is a good man of business, but he has not the same influence as his brother over the Maharaja.

Pundit Raj Kak, shawl contractor, is considered the cleverest officer in Kashmir. He has great wealth, and holds a high position. He is a native of *Srinagar*, and is thoroughly acquainted with all the affairs of the valley. He is described as very oppressive.

Wazir Punnoo, in charge of Kashmir valley, is a native of *Nagrot*, near *Jammu*. A clever man, but much complained against for his oppressive exactions.

Colonel Bijai Singh, a *Rajput* *Miyan* of *Aknur*, bears a very good reputation.

Wazir Zorawaroo is a native of *Kishtwar*. He exercises some influence over the Maharaja, and is greatly opposed to all extravagant expenditure.

The other ministers and officers are—

Miyan Bijai Singh, of *Seeba*, in the *Kangra* hills, *Punjab*, related to the Maharaja, in civil and military charge of the *Jurwota* district.

Dewan Hemraj, a *Dutt* *Brahmin* of *Kunjrur*, *zilla Gurdaspur*, in charge of the Military office, *Jammu*.

Dewan Shunkur Dass, native of *Lahore*, in charge of the Military Office, *Kashmir*.

Dewan Nursingh Dyal, Head Treasurer.

Dewan Thakur Das, resident of *Wazirabad*, in charge of *Jhupal*.

Wazir Labhju, household officer, also ferry contractor.

Sirdar Desa Singh, a *Khatri* of *Rawal Pindi*, made a *Sirdar* by the Maharaja; in charge of the private *Toshakhana*.

Sirdar Utter Singh, native of *Jammu*, head of the *News* department.

Sirdar Beer Sing, son of *Goorbuksh Singh* of *Nabha*, *Adawlati* of *Kashmir*.

Budrenath, nephew of the late *Raja Dina Nath*, *Adawlati* at *Jammu*.

Pundit Sahaj Ram, contractor for *Baj* or *Capitation tax*.

The general appearance of the country gives an idea of poverty. There are few men of respectable, none of wealthy, appearance. As compared with the hills of *Kullu*, *Bussahir*, and *Garhwal*, the houses of *Kashmir* are inferior, and the people seem to have much less spirit than their neighbours in the east.

The present Maharaja, however, does not oppress his subjects, as *Golab Singh* did, and he has made remissions of taxes in their favour. Had he the moral courage to overcome the position of his ministers, the Maharaja might make his rule very beneficial to the people. As it is, however, the officials exercise great power, and to their own advantage.

One great blot on the Maharaja's rule is the state of trade, and the almost prohibitive duties levied on all merchandise imported or exported.

The Maharaja farms out his customs to a native of *Rawal Pindi*, for 4 lakhs *Company's* rupees. This contractor, perhaps, makes almost as much more profit. He is perfectly irresponsible; no appeals against his exactions being heard by any one; and no one of the ministers being interested in putting a check on him.

The Maharaja permits all his officers to trade, and to import their goods from the *Punjab* free—or nearly free—of duty. The consequence is that they are one and all opposed to any reduction of duty.

In considering the question of trade, the Maharaja is of opinion that commerce between

his territory and India could not be increased, even if the duties were lowered. This is studiously impressed on him by his ministers. But without going to other countries for experience to refute such an idea, it is manifest, from conversation with the people, that they would gladly purchase English goods, if they could only get them at anything like a reasonable price. Commerce between Kashmir and India might be very brisk, if the duties were properly adjusted.

But more important than trade with Kashmir is our commerce with Central Asia, which is well-nigh prohibited from passing through Kashmir, by the excessive transit duty levied.

The Maharaja derives, at present, about Rs. 18,000 per annum from the import and export trade with Yarkand and China. Of this a large portion is derived from woollen imports; and the export and *bona fide* transit duties yield so little that it is at present scarcely worth while taking it into calculation. Yet, if the present rates were abolished, there is no road to Central Asia so easy as through Kashmir and by Ladakh. The highest pass on that line, between the Punjab and Ladakh, is not more than 13,000 feet, and an excellent road for mules and ponies could be made. In fact, the road lately altered and improved for the Lieutenant-Governor's use, between Jammu and Kashmir, passing by the Hunnibal route over the outer Himalayan range, is already quite practicable for laden animals.

The road by the banks of the Jhelum into the valley is also equally passable for traffic.

T. D. FORSYTH,

Offg. Secretary to Govt., Punjab.

Murree, 30th May 1863.

A.

Abstract Statement showing the total Strength of the Troops, Regular and Irregular, of the Ruler of Jammu and Kashmir.

No.	Description of Army.	In the Kashmir Provinces.		In the Jammu Provinces.		In Ladakh and Gilgit.		Grand Total.	NO. OF CASERNS, &c.														
		In the Kashmir Provinces.		In the Jammu Provinces.		In Ladakh and Gilgit.			CASERNS.			MOUNTAINS.			Grand Total.								
		No. of officers.	No. of men.	No. of officers.	No. of men.	No. of officers.	No. of men.		Large.	Small.	Total.	Large.	Small.	Total.									
1	Regular Troops (Infantry)	25	6,261	10,084	2,368	18,688	23	20	43	161	7	8	9	
2	Irregular and Miscellaneous Force. (Infantry)	not known.	13,810
3	Artillery and Military Garrison and Bepoys in Forts.	87	2,121	3,786	not known.	6,994
4	Cavalry	1,891	1,891
	Total	112	8,382	15,711	2,368	30,383

* This includes the garrisons in Forts.

B.

List of Forts, with a detail of Garrison, in the Province of Kashmir.

Serial No.	Name of Fort.	Strength of Garrison.	REMARKS.
1	Fort of Hari Parbut or Nuggur Nagur.	411	A strong fort, built of masonry. It has a double row of fortifications; the inner one is called Hari Parbut, and the outer one Nuggur Nagur.
2	Sopoor . . .	19	This is a masonry fort, situated on the banks of the river. It contains a tehsil building.
3	Baramulla . . .	9	This is a masonry fort, and contains a tehsil building.
4	Chogul	A small mud fort, garrisoned by a few sepoy from the garrison of Fort Baramulla. It is subordinate to Baramulla.
5	Shukkerghurh . . .	198	A masonry fort, situated on the banks of the river Jhelum, and commanded by Colonel Bijai Singh.
6	Nowshulra . . .	11	A small mud and masonry fort, situated on the banks of the river Jhelum, and commanded by Colonel Bijai Singh.
7	Goureegurh . . .	14	A small mud and masonry fort, situated on the banks of the river Jhelum, and commanded by Colonel Bijai Singh.
8	Oree . . .	114	A masonry fort, situated on the banks of the river. It formerly belonged to Raja Jubbar Khan and Nawab Khan, sons of Raja Mazaffur Khan, and is now commanded by Colonel Bijai Singh, commanding the Hill Stations. The villages depending on the fort are still in the jagir of the Raja, subject to the payment of a muszerana (contribution).
9	Kothdi . . .	34	It formerly belonged to Raja Sultan Muhammad Khan, son of Sultan Zulqadut Khan, but the villages attached thereto are still in the jagir of that Raja. It is a masonry fort, commanded by Colonel Bijai Singh.
10	Doputia . . .	115	This is a masonry and mud fort, situated on the banks of a tributary of the Jhelum. It formerly belonged to Sultan Atta Muhammad Khan, son of Sultan Nasir Ali Khan. Some of the villages attached to it are still in the jagir of the Sultan.
11	Chikar . . .	201	A masonry and mud fort, formerly in charge of Raja Mohabbat Khan, son of Sultan Subdal Khan, and some of the villages attached to it are still in his jagir.
12	Dunnah	This is a small fort, garrisoned by a detachment from Chikar.
13	Mozufferabad . . .	116	This is a large masonry fort, situated on the banks of a tributary of the Jhelum. It formerly belonged to Raja Rohutoolia Khan.
14	Kurna . . .	82	A masonry fort, which formerly belonged to Raja Sher Ahmad Khan, son of Raja Munsoor Khan.
15	Heerpoor	A small mud fort, garrisoned by a few sepoy.
16	Sheopian	This is a small mud tehsil building, garrisoned by the sepoy of the Nizamut and Bhim battalions.
17	Shardi . . .	33	A masonry fort in the Kashmir valley, situated on the Chilas road.
18	Sheepoora	A small mud and masonry fort, subordinate to Chilas, and situated on the Chilas road.
19	Gurboos . . .	9	This is a small masonry fort, situated on the Gilgit road.
20	Karghil . . .	25	A small masonry fort, situated on the Ladakh road.
21	Serreo . . .	6	A small mud and masonry fort, situated on the Ladakh road.
22	Draa . . .	26	A small masonry fort, situated on the Thibet road.
23	Iskardo . . .	95	A large masonry fort, in the Baltistan district, situated on the Gilgit road.
24	Husora . . .	100	A masonry fort, situated on a river on the borders of the Gilgit and Baltistan territory.
25	Boonji	A masonry fort, situated on the borders of Gilgit, and subordinate to Husora.
	TOTAL	1,464	

NOTE.—Besides, there is another fort within the town of Srinagar called Shergurber, situated on the banks of the river.

C.

List of Forts in the Jammu Territory.

No.	Name of Fort.	Number of Guns placed in each Fort.	Strength of the Garrison.	Remarks.
1	Ukhnoor	3	350	
2	Kote Suhrian	1	10	
3	Vatlah	2	150	
4	Bahoo	13	50	
5	Munawar	1	100	
6	Ramgurb	2	35	
7	Sochtgurb	4	80	
8	Deveegurb	3	40	
9	Lamba	1	25	
10	Saabba	7	150	
11	Jnarvota	4	310	
12	Hunck, near K-Alew	2	25	
13	Bosouhlee	3	60	
14	Ramnagar	4	35	
15	Pallawar	2	25	
16	Somergurb	2	17	
17	Kishtwar	3	30	
18	Rinsee	7	350	
19	Bhndoo	2	25	
20	Gujput	2	25	
		77	1,742	

APPENDIX 7 (see p. 81).

The Maharaja of Kashmir.

Whatever may be the faults of the Maharaja of Kashmir as a Ruler, there is this good feature in his administration, that he devotes a great portion of his time to the conduct of public affairs. His good example is generally followed by the various officials of his Government. The work of the State is divided amongst various departments, each of which receives the attention of His Highness during one day in the week. On two days the Maharaja sits in a prominent and easily accessible spot in the outer Court of the Palace, and there receives the petitions of all who wish to approach him. An immediate answer is given in such cases as admit of it. Such as require consideration are usually made over to the officials concerned. The eldest son of the Maharaja is being gradually educated for the performance of the high functions which will eventually devolve on him. Petitions of minor importance are sometimes referred to him for decision. He is also being instructed in the manner of keeping the public accounts, in the procedure observed by the Courts of Law, and in the Regulations which apply to the army. His knowledge of English would be improved by more opportunities of speaking and writing. In person and manner he is not so prepossessing as his father. The Maharaja is manly, not only in his person, but in his habits. He is fond of sport and fond of riding. In his domestic relations he is very affectionate, caring to have his children much with him, and to make up to the younger ones for the loss which they have sustained by the early death of their mother. Last year and this he helped with money many shawl weavers from Amritsar who were returning to Kashmir, because they could not earn a livelihood in India owing to the dullness of their trade. In affairs of State he is not influenced by the zenana. Nautches and such like amusements have no charm for him. In his manner of life he is abstemious. The use of strong drinks by his subjects is prohibited. Drunkenness, indeed, may be said to be almost unknown in his territories. During the whole of my residence in Kashmir I have never seen a native do the worse for liquor. Crime of all kinds is rare.

For want of firmness the Maharaja often cannot rise superior to the influence of the officials immediately connected with him. He lacks moral courage. His intentions are good, and he is persuaded in his own heart that they are so. But if it comes to a trial of strength between him and his ministers, he is the likelier of the two to yield. He is no statesman, but if freed from existing restraints and supported by impartial advisers, his natural desire to do what is right would, I believe, be more prominently developed than it is now. Impulsiveness is another of his failings. At one time his hobby is to establish a shawl agency in Europe, at another to set on foot a museum in his own capital. Anon he is anxious to give an impetus to some special class of industry. Whilst the fit is on him he will be most keen in his desire to further his object. But after a time his ardour relaxes and his well-intentioned schemes fall through for want of continued support. During the last six months much attention has been given to the improvement of silk cultivation in Kashmir. That there is a fair opening in this direction for the simultaneous improvement of the Maharaja's revenues and of his people's welfare, there can, I think, be no reasonable doubt. A good beginning has been made by Babu Nilambur Mookerjee, who has been allowed a credit of two lakhs of Chilki rupees with which to make experiments on an extended scale. This gentleman, who has studied the question well, is sanguine of success, if only he can manage to sustain the interest of the Maharaja. The construction of thirty-six new field-pieces for the six batteries usually in garrison at Srinagar is the last pet project. The order for this work was only received at Srinagar a few days ago. The officer charged with the execution of it, whilst energetically collecting brass for the moment, has expressed to me his doubts whether the order will not be countermanded before the guns for one battery are complete.

But the worst feature in the Maharaja's character is his excessive superstition. This weakness, though innate in him, has been aggravated by his ministers, who have found in it a convenient means of furthering their own designs. The Maharaja is surrounded by Brahmins, who are in fact the tools of the Dewans. The oracle speaks as the Dewans direct, for it is dependent on them for subsistence. Having got the Brahmins thoroughly subservient to them they make it to their interest to remain so. In private conversations with his intimate friends the Maharaja has admitted that he feels the incubus. But he is so superstitiously afraid of religious consequences and so vacillating in purpose that he will make no persistent effort to free himself. Except he has assistance and support from without, he will never, I fear, be rid of this baneful *entourage*. The following instances are given of the way in which this weakness of the Maharaja is worked upon. There is a mysterious rite, occasionally practised on his behalf, designated a *prajog*. It consists of the burning of sacrificial fires for a greater or less period, according to the importance of the case, usually in the inner apartments of the Palace, but if great secrecy is required, the fires are burnt at different places, far apart, in the Maharaja's territories. The number of fires may vary from five to thirteen. The period of burning ranges from three to thirteen months. During the time appointed the fires must never be let to die out. To each several Brahmins, highly paid for the occasion, are assigned, and over all is the Superintendent of the *Prajog*, whose fee is Rs. 101 for each fire. There was a *prajog* of three months to obviate the supposed ill effects to the Maharaja of Mr. Forsyth's enmity after the failure of Akbar Ali's arrangements for his journey to

Yarkand. In this instance each Brahmin had a fire to represent a portion of Mr. Forsyth's body. The man who had his eyes received a large reward when it was known that Mr. Forsyth had gone to Europe partly to consult an oculist in regard to the ophthalmia from which he was suffering on his return. There is also a soothsayer, an inhabitant of Baltistan, on whom great confidence is placed, and who is summoned to Jammu in emergencies. He was called down previous to the interview at Skalkote last year, and asked whether the Viceroy was sending for the Maharaja from friendly motives, or whether the object was not to get him into British territory, and confine him and then seize Kashmir. The answer given was that the Viceroy had no cause for dissatisfaction with the Maharaja, but would send him home content. The prohibition against fishing between the first and fourth bridges at Srinagar, lest the soul of Golab Singh, which is supposed to have entered by transmigration into a fish and to be lurking thereabouts, should be imperilled, is another instance of the Maharaja's superstition.

The pervading motive of the Dewans is the aggrandisement of their own family. At this moment there is hardly a district in the Maharaja's territories in which Dewan Jowla Sahai, the Prime Minister, does not possess a rent-free estate. He enjoys, besides, a percentage of Rs. 4 in 1,000 on all realisations of revenue. This in itself is a direct incentive to hard dealing. His son, Kripa Ram, who discharges the duties of Huzoor Navees, or Chief Secretary to the Maharaja, does not receive any settled stipend, but is rewarded by occasional presents in money, which are said to average a lakh of rupees a year. So great are the aspirations of Kripa Ram after power that he is often spoken of behind his back as the Raja of Eminabad, the family place of his house. The emoluments of other members of the family, such as Nihal Chund and Hira Nand, are said to be by no means inconsiderable. Anunt Ram, the son of Kripa Ram, is already installed as Dewan to the heir-apparent. The family has seen the sudden rise to power and wealth of the old stock which till lately had but the province of Jammu for its patrimony. It has witnessed the change in fortune of Zorawur Singh, the conqueror of Skardo, who began life as a common soldier, and ended by being the trusted friend and General of Golab Singh. It has seen Gobind Ram rise from the position of a Commissariat Clerk to be the Tutor of the heir-apparent and Chief Judge in Jammu. It is not surprising therefore that in its desire, in the first instance, to achieve equal success, and afterwards to maintain its importance, it has not been altogether scrupulous in the means which it has employed. It naturally wishes to make hay whilst the sun shines. The family has been paramount for some time past, and is so still, and the administration of the country is too much in the hands of its partisans. The principle of action which guides the Dewans in questions concerning the British Government is to keep it satisfied. It is in matters of internal administration that there is reason to fear illiberal and oppressive conduct on their part.

The spirit of intrigue is active at Jammu. At present I believe that the constitution of parties is as follows :—

1.—The Maharaja.
Jowla Sahai.
Kripa Ram.
Deesa Sing.

2.—The opposition.
Wazeer Lobja.
Atlah Sing.
Gobind Ram.
The heir-apparent.

The point of difference is the policy which should be pursued towards the British Government in case it should shew any inclination to occupy Kashmir. The wish of the Maharaja and his party is to let matters drift, whilst the opposition wants to take some such course as would plainly show that it would actively withstand us in any attempt to gain possession of Kashmir. The fear of such a contingency is ever present in the Maharaja's circle. It is to be accounted for probably by the fact that the question is a favourite one with many of the European visitors, who never cease to deplore the alienation of the country, and speculate as to the chances of getting possession of it. The *shikarees* and boatmen, who are the subjects of the Maharaja most brought in contact with Europeans, discuss the matter in the same strain. It not unfrequently happens that such servants, who are Muhammadans, to a man enquire from their employers when they are coming to release them from the Hindu oligarchy whose rule they deprecate, or why the British Government will not allow them to rise in rebellion against their tyrants. At my own table I have had to stop a conversation in which my guests were beginning to discuss whether the English sportsmen in the country were sufficient with their *shikarees* to overpower the garrison of Srinagar by a *coup de main*. The Maharaja cannot be ignorant, I apprehend, of the views which many of his visitors have in successive years entertained, and he apparently derives more uneasiness from the idle talk of irresponsible officers than consolation from such assurances as those given by the Viceroy at Skalkote in the spring of last year. The practical proof of his fear consists in the hoard which he is laying up against his supposed evil day in his forts on the Chenab and the Towee. The custom for some years past has been to set apart a large sum annually under the head of savings. It is expected that the balance of the revenue should meet the current expenses of the year. If it does not, somebody, usually the army for choice, falls into arrears of pay.

The key-note of the policy pursued by the Maharaja's Government towards the States beyond his northern and western border seems to be a desire to uphold the old tradition as to the exceeding importance of Kashmir. I believe that to this day the Khan of Chitral and other petty Chiefs of Yaghistan look upon the Maharaja of Kashmir as equal to, if not greater than, the Viceroy of India. None of them have apparently any idea that he is a

tributary of the British Government. On the contrary, even as near as Gurnis and Gilgit, people ask what tribute does the British Government give to the Maharaja. The former has itself to blame in some measure for this. In the rules relating to the conduct of visitors in Kashmir the Maharaja is to this day described as an independent sovereign. To this I have called the attention of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab in my yearly report. I know not whether in direct communication with His Highness the word 'Wali' is used by the Punjab Government amongst the other titles of His Highness, but in an official letter to the head of the Nakhbundi family in Srinagar, who are by long domicile his subjects, this term was unmistakeably used with reference to the Maharaja quite lately. The title is subscribed to the Maharaja's signature in his private letters to me. I have noticed it also on the badges of his orderlies. Yet it does not occur in the list of his titles published by authority, nor does it seem to me to be consistent with his true position. The better to keep up its importance amongst its neighbours the Maharaja's Government sedulously endeavours not to let their vakils have access to the British representative at Srinagar. Vakils from Hunza and Nagar have been there this season, of whose presence within the Maharaja's territories I was not aware till they had passed on to Jammu. I only learnt of the Chitral vakil's arrival by accident after he had been at Srinagar some days. When it was known at Jammu that he had been several times to see me a hint was given to the Wazir to hasten his departure. In reference to this it must be remembered that the special officer in Kashmir is not avowedly endowed with political powers. It is also the policy of the Maharaja's Government to sow dissension amongst its neighbours in Yaghistan so far as it can, in order to prevent a combination against itself. To this end the Chitral vakil was this year cajoled into deliberately insulting the vakils from Hunza and Nagar in the presence of a numerous concourse at an ordinary Durbar of the Wazir of Kashmir. To the best of my experience I do not think that the Maharaja's Government intrigues with foreign States in order to undermine the British rule. It seems not unlikely that there has been an interchange of presents between him and the Russian Governor of Western Turkistan, of which the British Government has not been informed. His Highness has agents at Yarkand ostensibly for commercial purposes, but from whom political intelligence is received. He has also a near relative of Sher Ali, who lives at Srinagar, and through whom he obtains news from Kabul. So far as news is concerned, he is not in my opinion so well or so accurately informed as we are. So far as other motives are to be found in his correspondence, I suspect that his Government blindly aims at maintaining a reputation for independence, and that when it keeps us in the dark it does so for fear we should put a stop to its proceedings. In the same way I think that if the Maharaja's Government compassed Mr. Hayward's death (I am not prepared yet to say that it did), its object was to prevent a traveller who knew of its dependence from publishing the fact to States whom it believed to be in ignorance thereof.

The want of uniformity in regard to various points connected with the administration

	Chilki R
* Value of rice	18,98,077
Land revenue in cash	9,62,057
Taxes	19,10,650
Nuzurana, fines, and miscellaneous	5,59,088
Total	51,21,879

The figures here and below are those of 1862 A.D. which I have accidentally obtained. I hope shortly to have trustworthy figures of last year's income and expenditure.

† Revenue of Gilgit, Chilki Ra. 20,985.

‡ Revenue of Ladakh, Chilki Rupees 3,00,572.

of the Maharaja's territories is probably due to the retention of the system obtaining at the time in the various provinces which have within the present century come into the possession of his family. The large* portion of the revenue of Kashmir realised from rice is paid in kind. The contribution on account of other crops is in cash, and there is also direct taxation on shawl wool and shawls and on almost all the trades exercised in Srinagar and other large towns. The inhabitants of Kashmir grumble, but pay. Gilgit, † the military occupation of which is costly, does not nearly pay its expenses. Its produce is small, and its peasantry, if pressure is put on them, are apt to be refractory. It is therefore deemed politic to rule them with a light hand. A horse tax provides about two-thirds of the revenue of Ladakh. ‡ The rest is realised from produce, of which only Chilki Ra. 28,000 represent the value of payments in kind. The income more than pays the expenses of the province. In Jammu the revenue is paid in cash. Here both the British and the Chilki rupee pass, but the former from its greater purity has the preference. The Chilki, more or less debased of late years, is the tender of Kashmir, but it is in the Hurree Singhi, worth about eight annas of our coinage, and no longer to be found amongst the currency, that the merchants, and especially the shawl dealers, both French and Native, adjust their transactions. The public accounts of Kashmir, Gilgit, and Ladakh are kept in Chilki rupees, those of Jammu in British rupees, I believe. In Ladakh the British rupee, and an old silver piece of the disestablished Rajas, worth about three annas, are the recognised currency. The affairs of the Jammu districts are conducted through the Prime Minister, to whom the local authorities write direct in detail. The Governor of Skardo has of late years been non-resident, and reports in person to the Maharaja on the strength of letters received from tehsildars on the spot. The Governor of Badrawar also remains at Court by virtue of holding the more acceptable office of Grand Chamberlain. In regard to political matters the Governors of Kashmir, Gilgit, and Ladakh, who have no final authority in questions of importance, address the Maharaja direct in despatches which are read out by the Huzoor Navees (Kripa Ram). The revenue work is reported, but only in bulk, through the Prime Minister.

The great military divisions are Jammu, Srinagar, Mozufferabad, and Gilgit. The army is at the present time, from being in arrears, disaffected to no small extent. Its animosity

is more directed against the Dewans, considering that all its ills arise from them, than against the Maharaja, for it believes that if the all-pervading influence of the Dewans could be counteracted, so that men of disinterested

* I have not at hand all the details collected about the army. On paper the complement of regular infantry is 14,400. Probably the actual number does not exceed 10,000. The irregular infantry muster 3,800. There are also sixteen batteries of artillery, insufficiently manned, and two small regiments of cavalry, and the Gorchur regiment, composed partly of horse and partly of foot, which is full of the Maharaja's relatives and men of good family.

combated. They are made both of brass and iron. Still it must be borne in mind, so far as Kashmir is concerned, that the soldiery alone have arms in their hands, and that with this advantage they might do much harm before any excesses on their part were stopped. There is the fear too that they might be joined by numerous discontented Mussulmans, to whom the right of military service is now denied.

Of the labouring classes in Kashmir it may be said, with the exception of the shawl weavers, whose wages are low, even as compared with the price of provisions, whose labour is very severe, and whose children are impressed at too early an age, that they are, as a general rule, well fed, well clothed, and fairly housed. A coolie, if engaged by contract, will carry up to two hundred pounds' weight, for days in succession, at the rate of eight to ten miles a day along hilly roads. The women, of whom many ply the oar on the Jhelum, will work against stream, either towing or paddling, for several hours without cessation. Neither sex could stand this strain, as they do for months off and on, if they did not get a sufficiency of nourishing food. The absence of silver ornaments amongst the lower classes is significant. Their savings, when they have any, usually consist of British rupees, hidden, as a necessary precaution against the greedy grasp of Pandit officials, under the earthen floor of their cottages. On the whole, though their standard of living is not a high one, it is far removed from actual want. In a country where mulberries, apples, and apricots are left to rot on the ground in the very precincts of the villages, where milk is sold in many places to Europeans at forty seers for the British rupee, and meat at six seers for the rupee, where fish, in the neighbourhood of rivers, has little more than a nominal price, and where common rice may be bought from forty to fifty seers for the rupee, it will be understood that the rural population need not starve because wages are low. The main requirements are an increase in the population, extended cultivation, and the substitution of cattle, both by traders and European visitors, for human beings as beasts of burden. In Kashmir, as also on such roads thither as those by the Bunnial pass (which is the great trade route), Baramulla (the Murree route), and Puncb, and in outlying valleys like those of the Sindh, the Liddur, the Noubog, and the Lolab, there is no reason why ponies and mules should not take the place of coolies. In Kashmir and far up the outlying valleys just named roads fit for springless carts could be made with little cost. At present the means of communication are rough and rude in the extreme. With more hands set at liberty to till the soil much of the waste land now existing could be brought into cultivation. To ensure this being done, however, one vital condition remains that the labourer should be secured a fair proportion of the additional crop or its value. At present he only produces just as much as will, after payment of his revenue, provide for the actual wants of himself and his family, because he knows by experience that rapacious underlings will seize his superfluity. Hence the chance of an export trade, which would benefit the lower orders, is checked. At the present time most of the rice used by Europeans and the higher classes of natives is brought from the Punjab, and this in a country where rice of any quality can be grown to any extent! The truth is that the cultivation of the better kinds of rice has been abandoned, because the peasants feared that it would all be seized as soon as it was ripe.

Some weeks ago I expressed in a demi-official letter to the Foreign Secretary my decided opinion, for reasons given, that the sooner a permanent Resident is appointed to the Court of Ranbir Sing the better for his interests and ours. This view the Foreign Secretary has reciprocated. A year and a half have* passed since the Government of India urged "the strong necessity for constant watchfulness over all diplomatic proceedings (of the Kashmir Government) in which British interests are directly or indirectly involved." It is directly to the interests of the British Government that the true position of the Maharaja should be known and felt beyond his border, and that it should have full knowledge of his correspondence with Foreign States. It is directly to the interest of the Maharaja that he should learn by personal contact with a duly accredited Political Officer the truth that the British Government is in all its dealings with him actuated by pure motives, that it has no desire to annex or occupy any portion of his country, that it wishes to protect him against designing persons, and that, under all circumstances and at all times, it will give him the best advice in its power. Till the fear of annexation or occupation is entirely removed, it is useless for obvious reasons to try and induce him to initiate material improvements. In the days of the Moguls Kashmir must have deserved the Persian poet's epithet of an earthly paradise. At present it is a country of neglected op-

* Confidential para. 4 of No. 766P., dated May 16th, 1870, from the Foreign Secretary, to the Punjab Government.

opportunities. It is sad to see the signs of decay and listlessness in regard to a soil fertile in itself, for the irrigation of which nature has been so lavish. The water power of the valley, now unheeded—for there is but one mill of which I know—is probably not exceeded in any other part of the world. Silk, as I have already said, offers a fair field for improvement. So, I believe, does the preparation of sugar (now imported from the Punjab) from beet, melons, and maize, all of which Kashmir can produce to any extent. At present those who are too poor to sweeten their food with imported sugar, use dried apricots as a substitute. I conceive also that much might be done at an early date to promote an export trade in horses, wine, cyder, perry, cheese, oil, malt, hops, preserved fruits, turpentine, and leather. As regards the last-

• Moorcroft speaks of this use of the pomegranate in his time at Pinjor, in the Pottialla territory.

named article, the element for tanning exists in the rind of the pomegranate,* which grows wild in many parts of the Maharaja's dominions. The wild olive, now growing on the Kishen Gunga and the Bichlari, requires but care to yield fruit. With reference to such articles as rhubarb and criss root, which only require the trouble of digging in the jungles where they grow wild, the Maharaja already has an export trade. Where manufacture on the spot is required to utilise the gifts of nature his Government fails for want of good agency, such as that which a good European farmer, gardener, road superintendent, and dairy-maid would afford. A choice of such servants would have to be carefully made, and the presence of a Resident would facilitate their operations and be more likely to keep up the Maharaja's interest in them. I have reason to believe that the Maharaja is alive to the benefits which a permanent Resident would confer on him. The Dewans think that their interest lies in the other direction, because in the creation of such an appointment they fear a diminution of their own influence. I do not advocate any such step as dismissing them from power. On the contrary, I would urge that every effort be first made to bring them to a knowledge and regard for the principles of liberal government, and to associate with them others as yet unconnected with the administration. Not in a year will great results be achieved. But till a beginning is made there is no chance of improvement. Equally desirable does it seem to me that the usual practice should be discontinued of deputing each season a new man, unacquainted with the temper of Europeans, in Kashmir. For a long time a new man is not so successful as he might be amongst his fellow-countrymen for want of experience.

(To conclude with, if a permanent Resident be appointed, I would earnestly urge the nomination of such a man, be he who he may, as would at once inspire confidence in the Maharaja. There is much of the secret working of His Highness' Government which the Maharaja alone would be likely to divulge, and he would not divulge anything except to one whom he considered as a friend. At present I expect that we know little of what it would be to the Maharaja's real interest that we should know. Again, whoever is chosen, should remain for some years at his post. In regard to superior control I recommend the supervision of the Foreign Office. The Punjab government is, rightly or wrongly, looked on with suspicion by the Maharaja. He believes that its traditions are such that it will admit little of good in his conduct. What is wanted is that both sides should start fair, without distrust of each other. As a matter of fact, the majority of cases, other than those relating to the visitors, referred from Kashmir are such as only the Supreme Government can decide. As to the visitors, the less the Resident is interfered with, and the greater the absoluteness of his responsibility, the better. If he abuses his authority, which is very unlikely, punish him, but do not, as is now the case, let there be a chance of an appeal against his orders to a committee of officers, whom he, if an appeal is claimed, has the misfortune to have to nominate. The Foreign Office, with its general control of all great feudatories, has a wider point of view than any local Government can have. By direct correspondence it would ensure greater rapidity and greater uniformity of action. The local Government need not be prejudiced thereby, because wherever its interests are concerned it would be duly consulted or informed.)

The above is but a sketch, compiled whilst awaiting the Viceroy's arrival at Madhopore, from my note book. My proceedings during the season have been already recorded in my annual report, the draft of which is ready. Later I hope in regard to Kashmir, its resources, its administration, its means of defence, and its relations with other States, to write a more detailed memorandum from various sources of information to which I have had access whilst in Kashmir.

CHARLES GIRDLESTONE.

MADHOPORE,

The 14th November 1871.

APPENDIX B (see p. 76).

Notes on PUNCH, by Pundit Munphool.

The territory of PUNCH, which is held by Raja Moti Singh,¹ a cousin of Maharaja Ranbir Singh, was wrested by the Dogra brothers, under Maharaja Ranjit Singh, from Raja Mir Baz Khan Goojur, its hereditary ruler, about 40 years ago. It formed part of the possessions of Raja Dhian Singh, which descended to his sons, Jowahir Singh and Moti Singh. The intrigues of Jowahir Singh against his uncle and cousin at length led to his banishment to the Punjab, on a cash pension of one lakh per annum, and to the absorption of his patrimonial estate in the Jammu territory. Moti Singh gained the good graces of Golab Singh by submission, and received from him the grant of PUNCH, on conditions of fidelity and allegiance.

PUNCH is bounded as follows :—

On the north, by the high mountain chain, an offshoot of the Pir Panjal range, which divides it from the Khukka country, Ooree, Chukar, and Duuna.

On the east by the Pir Panjal range.

On the south by the parganas of Rajour, Jhupal, and Kotlee, under Jammu.

On the west by the river Jhelum.

The principal line of the Blimbur and Rajour route from the Punjab to Kashmir passes through the south-east corner of PUNCH.

It is divided into seven districts :


1. *Huvelee*, containing three parganas, Huvelee, Mundee, and Tal.

	Co.'s R
The revenues of this district, consisting of land tax, grazing taxes ("zur-i-shopan" and "shakhhoomaree,") and licence tax ("haj-i-peshewuran,") amount annually	47,000
The town of PUNCH, the capital of the principality, is situated in a small fertile valley, on the bank of the river Pir Panjal, in pargana Huvelee. Its population is estimated at 8,000 souls. The houses are generally kucha. The Raja lives in the fort, which is built of stone and surrounded by a triple row of walls.	
2. <i>Maindur</i> , containing two parganas, Maindur and Sohrin, in a small valley watered by the Pir Panjal river. Amount of revenues	47,000
3. <i>Purawa-Thukiala</i> , containing two parganas, Purawa and Thukiala. Revenues	11,000
4. <i>Baghan</i> , containing two parganas, Baghan and Salian	40,000
The Baghan valley, watered by a hill stream, is one of the most fertile tracts in the territory.	
5. <i>Purl</i> , containing five parganas, Purl, Pulungee, Pulundree, Mangors, and Barul. Revenues	45,000
Purl consists of an extensive plateau.	
6. <i>Punjsura</i> , containing five large villages, Punjsura, Buhramgola, Chuundeemurh, Dogree, and Poshana. Revenues	1,350
7. <i>Sudroon</i> , a hilly tract, held in jagir by Raja Surundaz Khan Goojur, a hereditary Chief. Valued at	10,000
Total	2,17,350

Add other items of revenue—

1. "Zukut" (customs duties) farmed to Sirdar Hara Singh, a Khutree of Monza Wali, in pargana Pind Dadun Khan, zila Jhelum, Prime Minister of the Raja, for	20,983
2. Stamped Paper revenue, farmed to ditto, for	8,000
3. "Phoolsehrs," or tax on marriage from Muhammadans, farmed to ditto for	8,000
4. Monopoly of the sale of the "Chikree" wood growing in the parganas of Sohrin and Sudroon, farmed to ditto for	1,000
5. Monopoly of the sale of "Chobkoot" (<i>Aucklandia Foracosta</i>) growing in the pargana of Mundee only, farmed to ditto for	1,000
6. Monopoly of the sale of Iron procured from the mines in pargana Mundee, Sohrin, and Thukiala, the only iron mines worked out in the territory, farmed to ditto for	1,600
7. "Furoee," or fines levied in the Judicial and Revenue departments, estimated at	50,000
Total Revenues,	3,07,333
Khalea paid into the Raja's treasury.	2,97,333
Jagir held by Raja Surundaz Khan	10,000

¹ Mian Kiabor Singh Dogra.



The land revenue is collected in cash, at revenue rates fixed on land with reference to Mode of Collection. Land Revenue. the quality of soil; for instance :—

Land Revenue determined by the quality of soil.	{	Per Dharatee,	} From Co.'s R 2-12 to Co.'s R 2-4.
		" Tunka,	
		" Anna,	
		" Tach,	
			Co.'s R 13.

The first gathering of the cotton crop belongs to Government, which sells it to zemindars and others, at five seers less than the current price per rupee. Cotton grows chiefly in pargana Maindur.

The following additional taxes are collected in kind :—

<i>In Grain.</i>	
Wheat,	} 2 seers ¹ for each rupee of land revenue.
Indian-corn,	
Itice,	2 seers and 1½ seers do.
Turmeric,	} Lately grown in parganas Huvelee and Maindur. The Government supplies the seed, and takes ¼ths of the produce.
Sugar-cane,	
Ghee,	per buffalo, 2 seers, per cow, 1 seer.
" Unardana " (pomegranate seed), which grows in pargana Maindur only, from 5 to 10 seers per house or family.	
Woolen Cloth, " puttoo," one yard per rupee of land revenue.	
<i>Fruit—</i>	
Apricot (" khoobance, zurdaloo "); pears (" butung "), and (" nak "), as much as may be required by Government.	

The " zurchopan," or grazing tax, is levied from shepherds at Co.'s Rs. 15-10 per 100 head of sheep. The parganas of Punjsarwe, Sohrin, Mundee, Sudroon, and Baghan, contain the largest number of sheep.

The " Shakh-shoomarce" is collected on buffaloes and cows from the owners, who are mostly Goojurs, a well-known pastoral tribe, the ancient inhabitants of Punch, at the rate of one rupee and 8 annas or 1½ rupees per buffalo, and 12 annas per cow.

A tax (called the " zur-i-murkub") of 5 rupees per pony is levied at Poshana, a large village of some commercial importance, in pargana Punjsarwe, on the Kashmir road. There are about 500 ponies used for carrying loads in this village.

The " baj-i-peshewaran" is a tax on trades. The grocers, " bunias" (provision sellers) of Mundi, a trading place in pargana Huvelee, pay at one rupee per shop. Those of Punch are exempt from the payment of this duty. All other traders, artisans, carpenters, ironsmiths, weavers, barbers, leather-makers, tailors, silk-twiners, dyers, soap-makers, corn-grinders, &c., pay at the rate of 2 rupees per shop or house.

Customs and Trade.

The " zukat" consists of transit and town duties.

Rates of Transit Duty levied on certain articles of export and import.

Imports into Punch from the Jammu and British territories, for Punch or Kashmir :—

	Co.'s R a. p.	
English cotton piece goods	12 8 0	per maund of English standard.
Coarse country cloth, cotton and woollen	7 8 0	ditto.
Sugar-candy	16 0 0	ditto.
Sugar	12 8 0	ditto.
Coarse engar	6 8 0	ditto.
Molasses	5 0 0	ditto.
Salt	5 0 0	ditto.
If taken in lumps	0 11 0	per lump without reference to size and weight.
Kiriana (spices, medicinal drugs, &c.)	12 8 0	per maund of English standard.
Tobacco	7 8 0	ditto.
Cotton	5 0 0	ditto.

Imported from Kashmir :—

Kashmir blankets (Loee) per piece	0 8 0
" (puttoo) per piece of 10 yards	0 8 0
Apples (per hundred)	1 0 0

Exports from Punch :—

Punch blankets, per piece	8 annas or 8 annas.
Ghee	3 12 0	per maund of English standard.
Buffaloe, female, per head	2 12 0	
" male	1 4 0	
<i>Note.</i> —Export of cows and oxen strictly prohibited.		
Leather, per pony load	1 8 0	

¹ A seer is equal to 1½ seers of English standard.

The duties are collected by the men of the contractor, Sirdar Hara Singh, at the different customs posts or chokies, of which there are seventeen * on the frontier, and five in the interior of the country.

The following are the principal commercial lines through Punch:—

1st.—The principal road from the Punjab to Kashmir by Bhimbur, Rajour, Punch, and the Pir Panjal Pass; see Route VIII, Appendix XXIV, to the printed Punjab Trade Report. Buhramgula (next stage from Thunna in Rajour) and Poshana are the only two stages in Punch on this line.

2nd.—From Thunna on the above line to Kashmir by Punch, the Haji Pir and Baramulla passes, viz.:

		<i>Miles.</i>	
From Thunna to	Sohrin,	10	Cross the Buttun Pir Spur at the Doonar Pass.
	Punch,	14	
	Kuhoota,	9	
	Uliabad	9	
In Punch territory.	Ooree,	17	Cross the Haji Pir pass, Halderabad area, a halting place a short distance beyond the pass. Ooree is in the Khukhla hills, thence to Baramulla and Biringar, see in Route XI, Appendix XXIV to Trade Report.

This road is open all the year round, and passable for laden ponies throughout from the Punjab to Kashmir, though the above portion within Punch territory is more rugged and difficult than the Mozufferabad line, the only other road from the Punjab to Kashmir which is not closed in winter.

The Kashmir traders use this road in winter.

3rd.—From the Find Dadun Khan Salt Mines and Rawalpindi, by Kuhoota, through Punch to Kashmir.

		<i>Miles.</i>	
From Find Dadun Khan in zilla Jhelum to Kutloota, in zilla			
Rawalpindi, by Chukkowal		about 60 kos.	
From Rawalpindi to Kuhoota, a Tubseel station		12 "	
From Kuhoota to the Ferry on the Jhelum river		15 "	Cross over into Punch territory.
In Punch territory.		Pulunduroo	
		Dunna	4 "
		Palungee	7 "
		Punch	16 "
		Humde	8 "
		Sultanpudri	9 "
		Tosa Maidan	5 "
Patun		6 "	
Srinagar		10 "	In the valley of Kashmir.

This is more difficult but shorter than either of the two above roads within Punch territory. It is passable for laden ponies, and by it the Punch traders, and Raja Moti Singh, who is the largest trader in salt in Punch, in particular, send their goods to Kashmir. Open for six months—from May or June to October and November—only.

4th.—From Murree to Punch:—

From Murree to Rubat	4 kos.	
Ferry on the Jhelum called Taen	6 "	Cross the river into Punch territory. Taen is a village on the left bank of the river in Punch. This ferry is also called "Dalkot," from the name of the fort in Taen.
Purl	16 "	
Doon Randee	8 "	Road hilly and difficult, but passable for laden ponies.
Punch	8 "	

This road is used by the Punch traders, who bring large quantities of ghee, blankets, &c., to Murree. The portion from Rubat to Purl is the most difficult. It is, however, passable throughout for laden ponies and mules.

The monopolizing system of trade on the part of Government and its officials is carried on in Punch to a much greater extent than in the Jammu and Kashmir territories. The trade in Find Dadun Khan rock salt and the Punch ghee, the only articles capable of an extensive speculation, is chiefly in the hands of Sirdar Hara Singh, the Prime Minister of Raja Moti Singh, and the contractor of customs, stamps, &c., on his own account, as well as that of his master. The purchase and sale of the other valuable productions of the country, viz., the iron, the "chikree" (a superior kind of wood used in making combs in the Punjab, particularly at Amritsar), and the root of the wood "Chob-i-koot" (*Aucklandia coracosta*) are also monopolised by Hara Singh. Both these woods grow indigenous.

About 20,000 maunds of salt, worth more than Co.'s Rs. 60,000 at the Find Dadun Khan mines, is believed to be thus annually imported by Hara Singh, for sale in Punch and Kashmir; and the annual quantity of ghee exported to the Punjab is estimated at 8,000 maunds. Most of the ghee consumed in Murree and Rawalpindi comes from Punch. The price paid by Hara Singh in Punch is about Rs. 7 per maund (equal to 1½ maunds English standard), and that obtained in the Punjab from Rs. 1½ to 17 per English maund.

* 7 on the river Jhelum.
6 on the Kashmir border.
4 on the Jammu border.

Civil Establishments and Troops, and their estimated cost per annum.

Principal Officers:—

	Co.'s R	
Miyau Golab Sing, Chief Military Officer	2,600	
Billoo, Soobedar	1,000	
Sirdar Harm Singh, Minister	1,000	
Head Munshis and Officials in the Sudder office	2,400	
	6,900	All these officers, as well as the Tahseeldars, hold farms of village.
Five District Officers:—	Co.'s R	
Tahseeldar	900	
Tahseel Establishments	200	
	1,100	
Nine Thandars	800	
200 Sepoys under the Thandars, at Co.'s Rs. 4 each	800	
	1,600	The Thandars are Police officers under the Tahseeldars.
A regiment of Infantry, consisting of 400 Sepoys and Officers	16,000	The Sepoys in Thanas are armed with muskets, swords, and shields.
	25,000	The Regiment is stationed at Punch.
Total estimated cost of Civil and Military Establishments	25,000	

The regiment is properly drilled and disciplined. Their clothing consists of a red cloth turban, red woollen coat, and blue woollen pantaloons with red stripe. The sepoys are armed with Bhurmar (flint guns) and sword, and are recruited chiefly from the Jammu hills. There are about 50 Hindustanis in the regiment. The pay of the sepoy is Co.'s Rs. 5, of which Rs. 2 are monthly deducted for rations, and 8 annas for clothing.

The rations cost little or nothing to the Raja, being supplied from the grain and ghee collected from the zumeedars, as shewn under the head of land revenue collections.

There are 10 forts in Punch, Bahramgula, Mankot, Punch, Purl, Baghan, Salian, Dulkot, Mangora, Pulungee, Barul—each garrisoned by 20 to 25 sepoys under a thanadar.

The Punch and Baghan forts are the strongest, and entirely built of pukka stone and brick. The others are built partly of mud and partly of stone.

The Raja has got only one "Jinsee" gun or field piece, and nine "Sherbuchas," or swivels, all in the Punch cantonment.

The district officers called Tahseeldars dispose of all revenue, civil, and criminal cases, referring only heinous crimes, such as murder, kine killing, &c., for orders to the Sudder Adalat at Punch, presided over

by the Raja himself.

Miyau Golab Singh, of Seeba, a relation of the Raja, is Commander-in-Chief of his troops, and also chief judicial functionary.

Billoo, Soobedar, a Thakur of Jammu, assists the Miyau in both the civil and military departments.

Hara Singh, a Khutree of Mouza Wali, pargana Pind Dadun Khan, zilla Jhelum, is the chief adviser and coadjutor of the Raja in all matters of finance and trade. He possesses great influence over the Raja.

The Raja devotes most of his time to sporting, leaving much of his work to be done by Miyau Golab Singh or Hara Singh.

There is no code or written law. All decisions are regulated by precedents, will, or judgment of the presiding officer.

No record of cases, excepting those of murder, kine killing, &c., is prepared, either in the Mufussil or Sudder Courts.

All crimes and offences, criminal and revenue, are punishable by fine, which is usually resorted to, imprisonment, without any limited term, being awarded on default. Capital punishment is never inflicted. Imprisonment is commutable to fine even in case of murder.

In cases of theft and cattle stealing, in which stolen property is recovered, both parties are generally fined; the money paid by the plaintiff, at the rate of one-fourth of the value of the recovered property, is called "Shookurana."

Most of the criminal offences are taken up by the local authorities themselves, on being reported by the Police, even if there be no complaint made by either party, for the sake of fine, which is imposed on both parties in one form or another.

Any marriage effected amongst Mussulmans without marriage deed being endorsed on the usual stamp paper, is punishable by fine, as follows:—

	Co.'s R
Fine leviable from the Kazi	25
" from the Witnesses	25
" from the Husband	25
" from the parents or relatives of the bride	25
" from the village Lumberdar	25

The value of stamped paper prescribed for marriage deed is Rs. 7 for the marriage of a widow, and Rs. 3 for the marriage of a virgin.

All petitions presented to the Sudder Adalat are endorsed on stamped paper of two annas value. No written petitions are taken in a Mofussil Court, all proceedings being conducted *visa voce*. Government takes one-fourth share of all sums decreed in civil suits.

The administration of Raja Moti Singh is complained of as being very oppressive, and the taxation as exceedingly heavy.

Besides the usual *begar* (pressed labour), the agricultural classes have to supply *begaris* every harvest at the rate of one man to every two houses, to collect grass for the Raja's stables and fuel for his kitchen, as well as for sale to a contractor, to whom the monopoly of the sale of fuel in the town of Punch is given.

Driven by poverty and the demands of the tax-gatherer, thousands of the *zummedars*¹ (agriculturists) of Punch annually come to Murree, Abbottabad, and Rawalpindi, where they labour hard as coolies for the season, and save as much of their wages as they possibly can to pay into the Raja's treasury.

¹ *Hindu*.—*Brahmins*.

Meanston Classes.—Soodoon, Mallia, Dhoond, Kural, Sottee, Junjoo, Doomal, Hattal, &c.

your office, but it will perhaps not be considered superfluous if I here give a brief sketch of the noticeable portion of the contents.

13. The report deals with the administration under the following heads:—

1. Trade.
2. The *mela* or fair of "Raghúndh Ji."
3. The administration of justice.
4. The tumult that arose between the Sunnis and Shiáhs.
5. The police.
6. Revenue and material improvements.
7. The troops.
8. European visitors to Kashmir.
9. Educational institutions.
10. Translation of good and useful books into the vernacular.
11. Hospitals and dispensaries.

14. *Trade*.—The trade statistics are translated in Table A appended to this my report.

15. *The Fair of Raghúndh Ji.*—With the view of increasing the commercial importance of his capital, Jammú, an object long held in constant view, the Máharája instituted a fair there, named the *Raghúndh-ji-ki mela*, to occur annually from the 28th Káitak to the 26th Maghar (corresponding this year, 1873, with 12th November to 12th December).

16. Last year, 1872, property worth Co.'s Rs. 2,80,278 was brought from all sides to this fair. Goods brought from the Punjab were free from half the usual customs duties, and numerous rewards in the shape of khilluts were given to those who were conspicuous among the importers. [This year, 1873, I may here add, the prosperity of the fair was much impeded by a surmise which arose on the late occasion of mourning in the Máharája's family that it would be postponed to another date.]

17. *Justice*.—Table B (1) here below appended shows the number of suits of all sorts that occupied the attention of the Courts during the year, and Tables B(2) and B (3) the heinous and petty offences during the same period. I believe that there is no doubt that security both of person and property prevails to quite an unusual degree in this State,—a fact which is, I believe, due to the following causes:—

- (1.) The extreme severity of the punishments inflicted in the time of Máharája Golab Singh.
- (2.) The extent to which the responsibility of the local officials and village headmen is enforced in cases of undetected crime.
- (3.) The extent to which the acts and character of every inhabitant and every official are known owing to the action of the secret intelligence department.

18. *The Tumult between the Sunnis and Shiáhs.*—Among the offences entered in the tabular statement that of chief importance was the tumult which in September 1872 arose in the city of Srinagar between the Sunnis and the Shiáhs. The animosity between the two sects has on many previous occasions caused tumults and bloodshed in the city. On this occasion the disturbance and the punishment that followed are thus described:—"The cause of the tumult was that the Shiáhs commenced to build a square house of unburnt bricks and mud near the tomb of Mádin Sháh, whom the members of each sect regard as a follower of their own creed; that is to say, the Sunnis regard him as a Sunni, and the Shiáhs as a Shiáh; and priests for his shrine are appointed by both parties. The disturbances extended so far that the Sunnis burned hundreds of Shiáh's houses and plundered their property, valued at lakhs of rupees. There was a prolonged investigation by the joint agency of Wazir Punnú and of Babú Lilambar Mukarji," and [in February of this year 1873] "the Máharája pronounced his decision, which was embodied in a resolution published in the *Vidya Bilas*, the official newspaper of Jammú, "and was to the following effect:—

3	Sunnis	were	imprisoned	for	life,
1	ditto	ditto	12	years.	
31	"	"	10	"	
46	"	"	7	"	
35	"	"	5	"	
5	"	"	4	"	
10	"	"	3	"	
68	"	"	2	"	

and on four heavy fines were inflicted."

[Some hundreds of men who were implicated to a less degree in the disturbance, and who had been at once arrested, were after a time released on payment of a small fine.]

19. The Máharája further published certain regulations having in view the prevention of such an outbreak for the future. [I may add that, when the Máharája was leaving the valley this year, 1873, he desired Diván Kirpa Rám to represent to the leaders of the two sects, who accompanied His Highness as far as Islámábád, the extreme mischief resulting from their mutual animosity, which had reached such a pitch that no member of the one sect would buy or use in their manufacture anything sold or made by members of the other sect. The Diván spoke to such effect that the leaders promised to forgive and forget, and, as an earnest of the reconciliation, to go and eat bread in each other's houses on the termination of the then closing Ramzána. This promise, I have since heard, they fulfilled; but, as I have observed to the Máharája, the animosity must be expected to break out again unless the members of the two sects are raised from the state of ignorance in which they now are, very few having received other than a very slight education, and that of a narrow sectarian character.]

20. *Police*.—One result of the outrage was the establishment of a body of city police on the model of the Punjab constabulary, numbering 337 men, and costing Co.'s Rs. 2,555 per mensem.

21. *Education*.—During 1872 more attention than before was devoted to education, and Table C. appended to this my report contains certain statistics regarding the educational institutions in existence at the beginning of the present year.

22. And about two years ago the Māharāja determined to devote 30,000 Chilkis (=to Co.'s Rs. 18,750) per annum to the work of preparing and printing translations of

* Being confined, so far as I can ascertain, to the following,—all of them in poetry, and none of them of any length—:

- (1) Eight Romances by Muhammad Gāmi, viz.:
 - "Shifrū-o-Khnerā,"—adapted from the Persian.
 - "Laila-o-Majnu," do.
 - "Mahmūd Ghaznavi," do.
 - "Aknauldā," an original romance.
 - "Yusuf-o-Zulfa," adapted from the Persian.
 - "Zohra Khatūn,"—an original romance.
 - "Toba Khān," do.
 - "Mahmūd Akā,"—adapted from the Persian.
- (2) Other romances by authors whose names were unknown to my informant, viz.:
 - "Kisa-i-Sheikh Sanna" } adapted from the Persian.
 - "Kisa-i-Husam Dāstān" }
 - "Sam Neriman" }
 - "Wamīk-o-Urm," an original love story.
 - "Kisa-i-Gūdkhbari" } original romances.
 - "Kisa-i-Saifullah Mallik" }
- (3) "Nūr Din,"—a theological treatise in poetry by Nūr Din.
- (4) The "Nisab" of Pandit Gobind Rām, a poetical catalogue of the names of things in Kashmiri and Persian—a kind of *memoria technica*.
- (5) A do. do. by Sant Pandit.

Besides a lot of short love songs and other songs which have not been committed to writing.

I have made arrangements for getting that nicely written and interesting little Urdu work the *Mirāt-ul-Urusāb*, by Maulvi Nasir Ahmed, of Azimgarh, translated into Kashmiri.

advanced beyond the place of unformed and unsystematised provincial dialects. I make no mention of Ladākhi, about which I know nothing. I am informed, however, that an attempt is about to be made to prepare some simple books in Dogri.

23. *Army*.—During the same year there was in the following respects an improvement in the condition of the soldiery in the Māharāja's service.

24. The pay of the private was increased to Co.'s Rs. 5-10-0 per mensem, and that of the Rājput (or Dogra) private to Co.'s Rs. 6-4-0,—that of the superior ranks being also raised.

25. As in some places the cost of living is far greater than in others, and especially in Astor and Gilgit grain is scanty and extremely dear, it was decided to supply the following rations daily:—

* A Kashmiri sēr is 9 of a Com- pany's sēr.	3 Kashmiri sērs* of flour,
	½ ditto dāl,
	¼ chittak of salt, and
	a sufficiency of fuel,

only Co.'s Rs. 1-14-0 being in return deducted on this account from the monthly pay.

26. Lastly, whereas a Chilki rupee was each month deducted from the pay to cover the cost of uniform, this was remitted, and the soldier is every three years to receive gratis one suit of uniform for winter and two for summer use (one full dress, the other *khaki*). The soldier still has to supply his white uniform out of his own pocket.

Material improvements.

27. Substantial endeavours were during the same year made to develop the resources of the Māharāja's territories.

28. Stallions of improved breed (Arabs and Turks), though of advisedly small stature, were imported.

Bulls of improved breed were also imported.

[Altogether up to the present time 59 stallions and 80 bulls have been so imported. They have been distributed over the country, but have all been put under the charge of the officials.]

29. About 1,000 ghumāos of land were prepared for the growth of tea in the neighbourhood of Jammū, and 84 ghumāos were actually planted with tea bushes.

30. The growth of opium was introduced into Kashmir.

[I cannot say that the crops which I have seen there had a promising appearance.]

31. And the silk culture of Kashmir, which had only produced a revenue of some seven or eight thousand* Chilkis a year, was, by Bābū Nilambar Mūkarji, put on a really improved footing, which even in the first year resulted in a return to the State of 1,86,300 Chilkis, deducting from which the expenditure 89,480 Chilkis (excluding the amount spent once for all in erecting permanent buildings), there remained a balance of 96,820 Chilkis. [The development of this culture, which promises to be a source of abundant riches to Kashmir, has formed the subject of my letter No. 206, dated 28th instant.]

* The new Chilkis is equivalent to 10 Company's annas.

32. *Revenue. The Shawl Trade.*—At the beginning of the year there were very heavy balances due by the shawl-makers to the Shawl Department of the Kashmir administration. This was due to the extreme depression of the trade owing to the state of affairs in France. [A depression which still continues, and is, indeed, at the present moment greater than ever before. At the London sale, the results of which have just been communicated by telegram, while £2,500 worth of Amritsar shawls were sold, nothing whatever, I am told, out of the £4,000 worth of Kashmir shawls that were presented, was sold. What to substitute for this article of industry, which has hitherto provided sustenance for between 80,000 and 90,000 of the population, is a question now seriously occupying the Māharāja's attention. As an alleviation in the beginning of the summer, the Māharāja assigned to a number of shawl-weavers work in the silk factory at Srinagar, but as it was represented that the alleviation would be very slight (the work in the silk factories lasting at present for so small a portion of the year), and that the process would ruin that delicacy of hand which constitutes the special distinction of the shawl-weaver, the order was rescinded. I have suggested that the work of carpet-making be stimulated, as that would provide for the shawl-weavers an occupation which, though coarse, is still not radically different from that in which they have been hitherto employed, while the demand for Indian carpets is on the increase. And the suggestion is under consideration.]

Re-settlement of land revenue.—After a regular measurement, a re-settlement was made of the land revenue in the wazarats of Minawar, Naoshehra, Jasrota, Uddampur, Karnnagar, and Riassi, the districts round Jammú. The previous settlement in fixed cash amounts had been made in 1860, and had expired in 1868. The re-measurement showed a considerable increase of cultivation, and the revenue was accordingly enhanced by 10 per cent., and was again fixed for 10 years.

34. The term of the five years' farms of the land revenue in Kashmir having expired, they were renewed at an enhancement of about 15 per cent.

35. This is the last matter of importance to be noticed in the annual report for Sambat 1923-29 (1872), and during this last season, 1873, the Māharāja has abolished the system of farming the land revenue in Kashmir, and substituted a regular settlement in cash amounts fixed for three years.

36. This substantial reform merits a somewhat detailed description, both of itself and of the system which preceded it, and the following particulars have been communicated to me by the Māharāja's order. From a view of those particulars it will, I think, be seen that the Māharāja inherited from previous administrations a most unfortunate revenue system, the evils of which were but slightly lessened by the various experiments that had been made previous to this year of real improvement.

37. In the time of the Hindu Rajás, i.e., till about the beginning of the 14th century A. D., no more than a sixth of the produce was paid to the State.

38. The Mussalman Sultans, who succeeded, continued at first to collect at the same rate; but they and still more the Moghal Emperors of Delhi, began gradually to make enhancements on, according to tradition, the following pretext:—The population being divided into inhabitants of the city and inhabitants of the country, a sixth of the produce raised by the latter was supposed originally to suffice for the wants of the former (to whom it was sold by the rulers), and for the court officials also. It was then from time to time given out that

*=6 Kashmiri sérs, or 5-4 Co.'s sérs. this was insufficient, and additions were made (under the name of *tavukki amal*) first of one *trak** per *khirwar*,† then of another *trak*, and so by degrees. From time to time

the additions and the original share were consolidated into a revised share of the produce, and then a new departure was made in the work of gradual enhancement. It reached its

I In those villages, out of each 96 sérs, the State took 48+38 sérs=84 sérs, leaving only 12 sérs, or an eighth, to the zemindar; and besides there was—

(1) the regular due of the *patwarí manoollee* (or 2½ sérs) per *khirwar*;

(2) the presents (called *dáman gada*) to which the *kardár* and the *sazádal* and the *shakdár* were entitled at the time of the division of the crops.

To these dues, it may be added, Māharāja Golab Singh added what was called *mandar páwi* a 1/16 or 1/8 sérs out of each *manoollee* (or 6 sérs per *khirwar*) being taken for the Hindu temples in the city.

This enumeration shows that the proportion nominally due could never have been really taken.

others three or less. The particular rate of collection in each village depended in fact on the productive capabilities of the soil, on the power of the zemindárs to resist, and on the disposition of the local officials.

39. The first Sikh governor continued to levy the land revenue at these heavy rates, to which indeed they added dues and supplies for the local officials called *abwah* and *rossada*; and these latter exactions were so heavy that General Mián Singh, whose governorship began in 1833, is held in favourable remembrance by the people, because he abolished these extra *cesses*, though he made the demand uniform at the enormous rate of 80 sérs per *khirwar*. He found, too, that the rate of payment for the compulsory transport of the government share of the produce from the different parts of the valley to the government store-houses in the city was arbitrary, uniform and insufficient, and fixed it accordingly at fair amounts, proportioned to the distance over which the grain had to be carried. Still it is of course a matter of the utmost wonder how

the zamindars could keep soul and body together on such a system, and I am told that they did so (1) by growing vegetables in little garden plots, which, by bribing the officials, they managed to keep free of taxation, (2) by the sale of sheep and ponies, and (3) by the manufacture of coarse cloth during the winter months. In fact, agriculture was so far from being a source of profit to them, that officials (the *shakdar* and the *sazawal*) were employed to watch; but they left their fields fallow, or cultivated them carelessly, or neglected to cut the crop when ripe, and so forth.

40. Ghulam Muhi-ud-din, who had the real control in the time of the next governor, Diwan Kirpa Ram,* found that great frauds were practised on the State by the subordinate officials who were charged with the superintendence of the crops while they were growing,

and the division when cut, viz., the *shakdar* (watcher), the *sazawal* (his superior officer), and the *tapasdar* (the weighman) all subordinate to the *kardar*, who looked after the collection in the group of villages. As a check he applied the following cumbrous remedy: The grain, as it was cut, was tied up into little sheaves (*pulaa*) of the size which a man could grasp with his two hands, the fingers of the two meeting. It was the business of the village *shakdar*, watcher of the crops, acting under the orders of his superior, the *sazawal*, to see that all the grain cut was so stored; and it was the business of the village *tapasari*, the accountant, to number the sheaves in the different heaps. This being done, respectable men, specially chosen for the purpose by the governor, came round and took out of the heaps certain average sheaves, which were threshed out in their presence, the produce weighed, and the total output of grain in the village thus estimated. This process was called the *taahkis* (assessment). By means of the data so acquired, the total amount of grain due to the State from the circle of villages under each *kardar* was estimated, and for that amount he was held responsible. This was the process uniformly adopted in the case of the rice crop, which is the staple of the province. With regard to the other crops the practice varied. In some tracts where wheat or barley, or Indian-corn, is the staple, there was a *taahkis* to show what amount the *kardar* was expected to pay in, but in general the amount realised during the previous year from these crops was, with such addition or diminution as the character of the season seemed to warrant, fixed as the amount due by the *kardar*. And it was generally fixed in money, the *kardar* being left to collect from the villages as he pleased. If there was a general outcry against a particular *kardar*, or if a neighbouring *kardar* offered to pay more for that particular circle of villages, he was turned out, and the one that offered more put in his place.

41. With the exception of a slight reduction of 3 *manwallah*=7½ *seer*, made in the time of Máharaja Golab Singh, such was the system that continued in force till the year 1860, when Diwan Kirpa Ram, by the Máharaja's orders, divided the valley of Kashmir into *chaklas*, each containing several *kardarships*, and farmed the collection of the revenue in each *chakla* to the *chakladar*. In fixing the amounts of grain and money to be paid by the farmer, the average amount collected during the previous five years was taken as the basis, and in the most heavily taxed villages 7½ *seer* per *kharwar* (i. e., 3¼ per cent.) were remitted. The amount was fixed for three years, the farmer being left to share with the zamindars the profits from extension of cultivation. And the lease was guarded by a code of regulations (of which I am able to transmit a vernacular copy, see Appendix E., intended partly to protect the interests of the State, and partly to protect the zamindar from extortion on the part of the farmer. Moreover, in each *chakla* a *thanaadar* was appointed for the protection of the zamindars, if need be, against the *chakladar's* oppression. In some *parganas* it was found impossible or unadvisable to farm the revenue, and in them the system of actual division of the produce, called the *amaní* system, was continued.

42. In the same year, 1860, an endeavour was made to bring again under cultivation the extensive areas that had fallen into waste by promising to take no more than two-fifths of the normal dues for the first year, and no more than one-half the normal dues for four years more. I have myself passed over considerable areas which have been brought under cultivation on these terms.

43. In 1863 the leases expired, and were renewed at, in general, somewhat enhanced rates, for three years more. But in 1863-64, and still more in 1864-65, the crops failed extensively, and in consequence the leases broke down.

44. In 1866 the Governor Diwan Kirpa Ram, by the Máharaja's orders, resorted again to the *amaní* system.

45. In 1867 the Máharaja himself gave out fresh leases of the same nature as those given in 1860, but fixed for five years, and as by this time the advantages of the system to the farmers had become fully appreciated, the leases were generally accepted. The amounts of the leases were, moreover, less than they had been previously, being based on the principle that for the spring crop exactly half, and for the autumn crop 10 out of the 16 *trales* in the *khirwar* (i. e., 62 per cent. should be taken. Nevertheless, at the end of each of the three first years of the lease, the farmers came forward and said they could not continue to hold the farms. In three *parganas* in which the farms were thrown up at the end of the first year, namely, Nágún, Vihú, and Shapyon, Diwan Kirpa Ram, as an experiment, granted leases at amounts fixed in money for one year to the village headmen, whereas all the previous leases had been granted to outsiders. And the experiment succeeding, it was continued in those three *parganas*.

46. Wherever the five years' leases had held good, on their expiry in 1871 they were renewed for one year at enhanced rates by the Governor Wazir Punnu, and the next year, 1872, they were again renewed at, wherever it was found possible, still further enhanced amounts. Comparatively few, however, of these leases were accepted.

* But the *patwari's* papers contain the approximate amount of each man's *abli* (irrigated) and of his *khādkes* (dry) land, the measure in use being the *khirwār*, and the *path*, or amount of land on which a *khirwār* or a *śer* of seed is sown, and differing in size according as the land is used for rice *abli*, or *khādkes* used for wheat, &c.

48. In assessing the amount of the amount varied. In some, the more remote *paraganas*, the *zamindārs* were allowed to sell the whole of their share of the produce; in others, a *śak* out of each *khirwār*, others more. The amount was called the *mānāsi zamindāri*.

† Against this benefit was, however, to be set the fact that the measure at which grain was sold at the public granaries was less by a sixteenth than that ordinarily in use. It was not, I may remark, found necessary to graduate the rates according to the qualities of the grain sold. The best qualities were kept for the use of the court and the officials, the common qualities being alone sent to the public granaries to be sold.

among the different *zamindārs*.

This was a laborious task, the process adopted in assessing the village being repeated in all its stages, in the case of each *zamindār*.

49. As village bankers and grain dealers on an extensive scale do not exist in Kashmir, the *Māharāja* appointed six men of the banker caste, natives of Jammū and elsewhere, to fulfil their functions by the help of capital placed in their hands out of the State treasury; and by this means nearly the whole revenue for the summer harvest has been collected with ease. The *zamindārs*, being for the first time free to sell their grain to whomsoever they pleased and at what prices they pleased, at first demanded rates higher than those which had up to that time been authoritatively fixed by Government, and many purchases were made at these higher rates; but the amount of grain thrown on the market soon lowered the prices obtainable by the *zamindārs*, who then resorted to the State bankers, and sold their grain at the rates which had been used in calculating the assessment.

50. One of the consequences of this reform most appreciated by the people is the complete cessation of the functions of the *shakdar*, the *sazawal*, and the *lavazadar*. The out-turn of grain in each village will still be reckoned for the information of Government, but it will be reckoned by the *zamindārs* themselves, and entered in the *patwari's* books. The *patwari's* are to be paid by the State, but the arrangements in this respect have not yet been settled. And sufficient encouragements being given by the nature of the lease, the *shakdar* and the *sazawal* will not be, as they have hitherto been, employed to watch and report whether any *zamindār* leaves his fields unsown, or his crops uncut, as was necessary in the time when so little was left after paying the dues of the State and of the several officials.

51. To these and to the other members of the great army of officials the new system is of course utterly hateful, as taking away their hope of gain. Members of this class made a strong endeavour to turn the *Māharāja* from his purpose by their gloomy prognostications; and it will be matter for surprise if that endeavour is not repeated on the occurrence of the first bad season which even under the present reformed system will too probably render remissi necessary, unless the *zamindārs* have had time to amass a little capital.

52. In several tracts exposed either to such inundation as to ruin the crops entirely, or to such drought as to make the crops uncertain, the continuance of the *amāni* system is still necessary, as there are no *zamindārs* possessed of sufficient capital to take up the management of such tracts and recoup themselves for the losses of one year by the profits of another.

53. *British Mission to Eastern Turkistan*.—Such was the measure of internal reform which most occupied the attention of the *Māharāja* during the period of his stay in Kashmir; but a matter which, as I have good reason for knowing, caused him nearly as constant consideration, and far more anxiety, was the task of arranging for the safe and commodious transit of the Mission to Eastern Turkistán.

54. His Excellency the Viceroy, and His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, and Mr. Forsyth have in letters severally addressed to the *Māharāja* conveyed their high appreciation of the perfectly successful arrangements which were made, and, valuing highly the expression contained in those letters, the *Māharāja* desires no further acknowledgment. But I have thought it right to place on permanent record, in a readily accessible form, a connected statement of what was done by this State for the purpose of furthering the Mission. Such a statement the *Māharāja* has at my request supplied in Persian, and a copy forms Appendix F to this report. The *parwanas* attached thereto are only specimens of the many similar orders which were sent from time to time whenever there appeared reason to fear that any of the officials charged with the superintendence of the arrangements were not sufficiently alive to the necessity of themselves seeing that the orders they had received were fulfilled. But the statement gives no idea of the extent to which the exigencies of the different parties of the Mis-

sion necessitated a drain on the resources of the country. This was more especially felt in the case of the last two parties—that of Syad Yakúb Khán, the Yárkandi Envoy, with the first, and that of his subordinate, Haji Kurban Ali, with the second, detachment of the heavy baggage. In both cases the baggage included cannon and other articles which could not be carried by less than, in some cases, eight men, and the difficulty of taking them up and down the steep ascents and descents on the line of journey was very great. Both coolies and baggage animals were brought from great distances, and, as the last two parties passed after the first fall of snow in the commencing winter, it is a mercy that on the bleak heights which intervene between Kashmir and Leh there was no loss of human life, and but a small mortality among the beasts of burden.

55. *Communications.*—The experience of the different parties, and more especially of the last of all, brought into a prominent light the bad state of the paths between India and Kashmir, and it will have been observed that neither in the report printed by the Máharaja nor in my own remarks has any mention been made of that important matter—communications. Nothing unfortunately could be said on this subject for the past, because, with the exception of a little scraping here and there, next to nothing has yet been done. But the Máharaja intends henceforth to devote to the improvement of the paths in his territory an annual sum of half a lakh chilkí (10 anna) rupees,—an announcement which will, I feel sure, be received by Government with much gratification.

TABLE A (1).

Value, in Company's Rupees, of the Trade carried on in the Territories of His Highness the Máharaja during the Year 1872.

NAME OF PROVINCE.	CHANGED WITH DUTY.		FARE OF DUTY.		TOTAL.
	Import.	Export.	Import.	Export.	
	R a.	R a.	R a.	R a.	R a.
Jammú	23,64,372 4	16,38,045 0	11,23,690 0	...	60,25,907 4
Kashmír	5,20,685 0	27,53,377 0	14,95,437 0	...	47,69,499 0
Ladák	6,79,738 14	4,09,551 4	0,89,285 8
TOTAL	28,56,067 4	42,91,422 0	21,09,750 14	4,09,551 4	1,07,84,781 8

N.B.—In the statistics regarding the trade of Jammú and Kashmír the internal trade from one of those provinces to another is not included, and articles entered in the list when they are imported are not entered again when they are exported. But the statistics of the Ladák trade are prepared on a different principle, being the same as that adopted by the British Joint-Commissioner,—articles that are passed through being entered both when they enter and when they leave that territory; consequently, as there is little local commerce, the trade of Ladák is really little more than half the amount shown in this Table.

TABLE A (2).

Detail of the Value, in Company's Rupees, of the Articles imported into, or exported from, the Territories of Jammú and Kashmír as a whole.

NAME OF ARTICLE.	CHANGED WITH DUTY.		FARE OF DUTY.		TOTAL.
	Import.	Export.	Import.	Export.	
	R a.	R a.	R a.	R a.	R a.
Opium	4,68,636 0	2,03,739 0	10,68,160 0	...	18,30,554 0
Cloth, cotton and woollen	6,93,968 0	1,66,597 0	94,777 0	65,310 0	10,19,658 0
Sugar and molasses	4,37,298 0	1,39,155 0	42,265 0	12,755 0	6,31,471 0
Metal vessels	56,717 0	...	2,611 0	8,005 0	65,303 0
Salt	2,69,410 0	26,160 0	620 0	7,036 0	3,03,225 0
Tobacco	50,774 0	...	830 0	...	5,140 4
Snuff	40,462 0	2,000 0	42,462 0
Ghi	1,60,078 0	2,41,264 0	665 0	...	5,02,097 0
Jowá-o-kaml khésh (bags of goats' wool for carrying goods on the backs of baggage animals)	1,34,046 0	3,30,737 0	80,369 0	2,308 0	4,97,474 0
Saffron	7,400 0	5,539 0	2,219 0	2,250 0	17,409 0

TABLE A (2)—continued.

NAME OF ARTICLE	CRANESB WITH DORT.		PANE OF DORT.		Total.
	Import.	Export.	Import.	Export.	
	R a.	R a.	R a.	R a.	R a.
Woolen articles made from the sheep wool of Kashmir, Jammu, and Ladakh	1,38,006 10	1,10,019 13	4,258 0	81 0	2,47,388 8
Broad sheets of patlu	13,480 0	1,01,174 8	178 0	86 0	1,13,865 8
Pashmias	8,405 0	16,72,100 0	250 0	10,091 0	16,92,448 0
Tea and fult, a kind of salt found in the Nubra valley, and mixed with tea in Kashmir to give color	21,896 14	2,116 0	61,519 0	39,098 2	1,24,958 0
Coin, i.e., cash	57,952 4	3,31,086 15	9,120 0	2,275 0	4,00,434 3
Chusam	35,625 0	35,625 0
Ashkar-i-Kashmiri (Sajji produced in Kashmir)	2,000 0	3,510 0	5,510 0
Khak Zag, a black dye	1,000 0	1,000 0
Bark of Jodiar	2,000 0	2,000 0
Precious stones	1,56,000 0	...	1,000 0	1,000 0	1,58,000 0
Ingots of silver	10,24,840 0	79,024 0	11,03,864 0
Root of the Réth (<i>Aucklandia celtica</i>)	...	92,896 8	92,896 8
Apples and pears	...	4,160 0	4,160 0
Medals and violet roots	...	32,508 0	4 0	...	32,513 0
Quince seeds	...	5,000 0	5,000 0
Bir Tang (<i>plantago major</i>), a drug	...	8,000 0	8,000 0
Dried apricots and currants	...	3,000 0	1,213 0	...	4,213 0
"Zirok dandá"—Aniseed of an inferior description	...	2,200 0	2,200 0
Drugs made by mixing violet flowers and <i>Kabisa</i> flowers in sugar and exposing them in the sun	806 0	600 0	1,186 0
Kashmiri paper	...	553 0	53 8	...	636 8
Stockings of pashmina and patlu	...	400 0	55 8	...	456 8
Pattu coats	...	9,963 0	9,963 0
Gabbs for floor cloths	...	18,000 0	18,000 0
Horn and wooden articles	...	1,500 0	1,500 0
Papier maché pen and ink cases	...	2,577 0	2,577 0
Walnuts	...	8,000 0	8,000 0
<i>Pisjan Nadafce</i> —The stick which cotton-spinners use to clean the cotton	...	4,517 0	4,517 0
Deodar timber	...	5,18,000 0	5,18,000 0
Shawl-waivers' spindles	...	2,042 0	2,042 0
Horse furniture made of leather	...	4,400 0	1,415 0	1,000 0	7,715 0
Singhara nut	...	2,145 8	46,875 0	...	49,020 8
Oxen, cows, and buffaloes	...	2,169 8	11,980 0	100 0	14,248 8
Horses	59,000 0	12,900 0	71,900 0
Mules	14,800 0	...	14,800 0
Elephants	27,000 0	...	27,000 0
Cotton	1,32,500 0	...	1,32,500 0

TABLE A (2)—continued.

NAME OF ARTICLE.	CHARGED WITH DUTY.		FREE OF DUTY.		TOTAL.
	Import.	Export.	Import.	Export.	
	R. a.	R. a.	R. a.	R. a.	
Opium	15,900 0	100 0	2,560 0	18,560 0
Confectionery	2 0	...	2 0
Dried Ladáki apricots	281 0	581 0	662 0
Setta flour	66 0	569 14	635 14
Cups of the "Zakr Moakra" stone from Ladáki	75 0	132 0	207 0
Carpets	19,160 0	19,940 0	39,090 0
Felt cloth	13,860 0	5,093 8	19,853 8
"Chicken work" (embroidery)	2,600 0	516 10	3,116 10
Fur post(n)	200 0	213 0	413 0
Hobbars tillas	16,522 0	15,600 0	32,122 0
Dyes of different kinds	14,582 0	...	14,582 0
Yákrandi silk	16,128 0	7,015 0	23,143 0
Jadwar, a drug (<i>curcuma zedoaria</i>) grown in Kashmir	320 0	...	320 0
Turquoises	1,000 0	...	1,000 0
Máwirda—A drug, the root of the <i>thalictrum falcatum</i>	50 0	...	50 0
Musk pods	150 0	...	150 0
Towar—A China silk fabric	190 0	120 0	310 0
Shoes	2,065 0	...	2,065 0
Amer' skin used in the Turkistáni saddles	1,134 0	...	1,134 0
Indigo	5,173 0	4,000 0	9,173 0
Hákha pipes	10 0	...	10 0
Otter skins	12,640 0	3,184 0	15,724 0
China cups	408 0	...	408 0
Guns (small arms) brought by the Yákrand Envoy, Akzar Khán, from India	1,75,895 0	...	1,75,895 0
Pistols, do. do.	3,750 0	...	3,750 0
Swords, do. do.	1,220 0	...	1,220 0
Percussion caps, do.	2,400 0	...	2,400 0
Papier maché articles	40 0	...	40 0
Honey	472 0	562 8	1,034 8
Sakhtasa—Red sheep and goat skins	5,371 0	7,484 0	12,755 0
Monyari—Pedler's articles—needles, penknives, looking glasses	220 0	...	220 0
Time Hindi (a drug made of tamarind juice)	556 0	1,440 0	1,996 0
Kachar, the root of the <i>curcuma</i> <i>zambel</i>	1,813 0	864 0	2,677 0
Senna makhi, a drug (<i>caesia elon-</i> <i>gata</i>)	220 0	304 0	524 0
Preserves of mangoes and other fruits	120 0	210 0	330 0

TABLE A (2).—concluded

NAME OF ARTICLE.	CHARGED WITH DUTY.		FREE OF DUTY.		TOTAL.
	Import.	Export.	Import.	Export.	
	R. a.	R. a.	R. a.	R. a.	
Sulphur	14,415 0	7,917 4	22,332 4
Horn bows bound with hides, used in Tibet, but not made there	600 0	600 0
Yárkandi silk fabrics (Darys)	1,525 0	1,525 0
Gajjá—Chowries of yak tails	68 14	68 14
Jade stone	3,102 0	3,102 0
Rhubarb—"Rwaid Chini" (Ehrew Moorcroftianum, &c.)	29 0	29 0
Shana Kengi—Large combe	1 14	16 0	17 14
Oil	1,51,250 0	...	1,51,250 0

TABLE B (1).

Statement of Civil, Criminal, and Revenue Suits, &c., instituted in the Courts of Jammú and Kashmir from the 1st of Pos 1928 to Maghar 1929.

NAME OF JURISDICTION.	No. of Courts.	INSTITUTED.					DECIDED.					UNDER CONSIDERATION.				
		Criminal.	Cvdl.	Revenue.	Miscellaneous.	Total.	Criminal.	Cvdl.	Revenue.	Miscellaneous.	TOTAL.	Criminal.	Cvdl.	Revenue.	Miscellaneous.	Total.
Jammú	11	3,620	1,367	2,264	2,414	9,734	3,505	1,175	2,081	2,214	8,975	184	192	183	200	759
Kashmir	10	3,119	635	6,162	792	10,728	2,943	576	6,000	736	10,255	170	59	142	56	473
Ladakh	3	133	106	21	...	260	129	102	19	...	251	4	3	2	...	9
TOTAL	22	6,941	2,108	8,467	3,206	20,722	6,577	1,854	8,100	2,950	19,481	364	254	327	256	1,241

TABLE B (2).

Statement of Heinous Criminal Offences.

NAME OF JURISDICTION.	Murder.	Homicide.	Suicide.	Tumult.	Rape.	Causing abh- sion.	TOTAL.
Jammú	4	5	28	...	1	1	37
Kashmir	1	4	3	1	7	6	21
TOTAL	5	9	28	1	8	7	58

TABLE B (3).

Statement of Petty Criminal Offences.

NAME OF JURISDICTION.	Grievous hurt.	THEFT.		Quarous hurt & pulling in hurt.	Adultery.	Petty assault.	Miscellaneous.	TOTAL.
		Burglary.	Pick-pocketing.					
Jammú	18	143	292	23	33	469	2,979	3,852
Kashmir and Ladákh	80	9	443	66	163	1,179	1,229	3,231
TOTAL	98	152	735	89	196	1,648	3,065	6,883

TABLE C (1).

Statistics regarding the Leading Educational Institutions in Jammú and Kashmir in the Spring of 1873.

NAME OF INSTITUTION.	SANSKRIT READERS.		English Readers.	Persian Readers.	Arabic Readers.	Total No. of Students.	Yearly expenditure in the food and maintenance of pupils.	
	Sanskrit Readers.	Veda Readers.					In cash.	In kind.
The principal School in Jammú	287	...	48	95	40	470	19,197	
Pathshala in the Temple of Sri-Raghunáth Ji. in Jammú.	181	133	314	12,346	
Pathshala in the Temple of Bádhá Krishon Ji, in Jammú.	...	28	28	1,429	
Pathshala in the Temple of Tikta Devi Ji, in the mountains north of Jammú.	...	18	18	702	
Pathshala in the village of Utar Bohari, a place of pilgrimage.	190	77	307	873	
Pathshala in the village of Parmandal, a place of pilgrimage.	145	15	160	6,340	
Pathshala of Srinagar	75	75	In cash.	In kind.
Madrasa of Nao Kodal in Srinagar	192	...	192	246	135 10 0
Do. of Máharaj Ganj in Srinagar	88	...	88	1,402	1,300 0 0
Do. of Ráná Wari, below the Hari Parbat in Srinagar.	71	...	71	186	12 0 0
Do. of Basant Dágh in Srinagar	154	...	154	180	10 0 0
Do. of Aisha Kaul in do.	51	...	51	319	10 6
13								
TOTAL	818	271	48	631	40	1,808	50,321	6 8

TABLE C (2).

[In addition to this there are, in the neighbourhood of Jammú itself, numerous Village Schools in which Sanscrit and Hindi are taught.]

NAME OF WAZARAT.	No. of Schools.	No. of Pupils.
Jammú	97	719
Jawala	26	878
Bamnagar	28	669
Riassi	36	341
Uddampur	12	407
Mandwar	63	1,340
Noushora	30	523
TOTAL	220	4,518

APPENDIX D.

Names of English Works translated by order of His Highness the Māharāja Sahib of Kashmir and Jammū.

Number.	Names of Works.	Names of Writers.	Language of the Translation.	Purport of the Work.	Whether it has been printed or has been completed and awaits printing.
1	Political Economy, 3 parts.	Mill	Hindi	Completed and awaits printing.
2	Ancient and Modern History of the World, 2 parts.	Tytler	Sanskrit	Containing historical accounts of all nations, as of Greece, Rome, India, &c.	Do.
3	English Grammar	Hiley and others	Hindi	Do.
4	Bridges, 3 parts	Compilation from Telford and others.	Do. . . .	The 1st part containing theory, practice, and architecture of bridges of stone, iron, &c.; and the 2nd and 3rd parts illustrations.	Do.
5	Engineering	Rurki Treatise	Do. . . .	A general view of the subject, with illustrations.	Do.
6	Surveying	Do. . . .	Do. . . .	A short outline of the subject.	Do.
7	Irrigation	Compilation	Do.	Do.
8	Conic Sections	Chambers and others	Do. . . .	Very short outline.	Do.
9	Hydrostatics	Do. . . .	Do. . . .	Do. . . .	Do.
10	Hydraulics	Do. . . .	Do. . . .	Do. . . .	Do.
11	Hydro-pneumatics	Do. . . .	Do. . . .	Do. . . .	Do.
12	Chemistry	Chambers (Wilson)	Sanskrit	Do.
13	Physiology	Kirke and others	Hindi	Do.
14	Astronomy	Joyce and others	Do.	Do.
15	Electricity and Magnetism.	Do. . . .	Urdu	Do.
<i>Works in the course of preparation.</i>					
1	Physics	Ganot	Hindi	Natural Philosophy of Science.	
2	Optics	Parker and Chambers	Urdu		
3	Physical Geography	Hugh	Hindi		
4	Geology	F. C. Dakewell	Do. . . .		
5	Botany	Lindley	Do. . . .		
6	Anatomy	Dr. Moatt and Wilson.	Do. . . .		

APPENDIX D—continued.

Names of Works translated by order of His Highness the Māharāja of Kashmir and Jammū.

Number.	Names of Works.	Purport of the Work.	Language of Translation.	Whether it has been printed or has been completed and awaits printing.
<i>Sanskrit Works.</i>				
1	Shanti Parb, a portion of Mahabharata.	Duties of a Sovereign, Charity, Salvation, &c.	Hindi	Completed and awaits printing.
2	Sarant	A Sanskrit Grammar	Do. . . .	Do.
3	Amarkosh	A vocabulary of Sanskrit words	Do. . . .	Do.
4	Ramayana of Valmiki	A well-known epic poem	Do. . . .	Do.
5	Lilavati	Arithmetic and Mensuration	Do. . . .	Do.
6	Banbir Chakitaha Pargah in 3 parts.	A compilation from various Sanskrit Works on Hindu Medicine.	Do. . . .	First part printed; second part in the press.
<i>Persian and Arabic Works.</i>				
1	History of Shāh Jehān	Hindi	Completed and awaits printing.
2	F'ulām-al-Twarikh	An abstract History of India and the territories lying beyond the Indus.	Urdu	Do.
3	Mistabul Hisāb	A treatise on Arithmetic in Arabic	Persian	Do.

Proceedings of the Hon'ble the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Foreign Department,—No. 132, dated 14th January 1874.

READ—

Report of the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir for the season of 1873, furnished by Mr. H. LePoer Wynne.

REMARKS.—The Hon'ble the Lieutenant-Governor concurs with the Officer on Special Duty in considering it advisable that each officer on his first arrival in Kashmir should report that arrival to the Officer on Special Duty, sending in his passport at the same time. As it has been deemed necessary, in view of the limited supply of carriage in Kashmir territory, to restrict the number of military officers travelling therein, it is right that the orders directing such restriction should be duly enforced, and the measures suggested by Mr. Wynne appear to be necessary to secure that object. The attention of the Government of India will accordingly be invited to Mr. Wynne's suggestion; but the Lieutenant-Governor is not prepared to recommend that an order be issued of the nature described in paragraph 4.

2. His Honor has already communicated to His Highness the Máharája his satisfaction at the receipt of the first Annual Report of the Administration of the Territories of Jammu and Kashmir for the year 1872. The progress effected in the translation of works of useful knowledge,—the arrangements made for the improvement of the breed of horses and cattle, the promotion of tea cultivation and silk manufacture,—the reform of the police arrangements of Srinagar, and lastly, the substitution in Kashmir of a regular settlement of land revenues in cash fixed for three years in lieu of the farming system which previously obtained, are events in the year's history especially gratifying to the Lieutenant-Governor and creditable to the Máharája's government. His Honor can further bear personal testimony to the excellence of the arrangements of the silk factory at Srinagar, and the superiority of the Jail manufactures.

3. In reference to the reform of the land revenue administration, the account of the past assessments of Kashmir contained in para. 36 to para. 53 of Mr. Wynne's report is interesting. It affords a vivid picture of the difficulties and abuses connected with grain collections by State officers, and His Honor trusts that, however hateful the reform may be to those who lose thereby the opportunity for exaction, His Highness will never be induced to retrace his steps. But, though the reform is doubtless a great step in advance, and was creditable to the Máharája's statesmanship, the assessment, judged by the standard of those effected in British territory, must be considered high. The assessment, it appears, is based upon the principle that the State is entitled to the value of 62 per cent. of the gross produce calculated on the average of 10 years, from which demand, however, remissions are made of one-sixth, one-fifth, or one-fourth, according to the circumstances of each village. Allowing for the deductions made, the land revenue demand in Kashmir is still upwards of three times the maximum demand in settlements now being made in the Punjab, and contrasts even more remarkably with the settlement recently effected in the adjacent British districts of Hazárá.

4. The cordial thanks of His Excellency the Viceroy and of His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor have already been conveyed to His Highness the Máharája for the successful arrangements made by him for the transit of the mission to Eastern Türkistan; but the Lieutenant-Governor is glad that Mr. Wynne has placed on record a connected statement of what was done on the occasion, as His Honor desires also to express his thanks to His Highness for the hospitable reception accorded to him on the occasion of his visit to Srinagar during the early part of the season.

5. The announcement contained in Mr. Wynne's concluding paragraph that His Highness the Máharája has determined to devote henceforth the sum of half a lakh of chiki rupees per annum to the improvement of communications in his territory is highly gratifying.

6. In conclusion, the Lieutenant-Governor desires to express his approval of the manner in which Mr. Wynne has performed the duties of his office. In his political capacity he has maintained cordial relations with the Kashmir Darbár, and he has evinced sound judgment in the performance of his judicial and magisterial functions.

ORDER.—Ordered, that a copy of Mr. Wynne's Report, with appendices, and copy of this review, be forwarded to the Government of India, Foreign Department, for information, and that attention be called to the suggestion contained in paragraph 4 of the review, and that copies of the review be sent to the Officer on Special Duty; also that extract paragraphs 21 and 22, and Appendices C. and D. be sent to Director, Public Instruction, for information, and communication to the Senate of the Punjab University College.

APPENDIX 10 (see p. 99).

THE FAMINE IN KASHMIR DURING 1877-78-79-80.

"It is an old truth that wherever Auge physical evil is, there, as the parent and origin of it, has moral evil to a proportionate extent been."—CARLYLE.

1. Kashmir is a plain embedded in the midst of mountains, lying in an oval shape, north-west and south-east between $33^{\circ} 5'$ and $34^{\circ} 7'$ north latitude and 74° and $75^{\circ} 10'$ east longitude, elevated 5,200 feet above the level of the sea, containing an area¹ of 2,000 square miles, and drained by the river Jhelum, the Hydaspes of the Greeks, which, after traversing the valley, breaks through an opening at the north-west extremity, and pursues a tortuous course to the plains of the Punjab. The barrier of hills which encompasses Kashmir is pierced at numerous points by roads or, more properly, paths: north and east towards the Upper Indus, Ladakh, and Yarkand; south-east towards the Native State of Chumba and the British district of Lahoul; south to Jammu where the Hindu ruler of Kashmir holds his court on the densely-wooded hills that skirt the Himalaya; south-west across the Pir Panjal range and along the vestiges of the once imperial road to Bliamber and Lahore; west by the banks of the Jhelum to the British district of Hazara or the hill-station of Murree. But although at least one of these routes, viz., that following the left bank of the Jhelum towards Murree, presents no insurmountable engineering difficulties, there is no road leading from the Punjab to Kashmir on which even a laden camel can travel, when once the mountains are entered. Upon all the routes the only carriage that can be used consists of mules, ponies, bullocks, and porters. More than thirty years have elapsed since the English subdued the Punjab. Within that period crowds of officers, travellers, and visitors have entered Kashmir; and every point relating to the country and the local administration has been disclosed. Kashmir could not have been suffered to remain cut off from the food-supplies in India, were it not for the policy which has left a Hindu chieftain to his own devices, to work his will on a Mussulman population entrusted to his care by the English themselves.

2. The climate of Kashmir is finely tempered, as Marco Polo observed, being neither too hot nor too cold. In mid-summer the thermometer sometimes ranges up to 90° in the shade, and in winter it descends several degrees below freezing-point. The mean temperature of the year is nearly 57° , or rather lower than the temperature of Rome. Kashmir is less hot throughout the year, and during winter only two degrees colder than Southern France. According to the Punjab Administration Report for 1878-79—

"the rainfall of the country is said to be 18 inches, but is probably less. Of this, 6 inches only benefit the crops; the rest falling during the winter months when no agricultural work is done. More important than the rain is the snow which falls from November to March, and on which the rice crop depends for its irrigation. Heavy rains fall in March and April, and without them the spring crop, which consists of barley and wheat, cannot be other than poor. Some heavy showers are usually hoped for in July to benefit the Indian-corn and rice, and showers fall again in September and October. The valley is completely removed beyond the effects of the Indian monsoon, and the rain always comes from the west. The spring crop . . . ripens in June and July. Following it is an intermediate crop of Indian-corn and other less important grains ripening in August and September, and finally the rice is ready to be cut from the beginning of October. The staple food and most important crop is rice, occupying three-fourths of the cultivated area: lands culturable probably bear to lands cultivated a proportion of two to one, though this estimate is necessarily imperfect."

On the whole, it is hardly possible to imagine circumstances under which a famine in Kashmir could be produced by lack of moisture. In the famine time of 1831, when Sher Singh, son of Ranjit Singh, misgoverned the Province, as likewise at the present day, whatever the seasons have done towards creating dearth has been rather by inopportune and excessive rainfall than by drought.

3. The valley of Kashmir seems to occupy an original depression or fissure among the surrounding mountains, which has doubtless been enlarged by the denuding powers of water. There is good evidence for the opinion that in geologically modern times the valley was filled by a broad sheet of water which has left its traces in the beds of sand and gravel that skirt the hills. Ancient tradition, moreover, points to the existence of one or more great lakes. The general aspect of the country, as it is believed by a traveller looking down from the crest of one of the ridges, is that of a capacious and level tract, dotted here and there by marshes, seamed with the windings of the Jhelum and its tributaries, and bordered by gently-sloping uplands that lead to the foot of the mountain-barrier. The low-lying fields yield rich crops of rice, of which it is said that nearly one hundred varieties have been named. The higher levels are sown with wheat and barley, peas, Indian-corn, oil-seeds, and various kinds of millet. Indeed, it appears as though anything in the shape of vegetation would flourish in this productive soil. Vines, mulberries, walnuts, peaches, apricots, apples, pears, quinces, cherries, &c., grow in such profusion, that fruit, though the staple food of the poorer classes for many weeks in the year, has often been seen rotting on the ground for want of somebody with enough energy to pick it up. The surfaces of the lakes are turned into floating gardens, wherein are grown melons, cucumbers, tomatos, and other vegetables. The bottoms of the same lakes yield tons of the horned water-nut, and are said to support thereby 30,000 persons

¹ The area measured from the ridges of the surrounding ring of hills is nearly 4,000 square miles.

for five months in the year: the water itself is searched for the stalk of the lotus plant, of which the people are fond. We may pass without special notice the crops of saffron, the silk culture, the valuable timber, the minerals, and the manufactures, such as shawls, woollen cloths, paper, and so forth, for many of which Kashmir is renowned, and all of which might be developed if the government of the country were in safe hands. The point to which attention should be directed is this.—That Kashmir has been extraordinarily endowed by nature, particularly in the matter of its capabilities for raising food supplies, and that supposing the inhabitants of this favored country to be destroyed by hunger, the cause must be sought either in some unparalleled accident of weather and season, or in such external circumstances as the fiscal and commercial policy of the Government, and the conduct generally of the rulers towards the ruled.

4. The population of Kashmir was reckoned before the famine at about half a million, of whom all but 75,000 Pandits were of the Muhammadan creed. No accurate census was ever taken, and at the present time it is impossible to say what the number of survivors may be, since the method followed in distributing food leads necessarily to the falsification of returns. This will be clearly seen hereafter. Some idea, however, of the depopulation of the country may be formed from the following authoritative description:—

"No European who carefully examined the city this summer (1879) with a view to guessing its population ever put the people at over 60,000 souls, but nothing can be exactly known. A number of the chief valleys to the north were entirely deserted; whole villages lay in ruins; some suburbs of the city were tenanted; the city itself half destroyed; the graveyards were filled to overflowing; the river had been full of corpses thrown into it. It is not likely that more than two-fifths of the people of the valley now survive."

Monsieur Bigex, a French shawl-merchant, has informed the writer of this note that, whereas in former times there were from 30,000 to 40,000 weavers in Srinagar, now only 4,000 remain, and that orders from France for shawls cannot be executed for want of hands. It may be that the famine has fallen with most severity on the weaving class, but as the Persian proverb says—

"a handful is a specimen of the sea-load."

The Pandits are all of the Brahmin caste and descendants of the ancient Hindus of the valley who refused to embrace Islam. They are a cunning and avaricious tribe. They fill almost every civil office of State, from the Governor of Srinagar down to the clerks in attendance on the collectors of revenue. Their pride and cowardice unfit them for military employ. Pampered by the Hindu ruler, they play a tyrannical part in the administration of the valley; and they reap the fruits of their religious superiority in freedom from the pangs of famine, for it is a noteworthy fact that while thousands of Muhammadans have died and are still dying of hunger, no Pandit is to be met with who shows signs of starvation or even of pressing want. If attempts be made to control the Pandits, check their speculations, and introduce some equality between them and the Muhammadans, they repair to the Governor, and, with threats of cutting their throats before him or abandoning the country with their gods, they bring him to their feet in submission; for they are holy Brahmins, and he is a devout Hindu. The Muhammadans of Kashmir bear an evil reputation. A proverb warns the stranger that, if there should be a dearth of mankind in the world, he would do well to avoid the vile Kashmiri. These Kashmiri Muhammadans have been accused of a larger than the usual Asiatic measure of vice, perfidy, and fanaticism; and certainly the hatred which the rival sects of Sunnis and Shi'ahs bear to one another, and which has more than once led to bloodshed, incendiarism, and sacrilege, testifies to the prevalence of at least one of these faults. But they have further been charged with inveterate idleness and want of energy, whence it becomes necessary to drive them like slaves to the rice-fields. An answer to this last charge might be found in the products of Kashmir labour, for it is hard to imagine that a people gifted with such a fine appreciation of form and color, and capable of manufacturing most excellent and delicate fabrics, can be averse to industry. The wonder rather is how men, whose efforts barely suffice to keep them alive owing to the burdens laid on them, can be got to work at all. Mr. Robert Thorp, an English traveller who visited Kashmir in 1883 and died there, writes that fugitives from the valley are in the habit of sending supplies of money to their families, as occasion offers, by some returning trader or other agent; and that the confidence thus reposed is never abused. He attributes to the Muhammadans two admirable qualities, namely, honesty amongst themselves and loving-kindness. He observes that in their villages any one who had become incapacitated from old age or sickness, and who had no relations to care for him, was supported by the community: further, that in the towns, especially in Srinagar, food and money were given to all of the poor who asked for alms from the houses of the well-to-do. This could only have been true of those days when there was no famine: yet it is a pleasant trait in the character of a people of whom not over-much good has been spoken.

5. The Kashmiris, whatever judgment may be pronounced upon their merits and faults, are such as centuries of subjection and misfortune have made them. Dr. Arnold, in his *History of Rome* (Vol. II, pages 19 and 20), depicted the awful consequences that flow from continual suffering and oppression—

"how constant poverty and insult long endured as the natural portion of a degraded caste, bear with them to the sufferers something yet worse than pain, whether of the body or feelings; how they dull the understanding and poison the morals; how ignorance and ill-treatment combined are the parents of universal suspicion; how from oppression is produced habitual cowardice how slaves become naturally liars;"

¹ The wages of a weaver have been reckoned at three pence per diem. The weight of the taxes levied on the trader prevents the master from paying more, and as it is hard for the weaver to change his calling, he must submit.

and finally how all these evils, and the moral death to which they lead, are turned to account by "oppressors as a defence of their own iniquity and a reason for perpetuating it for ever." The political history of the unhappy people of Kashmir may be very briefly summed up as follows:—The country was ruled by Hindu and Tartar Princes until the eleventh century, when it fell beneath the sway of Mahmud of Ghazni. The Hindu Rajas once more re-established their power: but in the fourteenth century a Muhammadan adventurer seized the throne, and in the course of the same century the bulk of the population became converts to the Islam. Under warlike sovereigns of the Chak tribe, who reigned in the middle of the sixteenth century, Kashmir enjoyed a short period of national prosperity and independence; but by the year 1587 it had fallen into the condition of an appanage of the Mogul Emperors, who, however wise and powerful elsewhere, were but stage kings in Kashmir, and have left few traces behind them, save kiosks and cascades, summer-palaces, and groves of plane trees. In 1762 Kashmir was annexed to Afghanistan, and in 1819, after many sanguinary contests, it was subdued by Ranjit Singh, Maharaja of the Sikhs. From 1819 to 1846 a series of rapacious Governors, aided by famine, earthquakes, and pestilence, reduced the population to 200,000, and turned half the culturable area into a waste. On the outbreak of the first Sikh war, Kashmir was held for the Sikhs by a Muhammadan Governor named Sheikh Imamuddin. After the battle of Sobraon, Raja Golab Singh, ruler of the Dogra principality of Jammu, arranged the terms of peace with the English; and, in consideration of his services, and of the payment by him of a million sterling, the British Government surrendered to him Kashmir and the hill States between the Beas and the Indus. This transaction, for which there must have been urgent political reasons, bears date the 16th March 1846. Even then, however, Golab Singh could not have made himself master of his new province without the co-operation of the English. His army of Dogras was disastrously beaten by the Kashmiris under Imamuddin, who declined to yield up the valley, until warned that he would, in the event of further resistance, be treated as an enemy of the British Government. Thus it came to pass that a country inhabited chiefly by Muhammadans was handed over to a foreign and Hindu Prince.

6. The abject condition of the Kashmiris has been well described by the French naturalist, Victor Jacquemont, who visited the valley in 1833, and was, therefore, spared the pain of assisting as a spectator at the latest phase of national degradation.

"The Afghans," he wrote, "having during the last century despoiled the Moguls of their conquest, and the Sikhs having expelled the Afghans in this century, a general pillage has ensued upon each conquest; and, in the intervals of peace, slavery, and oppression have done their utmost against labor and industry, so that the country is now completely ruined, and the poor Kashmiris appear to have thrown the handle after the hatchet, and to have become the most indolent of mankind. If one must fast, better to do so with folded arms than bending beneath the weight of toil. In Kashmir, there is hardly any better chance of a meal for the man who works, weaves, or plies the oar, than for him who, in despair, slumbers all day beneath the shade of the plane tree. A few stupid and brutal Sikhs, with swords at their sides or pistols in their belts, drive along like a flock of sheep these people, whose numbers and ingenuity are marred by their cowardice."

Let Dogras be substituted for Sikhs, and the picture will be recognized at the present time.

7. In order to apprehend clearly the actual state of things in Kashmir, this country may be usefully contrasted with the valley of Nepal, which, in situation, climate, and physical characteristics, is not dissimilar, though possessed of far inferior capabilities for irrigation. The Nepal valley is 300 square miles in area. It contains three large cities, numerous villages of considerable size, and a population reckoned at half a million. Every acre of culturable soil is well tilled, and the country is thickly dotted with cottages comfortably built and snugly thatched, each with a little well-kept garden and a sufficiency of cattle. The aspect of the peasantry is bold and frank, and the bazars of the towns are lined with substantial houses and swarming with life. In short, there is every sign of a just government and a contented people. The traveller on entering Kashmir, which he knows to be more than six times as large as Nepal, observes, indeed, the traces of by-gone prosperity and an old-world civilization. The relics of ancient Hindu or Buddhist fane, the terraced hills now overgrown with jungle, and the innumerable fragments of stone and pottery strewn on the slopes of the uplands, point to a time when the Kashmir nation had a name and fame. But farther on, within the valley the eye meets wide tracts of unreclaimed swamps, fields thrown out of cultivation, and wretched hamlets in which half the houses are empty and many more rootless and ruined. The appearance of the peasants is pitiable in the extreme. In the fields are women and children digging for edible weeds and roots. In Srinagar, the capital, and in some of the larger places, such as Islamabad near the head-waters of the Jhelum, Shupiyan on the old imperial road, and Sopur in the margin of the Wular lake, there are vestiges of populousness; but the bazars are sadly thinned, the suburbs are like cities of the dead, trade is either decaying or gone, and large numbers of the lower classes of people are so impoverished that they have no money to buy food even when food is procurable. During the height of the distress, if the enquirer asked for relief-works, he was shown a few labourers collected on roads near the English quarter; but these would loudly complain to him that they got no wages. If he asked for Government poor-houses, he was conducted to enclosures where handfuls of boiled rice, in quantities insufficient to keep a dog alive, were given out to hundreds of people in the most awful state that can be imagined from hunger and disease. Sometimes the supply of rice was not enough even to go round the throng, and then an indescribable scene of confusion ensued, in which men, women, and children were beheld fighting and tearing one another for the scrapings of the pans of rice, while soldiers armed with sticks laid about them on every side but in vain, and the sleek Pandits, not one of whom had felt the pangs of hunger, sat enveloped in their cosy blankets, unconcerned witnesses of the agony of their Muhammadan fellow-subjects. These are not the inventions of a disordered fancy, but

statements of facts as noted by an eye-witness, whose painful duty it has been to observe them without power or opportunity to interfere. Such facts should surely afford ground for careful enquiry as to what may be the causes which have outweighed so many natural advantages, destroyed the commerce of Kashmir, laid waste her fertile fields, depopulated her towns and villages, and left her rulers helpless in the face of a great calamity.

8. The first of these causes is the crushing severity of the assessment of land revenue. In Kashmir the land belongs to the ruler, and the cultivators are his servants. In the days of the old Hindu Rajas, the State is said to have taken no more than one-sixth of the gross produce, the theory being that, on a division of the population into inhabitants of the gross and inhabitants of the towns, one-sixth of the food produced by the former was enough for the wants of the latter, as well as of the court and officials. The native dynasty of Chak sovereigns took one-half of the rice, and one-tenth of the dry crops. The Afghans left all vegetables and minor cereals and took five-eighths of the rice. The Sikhs introduced the system of 'traki,' i.e., of exacting one or more traks of 6 sers over and above the fixed share. This was accompanied by cesses such as *tambol*, *mandiri*, *rasûm-i-daftar*, and the like; and gradually the share of the State was augmented under one name or another, until at length in 1833 the Sikh Governor, Mian Singh, was considered humane because he abolished a few cesses and only extorted five-sixths of the crops. It may well be a subject of wonder how the cultivators have survived such treatment as this; and, indeed, they would not have survived had they not grown vegetables in garden plots, which, by bribing the authorities, they managed to keep free of taxation, or had they not made a little money by the sale of sheep and ponies, and by the manufacture of coarse cloth during the winter. From agriculture they gained no profit, and in it they felt no interest; so that officers had to be appointed lest the fields were left fallow, or carelessly tilled, or the crops uncut when ready for the sickle. Year by year land has been thrown out of cultivation, and new land is rarely taken up by the farmer. To the present day the Government of the Maharaja of Jammu has introduced no real reforms in these matters. From time to time there have been pretences of diminishing the share of the State, and even of setting the revenue on a basis of payments in cash; but the interests of the army of officials are so bound up with the maintenance of ancient abuses, that improvements are unmade almost as soon as made, and promises of future concessions are received by the peasants with a smile of incredulity. Though the nominal share of the State is now one-half the produce, the cultivator rarely gets one-quarter; and for the two seasons of 1877-78 and 1878-79 he received scarcely any portion of the rice, which is the staple crop. So surely is prosperity turned into pretax for further extortion, that farmers have been known to decline offers of foreign seed, lest the unusually fine crops that might be expected therefrom should catch the eye of the tax-gatherer. The principal cause, therefore, of the ruin of Kashmir is the pressure of the land revenue which is assessed at such a proportion as to deprive the agriculturists of all incentive to exertion.

9. The second cause is to be found in the arrangements for collecting the revenue. In most parts of India the demand of the State is satisfied by a sum of money which is fixed for a term of years. The cultivator or his employer does what he likes with his lands and his crops; and so long as he pays his quota by the appointed day, he is unmolested. In Kashmir the crops are actually divided upon the ground and in a manner which combines the greatest risk of loss to the ruler with the greatest certainty of extortion from the ruler. The common practice is to let out a circle of villages to a contractor who engages to deliver a stated quantity of grain, representing an estimate of the Government share, together with numerous petty cesses in cash and kind, for the support of Hindu priests, for the supplies of officials, for the expenses of village servants, and so forth. The contractor is remunerated by a percentage as commission, and he is aided by a chain of officials, who, excepting in the lowest grades, are Pandits and therefore out of sympathy with the peasantry, while all are most irregularly paid, and are consequently forced to live on the villagers. The following is a list of these officials:—

- (1) The *tarâzûdâr*, or scalesman, who weighs out the shares of the State and of the zamindars.
- (2) The *shakdâr*, who watches the crops.
- (3) The *sazûval*, who controls the *shakdars*.
- (4) The *patwari*, or accountant.
- (5) The *mukaddam*, who aids the Pandit.
- (6) The *kardar* over several villages, who arranges distribution of produce, &c.
- (7) The *tahsildar* in charge of several parganas.

When the harvest approaches, there is usually a dispute as to whether the crop is such that the contractor can be fairly called upon to fulfil his engagement. This leads to the appointment of an official appraiser, whose valuation depends in the main on the adequacy or inadequacy of the bribe received by him. When the valuation is completed, and the quantity of grain to be delivered by the contractor summarily settled, the harvest proceeds, and the crops, after being cut and threshed, are stacked within an enclosure surrounded by a low hedge of thorny bushes, where they remain for months piled in heaps, corresponding with the number of sharers, until the contents are pilfered by officials, robbed by the peasantry, or conveyed away to the public granaries. The cultivators are allowed at harvest-time to take a small advance from their supposed shares, and these advances are barely enough,

eked out with vegetables and weeds, to keep them alive until the authorities shall be pleased to decide whether the food-stocks are sufficient to admit of a final separation of the portion of the State from the portion of the cultivators. On one pretext or another, either that the cultivators are in arrears, or that they get the lion's share of the spring-crops, and so forth, the question is generally in the end settled by the greater part of the principal crop, *viz.*, rice, being swept into the granaries.

10. This brings us to a consideration of the third cause, which is—the State monopoly of grain. The grain reserved for the State is conveyed, as occasion requires, on ponies or in boats to the public granaries, whence it is sold by officers appointed for the purpose at prices that seem extraordinarily cheap¹ when compared with those ruling in India. But the common people reaped little advantage from these low prices. While the officers of Government and the Pandits had no difficulty in obtaining as much as they needed at the fixed rate, the stores were often closed to the public for weeks together, and at other times the grain was sold to each family in a quantity supposed to be proportionate to the number of persons in the family. The judges of the said quantity were not the persons most concerned, *viz.*, the purchasers, but the local authorities. Since the end of 1878 the proportion allowed has varied, but it has rarely exceeded 10 lbs.² weight of cleaned rice per head per mensem—a supply which is clearly not enough to support life, and which has consequently to be supplemented by any edible herbs the people can pick up. The official explanation of this extraordinarily small allowance is that the inhabitants exaggerated their numbers and evaded attempts to make an accurate census; and for this reason a proportion which is apparently deficient for the nominal number is ample for the real number. But they seem to forget that a reduction which may be justifiable in the case of a rich man, whose family lives in privacy, is death to the poor who are neither likely nor able to demand more than their families want. Srinagar and the large towns were in fact treated like besieged cities, in which the poorer inhabitants were put on half or quarter rations, while the ruling classes feasted to their heart's content. Apart from the mortality arising from scanty nourishment, the evils of such an arrangement as this, if arrangement it can be called, are plain. In the first place, a private grain-trade cannot be openly conducted in Kashmir, and the stocks of the country cannot be replenished by individual enterprise. However dreadful the famine may be, no merchant will dream of importing grain from India; for, supposing that he surmounted the difficulties and dangers of the roads and escaped the exactions of petty servants of Government, on arrival at Srinagar he would not be suffered to sell his goods at his own price; and in endeavouring to dispose of them, he would be harassed and thwarted by numerous officials, to whose direct advantage it is that a real or artificial scarcity should be created. The peculiar phenomena of the Kashmir grain trade are well illustrated by the Punjab Trade Report for the year ending March 1879. This was a period during which food-stocks in the valley were at the lowest ebb. The exports of grain and pulse from Kashmir to the Punjab increased from 44,643 maunds in 1877-78 to 53,881 maunds in 1878-79, while the imports of grain and pulse into Kashmir territory from the Punjab decreased from 3,14,352 maunds in 1877-78 to 1,78,104 maunds in 1878-79. As the Deputy Commissioner of Jhelum remarked—

“the fact is that, owing to the bad roads in Kashmir, a great deal of the wheat growing in the plains at the foot of the hills, where there was little or no famine, was brought into Jhelum as being a large market, where the cultivators were certain of getting a good price.”

Whether, as the same officer supposes, the grain was re-exported to Jammu or not, certain it is that little or none was brought by private traders into the valley of Kashmir. Regarding obstructions placed in the way of a trade in grain by interested parties, it is plain that since the officers of the Government and the classes whom they favor can procure as much grain in Kashmir as they please at a cheap rate, while the public are kept on the shortest possible rations, the former have a strong temptation to accumulate stocks for secret sale at greatly enhanced prices to those of the latter who are able to pay what is demanded. It is also obvious that the former have good reasons for not exerting themselves to put an end to a condition of affairs which brings them in an abundant harvest of money and for excluding foreign competitors. The devices to which the officials resort for the purpose of accumulating grain are most ingenious. For example, an officer, whose position gives him the opportunity, steals a large quantity of rice from the public stores. If he were to sell this rice openly, suspicion might fall upon him. Accordingly, he makes terms with a friendly jagirdar or privileged landowner who may fairly be held to have private stocks, and so the traffic is safely carried on. The defalcation is not apparent until after some time when the store is found to yield less than was anticipated. And then what can be more easy than to say that the estimate of the crop collected in this store was exaggerated, or that the zamindars, who have probably died of starvation meanwhile, are the thieves? To take another instance. An influential Pandit has charge of rice brought to the city of Srinagar. His son is zilladar of Sopur, a place some 20 miles distant. An order comes from the Maharaja that so many kharwars of rice are to be sent from Srinagar to be sold in rations to the people of Sopur. The Pandit forwards the supply to his son, who, after a decent interval, and after depositing

¹ The Government rate in 1879 was at first Rs. 3 local currency, equal to Co.'s Rs. 1-14 per *kharwar* of rice in husk. The *kharwar* is reckoned at 90 local *seer*, equal to nearly 80 British *seer*. The rice is loaded with dirt and moistened with water, so that it yields only half the quantity of cleaned grain. Therefore the rate was Co.'s Rs. 1-14 per maund of 40 British *seer* of cleaned rice, which gives over 21 *seer* per Co.'s rupee. During the summer of 1878, the Famine Committee prevailed on the Maharaja to restore the old rate of Rs. 2 local currency per *kharwar* of unhusked rice.

² 2 *straks* = 12 Kashmiri *seer* of rice in husk which yields half the weight in cleaned rice.

the value at Rs. 3 local currency per khirwar in the Sopur treasury, returns it to his father. The Pandit then sells the rice secretly in Srinagar for what it will fetch, sometimes as much as 6 *anna* per Co.'s rupee, or more than thrice the rate which his son paid for it. The treasury favourites must foresee in the ultimate ruin of the country the cessation of their own gains and of the gains for their successors; but no man cares less for posterity than the Asiatic; and, besides the preference of an immediate fortune to the chance of assured and permanent prosperity in the future, there is the apprehension, from which the minds of the rulers of Kashmir are seldom or never free, that some day or other strangers will enter into their inheritance. We may mention here, as a significant fact, that, although the dishonest misappropriation of grain by Kashmir officials was notorious throughout the famine, and was often reported to the Maharaja with evidence of the most convincing kind, not a single instance is known in which the guilty were punished, and in some cases it happened that, when the scandal grew too flagrant to admit of the offender being kept in high employ in Kashmir, he was merely removed to Jammu and there comfortably provided for. This failure of justice, coupled with the remarkable circumstance that the price of grain sold secretly has sometimes risen and fallen according to the political exigencies of the Durbar, has led to the suspicion that the Maharaja himself was interested in these transactions, and that he endeavoured to replenish his treasury by selling grain privately through his officials at the natural market rate, which was extremely high; while at the same time the public sales at low rates were retarded or even stopped altogether. This is of course a matter hardly susceptible of proof; but, seeing that the Maharaja is the principal, if not the only, grain-dealer in the country, the suspicion is not unreasonable, and, indeed, the extraordinary impunity with which the secret sales were carried on is difficult to account for on any other hypothesis.

11. The fourth cause is the oppressive taxation upon everything capable of being taxed. The trade of Kashmir with British India, even under the present melancholy circumstances and in the disastrous year 1878-79, was registered as of the value of Rs. 81,39,734. With a better system of government it might be largely expanded, but the consequences of the famine are already seen in the diminution of imports from India into Kashmir, which fell from Rs. 35,48,402 in 1877-78 to Rs. 25,56,445 in 1878-79. The actual depopulation of the valley and the impoverishment of the survivors must in any case delay recovery, but a graver impediment arises from the multiplicity and weight of the exactions levied upon every branch of commerce. It has been truly said that no product is too insignificant, no person too poor, to contribute to the State. Silk culture, once a humble but remunerative occupation for the villagers, has been taken up as a Government monopoly, which employed a large number of workmen it is true, but of which the profits went not to the ruled but to the ruler. Lately even the Government manufacture of silk has failed, for the employés and hands, being most irregularly paid, neglected their work, and the whole stock of eggs perished from cold. Saffron forms another monopoly. So likewise are tea and salt, and the aromatic plant called *kol*. Paper and tobacco have lately been added to the list. Though the sides of the hills are strewn with stones, not one can be taken to build a house, except through the man who has farmed the monopoly from the State. The same is the case with brick-making; and even the dead cannot be buried save by licensed and privileged grave-diggers. Besides the excessive proportion of produce claimed from the peasant, there is a cess of from 4 to 20 annas levied on each house in the villages. Of fruit three-quarters are appropriated by Government; and an experiment is now being made, under the supervision of a Belgian gentleman, to convert this produce into wine and spirits for the benefit of the treasury, though the consumption of intoxicating beverages is actually prohibited by the Maharaja's own laws! One anna is charged annually per head on sheep and goats, and the larger villages are called upon to give every year two or three of these animals, besides ponies and home-spun blankets, half the value of the contributions being returned in money. Milk, honey, water-nuts, and reeds used for thatching, all are brought under taxation. If a villager plant a tree, it is immediately claimed by the Government, in consequence of which scarcely a young fruit-tree is to be found in the valley, except in the Government gardens. If this should continue, it is obvious that the fruit-supply of the valley must very seriously diminish as the old trees die off or are cut down. This will be very markedly the case with the walnuts, which are being felled for the French market, without any provision being made for planting young trees in place of those removed. The shawl trade received a deadly blow from the impoverishment caused by the French and German war, and afterwards by the change of fashion which expelled these fabrics from the French and American markets. But it was always a marvel how the industry could have outlived the impositions to which it was subjected; nor, indeed, could it have survived but for the cruel regulations which forbade a weaver to relinquish his calling, or even, until the last few months, to leave the valley. The wool was taxed as it entered Kashmir: the manufacturer was taxed to every workman he employed: again he was taxed at various stages of the process according to the value of the fabric, and, lastly, the merchant was taxed before he could export the goods. Since the famine began, the poll-tax on weavers employed has not been exacted, for the simple reason that in a time of so deep and widespread misery the weavers could not pay. As a substitute for the poll-tax and other imposts on shawl-weaving, the export duty on shawls has been raised within the last year to 85 per cent. *ad valorem*. This enormous rate, besides being an inducement to smuggling, discourages intending purchasers. Other callings are exposed to exactions of the same sort. Coolies who are engaged to carry the baggage of

travellers, surrender half their earnings. Butchers, bakers, carpenters, boatmen, and even prostitutes, are taxed. As regards the last-named class, it has come under the notice of the writer of this narrative that a procuress has even sued in the local courts to prevent one of her victims from leaving Kashmir, on the ostensible ground that the girl was in debt, but really because her owner considered that she had a title to the miserable creature for whose services the Government dues had been paid. It is but justice to observe here that the decree passed by the court of first instance in favor of the complainant was overruled in appeal, but there is reason to suppose that this ultimate decision was owing to the fact that the matter had caught the notice of the English in Kashmir, for the normal position of these lowest of slaves in relation to their owners is notorious. Taxation of trades and professions is certainly not unknown in British India, but it would be difficult to discover elsewhere a system of imposts which embraces everything however petty, and descends, for what it can pick up, to the lowest abysses of human misery and degradation. Nor has the Government of Kashmir the excuse of being pressed by financial embarrassments. Not to mention the boards believed to have been accumulated by Gohab Singh and the present Maharaja, the income of Kashmir has exceeded the charges. The revenue from all sources, though not accurately known, has been estimated by good authority at not less than £400,000, while the expenditure cannot exceed more than half that amount. Doubtless it must be admitted that many of the exactions which we have described have been handed down from former times, and that it is always difficult for a Native Chief to enforce beneficial changes upon unwilling subordinates, and the more especially so in critical times. It could not, however, have been intended, when Kashmir was given to the Dogras, that all hope of reform and progress should be extinguished. If it be asked to what purposes the surplus revenues have been devoted, the answer must be that the money has gone to maintain an army far in excess¹ of the needs of the country, to pamper the priests of a hostile creed, and to supply the luxuries of a corrupt court, while no public works of utility are connected with the name of the Dogra House, and the administration of the country has been allowed to slide into a condition of weakness and disorganization.

12. It is now time to review briefly the course of the famine. The spring harvest of 1877 was short even for Kashmir owing to want of rain. The autumn and winter of 1877-78 were unusually rainy. Some notion had been entertained of taking the revenue in money; but no sooner was the rice, which was a very full crop, cut and stacked, than the rain fell, and the authorities, fearing an exhaustion of the public granaries, revoked previous orders and announced their intention of collecting the dues in kind. Even then, had the cultivators been free to make their own arrangements, much of the endangered rice might have been preserved by removing it beneath the shelter of houses or to localities which could be easily drained. But there was the fear lest the cultivators might appropriate too much for themselves if allowed to convey the rice from the places where it had been stacked, and, in consequence, the crop remained on the low ground and in the open air, and there it rotted until at least one-half was lost. There might yet have been a chance for the country, had the authorities divided what was left with the cultivators and forthwith set to work to import grain from India. They acted in a very different way. As the share of the State had already been estimated before the bad weather began, the exaction of the whole share would obviously more than cover all the rice that had been saved. Accordingly, every grain was set apart for the public granaries: and the almost inconceivable folly was committed of leaving the agricultural population during the winter without any food whatever, excepting such roots as grow wild in the fields. The immediate effect of these measures was felt in the mortality and flight of the peasantry. The emigrants indeed could only escape by stealth, because the Government, though unable to feed its people, still maintained the rule against emigration, and posted guards at the passes with strict injunctions to turn back all who were not provided with a written permission to leave the country. It would be easy to multiply instances of the sufferings to which these barbarous proceedings gave rise. Bands of starving wretches have been seen sitting in despair by the side of a river which they were debarred from crossing: a woman has been seen brutally beaten back from a bridge over the Jhelum, while her child stood weeping on the British bank of the stream: the inhabitants of the village near Gulmarg essayed to cross the snowy Pir Panjal, and left their bones in a desolate ravine. How many perished in like manner will never be known, but the frontier districts of the Punjab have witnessed the condition of those who survived the journey.

13. The spring-crops of Kashmir are never abundant: most of the land is low and swampy, and fitted only for the cultivation of rice, and none but the rice-fields are manured. The wheat and barley in 1878 were exceedingly poor, not yielding more perhaps than 1,000,000 maunds. The fruit also had suffered from long continued wet and cold; and the early autumn grains, such as maize and millet, were partly destroyed by intense heat and blight, and partly devoured by the starving peasants; so that scarcely any reached the granaries. Thus the famine increased in severity as the year 1878 wore on, and even the urban population, who had hitherto been preserved at the cost of the cultivators, began to feel the pressure of want. The Government store-houses, from which rice is usually sold to the people at fixed rates, were closed for weeks, and none, save officials and Pandits, succeeded in procuring food. It was known that these persons resold rice secretly at five times the regular price, but the quantity thus disposed of must have been limited, and none of the poorer classes could purchase on

¹ The regular army is about 15,000 strong. Some 6,000 are kept at Jammu where they are used for display, 6,000 are in garrison in Kashmir, and the rest hold the frontier posts, such as Iskardo, Astor, and Gilgit. There are, moreover, some 6,000 irregular levies.

such terms. Mortality, therefore, advanced in rapid strides, and the roads, bazars, and villages began, by summer time, to be thronged by starving wretches. All this while the Dogra Governor, Wazir Punnu, a man who had ruled Kashmir for many years and distinguished himself by realising a larger revenue than his predecessors, endeavoured to persuade the Maharaja that the accounts of the distress were exaggerated. His character may be judged from a remark which he made to Mr. Henvey, the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, upon the subject of a suspension or remission of revenue: "Why talk of remitting revenue? The zuameendars themselves are dead or dying."

14. Yet even in Kashmir the truth contrives sooner or later to prevail. By midsummer reports of secret news-writers, indignant letters published in Anglo-Indian journals, and the complaints of travellers and merchants, produced an effect at Jammu, and convinced the advisers of the Maharaja that efforts must be made to relieve the growing distress. Accordingly, in the early autumn, there was talk of bringing in grain from India; and though the Maharaja rejected the proffer of British aid in other ways, he applied for assistance in collecting carriage, which was readily given him so far as the resources of the frontier districts permitted. Unfortunately the season for such measures as these had passed, and the heavy rains which now began to pour on the mountains between Kashmir and the plains, put a stop to importation, so that the greater part of the grain had to be stored on the roads, and very little of it ever reached the valley.

15. About the same time the Governor of Kashmir received instructions to open relief-works and distribute food to the poorest of the urban population. The labourers on the works received neither money nor grain. Payment was not provided for, or supplies were intercepted by faithless subordinates. So these measures soon came to an end. At Gulmarg, for example, the relief operations consisted of a collection of some fifty villagers, who were pressed from their fields and set to labour on a road near the cricket-ground. After ten days the labourers fled, because they were neither paid nor fed. Even Kashmiris cannot work on a diet of weeds and jungle produce. The distribution of gratuitous relief in the shape of food proved as marked a failure. There was no attempt made to discriminate between those who were really in want and those who preferred mendicancy to labour. Handfuls of cooked rice were given out at two or three places in Srinagar to any who might choose to ask, and the natural consequence was that the able-bodied, who could scramble and fight, got a meal for nothing, while the women and children, the sick, infirm, and aged, went empty-handed away. Meanwhile, the mortality increased to a terrible degree, especially among the peasants, who had been practically abandoned to their fate. Yet the orders prohibiting emigration remained in force.

16. The results of so suicidal a policy were soon perceived in the shortness of the growing rice-crop. Rice is a crop that needs many hands. In the first place, the land on which it is planted is the only soil in Kashmir that requires to be well manured. Next, there is the transplantation, which cannot be accomplished without labourers. Thirdly, if there are not plenty of weeders, the crop is liable to be choked by jungle. The Kashmir villages being half-depopulated, these conditions were not fulfilled; and, moreover, the starving peasants had devoured much of the seed given out to them. They preferred a present meal to the distant hope of obtaining their share of the harvest when ripe, and in this they were justified both by their previous experiences and by the actual course of events.

Thus it became evident that there would be but a poor harvest of rice even in the most favoured parts of the valley, and that in the worst parts there would be none; while the average all over the valley could not exceed one-half of the usual return. This failure of the rice was due, he it observed, not to climatic accident—since the weather had been favourable for the cultivation of rice—but to the decimation of the husbandmen, and to the despair, caused by want of confidence in their rulers, of those who had survived. To complete the picture, it should be added that the hot summer of 1878 was hurtful to the crops of Indian-corn and millet, and that there was scarcely any fruit owing to the severity of the preceding winter and spring.

17. The prospect then, in the autumn of 1878, was extremely dark. It is true the number of mouths to be fed had decreased along with the food, but not in a like proportion, since whatever relief had been given tended to the preservation of the food-consumers in the cities, while the full weight of the calamity had fallen on the food-producers. The condition of affairs was set before the British Government, and it was immediately decided that the imprisonment of the starving people within the valley could no longer be tolerated. The Government of the Maharaja pretended at first that emigration was not forbidden, but subsequently yielded to British remonstrances, and undertook to withdraw the guards from the passes. The Maharaja's orders, however, were not at once obeyed, for it is a fact that even late in October 1878 the servant of an English officer was seized on the road to Murree and conveyed back to Srinagar merely because he was accompanied by his wife and daughters. In the end, a considerable number of Kashmiris availed themselves of their newly-found freedom, but not enough to materially redress the disproportion between food-consumers and available stocks. Many of those who might have emigrated at an earlier time had perished, and their women, children, and aged or infirm relatives were not fitted to accomplish so formidable a journey. Formidable it always is by nature, and still more formidable was it then, owing to the exceptional hardships of the time. A party of emigrants could not procure food in Kashmir before setting out, nor could they buy food on the road. Under such circumstances as these, only the very strong, or the very fortunate, would survive an expedition of thirteen or fourteen marches leading across ridges of mountains

from 9,000 to 11,000 feet above the sea. Had the local authorities organised and conducted a migratory movement on a large scale, and, since they could not bring food to their subjects, brought their subjects to the food, many lives would have been saved; but far-seeing measures of this kind were not so much as thought of.

18. The famine continuing to increase in severity, the Maharaja at length deputed Dewan Anant Ram, one of his principal ministers, to Srinagar. Anant Ram arrived in Kashmir towards the end of September, about the time when the early rice was being cut, and his advent was followed by a more liberal distribution of food in the city. So profuse, indeed, was the distribution that Anant Ram is officially reported to have disposed of nearly 90,000 kharwars of rice within two months by sales to the public of Srinagar and issues of rations to the troops. These 90,000 kharwars of rice represented about a quarter of the stock of rice which the Government had in hand for consumption until the next autumn harvest. It was soon perceived that Dewan Anant Ram could not cope with the famine, for his influence was powerless to overcome the opposition of officials trained under the former Governor, Wazir Pannu. This man was indeed ostensibly disgraced and recalled to Jammu; but as he had proved himself to be a profitable servant, he was immediately admitted into the most intimate councils of the Maharaja, and his voice has to the present day preserved all its power for evil; in a word, Kashmir is still ruled by the very man who has ruined the country, and on the very system to which that ruin has been due. It might have been supposed that care would be taken in 1878-79 not to repeat the mistake committed in 1877-78, and that the cultivators would be allowed to appropriate their own share of the rice. The contrary occurred. Excepting a small quantity of rice given at harvest-time, and a few subsequent doles, for which the cultivators were compelled to pay, the villagers once more received scarcely anything. It is true nearly 4 lakhs of kharwars of rice in husk were officially returned as the zamindars' portion, but this portion never reached them; it was appropriated by the agents of the State. Of this fact the common voice of the people and the deserted condition of the villages gave evidence. If pressed for explanation, the authorities would probably allege that the villagers were in debt for previous balances; but, apart from the fact that revenue demands are so heavy as to leave the cultivators no hope of clearing themselves, it is obvious that not even the most odorous of creditors would be expected to exact his dues at a time when the exaction must prove fatal to the existence of the debtor. The Government admitted this view in theory, and Dewan Anant Ram repeatedly promised that, whatever occurred, the State would leave to the cultivators their full portion; but, in practice, what the State left, its servants have taken. The deputation of Dewan Anant Ram, therefore, produced no lasting benefits: and, as he himself acknowledged his impotence in the face of obstruction in Kashmir and discouragement from Jammu, he left the country early in December 1878, shortly after the death of his grandfather, Dewan Jowala Sahai, who was for many years the trusted minister of the Maharaja. Dewan Anant Ram was succeeded by Dewan Badrinath, a respectable but feeble Pandit, whose administration, to use the words of the Punjab Report for 1878-79, "proved as inefficient and calamitous as that of Wazir Pannu had done." Badrinath, however, has not had a chance. The real ruler is still Wazir Pannu, who by a special order of the Maharaja controls the purse-strings, so that no Kashmiri official can get his pay without the Wazir's leave. The Wazir also retains charge of public works, distribution of *rasad* to troops and others, the *toshakhana*, and so forth.

19. In the meantime the British Government, aroused by the severity of the famine, instructed its agent, Mr. Henvey, to proceed to Jammu and confer with the Maharaja. The meeting, at which the Hon'ble Mr. Cunningham, President of the Indian Famine Committee, happened to be present, took place in October 1878. It then appeared that the Maharaja's Government estimated the output of the whole autumn harvest, including rice, to be 11,00,000 kharwars, or about half the average. Preparations were being made to sow an unusually large area with wheat and barley for the spring harvest: but, on the whole, the Maharaja apprehended that there would be a deficiency of food-stocks in 1879 of about 2,00,000 maunds of grain, and His Highness consequently proposed that he should endeavour during the winter to throw in 1,00,000 maunds by the Banihal road, while the British Government might help him by importing another 1,00,000 maunds by the road from Murree along the valley of the Jhelum. At the same time His Highness stipulated that the British Government should employ native, not English, officers, in carrying out the measures which might be agreed upon, though he knew too well how fatal to efficiency such a stipulation must prove to be. However unsatisfactory these proposals were, it is unfortunate that immediate action was not taken upon them. The Maharaja indeed, in evidence of his earnestness, made spasmodic efforts to collect carriage and convey grain from Jammu to the southern foot of the mountains bounding Kashmir; but owing principally to the corruption of his officers, who never pay the whole of the remuneration sanctioned for the owners of carriage, His Highness's exertions were not successful, and up to the very end of the famine not more than 60,000 maunds reached the valley *via* Banihal.

20. The British Government was fully engaged at this time by the preparations for the first campaign in Afghanistan, and it was, therefore, naturally reluctant to undertake the work of collecting an additional supply of carriage unless the need were urgent and indisputable. The estimate afforded by the State officials seemed to show that, although the rice might not exceed one-half an average crop, yet, considering the diminished population and the expectations of an abundant spring harvest, which was reckoned at two lakhs of kharwars, the food-stocks would be sufficient. It was, perhaps, not fully realised at that time that the authorities of the State, even if they could be relied on to tell the truth, were unable, from the very

nature of their system of collecting land-revenue, to compute accurately the yield of the crops, or at least of that portion of them which would reach the granaries. There were, moreover, considerations, which were of greater importance than fabricated estimates, and which should have disclosed the real condition of affairs. *First*, the Kashmir Government continued doling out food in most insufficient quantities. *Second*, looking to the expense and difficulty of importation, it was unlikely that the probable shortcoming would be exaggerated. *Third*, the inference from previous experience was, that the food, whatever the outcome, would not be fairly distributed, but appropriated in large quantities by officials and Pandits, and withdrawn from consumption, either to be locked up as a precaution against the future, or to be privately sold at high rates. The British Government, however, misled for the time by the figures which the Maharaja's Government had produced, shrank from the task of aiding in the importation of grain. The English Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, after returning to Srinagar for a short time in November and December 1878, during which period the people were still rejoicing in the comparative plenty following Anant Rau's liberal distribution of food, received orders to repair to Lahore, and the country was left without any responsible British official to watch the progress of events. The only Englishmen remaining in Srinagar were the Reverend T. R. Wade and Dr. Downes of the Church Mission Society. It is impossible to speak too highly of the exertions of these two gentlemen to save the lives of the Kashmiris. In the face of much senseless opposition from the authorities, who would prefer the destruction of their people to even the semblance of European intervention in their affairs, Mr. Wade and Dr. Downes opened an orphanage, where 150 children were fed with wheat imported from the Punjab, and employed many hundreds of starving labourers on roads and other easy work.

21. It was not long before alarming reports reached the ears of the Court at Jammu and of the British authorities in India. The sale of grain to the city population had been stopped, though it was previously agreed at Jammu that the distribution should be continued on the calculation that at least a ser of *shali* (unhusked rice) equal to half a ser of rice, per head per diem, was required, together with milk, vegetables, and oil, to sustain life. It was further agreed that, with the threefold object of checking consumption, reducing the temptation to misappropriation, and collecting more money which could be devoted to the relief of distress, the price of rice should be raised¹ to one-half as much again as it had formerly been. The price was indeed raised, and there the measures for combating the famine began and ended, while the dead and dying lay uncarred for in the streets. The extreme misery which prevailed at this time has been truthfully recorded by the Reverend Mr. Wade of the Church Mission Society—

"Men, women, and children are dying now daily of starvation, and many others are seen on every side crawling about who bear the seal of death on them. Quite recently I have seen them dying in their villages, unsheltered and uncarred for, lying in mire and filth, too weak to rise, and only able to open and shut their mouths to signify that it was food they wanted, and their relations and neighbours, when money was given them, would look up hopelessly and say: 'For God's sake give us a little food.' I have seen them lying dead in their houses with starving ones around waiting their turns to die,—dead by the roadside, their relations and friends too poor to obtain a piece of cloth in which decently to wrap them, or unknown and, therefore, unburied: in one case at least the body had been half devoured by birds and beasts. Yesterday there was a girl of about twelve years of age lying dead at the door of our orphanage; a day or two before I saw a man lying dead under a rock at a little distance from this. Several of our coolies have died on the famine relief-works; a large majority of the 60 or 70 in-patients in the hospital are suffering from the effects of starvation; and some 60 of the children taken into the orphanage never recovered from the terrible state to which they had sunk, but gradually grew weaker and weaker, and at last died notwithstanding all efforts to save them. . . . The appearance of the villages is most desolate, many of the houses deserted, roofless, and ruined, no sound of work or play, but a few half-starved, half-naked skeletons forms lying in the sun. Those who have the strength are out in the fields, the men trying to prepare the land for the next harvest, and the women and children grubbing up roots and gathering plants and bark. Everything that can possibly serve for food is eaten. I have collected, myself, about forty kinds of roots and plants the people eat: indeed, constrained by hunger they sometimes eat what is injurious and poisonous. . . . And what efforts have been made to meet this terrible distress caused by the famine? Had famine relief-works been commenced on a large scale, the great pressure upon the poor-houses might easily have been removed, the people assisted, and the country improved. But in the winter the Governor of the Province told a gentleman, who called upon him to try and get a little work done, that orders had come from Jammu that during the short days all Government works had to be suspended, so a proper day's work could not be obtained from the coolies for a day's pay."

22. Once more the Government at Jammu seemed to realise the gravity of the situation: but instead of introducing effectual reforms, the Maharaja and his advisers could think of no better plan than that of deputing officers from Jammu, whose duty should be to accelerate the transport of rice from the rural districts to Srinagar, and to administer relief to the poor in the villages. These officers were as bad as the men whose work they were required to superintend, and moreover, had they been both honest and efficient, they had no executive authority. Possibly the transport of grain into the city may have been stimulated for the time, but the people of Kashmir gained no further benefit from the employment of the Special Commissioners. As an illustration of their uselessness, it may be noted that the writer has seen villagers dying by scores of starvation at a distance of two miles from the head-quarters of one of the selected officers; and that within the jurisdiction of another of them, where the rice-crop had been abundant, not a sign of food could be found among the villagers, whose wretchedness surpassed description.

23. The English Officer on Special Duty returned from Lahore to Kashmir towards the end of February 1879, and found the country in the following state. Scarcely any rain or

¹ From 3 *Chilli* rupees to 5 *Chilli* rupees, or from Co.'s Rs. 1-4 to Co.'s Rs. 1-14 per *Shikar* of *shali* or *rice* in husk.

snow had fallen since October 1878, and the spring crops which had been sown over an unusually wide area for Kashmir were on the point of perishing from lack of moisture. There were said to be stocks of rice for about three months. The cultivators had not got their share of the last harvest. The city population had been put on rations of one-fifth of a *seer* of rice per head per diem. Attempts had been made to open relief-works, but the labourers, getting no pay from the dishonest officials employed by the Durbar, had run away. Several poor-houses, containing crowds of famishing creatures, had been established in Srinagar, but there was everywhere perceptible a want of organisation and management. The supply of food provided each day sufficed not to go round the circle of paupers and give each a bare handful, while there was no sort of attempt to discriminate between those who were really starving and those who were beggars, or to separate the strong from the weak. In most instances, the distribution of relief took the shape of a general scramble in which the weaker went to the wall; and after the distribution the paupers were suffered to wander at will through Srinagar and infest the streets. Nothing could be worse than the aspect of the rural districts. The villages seemed two-thirds deserted, and even in the suburbs of Srinagar whole lines of houses had been pulled to pieces in order that the materials might be sold for a few pice. The survivors of the population were in the fields digging up weeds and roots for food.

24. In the beginning of March 1879, an opportune fall of snow and rain saved for the time the wheat and barley. Nature had also been kind in covering the trees with a load of blossoms which gave promise of an unusually abundant crop of fruit: but this promise was in some measure destroyed by the famishing people who hardly waited until the green berries were formed before they plucked and devoured the fruit. Baskets of green apricots, scarcely the size of marbles, were exposed for sale in the bazars of Srinagar, and hungry crowds thronged the orchards and climbed the trees in quest of the growing apples. In the hope of encouraging agriculture, the Maharaja's Government issued a proclamation engaging to surrender one of the numerous cesses that absorb the cultivators' share of the rice-crop, and to reduce the State share of other kinds of grain from one-half to two-fifths. It is not a matter for surprise, however, that the peasants placed little confidence in such engagements as those which are more lightly undertaken than punctually fulfilled.

25. In the same month, March 1879, the British Government, having received alarming reports of the state of affairs from Mr. Henvey, the Officer on Special Duty at Srinagar, recognised the necessity of at once acting upon the proposals submitted by the Durbar at the Jammu conference of the preceding October.

26. The following is the official account given in the Punjab Administration Report for 1878-79 of the measures undertaken for importing grain and of the results achieved. It should be particularly observed that, apart from the misconduct of the Kashmir authorities, the most serious obstacle to the work of importation arose from the want of good roads leading across the Pir Panjal mountain range or up the valley of the Jhelum from the plains of the Punjab to Kashmir.

It should also be remarked that the same authorities, who either could not or would not supply Mr. Russell with Kashmir carriage, produced for inspection some 14,000 ponies when it suited their purpose to display a zealous co-operation in the war against Kabul.

"Arrangements were at once made by the Punjab Government to import a lakh of maunds of grain. Dewan Anant Ram visited Lahore early in March for the purpose of arranging the details of the contracts, and tenders were advertised for; the contract being eventually given to Seth Bansil Lal Ram Rattan for the importation of 50,000 maunds of grain by the Murree route by the 15th June, and Mr. Russell was employed on commission to import as much by the Dhimber route. The Kabul war, and the efforts made by the Punjab Government to supply the army in the field with transport, had almost denuded the Punjab of its carriage. The roads to Kashmir were difficult and bad, while six months of almost unprecedented drought had left no available fodder on the lines of transport. All possible assistance was, however, given to the contractors by the Punjab Government, and the Maharaja issued stringent orders to assist them in every possible way—orders which were too often neglected by the Kashmir officials, who threw every obstruction in the way of the British contractors, whom they saw likely to carry off the profits which they wished to obtain themselves. . . . The contractors meanwhile had been doing their best to fulfil their engagements, but the carriage obtained by Mr. Russell from the Punjab was unfit to cross the high hills of Kashmir, and he was persistently thwarted in his attempts to obtain baggage animals in the Durbar had the effect of somewhat removing obstruction, and a certain amount of carriage was placed at his disposal, but nothing at all was done to improve the roads, and not a single bridge was properly erected. On the other hand, the Seth was unable to collect carriage from the north of the Punjab, except very slowly, and the supplies of fodder stored by the Durbar on the Murree road were found to be quite useless.

"Thus it came to pass that, when the 15th June had arrived, only some 15,000 maunds, out of the lakh engaged for, had been delivered and were present in Kashmir. Fortunately the weather continued very fine throughout the summer till late in August, and the contractors were able to go on slowly with their work, without being stopped by the rains. At the end of June the work was inspected by the Assistant to Mr. Henvey, and, after this, better arrangements were made and some repairs were effected on the roads, though too late and too slowly to be of any great use. The contractors were also unlucky in having severe cholera and fever on both lines of transport, which frightened the coolies from flocking to the depôts; while foot-and-mouth disease attacked the oxen in the service of the Seth.

"The rain on the hills, however, checked the work of the contractors, and it became clear that the whole amount engaged for could not be delivered. It was determined, therefore, to stop the Pir Panjal importation on the 15th September, and to continue that by the Murree route till the 15th October. Up to the end of August 40,000 maunds had been delivered—not a very great quantity, but still sufficient to make an appreciable difference in the existing wretched state of the country. It was impossible to give carriers now to Mr. Russell, as the people were needed in the rice-fields; and as the setting in of a very early winter was anticipated, it was thought well to close his contract and make over to the Durbar the remainder of the grain which lay. This was accordingly done, Mr. Russell having delivered in Kashmir something less than 18,000 maunds. The Seth at one time did so well that it seemed as if the whole 50,000 maunds would shortly be delivered, but unfortun-

long before July. The Maharaja was exceedingly anxious to cultivate a large area with turnips, the seed of which was sent for from France. To prepare the ground for these, near the city, some 4,000 people were employed; these works were not, strictly speaking, relief-works, but no others were started, in spite of representations made on this subject. The city was like a besieged one. Large suburbs were deserted and in ruins; many houses in the chief streets were falling down; no crowd was to be seen in the bazars; few knots of people even could be counted; the bridges had no stream of passers crossing them; the very banks of the river were bare. In the villages desolation was even more complete; hordes of ten or fifteen houses might be seen without a single soul in them, and estates, which once could supply 50 coolies, could not now supply one.

So things went on throughout July and August. The spring-crop was reaped, and the outturn was found to be very small as compared with what was hoped for, only two lakhs of maunds being obtained in all. This was partly owing to the unfavorable weather early in the year, but chiefly to the thefts made in self-defence by the people. The promise to give them half was forgotten; and, just as the rice-crop was not fully divided till January, the spring-crop was not completely separated everywhere even in September. In one *scadrat* out of 14,000 *khirsars* the Government took half as its share, 3,000 *khirsars* on account of advances made and for seed hereafter, and left the people 4,000 out of which to pay all the petty dues (for if the Maharaja abolished these, the official class did not relinquish them) and keep themselves alive. If one-fifth of the crop ever reached their houses they were fortunate, and in many cases it remained still on the threshing-floors awaiting the last process of the division late in September; often, no doubt, the cultivator was dead before this time and never appeared to claim his share. The weather continued very dry, and the usual showers in July came and never appeared, and in consequence nearly all the Indian-corn on the uplands was dried up. The water in the hill-streams began to run low, as all the little snow had melted rapidly, and there was no small anxiety for the rice-crop at one time. Fortunately a great number of showers fell on the hills, though not in the valley, during the latter part of August and replenished the water-supply, thus saving the rice-crop.

The Indian-corn which survived the drought ripened early in September; but no share of the crop ever reached the hands of Government. The river was full of stalks from which the cobs had been cut and stolen, and which were thrown into the water to conceal the theft. Some showers of rain in September did great good to the rice, and brought the ground into condition for the turnips to be sown, and the prospects for the winter began to look a little brighter. Sales from shops continued, in spite of opposition, and the change² was admitted to be a great improvement on the old system, though they were by no means really free.

29. On the whole the Maharaja's visit to Kashmir was not productive of much permanent advantage. He came in with the wheat, barley, and fruit, and, consequently, with some lessening of distress. He gave employment to a few of the poorest people in spinning wool, weaving, and cultivating turnips, but he set on foot no relief-works worth mentioning. His reforms consisted in drawing up regulations which were not obeyed, and in appointing Secretaries of State who were supposed to resemble the Secretaries to the Government of India. He rarely stirred beyond the precincts of the Sheregurhi Fort in Srinagar, except to consult the color of a miraculous spring or to review his troops. He knew nothing of the condition of the outlying districts, for his observation was confined to the river Jelum and to the beggars who crept along its banks.

30. It may not be out of place to make mention here of a melancholy incident connected with the famine. In the early spring of 1879 a strange story was circulated to the effect that boat-loads of paupers, whom the Durbar wished to remove from the city of Srinagar, had been conveyed to the Wular lake and there drowned. At the special request of the Maharaja, Mr. Henvey consented, as a friend of His Highness, to enquire into the matter. Witnesses, whose relatives were said to have been deported in the manner described, presented themselves, and other evidence of a like kind was produced; but the impression left on Mr. Henvey's mind was that, whatever misconduct there might have been in neglecting to feed the paupers in question, and perhaps also in throwing the corpses of those who had died during the voyage into the lake, it was monstrous to imagine that His Highness would even dream of a wholesale *noyade* of his subjects. However, while these enquiries were proceeding, a witness, who professed himself to be a survivor from the scuttled boats, and to have beheld his children drowned before his eyes, was brought to Mr. Henvey by Mr. Beck, an Englishman employed by the Murree brewery in the cultivation of hops in Kashmir. This important witness, by name Zamán, died in Mr. Henvey's compound, as was at first thought, of cholera, but, as the *post-mortem* examination and analysis of the stomach proved, of poisoning by means of aconite. By order of the British Government the investigation of the murder was put into the hands of the Maharaja, and by him into the hands of the Kashmir officials, that is, of the men to whose interest it was that the evidences of the murdered man should be suppressed. Neither the Maharaja nor any of his ministers has informed Mr. Henvey of the result of the investigation made into an occurrence regarding which, to say the least, he might be expected to feel some concern; and this omission illustrates the views which the Durbar has always entertained respecting the position of the Viceroy's representative in Kashmir. It may be that the Maharaja was afraid to submit his proceedings to the only English official who knew all the facts. However regarded, the circumstances of the case were painful and mysterious.

31. On the whole, the rice-crop of 1879 turned out as well as could have been expected. The yield was officially estimated at 11 lakhs of *khirwars* of *shahi* or unhusked rice, equal to 11 lakhs of British maunds of cleaned rice. The State share was reckoned at 8 lakhs of maunds, 5 lakhs being nominally set apart for the cultivators. Deducting 2 lakhs of maunds for seed and for supplies to troops, public servants, inhabitants of towns outside Srinagar, poor-houses, European visitors and their establishments, it was hoped that 4 lakhs of maunds would remain wherewith to provision Srinagar for ten months, from December 1879 to the end of

¹ Should be "till March"—F. H.

² This reform was introduced on the suggestion of Mr. H. C. Fanshawe, to whose able assistance the Officer on Special Duty was deeply indebted. It is characteristic of Kashmir that the new and better plan should have been given up immediately after the departure of the English officers from Srinagar. To the present day the old and vicious method of rationing the people, according to a false enumeration, is maintained.—F. H.

September 1880. Moreover, instructions were issued for the cultivation of a large area with wheat and barley. The actual supplies of food at the close of 1879, together with the hope of an abundant spring harvest in 1880, ought to have sufficed to dispel all fears of continued distress among the slender remnants of the population. But unfortunately more than one cause of anxiety still remained. *First*, the official returns were not trustworthy. *Second*, the distribution of food, under the system pursued in Kashmir, must be regulated by the number of the inhabitants, and this number could not be ascertained for the following reasons. On the one hand, the people, knowing that the rations of rice sold from the Maharaja's stores would be proportioned to the accepted numbers of their families, used every means to exaggerate those numbers. On the other hand, the Maharaja had no wish for an accurate enumeration which would disclose the consequences of his misrule. Where the Government and the people both combined to falsify the figures, it was not likely that the truth would be discovered, and so it happened that a census of Srinagar which was undertaken in December 1879 returned 145,000 souls for a city which notoriously could not have contained at that time as many as 60,000. Hence it was apprehended that supplies which might have been enough for the real number of the surviving population would not suffice for the fictitious number. *Third*, the official classes had an interest in prolonging the distress whereby they were enabled to amass wealth at the cost of their starving fellow-subjects. Their influence protected them from a searching census, and they exaggerated the number of their dependants, so as to accumulate, at the cheap Government price, grain which was hoarded in private stores, or, as before explained, secretly sold at exorbitant profit.

32. The Officer on Special Duty left Kashmir for the Punjab in November 1879, and by the close of the year the Maharaja had returned to Jammu. There remained, to watch the progress of the famine, only the missionaries of the Church Missionary Society, to one of whom, the Reverend T. R. Wade, we are indebted for the ensuing account of what took place in the winter and early spring:—

"The weather in Kashmir during the last winter was most unusually severe. It was very cold in the beginning of December, and on the 25th of that month the first snow fell in Srinagar. From that time there was more or less snow upon the ground till the end of February, on the 25th of which month the last snow fell. During the greatest part of the winter most of the river and all the lakes were entirely frozen over. In the sitting-room of my house the thermometer at one time stood at 12° below freezing-point.

"The poor people suffered greatly from the cold as well as from want of food. They had no extra clothing; many of them were more than half-naked, and their only resource for heat was to carry a 'kangri.' But fuel was extremely scarce. At the commencement of the winter His Highness the Maharaja lined Dewan Badrinath several (three I was told) thousand rupees, because fuel could not be obtained for the palace: what then must have been the experience of the very poor?

"I do not think I saw so many dead as in the previous winter, but there were fewer to die. On the 3rd December I found a child dying at the door of the orphanage. It expired in less than half an hour after I saw it, notwithstanding all I could do to save it alive. On the morning of the 6th I found a girl of about twelve years of age lying dead in a corner of the open building in front of the Mission Hospital. She was frozen and nearly naked, her *lungri* was empty, and from her appearance she had evidently been starved. But I need not give a list of the dead I saw, nor of those I buried. I think I may safely say that there was not a day during the winter but that some—indeed, if the statements of servants and others are to be believed, I may say many—died of starvation and cold. When there was more than half a foot of snow upon the ground, I rode through a great part of the city and saw numbers who certainly could not live long. I tried to distribute some food to the poorest, but found it impossible to do so; I was mugged each time I made the attempt. The sights, too, which I saw when alms and clothing were given away at the Mission Hospital, are simply indescribable.

"At the end of November a census was taken by the Government of Srinagar, and at the beginning of the following month His Highness ordered two 'traks' (nearly 12 *seers*) of *shali* to be sold for three annas to each person in the city twice a month, but this '*rasad*' was never regularly distributed. There were said to be Government poor-houses in the city during the winter, but I did not visit any of them till February 12th when I went to three of them with Mr. Russell. In the first we visited we found a dead child lying in the sleeping-room. In the one at the Basant Bugh, where the food was cooked for all the poor-houses, the officials in charge informed us that there were in the half a dozen poor-houses in the city 913 poor persons, of whom 60 were Hindu and the remainder Muhammadans. Since then all the poor people have been collected together in the poor-house at the Haft Chinar and placed under the superintendence of Mr. O'Reilly."

"Dr. and Mrs. Downes and I did what we could for the poor and suffering during the winter; the hospital was crowded with in-patients, and the orphanage was full of children. From December to February I fed 100 to 300 children daily, and those who had no homes found shelter and warmth in three of our poor-houses. Twice a week I distributed food and pie to from 1,000 to 2,000 poor people, and employed as many more on famine relief-works. At one time I had 2,018 employed, though it was not always easy to find something to do that would not give offence to the Government. I wrote to Dewan Anant Rans at Jammu and begged for permission to do some famine-work. I received a letter in reply asking what kind of work I wished to do, and adding that, on hearing from me the matter would be laid before His Highness for consideration and sanction. I replied saying I should be glad to do any work for which His Highness would grant me permission, suggesting only that it should be easy work, as most of the coolies were women and children, and that it should be near the city, as almost all of them live there. I added that I was then prepared to spend Rs. 8,000, and I hoped to be able to spend Rs. 10,000 on the work. This letter was written in January last, and I have not yet received any answer to it. However, I kept the coolies employed till April, when the weather was warmer, and food, especially wild plants, more plentiful.

"I am not aware that there was a single famine relief-work opened by the Government during the winter. Mr. Ermos arrived here from Jammu on January 31st, and in February he commenced work in the vineyard at the Chashmah Shahi, some 4 miles from the city, where from 200 to 300 coolies were employed, and some time afterwards famine relief-works were opened much nearer the city, where the coolies are now making a garden for His Highness."

33. These last works to which Mr. Wade referred were set on foot shortly before the Officer on Special Duty returned to Kashmir at the end of March 1880. The famine was

¹ A portable warming-pan, consisting of a pot of charcoal with basket-work covering.
An old artilleryman of the East India Company's Army.

then beginning to show signs of exhaustion. The spring-crops seemed fair, and immense masses of snow on the surrounding hills provided for the irrigation of the rice-fields. Grain was distributed in Srinagar in the nominal proportion of 6 sérs of cleaned rice per head twice a month, but in reality, owing to delays and mismanagement, not more than thrice in two months. Private sales, however, were more freely carried on, and whether that was due to hopes of better times or to fears of the approaching interview¹ between the Viceroy and the Maharaja at Umballa, the result was beneficial to the poor, who could at last buy as much as they needed at varying rates, but not higher than one Company's rupee for 12 sérs of cleaned rice. It is not to be imagined that the suffering entirely disappeared. Trade being almost ruined and the poorer classes of people having parted with all they possessed to buy grain during the past two years, a dearth of money took the place of a dearth of food. In order to provide for the relief of persons who had no money and no opportunity of getting it, the Officer on Special Duty strongly urged the Durbar to open works near the large centres of population. Some steps were taken upon his recommendation, and, by employing a few thousands of coolies in this way, the Maharaja's Government has shown not only what might now be done to a far greater extent by way of protection against further losses, but also what might have been done long ago with infinite advantage to the people, had the Durbar been awakened to a sense of its duty.

The Maharaja was also advised to be very careful lest there should be a deficiency of rice-seed for the autumn crop, and he undertook that his officers should pay special attention to the matter.

34. The famine then may be said to have died out for the present, together with the bulk of the Mussalman subjects of His Highness the Maharaja. For those that survive a mere scratching of the soil ought to produce a sufficient yield of food, and there need be little or no apprehension of the recurrence of a great disaster, simply because those who remain to die are few in number.

35. The foregoing is a dull and monotonous tale of suffering, mismanagement, and wasted opportunities. In British India also famines have occurred with heavy loss of life, but there the State had to deal with millions of people, whereas in Kashmir the total numbers even before 1878 did not exceed 500,000, most of whom might have been easily provided for. Moreover, in British India the Government has generally turned its relief operations to useful account by employing famine labourers on public works. In Kashmir, with the exception of a few roads made by the English missionaries, and a garden which M. Bruens embarked since the beginning of March 1880, the famine has left no works of utility to commemorate the charitable exertions of the Maharaja. Had the Maharaja listened to the advice of the English officers at Srinagar, especially in 1873, he might have saved many lives by means of relief-works and well-managed poor-houses. But unfortunately the settled policy of the Durbar was to ignore the British Resident in Kashmir, and to show how finely the country could be governed without his counsel and aid. Hence it almost seemed that the best way of getting a good thing done was to recommend that it should *not* be done. The result, taken as a whole, is that, while the Maharaja has lost lakhs of rupees in diminished revenue and expended many lakhs in fruitlessly importing grain, the Kashmir famine will be remembered as a calamity which brought the country to the brink of ruin. From responsibility for this result it is impossible to absolve the Maharaja himself, though undoubtedly whatever exertions His Highness felt disposed to make were in great measure thwarted by the unenlightened and self-seeking men who surround him. Where a sovereign, however, not only reigns but governs, he cannot shelter himself behind his ministers. As regards the means of restoring the valley to prosperity and of again filling its wasted homesteads, the following suggestions are offered in the hope that they may be useful towards the solution of an important and difficult problem.

36. It is essential, in the first place, that the ruler of Kashmir should be brought under the control of the Paramount Power, and induced, through the influence of the British representative at his court, to make needful reforms. As experience has shown that the want of good roads practically cuts off Kashmir from the grain-producing plains of India, so it is of primary importance that there should be one or more roads over the mountains fit for the traffic of wheeled carts. The work should be entrusted to English officers, not to the inefficient native agency which the Maharaja would prefer to employ. Further, the road or roads should be periodically inspected by English officers, who would report to the Resident, for communication to the Durbar, what repairs might be required. Next, the system of land-revenue must be revised and a moderate assessment fixed for a term of years. The immediate result of such a change would be to sweep away a crowd of corrupt officials and to give the agriculturists a direct interest in augmenting the produce of their fields. If liberal regulations for breaking up waste land and reclaiming swamps were added, the treasury would in a few years gain far more by the increased fertility of the land than it would sacrifice for the time by reducing the State demand. It would probably be best that the revenue should be taken in cash, not in kind. This has been done for some time past in the pargana of Shahabad, where there are still some traces of prosperity. It may be argued that, if a good road be constructed, and if emigration be free, competition will force the Government to deal leniently with the cultivators, and that the reform of the system of collecting land-revenue is therefore a matter which may be left to time and to the operation of economical laws to settle. Experience has, however, taught us that, in a country situated as Kashmir is, with physical obstacles in the way of emigration and

¹ On the supposition that the Maharaja himself regulates the private sales and thus recoups his revenue, it will be easily understood why the sales should respond to the political circumstances of the moment.

with a Government secretly opposing the flow, whether of population or commerce, competition is not likely to be allowed fair play, and that reforms, if seriously contemplated, must be enforced by pressure from without. Still there may be reasons why the revenue should continue to be paid in grain; and if any experienced English officer of the Settlement Department, after enquiring into the customs of Kashmir, recommended that this should be done, either wholly or partly, there would yet remain the advantage inseparable from giving some fixity to the demand for a term of years, and from abolishing the practice of actually dividing the crops on the ground after each harvest.

37. Along with the abolition of the collection of the Government dues in kind would disappear the monopoly of grain. The agriculturists would dispose of their surplus produce for cash in order to meet the demands of the treasury; and the sale of grain being unrestricted, the markets would be governed by the ordinary laws of supply and demand. If at any time stocks should threaten to fail, the Indian corn merchant, who is as keen a trader as is to be found anywhere, might be trusted to import the necessary quantity. For a time prices might rise, but as the produce of the valley is even now in ordinary seasons superabundant, and the distance of the Indian markets would discourage exportation, the rise would not be permanent, and would be eventually checked by importation. Probably also freedom in the grain-trade would be followed by greater activity in other branches of commerce, which would naturally grow with the growing wealth of the country: wages would be increased; and even if the money-value of food should rise, there would be more purchasing power among the people.

38. Next, the taxation of trades should be carefully examined, and, where the taxes are found to press too heavily on any branches of industry, they must be taken off or remitted. It need scarcely be added that no interference with the liberty of the subject to depart from his country at will, or change his calling, should be tolerated. Forced labour and compulsory contributions for the entertainment of officials or visitors should be discontinued; or, if it be considered necessary for public purposes to provide against emergent demands, as, e. g., for the passage of troops, and so forth, the obligations of the villagers must be carefully guarded by well-considered rules. Here, as in other matters, Kashmir might learn a lesson from Nepal, in which country the service of the State in regard to carriage and supplies is placed in the hands of a contractor, who makes his own arrangements with the people, and only receives aid from the Government in cases of special and peculiar urgency.

39. The most important point of all is, perhaps, the entire recasting of the Kashmir establishment, which must involve the substitution of honest for fraudulent servants of the State. But, to ensure honesty and industry, it is essential that officers should be adequately and regularly paid. Under the existing system even the army is often ten months or more in arrears, and perhaps the only officer of the Kashmir Government who gets his pay every month is Babu Nilamber, and he is paid because he combines with his judicial duties the management of the silk monopoly, and deducts his salary from the proceeds. The wakil in attendance on the Officer on Special Duty lately tendered his resignation because his pay was in arrears for five months. The Governor of Kashmir issued three written orders for payment, but these orders were disregarded by the clerks of the Account Department, who refused to obey them without instructions from the Wazir Pannu at Jammu. Innumerable instances of a similar kind might be produced. What lies at the bottom of this kind of irregularities is the custom of giving all servants of the Government a fixed quantity of food from the public stores. This custom should be abolished, and the salaries raised in proportion, so as to compensate the incumbents for the loss of their rations. At first sight it may seem that the payment of wages in kind is not open to objection, but it is in reality bound up with the grain monopoly, and must perish at the same time, for obviously it would be absurd for the Government to buy grain in the open market in order to supply its own people, who could make better and more convenient bargains for themselves. Punctual payments would raise the character of the service. At present Kashmir is an asylum for the rascals of the Punjab. A disgraced tehsildar or an unsuccessful pleader may hope for a welcome at Jammu, where dislike of the English is considered a guarantee of oyalty to His Highness. This qualification need only be supplemented by indebtedness (which is easily arranged) to form characters well suited for any work that has to be undertaken.

40. To sum up, then, the regeneration of Kashmir depends on the construction of good roads, the introduction of a light settlement, the reform of the fiscal and commercial policy of the State, and the appointment of adequately and regularly paid officers. And none of these vital changes will be effected unless the Paramount Power resolves to exercise its legitimate influence and persuade its Feudatory to adopt them.

41. We have, lastly, to meet the objection, which will certainly be raised, that the interference of the Government of India in the internal affairs of a Native State is unusual and might have a bad political effect. The political difficulties of the case cannot be denied; and such interference as we have advocated could only be justified by exceptional circumstances. It is not, however, an unprecedented thing for the Paramount Power to step in, in cases of gross misrule, whether the evidence of such misrule assumes the shape of insurrection, or any other shape which is manifest and palpable. Now, insurrection in Kashmir is not to be looked for. Ages of wretchedness have emaciated the people. As Tocqueville observed, "quand le peuple est écorné par la misère, il se résigne." There is, moreover, the shadow of the irresistible British Empire in the background. It is true, signs of desperation have occasionally shown themselves, and do still appear from time to time. Such signs are the incendiary fires which occurred in Srinagar every night during the winter of 1876-79, the purpose of the

incendiaries being to plunder stores of rice which were believed to have been accumulated in the houses that were burnt. But no overt revolt against the authorities is to be apprehended. The evidence of Kashmir misrule consists in the famine and in the causes which we have disclosed as leading to it. There are, moreover, special circumstances which place Kashmir apart from other Native States in India, and support the conclusion that a policy which might perhaps be inappropriate and unwise as regards other States is justifiable as regards Kashmir.

First, there are the physical characteristics of the country such as we have depicted them. The barrier of high mountains, the bad roads, and the want of supplies for the journey, explain the local proverb that "Kashmir is a prison without chains." In short, the Kashmiris are at the mercy of their rulers. This situation is without a parallel in India, where people have often protested against the visitations of God or of man by leaving their homes *en masse*.

Second, the ruler in most of the Indian Native States is generally more or less in sympathy with the ruled. He is often the head of a clan, of which the members are the majority of his subjects. Thus the rigour of an Asiatic despotism is tempered by the kindly feelings springing from a community of tribe and religion. In the instance of Kashmir the ruler is a Hindu prince, while the great bulk of his subjects are Muhammadans. His court is held at Jammu, 150 miles from Kashmir. It has been well said that the power of an oriental sovereign decreases at least as the cube of the distance of the place where he resides; and thus even if the character of the Maharaja of Kashmir were without reproach, his government must be feeble. In point of fact, to some estimable qualities he adds a deep religious bigotry and a detestation of Mussalmans, especially the Mussalmans of Kashmir, whom he denounces as monsters of perfidy and wickedness. He rules Kashmir by means of an oligarchy of Hindu officials, who, with rare exceptions, are mere vulgar plunderers, seeking only to enrich themselves at the expense of both their master and his subjects. Of all bad Governments in the world probably the worst is that which is conducted by a corrupt official class, adverse, by every secular and religious motive, to the ruled. Such a Government there is in Kashmir, but nowhere else perhaps in India.

Third, the moral responsibility of the British Government towards the Kashmiris is exceptional. Whatever view may be taken of the transaction with Golas Sing, it might not unreasonably be supposed that the British Government would watch with peculiar tenderness over a people whose destiny it had bartered away; in truth, the tenderness actually shown has been in a totally different direction. While great feudatories, such as Scindia, Holkar, the Nizam, and the Rajput Chiefs, are attended and advised by accredited representatives of the Paramount Power, the ruler of Kashmir has been suffered to exclude British influence from his court and to govern the internal affairs of his State entirely according to his own devices. The officer who resides at Srinagar for eight months yearly is, in the eyes of the Maharaja, merely a Police Magistrate, whose function it is to keep order among European visitors. The very name of Resident or Agent is ignored. The officer is not even allowed to fly a flag, the symbol of English power. On one occasion when, in accordance with orders, he made preparations for hoisting a flag, the Durbar objected, and the flag was hauled down. This may appear a trivial affair, but, in the East, trifles have often a deep significance. In 1879 the Officer on Special Duty was allowed a guard of British sepoy. It is not known whether this was meant to be a temporary or permanent arrangement; but it is clear that, so long as the Residency house is surrounded and watched by the Maharaja's soldiers, policemen, and servants, the officer is under surveillance of the strictest kind. Neither the Maharaja nor his son condescends to return the visits of the Officer on Duty. Correspondence between the Maharaja and the British Government is conducted, on His Highness' part, not through the officers on duty, but through the Maharaja's own agents at the courts of the Viceroy or of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. Even in political matters relating to the frontier, a similar method is pursued, and the officer is rarely addressed or consulted by the Maharaja except occasionally for the purpose of promoting intrigues which may have been unsuccessfully tried in other quarters. This system of allowing the Maharaja to communicate with the British Government through his *wakils* at Simla and Lahore is not new. However adapted it may have been to the times when a Punjab officer used to be sent to Srinagar merely for the season, it is injurious now, for it paralyses the influence of the officer in Kashmir. Such a situation might be defensible if it could be demonstrated that the Maharaja has managed his affairs fairly well, without advice or control. But it is not so. On the contrary, the necessity of interference is proved by the ruin of the country, and if there were no *a priori* reasons for compelling the Maharaja to admit an English officer into his councils and to govern his subjects equitably, there are certainly cogent reasons for doing so now, unless the British Government is prepared to abide the issue of its policy of abstention. Further, continued and steadfast loyalty might perhaps be brought forward as a reason for treating the Maharaja with special indulgence. Those who know His Highness' character and the real nature of his sentiments towards Englishmen and the English Government would reject such a plea. One word more may be said under this heading. It is sometimes urged that the choice lies between leaving the Maharaja in isolation and annexing his country. The advocates of this opinion perhaps think that the cause which they defend will be best served by assuming the truth of their proposition and then raising a cry against annexation. Anyhow the fallacy is obvious. There are many stages and degrees between exercising a due control over an Indian Feudatory and taking his country. Unless it be meant to argue in the face of palpable facts that Holkar, the Nizam, Scindia, Baroda, Travancore, and in short all Indian State where there is a properly empowered Resident, are practically annexed, the argument is worthless. *Fourth*, the strategic importance of Kashmir, forming as it were the north-western bastion of the Indian

Empire, invites, nay forces, special attention to it. Luckily for the State, and perhaps for ourselves, the mountain rampart towards Yarkand and Chinese Thibet is so lofty and tremendous that a hostile incursion in force from those regions is beyond the bounds of probability or, perhaps, of possibility. And even north-westward in the direction of Gilgit no worse fate could be assigned to an enemy than that he should attempt to menace India on that line. He would have to traverse tracts which are not productive enough to sustain the local garrisons, and to surmount passes which are often closed for months together, and always arduous even to the practised hillman. Still it is well known that beyond Gilgit there are roads leading from the Pamir upland across the Hindukush and down into the districts of Chitral and Yasin, whence a bold and enterprising foe might possibly threaten Jellalabad and Peshawar. Over the chieftains of Chitral and Yasin it is understood that the ruler of Kashmir claims some shadowy sway, which is illustrated by occasional payments on his part, without any practical obedience on theirs. However, the claim exists and is recognised in a fashion, which recognition has its uses, since a ground occupied by our Feudatory is not open to others. So much is undoubtedly gained from a diplomatic point of view. But when the shock of war comes, diplomatic considerations are apt to be rudely swept aside: and an empty title to suzerainty, unenforced by real strength, is not likely to command respectful notice. Consequently, on the assumption that the Chitral and Yasin passes are assailable points in our armour, it is necessary that our Feudatory should be able to occupy them. After what we have said, it will probably be allowed that the condition of Kashmir is not such as to justify the hope that, when called upon, it will be found ready. It is true that, within the last few years, there have been no disturbances among the tribes which border upon the north-west extremity of the Maharaja's territories. This tranquillity is due to the influence of an English officer at Gilgit, and to dread of the power which he represents, not to the arms of a Government so feeble that it dares not withdraw from the small outpost of Chaprote, nor reinforce its garrison there from fear of arousing the wrath of the petty chieftains of Hunza and Nagar. A State which is rotten to the core within can scarcely show a bold front without. A State whose soldiers are always in arrears, and therefore discontented, forms a sorry bulwark to the Indian Empire. A State which cannot keep its people alive would meet with difficulty in equipping and supplying a force for distant warfare in a barren country. These are matters that seem to call for serious reflection.

42. Lastly, the very magnitude of the disaster and the hopelessness of the outlook remove the case far from the category of ordinary Indian calamities. Elsewhere, indeed, precious lives may be lost, and ruin may be more or less widely spread, but, after the worst is past, the recuperative powers of nature assert themselves: emigrants return, the waste fields are ploughed up, the villages re-peopled, and when a few years have elapsed, only the memory of a great famine remains. Here it is a question of the fate of a whole people who are being gradually destroyed, and whom sad experience has taught to hope nothing from their rulers. The British public and Government can feel sympathy for the sufferings of the Christian *rayahs* in Turkey. Have they no blessing left for the unhappy Mussulmans of Kashmir, whose lot they could ameliorate by a word or a hint?

F. HENVEY,

Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir.

The 15th May 1880.

APPENDIX II (see p. 99).

The Famine in Kashmir.

The valley of Kashmir is separated from the Punjab plains by a series of mountain ridges

Physical characteristics. culminating in the Pir Panjal range, whose heights rise to 14,000 feet in the west and centre, and fall to 9,000 feet in the east. The Jhelum river flows along the whole length of the valley in a north-west direction with a fall of about a foot a mile, and is joined by a hundred small rivers and a thousand mountain streams. By a moderate expenditure on irrigation works the failure of rain could be absolutely guarded against. Except near the banks of the river the surface of the country is not flat, but is cut up into small lateral valleys separated by level table-lands called "karewas." The soil is exceedingly fertile, even where stony; and while all the grains of the Punjab can be cultivated there, the country abounds with the fruits of Kabul and admits of the growing of English hops and French vines.

2. Inside the valley communications are easy and good, by water and by road. There are three main routes to it from the Punjab—by Murree, by Bhimbar, and by Jammu. The first road, though not in a good condition, could be easily made passable for camels, and by some skilful engineering for wheeled traffic: it follows the left bank of the Jhelum river throughout. The second road is fairly easy until the Rattan Pir is reached: beyond this are four very severe marches, and the Pir Panjal has to be crossed at a height of 11,000 feet; a branch road by Punch crosses the mountains at a height of 8,000 feet only, and joins the Murree road two marches from the valley: it is naturally much easier than the main route. Bad as this road is now and passable only for all practical purposes by strong ponies and mules when laden, it is susceptible of great improvement. When made by Mardan Ali Khan it was a good road for elephants, and is certainly capable of being made an easy one for ponies and oxen. The third route might also be made a good one—perhaps the best of all; but the only one which can remain certainly open all the winter through is that from Murree, which is nowhere at a greater elevation than 8,000 feet.

Communications. 3. The ruler of the country is the owner of the soil. In the eastern portion of the valley a cash revenue system exists; elsewhere the revenue is taken in kind. The country is divided into five wazarats, each of which contains a number of tahsils. Within these are other minor subdivisions, till we reach the village with its headman. The number of subordinate officials is enormous, and they have preyed unchecked on the agriculturist for years. The share which the Government takes of the crop in ordinary years is nominally one-half, but the cultivator has to pay a large number of cesses and dues from his share, so that he does well if he obtains one fifth of his harvest. The Government officials watch him at seed time, while the crop is growing, and especially when it is ripening: before this takes place a rough estimate is made of the probable produce, and the share finally taken is seldom allowed to be less than half of this. When the crop is ripe and cut, it is brought to threshing-floors, and after a time allowed to be threshed out, and finally separated. This process usually occupies two-and-a-half months, and may occupy much longer if the cultivator is unwilling to pay certain dues readily.

Revenue system. 4. The rainfall of the country is said to be 18 inches, but it is probably a good deal less; of this, 6 inches only fall so as to benefit any crop; the rest comes during the winter months, when no agricultural work is done. More important than the rain is the snow, which falls from November to March, and on which the rice crop depends for its irrigation. Heavy rains fall in March and April, and without them the spring crop, which consists of barley and wheat, cannot be other than poor: some heavy showers are usually hoped for in July to benefit the Indian-corn and the rice, and showers fall again in September and October. The valley is completely removed beyond the effects of the Indian monsoon, and the rain always comes up from the west. The spring crop is sown in February and March and ripens in June and July. Following it is an intermediate crop of Indian-corn, china, torumba, and other minor grains which ripen in August and September: finally, the rice is ready to be cut from the beginning of October. The staple crop is the rice, and it occupies three-fourths of the cultivated area: it is generally grown on the lowlands in the valleys, but also on the table-lands; on these latter nearly all the spring crops and Indian-corn are cultivated. Lands culturable probably bear to lands cultivated a proportion of 2 to 1, but it is difficult to speak confidently here. Still large tracts now overgrown with reeds and iris near the river, and endless highlands and mountain slopes could be brought under fine crops at once. Singharas grow abundantly in the Wullur lake; turnips, called *gonghis*, are cultivated in the autumn and dried for winter eating; potatoes are being introduced; fruit trees flourish wild on every side—chiefly cherries, mulberries, pears, apples, and walnuts; fish swarm in the rivers; and the flesh of goats and sheep is largely eaten. With any other Government than that at present existing, the people of Kashmir would be the best to do south of the Hindu Kush.

The people. 5. Of the people themselves little favourable can be said. Their rascality has passed into one of the best known proverbs of India: they are liars, cruel, and lazy—withal so crushed down

as to be incapable of lifting a hand in their own defence. Their weaknesses and vices are those which are naturally and indeed necessarily developed under a tyrannical and rapacious system of Government. Men are naturally lazy when their utmost energy will do no more than secure a greater profit for the tax-farmer; they are cowardly in the presence of a bureaucracy which is so powerful and omnipresent as to exclude all idea of resistance; and they are liars, as falsehood is the last refuge and hope of the oppressed. The agricultural population is generally of the Muhammadan creed; while the rulers and the official Pandit class are Hindus. The villages generally consist of scattered hamlets of a few houses, nearly always double-storied and made of wood; and single dwellings are scattered all over the country. The population of the valley was put at between 400,000 and 450,000 before the famine began: of this three-fifths are rural and two-fifths urban. In ordinary years the bounty of Nature makes the agriculturist happy and fat even on the small share that he actually does receive; but the shawl-weavers and other poor craftsmen of the towns are never removed from the depths of poverty: State arrangements again are the cause of this, a sort of "tommy" system existing for the payment of these people. When it is added that the State is the seller of its own share of the grain from Government store-houses, all has been said that is necessary by way of preface and to enable us to judge of the famine. It must be noted that the State monopoly (for such it is, no one having any surplus to sell except jagirdars) is not abused in ordinary times. Unhusked rice sells at Rs. 1-1 British coinage per khirwar which is 2 maunds 10 seers, and wheat and barley in proportion; and yet the people grumble that these rates are higher than they used to be 30 years ago!

6. From the above account it is clear where danger from famine lies in Kashmir. The population is dependent on the rice crop, and the rice crop is dependent on a sufficient fall of snow on the hills to feed the streams throughout the summer. On this the cultivation of rice hangs, and the failure of the snows causes most serious consequences; but the great danger to the harvest lies elsewhere. The crop ripens so late in the year that if the winter snows and rains set in early it is liable to be destroyed either before it is cut or after it is ready to go to the threshing-floor. The spring crop, no doubt, depends on the falls of rain in the spring, but even if this fails no very great inconvenience is caused to the people. As in Behar, the staple food is rice; and as there, if this crop is lost, the country is at once on the verge of starvation, while separated by terribly long and bad roads from all other sources of supply. There have been earlier famines than that of 1878 and 1879 in Kashmir, notably one in 1831 during the government of Sher Singh, and a second during the rule of Diwan Kirpa Ram, 15 years ago. But no sufficient details exist to make any full examination of their causes repay the trouble. The origin of the present famine was not due as in India to want of rain, but to the precisely opposite cause. The spring harvest of 1877 failed like that of nearly all the Punjab for want of the usual showers; but the snowfall of the winter had been abundant, and an unusually large and fine rice crop stood ripening in the fields in October. But before all the crop could be cut, or any large portion of it threshed, winter set in with heavy rains and snow, which continued almost without intermission till January 1878. Sufficient sunshine to dry the soaked sheaves never appeared, and the apathetic people never adopted any measures to try to save a portion of the crop. They left it to rot in the middle of the fields, where it lay, although much could have been saved by judicious stacking on high spots. It so happens that one part of the Kashmir system is to keep all officials in debt to the State as well as in arrears for pay, and they in turn accordingly always show the cultivator as in default for revenue. And in a season like this the Kashmir Government acts exactly like the Indian *bannya*: all credits are closed and all possible balances are got in to the full extent of the cultivator's crop if needs be. The Governor of the country was Wazir Pannu, who had held the post for many years,—a man of the old school and principles, strong as a ruler, but very harsh, and noted for his hatred towards the Mussalmans. He had the revenue to collect, and the city and the official class to feed; he knew that failure to do so would bring him into disfavour, and he wrung out of the wretched people every maund that he could. Meanwhile the continuance of bad weather prevented the sowing of a large spring crop, and many cattle died for want of pasturage, the grazing grounds lying for months under deep snow. It is not surprising, therefore, if by the summer famine was raging in the land.

7. These facts were reported by Major Henderson, the Officer on Special Duty, early in January 1878. In April he was succeeded by Mr. Henvey, C.S. Before that time it was admitted that there must be great scarcity in Kashmir, and the number of passes for visitors to the valley was limited. Distress being especially severe along the Jhelum valley, it was ordered that all persons proceeding to Kashmir should go by the Blimbar route. At that time the Durbar considered that there was barely enough food to last till the autumn; and it was admitted that all the grain which could be collected was stored in the Government depôts, and would be doled out to the people. Even small quantities of rice were already procured with difficulty. A great deal depended on the outturn of the spring crop, but fate was against Kashmir, and hail and rain caused much damage to what was sown; so that finally only one-eighth of the supplies hoped for were received by Government from this harvest. The excessive rains largely destroyed the produce of the fruit trees also, and before the summer was half over famine set in in Kashmir. The Indian-corn next suffered from intense heat and drought, while the consequent melting of the unusual masses of snow caused the rivers and streams to rise to an extraordinary height and swamp much of the low-lying rice lands, which it was impossible there-

fore to sow. Meanwhile such persons as could flee were leaving the country, although egress was not free, and the fugitives were not allowed to buy food on the road, and guards were placed on the passes. In March 200 persons daily were said to be crossing the Jhelum into British territory at Kohala, and large numbers found their way down to Jammu. So far the evil was perhaps remediable, but no remedies were applied. Orders were given to buy grain in Amritsar and Jammu and forward it to the valley, but the necessary money was not forthcoming, and this opportunity of importing supplies was lost. Early in June the Maharaja ordered 2,000 people to be fed daily in Srinagar, and various measures of relief were adopted, but none were carried out. The Governor clung to the hope that a full autumn crop would avert any great calamity, and the distress was in consequence allowed to go on and increase unchecked: the Durbar remained passive and acquiesced, although urged by the Punjab Government to use every effort to import grain.

8. Early in August the attention of the Famine Committee having been directed to the distress in Kashmir, Mr. Henvey was requested to submit a report and to obtain certain information from the Durbar. The report showed that some tracts were already depopulated; that measures to import grain or give relief were being executed so feebly by corrupt officials as to be useless; and that the approaching rice crop could only be half of an average one in the eastern half and a quarter of an average one in the west of the valley. Prospects therefore were most gloomy, and the gravity of the crisis was far from being realised by the Durbar. Emigration was certainly not freely allowed; on the contrary, every effort was made to prevent the people leaving the country. The Durbar, in reply to the questions put to it, answered early in September that eight annas of revenue had been suspended in 1877, and would now be remitted; that Rs. 15,000 had been spent on relief works up to date,—the nature of the works showing, however, that famine-stricken persons were not generally being employed on them, and very large numbers having already died of hunger; that since 16th July there had been 23 poor-houses open; that relief had been given to 5 lakhs of people (Mr. Henvey reported 2,000 a day); and that it was impossible to say how many men had left the valley. The news-writer at Jammu reported that 12,000 had fled before the middle of August. How far these statements agree with or differ from the facts related above may be seen at a glance.

9. Meanwhile the Maharaja had become uneasy at the state of things in the valley which he learnt from emigrants who began to pour into Jammu, and early in September Diwan Anant Ram was sent there to submit a special report on the famine. Shortly afterwards Wazir Panun was recalled from the Governorship, and it appeared probable that something would really be done to avert the calamity which threatened the country. The Government of India took the state of Kashmir into serious consideration, and after a proposed scheme for extensive emigration, which was not considered feasible at the time, it was determined that Mr. Henvey should proceed to Jammu to consult with the Maharaja as to the steps to be taken to alleviate the

The Jammu Committee—October. impending famine. He reached the capital on 20th October, and was met there by the Hon'ble Mr. Cunningham (the member of the Famine Commission for the Punjab) and Mr. Anderson, Assistant Commissioner from Sialkot. The figures then supplied by the Durbar led Mr. Henvey to believe that there would be a deficit of 2,00,000 maunds of grain before the autumn crop of 1879 was available. The authorities believed that the outturn would be 25 lakhs of maunds of uncleaned rice, and 4 lakhs of maunds of barley and wheat; they proposed that the Durbar should import 1 lakh, and that the Punjab Government should arrange to import the other by Murree, through the agency of native officers, the Durbar undertaking to keep the road in good order and supply fodder for the transport animals at the various stages. It was decided by the Lieutenant-Governor that no steps could be taken to import grain for the Durbar until the yield of the rice crop was known with tolerable accuracy, and Mr. Henvey returned to Kashmir to consult with Dewan Anant Ram on this subject. The Durbar at first set to work with some degree of will to import grain from Jammu. Cattle were purchased at Amritsar for transport, and one of the young princes was charged with the duty of seeing the convoys off daily. It was the Maharaja's wish to import 50,000 maunds before the winter set in, and a great deal of grain was forwarded as far as within three marches of the valley. But here an obstacle was met in the shape of a broken bridge, which no one seemed to be able to repair, and disease sprang up among the cattle; so that ultimately very little grain did get in before the winter, and in all only some 60,000 maunds ever reached Kashmir by this route. Want of ready money and the corruptness of officials had much to do with this, and the work, which was continued with energy for some weeks, ultimately died of inanition, like most things in Kashmir.

10. Mr. Henvey, after his return to Srinagar, reported on the last day of November that the estimates of the outturn of the rice crop were still 11,00,000 kharwar or equal to 13,80,000 maunds of clean rice (though this was the outturn of the whole crop, and not of what was in hand for future consumption), and that a yield of 4 lakhs of maunds was still counted on from the spring harvest. The figures were clearly not to be trusted, as otherwise there could be no necessity to hoard the stores so carefully as was being done. The price of rice, which till now had remained Rs. 1-4 per kharwar, was raised to Rs. 1-14 to try to prevent large sales, and this was a wise step. But, as a fact, it was already impossible for the

Mussalmans to buy a sufficient quantity of food to support life, the allowance made to them on a ticket system now introduced being only two seers per head of cleaned rice for 8 days. No Government relief works were in existence, although the people were dying in large numbers, and the officers of the Medical Mission had been compelled to open work on a road for a few hundred of people, while the poor-houses once open seem to have been closed. Emigration continued to be discouraged in so far as no supplies on the route were allowed to people the Punjab Government. Dewan Anant Ram was at this time unfortunately compelled to leave the valley by the death of his grandfather, Dewan Jowala Sahai, and was succeeded by Dewan Badri Nath, a man of no strength of character, and who was prepared to allow every kind of oppression and greed to be displayed by the official class. The death of the old Dewan was a great calamity to Kashmir, as Wazir Pannu succeeded him as the Chief Counsellor of the Durbar, both as regarded the whole country, and as regarded the valley in particular. Mr. Henvey also left Kashmir early in December.

11. On the facts reported in letters of the Officer on Special Duty, the Lieutenant-Governor decided that it would be certainly advisable to arrange for the importation of a lakh of maunds *viz* Murree in the spring, and the Government of India was accordingly addressed in this sense. But as soon as Mr. Henvey left the valley things went rapidly from bad to worse, so much so that the Maharaja was compelled to despatch special officers from Jammu to the Governor at the end of the month. The accounts of distress and misery sent by the Missionaries were terrible. Cold added to starvation carried off large numbers daily, and not only were no real relief works opened by the State, but efforts were made to obstruct the works which the Missionaries had undertaken, and on which 1,200 persons were employed. The same gentlemen also opened an orphanage for which an excellent building was afterwards made for them by the Maharaja's orders, and before long 460 starving infants were collected in it. In the city relief to the destitute ceased entirely, and relief by sales was largely curtailed. At the same time considerable efforts were made to secure a large area being sown for the spring crop, and potatoes were imported for seed, and gourds. The very gloomy facts revealed by letters from Srinagar induced the Lieutenant-Governor to write again more strongly to the Government of India, pointing out the serious nature of the distress, and that no real efforts were likely to be made to relieve it, and that the poorer classes would not receive the food withheld from them by dishonest officials unless British officers were sent to superintend the distribution. It was noted that such an arrangement would necessarily be most distasteful to the Maharaja. It was decided that Mr. Henvey should return to Srinagar, and on his arrival in February he found that misery and famine had increased terribly during his absence, while no further steps had been taken to meet the distress; no rain or snow had fallen since October, and great fears existed for the future of the next rice crop. The complete division of the late crop was only just completed, and it was notorious that the people had received very little of it, nearly the whole being swept into the Government granaries. The action of the officials showed clearly that a terrible deficit in food supplies was to be expected; so far only 20,060 maunds had been imported from Jammu; and death or emigration appeared to the Officer on Special Duty to be the only two alternatives for the remaining population.

12. The Government of India was not prepared to allow British officers to be deputed to superintend the distribution of food in Kashmir, but sanction was given to the proposal to import a lakh of maunds *viz* Murree. Dewan Anant Ram, therefore, visited Lahore early in March for the purpose of arranging details of the contracts, and tenders were advertised for. The only offers made were by Mr. Russell, of the late Central Asian Company, and Seth Banai Lal and Ram Rattan of Mian Mir; and it was determined to give a contract for 50,000 maunds, to be delivered in Kashmir by 15th June, to each of these, the former to import by Bhimbar and the latter by Murree. The drain of carriage on the Punjab for the Kabul war had unfortunately been very great; the roads to Kashmir were known to be very bad; no reliance could be placed on the promises to put them into good order and keep them so, and it was very doubtful how far fodder would be procurable for animals along the route. It was not therefore with any great confidence of success that the work was undertaken; but all that could be done under the circumstances was, and assistance was given to the contractors in every possible way by the Punjab Government. The success which attended their efforts will be seen further on.

13. Early in March rain and snow fell in Kashmir, and fears for the spring and autumn crops became lightened. It was impossible, however, owing to the lateness of the season, to sow an unusually large area with wheat and barley, as had been hoped, and the difficulty of preparing lands for rice cultivation was much increased. To encourage agricultural efforts it was announced that the Maharaja would take only two-fifths of the spring crop, but the people who had seen two rice crops swept away from them almost bodily were not readily disposed to give credence to this. But though prospects were improved, the present continued to show the same amount of acute misery and the same apathy or incapacity on the part of the officials. The Officer on Special Duty wrote early in March that nothing but the most drastic and sweeping measures taken by the British Government could save the country. At the end of the month, the Lieutenant-Governor met the Maharaja at Sialkot in a conference, when it was arranged that a committee should be appointed in

Srinagar to superintend famine relief measures, on which the Officer on Special Duty and the medical officer, whom it had been determined to send to Kashmir, should sit. The appointment of a Muhammadan Governor was suggested, but the proposal was not pressed. The members of the committee comprised six non-official Musalmans and two officials, together with Babu Nilamber sent down specially from Jammu, and two other Hindu gentlemen. Rules

The Kashmir Famine Committee.

were drawn up for its guidance by the Maharaja, which were approved by the Punjab Government. The committee met first on the 28th of April, and seven meetings were held in all. It was stated first of all in committee that the balance of food left in the country was only 37,000 kharwars of rice and 8,000 kharwars of wheat—a startling, but not quite true, announcement, as this was a supply insufficient to keep the people alive for a month. Various plans were proposed and agreed to for alleviating the distress, but nothing was immediately done; and when the committee began to investigate embezzlements of Government grain, its more important functions appear to have been diverted into quarrels of factions. Finally, on the 9th of May Mr. Hevey left the committee, believing that the Durbar desired to place upon it the responsibility for a calamity which it had no power to avert; while the only officials who could supply it with the necessary information were not compelled to give evidence before it.

14. Matters had now come to such a pass that it was deemed advisable to ask the Maharaja to proceed to Srinagar and take charge of the famine relief himself. His Highness consented to do this, and left Jammu on the 28th May. Three days later I was ordered to join the Officer on Special Duty, and I met the Maharaja on the road at Ulanpur, June 6th. He reached the valley on the 16th, and remained at first for some time in the eastern corner.

15. The contractors meanwhile had been doing their best to fulfil their engagements.

Import of grain.

But the carriage obtained by Mr. Russell from the Punjab was unfit to cross the high hills of Kashmir, and he was persistently thwarted in his attempt to obtain baggage animals in the valley, although many were procurable. A vigorous remonstrance from the Punjab Government to the Durbar had the effect of somewhat removing obstructions, and a certain amount of carriage was placed at his disposal, though not a quarter of what was really available. It is true that the contractor was expected to obtain his carriage from the Punjab; but circumstances made this impossible, and the carriage of Kashmir was not being used by the Government itself for import, although it was alleged to be so. But nothing at all was done to improve the roads, and not a single bridge was properly erected. On the other hand, the Seth was unable to collect carriage from the north of the Punjab except very slowly, and the supplies of fodder stored by the Durbar on the Murree road were found to be quite useless. Thus it came to pass that when the 15th June arrived only some 15,000 maunds, out of the lakh engaged for, had been delivered and were present in Kashmir. Fortunately the weather continued very fine throughout the summer till late in August, and the contractors were able to go on slowly with their work without being stopped by the rains. At the end of June, I inspected the work of both, and after this better arrangements were made and some repairs were effected on the roads, though too late and too slowly to be of any great use. The contractors were also unlucky in having severe cholera and fever on both lines of transport, which frightened the coolies from loading to the depôts; while foot-and-mouth disease attacked the oxen in the service of the Seth.

16. Meanwhile all through May and June famine was increasing in intensity, and, to add

Famine in May and June.

to its other horrors, cholera broke out badly in the city and continued for three months. The people died by scores daily. No relief works literally existed. The Missionaries had completed their road and had exhausted their funds; Mons. Ernans, the vine-grower, was obliged to discharge the 1,500 persons working under him, because they could get no pay; and no other works of any other kind existed. At a number of poor-houses an uncertain pittance, quite insufficient to maintain life, was given out without system or check to perhaps 2,000 persons. The ticket system of house-to-house relief was based on an utterly false enumeration of the population, which was now put 60,000 higher than it had been in the preceding November, and it was administered with the grossest partiality. While the official classes could obtain all they needed, the distribution of the allowance to the Mussalmans extended to only two mahallas in 10 days, so that it could only have reached the whole city in four months, and the amount given was 4 scers of cleaned rice! It is not necessary to repeat the sad tale of famine miseries, which is the same all the world over: famine raged unchecked in Kashmir, and its effects can be conjectured by all. Bread made of bark, roots and seeds of grass,—any garbage, any refuse,—was ravenously eaten: children were sold to buy bread, and children are said to have been killed to save them from further suffering. It is not correct, however, that no Hindus suffered. Few of them were in great distress comparatively, because they form the well-to-do and official classes; but I have seen a Pandit keeping himself from starvation by working as a coolie in the garden of the Officer on Special Duty. With these two months the sharpest spell of famine ceased. The barley and wheat began to ripen, and the fields were rilled and laid bare by starving wretches; and though the elements themselves seemed to fight against Kashmir in all other respects, yet the crop of fruit in 1879 was such as had seldom been seen before, especially the mulberries and pears which, though eaten unripe as they were, helped at least to alleviate the pangs of hunger. Vegetables also began to be procurable in considerable quantities.

17. At the end of the month the Maharaja reached Srinagar, having so far arranged merely for the collection of the spring revenue by quadrupling the number of officials (of whom a new body was brought

Arrival of the Maharaja.

over from Jammu), and lessened the price of rice, which was now hardly procurable. No attempt was made to open poor-houses on a proper system and sweep all the homeless and starving people of the city into them; they were left to die in the bazars and round the palace as usual. The house-to-house tickets were still retained, and a new census was made, which gave even a higher return than before. At last, towards the end of the month, the Durbar were induced to open 100 shops for sales in the city, a maximum amount, viz., $\frac{1}{4}$ seer, being fixed for each purchaser. This was the plan adopted in Behar, and it was found to work very well there. In Srinagar it could not of course be worked so as to do away with all favoritism of the official class, but the result was decidedly satisfactory as compared with former attempts to distribute food. Six hundred to 700 kharwars of wheat and barley per diem were now really sold, and the Mussalmans got a portion of this, whereas formerly they got nothing; at times before the Maharaja's arrival there were no sales at all and no distribution for days together. But for the private stores which they held, acquired largely no doubt by embezzlement, and which they sold to others, the Pandits as well as the Mussalmans must have died of hunger long before July. The Maharaja was exceedingly anxious to cultivate a large area with turpits, the seed of which was sent for from France. To prepare the ground for these near the city, some 4,000 people were employed; these works were not strictly speaking relief works, but no others were started in spite of representations made on this subject. A certain amount of activity in collecting carriage for Mr. Russell was displayed on the Maharaja's arrival, but as usual it soon died away. A hundred orders were issued no doubt for relief measures, but they were impracticable or opposed to official interests, or cancelled by other orders; none were carried out. The carpenters were to build boats; the blacksmiths were to go to the arsenal; the shawl-weavers were to weave for Government; the women were to spin; everything was to be provided for on paper; nothing was to be done that cost money. The city was like a besieged one. Large suburbs were deserted and in ruins; many houses in the chief streets were falling down; a crowd was not to be seen in the bazars—few knots of people even could be counted; the bridges had no stream of passers crossing them; the very banks of the river were bare. In the villages desolation was even more complete; hamlets of 10 or 15 houses might be seen without a single soul in them, deserted by all except a few cocks and hens; and estates which once could supply 50 coolies could not now supply one. Dead or fled,—it matters little, perhaps; few who escaped from Kashmir this year are likely to return there once more.

State of the city.

18. So this year went on throughout July and August. The spring crop was reaped, and the outturn was found to be very small as compared with what was hoped for; only 2,00,000 maunds were obtained in all. This was partly owing to the unfavourable weather early in the year, but chiefly to the thefts made in self-defence by the people. The promise to give them more than half was forgotten at once, and just as the rice crop was not fully divided till January the spring crop was not completely separated everywhere even in September. In one wazarat out of 14,000 kharwars the Government took half as its share, 3,000 kharwars on account of advances made and for seed hereafter, and left the people 4,000, out of which to pay all the petty dues (for if the Maharaja abolished these the official class did not relinquish them) and keep themselves alive. If one-fifth of the crop ever reached their houses, they were fortunate, and in many cases it remained still on the threshing-floors awaiting the last process of the division late in September. Occasionally no doubt the cultivator was dead before this time came, and never turned up to claim his share. A breach of faith of this kind is not uncommon in Kashmir, but on this occasion the people were so exasperated that they declared that they would destroy the rice rather than let it all go into the Government stores. The weather continued very dry, and the usual showers in July entirely failed, and in consequence nearly all the Indian-corn on the uplands was burnt up. The water in the hill streams began to run low, as all the little snow had melted rapidly, and there was no small anxiety for the rice crop at one time. Fortunately a great number of showers fell on the hills, though not in the valley, during the latter half of August, and replenished the water-supply, thus saving the rice crop.

19. As an instance of the unaccountable course of action pursued by the Durbar, it may be mentioned that throughout the famine the petty octroi taxes on fruit, vegetables, sheep, and the like were vigorously exacted. The desire to save expending money, if not to make money, effectually prevented the necessary famine measures being adopted. There was no hesitation of course to interfere with prices; bakers and fruit-sellers were ordered to sell at half their former rates, and they of course promptly closed their shops till the order was cancelled. An unusual tax was put on the singharas in the shape of a largely increased rate, and the price of wheat and barley was long kept up to a preposterous height, if the utter wretchedness and poverty of the people is considered. In all matters relating to the administration of famine the advice of the late Governor, and now chief favourite, was followed; and a number of Mussalmans were induced to request that he might once again be re-appointed to his old post. The feebleness of the supreme authority continued to be excessive throughout; famine relief measures were rarely or never considered, but hours and days were spent in striking balances against defaulters and arranging to secure the Government share of the next crop, or in creating new departments which had no duties to do, or did not do them. It must be noted, however, that the Maharaja consented to 500 maunds of grain sent down from Ladak being made over to the Missionaries for their poor-house and relief-work. Throughout the summer a small dole had been distributed by them twice a week to 600 or 1,000 persons at the hospital—a mere mite

Durbar policy.

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of course, but all that could be done—and now by this gift it became possible to start a small relief-work again. The orphanage at this time contained 200 children. The work of the hospital was carried on throughout the famine just as usual, and was an unmixed blessing. The action of the Durbar towards the Medical Mission was as a whole creditable and honourable.

20. The heavy rains on the hills checked the work of the contractors, and it became clear that the whole amount engaged for could not be delivered. It was determined, therefore, to stop the Pir Panjal importation on 15th September, and to continue that by the Murree route till 15th October. Up to the end of August 40,000 maunds had been delivered, not a very great quantity, but still one which made an appreciable difference in the existing wretched state of the country. Not one-fourth of the available carriage was ever allowed to be used; hundreds of State ponies, kept for military transport, were fed round the shores of the Wullar lake, but were not allowed to bring in grain to the starving people. It was impossible to give carriers now to Mr. Russell, as the people were needed in the rice fields; and as the setting in of a very early winter was anticipated, it was thought well to close his contract and make over to the Durbar the remainder of the grain where it lay. This was accordingly done, Mr. Russell having delivered in Kashmir something less than 18,000 maunds. The choice of the road was an unfortunate one, and the task needed great powers of organisation, which were not brought to it, and much tact in dealing with the native officials, which was singularly wanting. There was no cordial co-operation on the part of officials in the work, which, if it succeeded, they considered would be a standing reproach to them. On the contrary, passive resistance and even open obstruction prevailed everywhere; the road was not repaired till August, and the bridges were never kept in order at all. Had the available carriage been made over to the contractor, had the road been put into good order as was promised, and had cordial co-operation of the Durbar existed, Mr. Russell might have delivered his 50,000 maunds in place of the 18,000 which actually reached Kashmir. The Seth at one time did so well that it seemed as if the whole 50,000 maunds would shortly be delivered; but unfortunately disease broke out among the oxen, and things were at one period nearly at a stand-still; the road was not put into even decent order, and on more than one occasion important bridges remained broken for 10 or 12 days. The Seth ultimately delivered 43,000 maunds. The Durbar ceased to import grain after the Maharaja reached the valley. The Indian-corn, which survived the drought, ripened in September, but no share of the crop ever reached the hands of Government. The river was full of stalks from which the cobs had been cut and stolen, and which were thrown into the water to conceal the theft. Some showers of rain early in September did great good to the rice, and enabled the turnips to be sown; and the prospects for the winter began to look a little brighter. Sales from shops continued in spite of opposition, and the change was admitted to be a great improvement on the old ticket system, though they were by no means really free.

21. The Maharaja gave the strictest of orders in the early spring that every effort should be made to sow a large area with rice. The amount of seed said to have been given out would have produced at least double of the largest crop which the valley ever saw. But the greater part of this was embezzled by the officials, and the people naturally ate some of the share made over to them, to keep themselves alive while sowing the rest. As noted above, the late and scanty rains made it impossible to sow a very large area, because the lands remaining were too few and feeble to do much work within a short period. The cultivation of rice is by no means a task suited to famine-stricken persons, and not a little of the crop was never properly cleared from weeds. The general estimate of it now made is that the area sown is much the same as last year.

If so, and if the people are allowed to have a fair share of the crop, the famine will end. The loss of life has been so great during the last 12 months that there can be no doubt that a yield equal to last year's crop will amply suffice for all survivors this year. The people too are now in better condition than they were then,—thanks to the little help of the spring crops and Indian-corn, and the abundant crop of vegetables and singaras, and the yield of fruit. The weather has been favourable to the rice for the last month, and the outturn therefore should be good. It is devoutly to be trusted that the harvest will be entirely cut and secured before rain or snow sets in, and that the division will be rapidly concluded so as to enable the share of the people to reach them. It is not to be hoped of course that all mortality from famine or its effects will cease at once; the bitter cold of winter is about to commence, and there are many whose vital power has sunk too low ever to recover itself. But it may be believed that the present population will not be reduced in numbers to any further material degree, that any acute or general misery will gradually cease, and that the cultivators will be able to set about re-establishing their desolated homes.

22. The effects and the lessons of the famine have still to be noticed, and it is somewhat difficult for one who has been in the midst of the unalleviated misery of Kashmir to write temperately on these points. It would be a mockery to pretend to deal at length with the facts, having regard to the questions asked by the Famine Commission. We cannot say that any revenue was remitted, for the revenue is collected in kind and should vary with the season; but here the whole crop nearly was swept into the State stores to be re-sold to the people. Speaking broadly, one cannot say that any relief works at all were started by the Durbar, or that the people were paid on those which were started for the briefest periods. We

cannot say that gratuitous relief was given on any system; its distribution was hopelessly corrupt and unmethodical throughout, and often for months it did not exist at all. Where really nothing was done (though not a little was attempted), we can hardly say that what was done was sufficient; but we may safely say that if relief measures had been adopted, emigration would not have taken place. Perhaps no one in the world is so home-abiding as the Kashmiri, small reason as he may seem to have to be so, and nothing but the certainty of death if they remained in the valley could have driven the people to leave it. Relief was largely provided for Kashmir emigrants in the adjoining districts of the Punjab, but no sums were expended were charged against the State from whence they came. The only bright spot in the dreary history of the Kashmir famine is the devoted and unselfish conduct of the missionaries. Those who have seen and realised what they did, and how they disregarded all personal considerations in their efforts to alleviate misery even in a small degree, and gave themselves up entirely to doing good, may well excuse the somewhat intemperate letters which the sights of misery around them and the apathy of the officials drew from them.

23. And what were the effects of the famine? It will never be known how many people died, for no correct census existed before, and none is likely to be made now. The population was once put at 450,000; in November last it was put at 350,000, with the city population of 130,000. No European who carefully examined the city this summer with a view to guessing its population ever put the people at over 60,000 souls. But nothing can be exactly known. We can only bizard guesses which one is almost afraid to make, from such facts as were undeniable. A number of the chief valleys to the north were utterly deserted; whole villages lay in ruins; some suburbs of the city were tenantless; the city itself half destroyed; the graveyards were filled to overflowing; the river had been full of corpses cast into it. It is not likely that more than two-fifths of the people of the valley now survive. As to emigrants, it is impossible to speak with any certainty. Some 20,000 perhaps forced their way out to Jammu and the Punjab, and a few thousands to the north. Of the hundreds who perished on the roads we shall never have any account. A country has seldom come nearer to being left absolutely desolate on the face of the earth than Kashmir this year. The shawl trade and the silk trade have been utterly destroyed, and it will be years before agricultural prosperity fully recovers, even under a proper revenue system.

24. But it will be asked how such misery came about so rapidly, and when one crop only failed badly. It must be clear that the system of revenue leaves but little in ordinary years to the cultivator, and heavy imposts on all manufactures keep the townspeople even nearer the verge of actual want. No crop failed entirely during the four seasons of famine, but, as all the produce possible was swept up by the Government, it was much the same to the cultivator as if they had all so failed. In short, but for what they stole, the agriculturists of Kashmir would have been extinct before this; for the grain set aside for distribution to them never reached them. And again, it will be asked how the officials could allow this state of things to continue. Many reasons caused this. Some of the hard names applied to this class lately have been undeserved, but of their guilt from indifference and apathy there can be no doubt. At first, like the zemindars of Behar, they refused to face the impending evil, and hoped against hope that something would happen. Even when the famine was admitted, they looked rather to the future than the present. They made real and great efforts to get larger areas sown with crops, but the fates fought against them here, and when once there was a great scarcity of food their cold-blooded selfishness led them to secure all they could for themselves and leave the people to die. Attempts made to import grain or to start relief works failed hopelessly for want of vigor,—indeed the first task was beyond their powers,—and it must be said because there was very great unwillingness on the part of the Durbar to spend any money. I say nothing to exculpate any one: the state of Kashmir condemns all beyond excuse. The highest executive authority did not possess the qualities to insist on the execution of orders in face of a steadily opposed unwillingness of the officials, who were able to bring pressure to bear in many ways, and thus it came to pass that the official class was uncontrolled in its action.

25. Two famines have occurred during this generation from the same cause in Kashmir.

Remedies and reforms. A third may come any year, and we are bound to see how it may be prevented. There is no doubt that the revenue system needs radical alteration, and the Maharaja has promised a fair settlement of the question. A cash system is to be deprecated rather than otherwise; but a fair share of the crop should be fixed, and the multifarious cesses done away with, and with them should be removed the swarm of petty officials. The Government monopoly of grain sales will naturally cease at the same time, and the Durbar will have no difficulty to find purchasers for their share of the crop in the bulk. The new system may cause a loss of revenue at first, but this will soon be made up by the extension of cultivation. No Kashmiri at present is interested in raising more grain than will at his share suffice for his needs; for he is allowed to retain no more. When this direct discouragement is removed, lazy though he may be, he will exert himself further. But the official class must be paid regularly henceforth if they are to cease to prey on the people. A Governor of exceptional qualities is needed for some years, and Mussalmans should be largely introduced among the officials. Political considerations may forbid minute interference on some of these points, but on one point no considerations should be allowed to outweigh a clear necessity. It is obvious that with the present communications

it is neither possible for food to be imported into Kashmir by local or native agency, nor for the people to emigrate freely in a season of famine. A good easy road passable for all beasts of burden, including camels, must be made from Murree to Baramulla, and must be maintained in a state of perfect repair. The inconvenience which English travellers have hitherto suffered from the road is nothing, but the possibility of saving tens of thousands of lives by means of it, should there ever be a famine again, is a consideration of the first importance, and one that, I venture to believe, we are morally bound to insist on to the Durbar. The road of course must be made under the direction of some competent engineer, and there is no reason why it should not be made practicable for country carts throughout its whole length. A toll may be fairly imposed, and would be readily paid by those using it; and if the trade of Kashmir is allowed to flourish and the country to prosper, it is not unlikely that the tolls would presently suffice to nearly meet the cost of annual repairs.

APPENDIX 12 (see p. 132).

Memorandum.

The road to Yarkand may be divided into three portions—the Himalayan, the Tibetan, and the Turkistani. Each of these is distinguished by its natural features in a way which it is important to notice.

The first or Himalayan portion consists of deep gorges and precipitous hill-sides. The rain and the melting snow would soon obliterate any road, if it were not for constant repairs. Unfortunately, this is the character of the whole of that part of the road which lies in purely British territory. Its northern limit is the Bara-lacha Pass, leading from Lahoul into the Maharaja of Kashmir's territory.

The second or Tibetan portion is characterised by immense gravelly plains, broad valleys, and rolling mountains, where grass, water, and fuel are only to be met with at stated camping places. Its elevation is scarcely ever under 14,000 feet, which causes considerable distress to beasts of burden. The passes in this region generally lie at very easy gradients, the broad valleys themselves gradually rising to the tops of the rounded ridges. This region extends from the Bara-lacha to the Sanju Pass, and is cut in two by the valley of the Indus (Ladak), which descends to about 11,000 feet. Here the nature of the climate, &c., renders repairs of roads unnecessary, and even the making of them is merely the removal of big stones out of the way.

The Turkistani portion consists of the level plains of Yarkand, partly desert, intersected by oases, and partly highly cultivated plain country watered by canals.

About the line to be taken through the Himalayan portion of the route there is no doubt. If an alternative route to Yarkand, avoiding Kashmir, is desired, it must pass through Kangra, Kulu, and Lahoul. If you don't take the Beas route, you must take either the Ravi or the Sutlej. The head of the former leads to a glacier pass over 17,000 feet high. The latter leads into a *cul-de-sac*, viz., the Chinese province of Choornuti.

Being thus confined to the Beas, we must cross the Rotang pass, thence into the valley of the Upper Chenab, and follow this up to its sources in the Bara-lacha pass. All this way we have a made road, which, however, for the reasons above stated, requires constant outlay to keep it open for traffic. The expense is trifling but imperative. In some places in Lahoul, too, it requires widening, as the projecting rocks on either side impede laden animals, and even occasionally cause the loss of horses and mules. The only other things to be noted regarding this part of the route are the difficulty of obtaining carriage and the thievish habits of the Lahouli carriers, by which the merchants yearly lose extensively.

We now come to the Tibetan portion of the route. The Bara-lacha pass is a long, easy ascent and descent through a gorge where the only difficulty or danger arises from the immense quantities of snow which collect. Even thus, however, the pass could be crossed much earlier and later than it is, if it were not that travellers reaching it from the north have already come nearly ten days' march from the last inhabited place, and find no shelter where they can wait for fine weather, or supply themselves with fresh provisions. It would be possible to establish this on our own frontier at Lingti on the north of the pass. Mr. Forsyth, the Commissioner of Jullundhur, has been considering this suggestion. Its utility is obvious for all seasons of the year.

Here we enter the Maharaja's territory and the Tibetan portion of our route. Crossing the shallow 'Surpa stream, and the easy, though high, Lachalooing pass, the regular route then enters the high plateau of Roopshoo, 15,000 feet above the sea. This plateau is divided from the Indus valley on the north-east by a mountain ridge crossable at almost all points. The ascent from the Roopshoo plateau is always slight, while the descent to the Indus is long, and leads through rocky gorges towards the bottom. From the Roopshoo plateau several routes diverge and cross this ridge at different points. The route to Ladak leads northwards over the Tung Lung pass (18,000 feet). Eastwards two other routes lead across the ridge to the Indus at Choomatung (No. 23) and at Nyemo respectively, but they meet again at Choosbul (No. 25), near the Pangong Lake, beyond the Indus. I am unacquainted with the Nyemo route, excepting by enquiries, which lead me to prefer the Choomatung line for a trade route on account of the numerous islands near the latter village, which divide the stream into manageable spans for bridging, and also on account of its greater directness.

On this bit of road between Roopshoo and Choosbul the parts requiring attention are, *firstly*, about a mile of the rocky gorge leading down to the Indus; *secondly*, the bridging of the river; and *thirdly*, the road over the pass (Demochela) beyond the Indus. In the first a little building up would remedy the inconvenience of having to walk down through the shallow watercourse. The islands facilitate a bridge, and with regard to the last point, a few boulders rolled out of the way would make the road quite easy. It is, however, at present even quite practicable for laden horses, as is all the rest of the route.

It is to be remarked that on this route the only villages passed are Kinma and Chooma-tung on the Indus, and Choosul and Mun on the Pangong lake. These are the only villages in the Maharaja's territory which the route passes. They are all mere hamlets of, at most, 10 or 12 houses a-piece.

From Choosul, where the two routes above mentioned re-unite, two days' journey along the smooth banks of the Pangong lake takes one to Lookoong (No. 27), at the mouth of a grassy valley, whence also a road leads in four or five days to Leh, the capital of Ladak. Lookoong would be the most convenient place from which to take provisions for the onward journey, but at present there are only a couple of huts here, though the Maharaja's grain stores at Tankae are only a day's journey off on the road to Leh, and a camp of pastoral Tibetans is generally to be found up the grassy valley above mentioned, whence provisions can sometimes be obtained. From this place onwards no human habitations are met with until Yarkand province is entered.

Starting from Lookoong, we ascend one of the sloping passes characteristic of Tibet. Its elevation is about 19,000 feet, but it presents no difficulties, excepting about a mile of stony road on the descent, which would require a little expenditure to remedy. The road beyond this lies in the valley of the Chang-Chenmo river and of its tributaries. This river forms an elbow stretched across our route, and we have to cut across the corner through some low hills. Here the barrenness is complete, excepting at the places fixed upon for camping, where some scattered grass penetrates through the gravel and some low brushwood affords fuel. There is no difficulty about water, as we are following the courses of streams.

From this valley of Chang-Chenmo there are two ways of crossing the water-shed which forms the northern boundary of the Indus basin, and therefore the natural limit of the British dependencies. Beyond this water-shed the water which occasionally collects runs off eastward. Of these two ways, one starts from the point of the elbow above mentioned and goes in an easterly direction at first. This was taken by Mr. Johnson *en route* to Khotan. The other goes north past certain hot springs. This was the route taken by Dr. Cayley in his excursion to the Karakash in 1864. They both re-unite beyond the ridge at Nischoo (No. 33) on the edge of the high plain of Lingzee-tung. I myself intended to go the latter way, but was misled by the guides given me by the Ladak Governor, and taken a useless detour over a higher pass to the west. The Yarkand Envoy had ten days before been misled in the same manner by the same people, while my caravan which followed me was taken off into the desolate country to the eastward, till most of the horses died, and the rest had to return to Ladak. Thus I have not seen this part of the proposed route. But undoubtedly Dr. Cayley's is the best, being both more direct and over an easier pass than Mr. Johnson's. Here we get the only real difficulty about water, grass, and fuel. The cattle can obtain grass at the last halting-place before crossing the ridge, but not till the end of the second day after will they see it again. Thus, if they grazed on Monday morning before crossing the pass, they would again find themselves in a pasture on Wednesday night, having had to pass one entire day without grass. This remark applies to both of the routes, which, as will be seen, again diverge beyond Nischoo. Fuel, too, has to be carried for one day. It consists of the woody roots of a small plant which just shows a low cluster of shoots (like short stalks of lavender) above the ground. These shoots will afford a scanty feed to a hungry horse, and thus, to a limited extent, supply the place of grass. The only fuel, and probably the only plant of those high plains, is the "lavender-like" plant, or "boorsee."

Water is to be found in certain small pools known to the guides, but which a stranger would never discover on the wide gravelly plains which now stretch northward nearly to the horizon. Late in the year these pools dry up, but their place is supplied by the snow, which can then be found in occasional patches, remains of the frequent snow-storms. The precise route across the plains of Lingzee-tung depends upon the fulness or drying up of the several pools, and must vary according to the time of year. Hence trustworthy guides are here essential. At present their chief endeavour is to prevent caravans from finding the direct route.

I have mentioned that beyond Nischoo (No. 33) there is a choice of two routes again. The one which I followed leads across a succession of high gravelly plains, divided by broken ground where there is grass. It is the first of these grassy ravines that would be reached on the second day after that on which the pass out of Chang-Chenmo is crossed. Here the difficulty about grass ceases. After this it is to be got regularly at moderate distances apart, so also are water and roots for fuel. These plains extend up to the Karakash stream, which runs east to west across their northern side.

On the western side of these plains runs a stream, which Mr. Hayward followed down to its junction with the Karakash. The course of this stream, which is parallel with my route across the plains, is the second of the two routes which I mentioned. It is easily reached across a neck of hills dividing it from the plain, and affords plentiful grass and wood all down its bed. These advantages and the shelter it gives make it, I think, preferable to the road across the high exposed plains, though perhaps a day or two longer.

Whichever route we follow here, on reaching the main Karakash valley, we turn westwards down that stream, finding grass and brushwood plentiful, until we reach Shahidoolia Khoja, where we join the old route which comes from over the Karakoram pass.

We can now compare the route just described with its rival, the Karakoram route now in use. The road difficulties may be classed under the heads of, *1st*, passes; *2nd*, rivers; *3rd*, want of grass and fuel; *4th*, transport of supplies.

1st.—Taking the two routes from the Indus to Shahidoola, the old road has five high passes. The first and third (Karloug and Sasser) cross large glaciers presenting, according to the season, either deep snow or bare ice. The second (Karawal Dewan) has a very long and precipitous ascent, in short, zig-zags. The fourth and fifth (Karakoram and Sooget) present the ordinary features of high Thibetan passes. There are also three considerable ascents and descents at about 17,000 feet elevation, which Muhammad Amin calls "steep and difficult passes." His itinerary of this route is to be found in *Davies's Trade Report*, and is sufficiently correct for comparison.

The new road has only three passes on the part of the route under comparison, besides the low neck of hill which I have mentioned on the west of the Lingzee-tung plain. None of these passes have perpetual snow or glacier. They resemble Nos. 4 and 5 of the old route.

2nd.—In the matter of rivers, there are on the old road four places where water has to be forded, and where horses are often carried away in the floods caused by melting snow. The first crossing is that of the Shayok, which is there over a mile wide, and special river guides have to be employed in the crossing. The other fords have less water.

On the new road the Indus itself is at present not bridged, but, as I have shown, bridging is feasible, and even now rafts are used in places. This, however, may be set down as a river difficulty. Beyond this there are only two crossings, generally ankle-deep and never dangerous.

3rd.—As for grass and fuel, by the old route no grass is to be obtained between Moorghce and Kiziltagh, which is 4½ days' march. Thus starting with a full stomach on Monday

Nos. 18 to 17½ Davies's Trade Report, Appendix XXIV, route 1A.

morning a horse gets no more grass till Thursday afternoon, but he can crop the "boorsee" on Monday night. After thus fasting he will again be without grass at Saturday night's camp. He will further have to assist in carrying a certain quantity of fuel besides his usual load on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, and also on Saturday. The labour of this may be conceived at an elevation of 17,000 feet rising to 18,000.

By the new route, as we have seen, he has no grass from Monday morning to Wednesday evening, but he gets "boorsee" to eat on the intervening day (Tuesday), and only has to carry fuel one day (Monday).

4th.—With regard to supplies, they have to be carried from the last village, which in the case of the old route is Panamik, 13 days to Shahidoola, and on the new route would be Lookoong, 19 days to Shahidoola; the total time from the Indus being in the former case 21 days, in the latter 23.

In thus reviewing the difficulties of the two routes it would seem that in three cases the advantage is on the side of the Chang-Chenmo route, and in the fourth in favour of the Karakoram route. I think this proportion about represents the superiority in physical respects of the former over the latter.

At present the routes through Shahidoola are the only ones open. But there is another and far easier way of entering Turkistan by following down the open valley of the Yarkand river, and thence crossing over an easy ridge into the Tishnaf valley and coming out on the plains at Khoogiar. This is described as almost fit for wheeled carriages. But at present, owing to former incursions of the Kunjootis (a hill tribe bordering on Gilgit), the Atalik Ghazi has forbidden the use of the Khoogiar route until he can take some means for securing its safety.

The Chang-Chenmo line communicates easily with this Khoogiar route through an easy pass over a ridge, leading westward out of the Upper Karakash (Mr. Hayward's route), nearly opposite where it is entered from the Lingzee-tung plains. In the matter of natural advantages, this route is superior to any other, and if representations were made to the Atalik Ghazi, he might be induced to open it out. The suspicion with which he would, of course, regard any opening out of new routes on his border would probably be prevented by the suggestion that he should himself put a small fort on the upper Yarkand river at Kirghiz-jungle or Kooloo-Nuldee to protect the road from Kunjooti raids.

The latter part of this route is described in *Davies's Trade Report*, under the name of the "Zumistani route."

Before concluding, I may also mention that with regard to the first half of the journey, viz., from the plains of India to the Indus, it is not only on political grounds that the Kulu route is to be preferred to that *via* Kashmir as it now stands. In that portion of both which passes through the Himalayan region the same difficulties of rocky ravines and steep hill-sides present themselves. But in the one case they are passed on an English-made road, while in the Native State, of course, the road is hardly more than the foot track of men and beasts. Three or four times in the day's march all the animals have to be unladen, and their loads carried past the obstacles, a work of immense time and trouble with a large caravan; while few animals will accomplish the journey through the rough boulders without getting lame. This may be held in a great measure to neutralize the greater directness of the Kashmir road for the northern markets of the Punjab. From Amritsar the Kulu route is the more direct also.

	Route.	Miles.	Alternative routes.	
Himalayan Region.	1	Brijnath (village) . . .	11	
	2	Narveebagh (do.) . . .	10	
	3	Oel River (do.)	
	4	Karnon (do.)	
	5	Sultanpore Kooloo (town)	
	6	Dobee (village) . . .	10	
	7	Manalee (do.) . . .	10	
	8	Rala (bungalow) . . .	10	
	9	Kbhar (village) . . .	10	
	10	Seeno . . .	10	
	11	Gondia . . .	11	
	12	Krying . . .	13	
	13	Kotang . . .	14	
	14	Darba . . .	11	
	15	Zinloghar (camp) . . .	16	
	16	Lingtee . . .	15	
	17	Somdo . . .	17	
	18	Boongul . . .	19	
Tibetan Region.	19	Morchoo* . . .	10	
	20	Sall lake . . .	17	
	21	Silol (3 huts) . . .	10	
	22	Kifana (village) . . .	15	
	23	Camp above Choomatung . . .	15	
	24	Felden (camp) . . .	18	
	25	Chooohul (village) . . .	10	
	26	Mee . . .	22	
	27	Loohang† (boite) . . .	18	
	28	Masimik (camp) . . .	10	
	29	Fangroong . . .	14	
	30	Pumpisul . . .	10	
31	Ooga . . .	10		
32	Camp above hot spring		
33	Nichoo (camp)		
34	Lingzee-tung (camp) . . .	10		
35	Loohong (grass ravine) . . .	15		
36	Tusidott (camp) . . .	16		
37	Camp beyond ridge camp . . .	18		
38	Boda phin (camp) . . .	10		
39	Karabash Broetta (camp) . . .	11		
40	Iel jungle (camp) . . .	11		
41	Camps in Karabash valley		
42	Goolbaclur (camp) . . .	21		
43	Belakhee (Kirghis camping ground) . . .	11		
44	Bhahidoola Khoje, fort . . .	10		
	Cross ridge.			

Other routes through Pooga and Nyemo to Chooos† is seven days.

Mr. Johnson's route via Hiam.

Mr. Hayward's route across easy north of hill (17,000 feet) into valley of Upper Karabash; this route is preferable, though, perhaps, a day or two longer. Another route diverges from this.

Upper Karabash crossing the hills which form its western side by an easy pass, and, striking into the Upper Yarkand river near the Karabash, joins the Yarkand winter route by Khoogier, which avoids the difficult Sarjoo pass. This route is, however, at present exposed to attacks of Kuanjoni robbers, and therefore closed by order of the Atalik Ghani.

* Route to Leh diverges here.

† Take supplies.

APPENDIX 13 (see p. 133).

Memorandum.

On Monday, the 22nd November, I arrived at Jammu under a salute of 11 guns as bearer of the Governor General's *khariya*, and in the afternoon I accompanied the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab on his visit to the Maharaja, which was of course merely one of compliment. It was then arranged that the principal Dewan should meet me early next morning to learn the propositions with which I was charged, and regarding which I meanwhile had prepared a detailed memorandum in the vernacular.

2. Early on the 23rd Dewan Jowala Sabai arrived, and the propositions were explained and discussed with the aid of Shabzada Sultan Ibrahim Jan, the Native Assistant who accompanied me.

3. When the Dewan left me, he took with him the vernacular memorandum for submission to the Maharaja and Council, and promised to do his utmost to bring them to our views. I may remark that I had, during this interview, held back in the matter of concessions by the Viceroy, save a general intimation that His Excellency would be prepared to make some, were those of the Maharaja ready and satisfactory, and had of course reserved all discussion of details; and all argument regarding the claims we possessed to concessions by the Maharaja, the validity or otherwise of his pretensions to levy transit duties at all upon the new route, or the measures which would be open to us in the case of difficulties and objections arising on his part.

4. Later in the day, the Maharaja paid his return visit to the Lieutenant-Governor, when the usual "surwanas" or congratulatory offerings were made, I presenting Rs. 3,100 on the part of the Viceroy, after which I delivered the *khariya* and the gifts* brought from Lahore, and then accompanied the Maharaja back to the palace for a private conversation.

- * An ornolu clock with shade and stand.
- A black marble ditto ditto.
- 1 roll cloth of gold.
- 1 double tiger rifle, with case complete.
- 1 H. L. gun ditto ditto.
- 1 gold embroidery saddle cloth.
- 1 pair Hungarian vases.
- 1 clock mirror.

5. From the first entry of the Lieutenant-Governor into Kashmir the Maharaja and his Council had evidently expected that proposals of some sort were to be made to them, and I understood from His Honor that the Maharaja on various occasions dwelt upon his entire submission and hearty loyalty to our Government, relating that his father's dying advice was at all costs to retain the favor of the British.

6. In conversation with me on this occasion, he spoke in a similar strain; showing me his troops, he said they were raised and equipped for our service, and that he only longed for an opportunity, in his position of advance guard to our dominions, of showing his loyalty by leading them against our enemies; he dilated on the services of the Jammu Contingent at Delhi, and his eagerness to have led them but for Sir J. Lawrence refusing him permission; and regretted the opportunities recently afforded by fortune to the Amir of Kabul of becoming useful and necessary to us, but as yet refused to himself. He said he had perused the memorandum given by me to the Dewan, and that generally when willing to risk his life for the British Government, what was he likely to refuse them? At the same time, weighty matters should be considered and discussed, and he would send his Dewans to me in the morning.

7. My replies were to the effect that "the loyalty of the Maharaja's house and the services of his Contingent were matters of notoriety; but that he would doubtless perceive how much more serviceable to us and advantageous to himself it would be to avert, by the peaceful services we asked, the chance of our calling upon him for all the sacrifices which warlike operations such as he contemplated might necessitate. At present the vast expanse of Turkistan beyond him was filled with people who, now the Chinese oppression was removed, were quite prepared to become friendly to us and to himself,—a result which would keep all enemies far from his doors; and we looked to him to co-operate in that development of intercourse and of commercial relations which were certain to result in such friendship."

8. He said that "he quite agreed with the British Government in this policy, and would heartily co-operate therein, and did not doubt that the result of increased intercourse would be that the people of Turkistan would see the advantage of close relations with the British; at the same time it was a pity that the eagerness which, immediately after the Chinese overthrow, was felt for our protection, had been then checked and cooled."

9. On the forenoon of the 24th, Dewan Kirpa Ram came down, ostensibly sent by the Maharaja, to define and thoroughly understand certain parts of the vernacular memorandum furnished by me on the preceding day, and really to discuss the whole subject and make the best

Maharaja's views regarding Turkistan.

Interview with Dewan Kirpa Ram.

terms he could. The discussion was a long one. He urged the successive concessions made by the Maharaja, each supposed to be the last, each to be compensated by the increase of trade resulting, and with each of which the Government expressed itself satisfied, sending him *memoranda* purporting that he was to levy duties for the future at the new rates. He argued that "now a direct relinquishment of revenue was demanded which no argument could disguise as being a bid for profit hereafter; that to say that the concession was only for the Hindustan-Turkistan trade was absurd; the Kashmir duties must go too unless the Maharaja wished to drive all his trade to Hindustan; that to demur to his taxing our trade in transit was unfair when we did the same by his only valuable exports, shawls and incense wood (aggregating some 26 lakhs to Europe and China) at the sea-board; and that even the argument that we did not tax his export to Hindustan was fallacious, as his ghee and grain exports (aggregating some 5 lakhs) paid octroi at the towns of sale, and these articles, with the two before-mentioned, were his only items of trade worth mentioning." With reference to the concession I proposed on British duty-paying articles imported into Kashmir, he denied that it was any large item, "the only such article of trade being cotton piece-goods, consumed only in Jammu, or taken on to Turkistan, and in either case it did not profit the Maharaja; in the latter not even the merchants of his territory. In no case would it reach the ryots, the consumers, whose advantage would certainly have weighed with him.

10. On my part I "disputed the fact that such trade as arrived at Kashmir territory or Peshawar and Afghanistan could be diverted from its market, or driven into so circuitous a route as that by Lahoul by a mere 4 per cent. or 5 per cent. duty so long as oppressive exactions were not made." I pointed out that "when once the completion, at great expense to the British Government, of the Lahoul route had led the Turkistan-Hindustan traders to entirely adopt that line, and that thus their only connection with Kashmir remained the accident of their crossing a sterile uninhabited corner of that territory, doubts might very fairly have been raised as to the legitimacy of the Maharaja's as it were shooting the trade flying, and exacting a transit duty for which he afforded no sort of return in the shape of facilitation or protection of such transit; that our case was very different: in the first place Hindustan and England were one empire, duties levied in any portion of which could hardly be called transit duties in the sense that the term was applied to those levied by the Maharaja; but, apart from that, I asserted that protection and cheap and rapid transport over 1,500 miles of country afforded to the Maharaja's property at our own cost could hardly be considered dearly purchased by a 3 per cent. *ad valorem* duty. Where would be his transit trade at all but for our armies, our police, and our strong administration generally, and how much has been saved him in cost and duration of transport by the substitution, under a direct payment from our revenues, of the railway for such means of carriage as the Maharaja would otherwise have been able to procure?"

11. These arguments were unanswerable by the Dewan, but I further proved his statistics to be incorrect; "that the export of shawls from Kashmir was 12 lakhs, not 20 lakhs, of which, after deducting consumption in Hindustan and re-export to Afghanistan and Western Turkistan, only some 9 lakhs crossed and paid duty at our sea-board. That incense wood, so far from being 5 lakhs, had never exceeded a lakh, and, owing to the war in China and depreciation consequent on adulteration with 'Tooth' wood had for many years failed to reach Rs. 20,000, and that, consequently the total customs duties realised by us on the Maharaja's exports was short of Rs. 28,000." These statistics he made little attempt to deny, explaining merely that *once upon a time* the export of incense wood had been several lakhs, and that by 20 lakhs of shawls they really meant the total *outurn*, but that I was probably right regarding the proportion of this which crossed the sea-board.

12. Again, I showed that "their having an export of grain at all was an exceptional circumstance consequent on the scarcity, and that their export of ghee had never touched 2 lakhs. That the octroi was for the very purpose of maintaining those markets in which their goods found sale; without such maintenance of markets they would find it difficult to meet their customers." I also pointed out that "of a very large and profitable export, *viz.*, wood, which averages three lakhs, almost the whole was brought at the river-side and paid no charges of any kind."

13. Regarding this wood, at the subsequent interview, Jowala Sahai and Kirpa Ram said Discussion with Jowala Sahai regarding untaxed that we "were welcome to tax it if we liked, as the wood and taxed shawls. loss would fall on the contractors who purchased it standing, and even to them would be a matter of little import, as the duty would go on to the price and be borne by the consumers." On my replying that by a like reasoning the duty on shawls did not affect the Maharaja, they argued confidently that "shawls had so fallen in price as not to repay the manufacturers; that there was but a certain price to be obtained for them in the European markets; and that all charges went out of this return and diminished the profits of the producers." It was not difficult to bring home to them the fallacy of this reasoning, and to show "that the depreciation in price resulted from adulteration of the staple used in the manufacture; that while the *net value* was the varying quantity, cost of transport and other charges were certain ones, always falling on the consumer, and that their reduction, while increasing the sale by diminishing the cost to the consumer, could not affect the value *per se* of the product, which, if non-remunerative now, would remain equally so, the aggregate loss meanwhile being increased by the increased sale; and, similarly, wood being *remunerative* in itself, the increased sales resulting from the lowness of selling price consequent on the non-levy of duty, increased the aggregate profits of the contractors, and enabled the Maharaja to get so much the higher offers for the contract. That what I

presumed they meant to say regarding shawls was, that profits were so low as to necessitate large sales (which would be increased of course by diminution of charges) to afford adequate returns; and no doubt, if they could have secured the same safe, expeditious, and cheap transport for the shawls over 1,500 miles of Hindustan at a less percentage on their value than 3 per cent., this would have been a good ground for asking for reduction of the export duty as a set-off for concessions of their own."

14. With regard to the concession of free cotton goods, &c., which in this interview I had offered, I showed that their consumption was nearly 5 lakhs, which, calculating that duty had been charged on a value of 4 lakhs at the sea-board, gave an actual remission on our part of Rs. 20,000, while the protection and cheap and rapid transport afforded, as before explained, over 1,500 miles of our territory, remained, so to speak, a loss to us. As to such remission not actually profiting the Maharaja, I pointed out that it was open to him to establish a monopoly, or to increase the import duties for his own territories by the amount we remitted; though, of course, neither course could be called wise or really profitable.

15. Dr. Cayley's returns showed that the duties on the Turkistan trade had risen to Rs. 21,000 in 1863 from Rs. 16,000 in 1865 (the present year shows a further increase). Supposing, as was probable, that they might eventually have doubled, and thus reached the highest amount which was realised by the Maharaja at the old oppressive rates, still I maintained that our actual concessions as before detailed, viz., Rs. 20,000 duties foregone on cotton goods and cheap sales thereof, rendered possible (to the benefit of the people of Kashmir) by cheap, safe, and rapid transport afforded at our cost, and our non-levy of duties on a Kashmir export trade to Hindustan of over 8 lakhs (shawls 3 lakhs to Hindustan and Khorassan, wool 3 lakhs, ghee 1½ lakhs, other articles say 4 lakhs) could hardly be regarded as an inadequate set-off to the remission of duties of the Maharaja's in themselves indefensible.

16. All this Kirpa Ram could not deny, but said that "these could not be such direct benefits to the Maharaja as the remission of duty on shawls; but that he might hint from himself that the concession which would really gratify the Maharaja was a territorial one." I did not notice the hint, and the matter dropped.

17. With regard to the manner of remission on our cotton goods, he said—and enquiries in Amritsar confirm this—that purchases for Kashmir and Turkistan were at present made in the

open market at Amritsar, &c., and no imports, specially for that trade, were made into Calcutta or Bombay, nor could they well be so, the merchants holding this trade not having European correspondents. If, however, as done in Bombay for the Gulf trade, all goods purchased for Kashmir in the Calcutta or Bombay markets were, on being declared, immediately granted a drawback and passed through in bond to Amritsar, the merchants would take advantage of the railway to make their purchases at Calcutta and Bombay so as to obtain the drawback.

18. With reference to the other points of my memorandum, Kirpa Ram urged "that the Engineers deputed should either have nothing to say to territorial boundaries, or should accept those pointed out by the Kashmir officials, i. e., that the non-interference on their part stipulated for should not extend to allowing the Engineers to assume what boundaries they pleased." I said that "their business would lie with demarcating the road, not boundaries, and they would take it up wherever it at present left off, and carry it only to the head of the Chang-Chenmo valley. That, with regard to boundaries generally, I was certain the Government would determine on their definite settlement at an early date, and that, whatever the Kashmir Government might itself claim (both he and the Maharaja had at different times in conversation referred to Shabidoolla), I personally had no doubt that we should only recognise such as the Maharaja could himself maintain, or we support him in, which I could not conceive to be further north than the southern slopes of the Karnkoram range. With regard to his Lahoul boundary, I thought it possible, considering all the circumstances, and also the probability of ready and handsome accession to His Excellency's proposals disposing the Viceroy favorably to the Maharaja's wishes on all points, that our Government would not be very exacting of its right in that quarter."

19. With regard to the Joint Commissioners, Kirpa Ram stood out for sundry alterations and provisions which will appear in the Maharaja's memorandum. One of these, which I negatived, was that, though the general regulations for the Commissioners' guidance should be framed in consultation with the British Government, nevertheless the Maharaja should issue to them, from time to time, such further instructions as he thought fit, without reference to our authorities.

20. Kirpa Ram showed a similar carefulness of definition with regard to the stipulations for the arrangements for carriage and supplies.

21. In the present interview with Kirpa Ram I had not failed to recapitulate the substance of what I had said to Jowala Sabai, and Sultan Ibrahim had from the first been calling upon all the officials, and suffering them to extract from him information calculated to convince them of all that I stated.

22. In the evening Sultan Ibrahim returned from a visit to the Maharaja, with the intimation that the Ministers should wait upon me that night and convey his views; but when the night came, a further message arrived that he was not then prepared with them, and that the Ministers should come at midday on the 25th. I sent back to say that "the Lieutenant-Gov. eror desired to leave on the 25th with every matter in train of settlement; if, therefore, further matters remained for discussion, I should be glad if the Ministers would come down at what-ever hour of the night." After some delay the Maharaja returned reply that there was no further discussion necessary, that he acceded to everything, and the Ministers should wait

upon me in the morning." My wakil informed me that the Dewans were at first much alarmed, and that Kirpa Ram, taking him aside, had cross-questioned him as to whether I had shown any signs of displeasure.

23. Early next morning Dewans Jowala Sahai and Kirpa Ram arrived with the documents, translations of which, as finally fixed after further discussion, are attached. It will be noticed that in paragraph 1 of the Maharaja's memorandum the action of the surveyors is carefully limited to the line of route; also that combination on the part of the carriers is distinctly barred, as the Maharaja can well undertake, the business being really in the hands of himself and the Dewans.

24. With regard to paragraph 2 of the memorandum, I saw no object in demurring to the words "for the hot weather," which were verbally understood to mean during the passage of any traders. The stipulations regarding stamp duty, fines, and imprisonment in the Maharaja's jails are in accordance with the spirit of treaty engagements. With regard to the first, the institution of such fees is most improbable, and depends upon the rules established for the route. Generally, with regard to these and other concessions in view of the urgency of finishing the matter with the utmost possible despatch, I consider it advisable to meet the Maharaja's wishes and concede the utmost on unimportant points.

25. It will be noticed that neither of the provisions—1, regarding the establishment of regulations for the guidance of the Commissioners and their empowerment to carry them out, and 2, the non-residence within the route limits of any Kashmir official—appear on the Maharaja's memorandum.

The first is a clerical omission in the fair copy, in the correction of which the Dewans begged me not to insist as necessitating the re-writing of the paper, urging that the empowerment of the Commissioners to administer the route was conveyed in the word "intizam," meaning administration or government, and that the establishment of rules for their guidance naturally followed. I acquiesced in this, as their reasoning was correct, the matter being of small importance, and it was then late on Saturday, and the Lieutenant-Governor would leave Sialkot on Monday morning. The other point was by consent left for future settlement by the Commissioners proposing some practicable scheme for the avoidance of the necessity for Revenue Collectors at Choosul and Roopshar, without placing the business of collection in the hands of the Kashmir Commissioner, to which I demurred.

26. The leaving the trial of cases involving only Kashmir subjects in the hands of the Maharaja's Commissioner, and appointing himself the final Judge in case of difference of opinion between the Commissioners in civil and criminal suits, appeared to me to be fair, and the Lieutenant-Governor approved of my view, as the Maharaja justly argued the transferring of his jurisdiction at all to the hands of the Commissioners was a divergence from the treaty stipulations, to which, however, he willingly acceded with the above provisos.

27. The suspicious nature of the Durbar is evidenced by the provision debarring us from basing on the present concession similar demands with regard to other portions of his dominions,—a precaution in reality useless, as I had carefully reserved to the British Government the power of changing the Chang Chenmo route for any other should it see fit, in which case any propositions regarding such route would be made on distinct grounds, and no more based on present arrangements than these are on any previous ones. The Dewans said with regard to this reservation on my part "that was a separate matter; the Maharaja now merely wished particularly to provide against the separate jurisdiction arrangements, for the Chang Chenmo being afterwards stretched to include other portions of his territory (as noticed in paragraph 23), and for the same reason he wished that an outside limit for such jurisdiction should now be fixed, and that such should not be left elastic." I demurred at first to this latter, on the ground that I could form no possible estimate of the requirements of the route; however they, while really appearing to see the unreasonableness of the point, said that "the Maharaja had been firm on these two points, being very jealous of his jurisdiction and very loath to alienate any portion of it at all, and that he had, in fact, at one time determined to stand out upon the treaty engagements with reference to this point." Eventually an outside width of two kos was acceded to. There may possibly be some dispute about the interpretation of a kos, but the Surveyors can stand upon the Statute kos. Moreover, as the Dewans promised, and likewise the Maharaja himself, no difficulties will be made in meeting the wishes of the Commissioners in every possible way, the Maharaja merely desiring to be protected against encroachment.

28. Paragraph 3 of the memorandum defines the liability to duty of trade to and from the Maharaja's territory, including his royalties of salt and borax. Paragraph 4 limits the Kashmir liability of furnishing supplies to the requirements of the traffic only, on the suspicion before referred to (paragraph 23), and in the same view provides (the Dewans admitting that the country can amply supply all possible wants of the traders) that the arrangements for supply shall be the best possible, and that, in case of the inadequacy of Ladak, supplies may be obtained from Kulu.

29. Paragraph 5 of the memorandum needs no comment. I acceded to it at once. Paragraph 6 provides for non-interference with the Maharaja's arrangements with the Chinese, to

Comment on paragraph 3 of Maharaja's memorandum.

Comment on paragraph 4.

Comment on paragraph 6 of Maharaja's memorandum.

which my instructions did not extend, and stipulates for permission for the consumers of pushum to meet the supply at any point, in which view also of forestalling the Amritsar weavers, the Maharaja declares his intention of establishing a market convenient to the route, which is quite legitimate. The question had arisen as to who should bear the expenses incurred on the putting and keeping in order of the road, and I had said that, being but a trifling matter, I did not suppose that the Maharaja would desire the Government to make the outlay in his territories. The Dewans assented, and the specification regarding sermia provides for the only possible means of reimbursement which can be proposed for the Maharaja, save a toll, which could not be contemplated at present. Paragraph 7 refers more particularly to the revenue of the tracts traversed by the road.

Comment on paragraph 7.

30. Paragraph 1 of the paper of requests caused some discussion. I affirmed my confidence that Government could never contemplate thus to tie the hands of their successors; that, as to the general question of trade routes and arrangements, as before mentioned (paragraph 31), the right of proposing some new route other than the Chang Chenmo, if hereafter found preferable, was by no means foregone. Meanwhile, *transit* duties no longer remaining, I was certain no interference would be contemplated with internal duties as they now stood.

The Dewans, however, were urgent, and on reference to the Lieutenant-Governor, His Honor directed me to say that he would support the request, an assurance which had doubtless considerable effect in expediting matters.

31. With regard to request No. 2, I again explained the only concession which I believed the Viceroy likely to contemplate, but the Dewans urged its inadequacy, and pressed for the remission of duty on shawls, or, far preferably, some other and material compensation. (This I gathered, after their departure, to be the transfer to the Maharaja of the Illoqua of Bujwat, between the Chenab and Powee, and which geographically would appear to appertain to Jammu.) I was able, under authority from the Lieutenant-Governor, to inform them that His Honor would recommend the former, which must, of course, have been an unexpected concession for them, though they then affected to lightly regard it as compared with the transfer of Dujwat.

With reference to No. 3, I was able to partly satisfy them by informing them that the Lieutenant-Governor regarded the withdrawal of the Ladak Officer as eventually certain, he being no longer necessary with a British Commissioner on the Chang Chenmo route.

32. Finally, the Dewans expressed themselves satisfied, and agreed on the part of the Maharaja to accept the memoranda as they stood after this discussion, and to transcribe and deliver to me for submission to Government, and I accompanied them to the Lieutenant-Governor's presence to announce the settlement of the business in hand. Matters having arrived at this satisfactory issue, the Lieutenant-Governor decided to start at once, and I was directed to follow when the papers were fairly drawn up.

33. I accompanied the Maharaja home after his leave-taking with the Lieutenant-Governor a couple of hours later, and he expressed his pleasure at having been able to meet the wishes of the Viceroy, and his gratification at the honor done him in the deputation of a special agent instead of merely conveying the orders by *kharita* or through the Local Government (the Dewans had previously dilated on this point). He hinted distantly at his wish about the Illoqua of Bujwat in saying that "all his family cared for was increase of dignity, and were willing to pay any price for it."

34. While at the palace the Dewans produced the original *murasila* of 1863, in which, after stating the reduced duties, Sir R. Montgomery undertook to propose "that the Maharaja should be repaid for his concession by obtaining satisfaction of the debt then owed him by the British Government, in the shape of land in the Bujwat Illoqua, to such extent as that twenty years' revenue thereof should represent the principal of the debt; or, if the Supreme Government did not approve this, that half the yearly loss, as shown by the returns, to accrue from the new tariff, should be borne by the British Government till the increase of the trade made up for it;" but no comment was then made on it by the Maharaja or myself as regards the present negotiations.

35. The Maharaja further referred to the unpleasantness of the first year of the Ladakh Agency, resulting from the complaints being made direct to Government without being referred to him (and on this point the Dewans also dwelt both before and after this conversation), and begged "that any matter in which the new Commissioner might be dissatisfied or might require assistance, &c., might, in the first instance, be referred to him, and he promised never to fail to meet their wishes." He reiterated this, and I said that I would bring his request to the Viceroy's favorable notice.

36. On the morning of the 26th, Dewan Kirpa Ram again came down to press upon me the matter of Bujwat. He said that, although the debt in payment of which Sir R. Montgomery had proposed to transfer Dujwat had since been liquidated, the Maharaja would most gladly give back the money, and all interest ever paid thereon, *viz.*, a total of 8 lakhs, if he could obtain Bujwat as a set-off for his present concessions,—not that the tract was more

Request regarding "Bujwat."

Maharaja's difficulties with the Ladak agent.

Sir R. Montgomery's arrangement of 1863.

Interview with the Maharaja.

Conclusion of the negotiation.

Request No. 3.

Comment on request No. 2.

Comment on paragraph 1 of memorandum of requests.

than worth the 8 lakhs alone, but that the transactions would plainly show his favor with our Government, and, consequently, redound to his honor. He pointed out that even the alternative compensation proposed by Sir R. Montgomery had not been granted, on the

Maharaja's claims to compensation admitted by argument that the increase of trade would be sufficient to recoup the Maharaja; when, however, the Punjab Government.

it began to do, further successive reductions of duty were called for, and eventually now the duties were altogether abolished; that he had therefore a claim to compensation for former losses on Sir R. Montgomery's own written admission, and that the cession of tracts of land in compensation of such losses was supported by precedent.

37. In reply, I gave him distinctly to understand that, "though, of course, I would bring this request to His Excellency's notice, I felt confident that, in the face of the repeated orders from the Home Government on the subject of making over to Native Governments tracts in which rights have grown up under our rule, the Lieutenant-Governor was unlikely to support the request." On this Kirpa Ram remarked "that 'Bujwat' having been till recently in Raja Tej Sing's jagir, no such rights as I referred to could have grown up." I then added "that as regards the Viceroy, I was confident that when he instructed me to offer the remission on English duty-paying goods as the concession which he was prepared to make to the Maharaja, he had duly considered all other points on which concessions were likely to be sought by His Highness."

38. In the course of the afternoon I paid a visit of ceremony to the Maharaja, in which he urged upon me to bring his memorandum of requests to the favorable notice of the Viceroy, and

Visit to the Maharaja.

again dwelt on his "gratification at the deputation of a special officer upon this occasion, and the pleasure of having dealings with a Viceroy who, as report said of Lord Mayo, understood how to treat the Princes and Chiefs of India in a manner calculated to maintain his own dignity and increase theirs."

39. Throughout the proceedings I had been obliged to hurry the Dewans more than is consistent with etiquette, to enable me to reach Sealkote with the papers for submission to the Lieutenant-Governor before he left that station for Madhopore on the 29th, and I succeeded this day in declining all the civilities and entertainments offered by the Maharaja and getting my departure fixed for the afternoon of the 27th.

40. Accordingly, on the forenoon of the 27th, I proceeded to pay my farewell visit, and received the *khulluts* of dismissal and the *kharita* from the Maharaja. During the visit he said "that he had accepted a loss to please the British Government, and he entirely depended upon me to be his recommender and supporter with that Government, and to lay his views and wishes fully and favorably before them; that of course as we wished for a friendly Turkistan border, he wished it too: at the same time he hoped I would impress on the British Government how eager he was, supposing any other contingency to arise, to show his zeal in their service." All this I promised to do, and said that "the Government, I was convinced, felt as sure of his loyalty as I myself did." He said he saw no necessity for further record of the points fixed than that conveyed in his memorandum, and the exchange of *kharitas* accepting the same.

Farewell visit.

41. I then said good-bye, and, going to my quarters with Dewan Kirpa Ram, went finally over the fair copies of the memoranda, noticed but passed over the omission referred to in paragraph 29, and attached my signature in verification of copies of them to be retained by the Maharaja. I then considered it due to myself to convey through the Dewans to the Maharaja "my regrets at being compelled to urge him to the extent which the shortness of my time had necessitated, and my sense of the courtesy nevertheless displayed by himself and the Darbar throughout the negotiations."

Departure for Sealkote.

42. Proceeding the same night to Sealkote, I reported the termination of my mission to the Lieutenant-Governor, and next day after translation of the memoranda in the Punjab Secretariat for transmission to Government, received His Honor's permission to proceed with the originals to Calcutta, and submit according to promise the Maharaja's views and wishes to the Viceroy personally, and in detail, with such urgency (as I had reserved when taking leave of the Maharaja) as consisted with my duty to Government.

APPENDIX 14 (see p. 135).

No. 788 P, dated 16th May 1870.

NOTIFICATION—By the Government of India, FOREIGN DEPT.

The following treaty between the British Government and His Highness the Maharaja Ranbir Singh, G.C.S.I., Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, is published for general information:—

Treaty between the British Government and HIS HIGHNESS MAHARAJA RANBIR SINGH, G.C.S.I., Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, his heirs and successors, executed on the one part, by THOMAS DOUGLAS FORSYTH, C.B., in virtue of the full powers vested in him by His Excellency the Right Hon'ble RICHARD SOUTHWELL BOURKE, Earl of Mayo, Viscount Mayo of Monycrover, Baron Naas of Naas, K.P., G.M.S.I., P.C., &c., &c., Viceroy and Governor General of India, and on the other part, by HIS HIGHNESS MAHARAJA RANBIR SINGH, aforesaid, in person.

WHEREAS in the interest of the high contracting parties and their respective subjects, it is deemed desirable to afford greater facilities than at present exist for the development and security of trade with Eastern Turkistau, the following Articles have, with this object, been agreed upon:—

ARTICLE I.

With the consent of the Maharaja, officers of the British Government will be appointed to survey the trade-routes through the Maharaja's territories from the British frontier of Lahoul to the territories of the Ruler of Yarkand, including the route *via* the Chang Chenmo valley. The Maharaja will depute an officer of his Government to accompany the surveyors, and will render them all the assistance in his power. A map of the routes surveyed will be made, an attested copy of which will be given to the Maharaja.

ARTICLE II.

Whichever route towards the Chang Chenmo valley shall, after examination and survey as above, be declared by the British Government to be the best suited for the development of trade with Eastern Turkistan, shall be declared by the Maharaja to be a free highway in perpetuity and at all times for all travellers and traders.

ARTICLE III.

For the supervision and maintenance of the road in its entire length through the Maharaja's territories, the regulation of traffic on the free highway described in Article II, the enforcement of regulations that may be hereafter agreed upon, and the settlement of disputes between carriers, traders, travellers, or others using that road, in which either of the parties or both of them are subjects of the British Government or of any Foreign State, two Commissioners shall be annually appointed, one by the British Government and the other by the Maharaja. In the discharge of their duties and as regards the period of their residence, the Commissioners shall be guided by such rules as are now separately framed, and may from time to time hereafter be laid down by the joint authority of the British Government and the Maharaja.

ARTICLE IV.

The jurisdiction of the Commissioners shall be defined by a line on each side of the road at a maximum width of two Statute *kos*, except where it may be deemed by the Commissioners necessary to include a wider extent for grazing grounds. Within this maximum width, the Surveyors appointed under Article I shall demarcate and map the limits of jurisdiction which may be decided on by the Commissioners as most suitable, including grazing grounds; and the jurisdiction of the Commissioners shall not extend beyond the limits so demarcated. The land included within these limits shall remain in the Maharaja's independent possession; and subject to the stipulations contained in this treaty, the Maharaja shall continue to possess the same rights of full sovereignty therein as in any other part of his territories, which rights shall not be interfered with in any way by the Joint Commissioners.

ARTICLE V.

The Maharaja agrees to give all possible assistance in enforcing the decisions of the Commissioners and in preventing the breach or evasion of the regulations established under Article III.

ARTICLE VI.

The Maharaja agrees that any person, whether a subject of the British Government, or of the Maharaja, or of the Ruler of Yarkand, or of any Foreign State, may settle at any

place within the jurisdiction of the two Commissioners, and may provide, keep, maintain, and let for hire at different stages, the means of carriage and transport for the purposes of trade.

ARTICLE VII.

The two Commissioners shall be empowered to establish supply depôts, and to authorise other persons to establish supply depôts at such places on the road as may appear to them suitable; to fix the rates at which provisions shall be sold to traders, carriers, settlers, and others, and to fix the rent to be charged for the use of any rest-houses or serais that may be established on the road. The officers of the British Government in Kulu, &c., and the officers of the Maharaja in Ladakh shall be instructed to use their best endeavours to supply provisions on the indent of the Commissioners at market rates.

ARTICLE VIII.

The Maharaja agrees to levy no transit duty whatever on the aforesaid free highway; and the Maharaja further agrees to abolish all transit duties levied within his territories on goods transmitted in bond, through His Highness's territories from Eastern Turkistan to India or vice versa on which bulk may not be broken within the territories of His Highness. On goods imported into, or exported from, His Highness's territory, whether by the aforesaid free highway or any other route, the Maharaja may levy such import or export duties as he may think fit.

ARTICLE IX.

The British Government agree to levy no duty on goods transmitted in bond through British India to Eastern Turkistan, or to the territories of His Highness the Maharaja. The British Government further agree to abolish the export duties now levied on shawls and other textile fabrics manufactured in the territories of the Maharaja and exported to countries beyond the limits of British India.

ARTICLE X.

This treaty, consisting of ten Articles, has this day been concluded by Thomas Douglas Foreyth, C.B., in virtue of the full powers vested in him by His Excellency the Right Hon'ble Richard Southwell Bourke, Earl of Mayo, Viscount Mayo of Monycrover, Baron Naas of Naas, K.P., G.M.S.I., P.C., &c., &c., Viceroy and Governor General of India, on the part of the British Government, and by His Highness Maharaja Ranbir Singh, aforesaid; and it is agreed that a copy of this Treaty, duly ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India, shall be delivered to the Maharaja on or before the 7th September 1870.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged at Sealkote on the second day of April in the year of our Lord 1870, corresponding with the 22nd day of Bysakh Sumbat 1927.

This Treaty was ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India at Sealkote, on the 2nd day of May, in the year 1870.

The following rules for the guidance of the Joint Commissioners appointed under Article III of the above treaty are published for general information:—

Rules for the guidance of the Joint Commissioners appointed for the new route to Eastern Turkistan.

I.—As it is impossible, owing to the character of the climate, to retain the Commissioners throughout the year, the period during which they shall exercise their authority shall be taken to commence on 15th May, and to end on 1st December, or till such further time as the passage of traders renders their residence on the road necessary.

II.—During the absence of either Commissioner, cases may be heard and decided by the other Commissioner, subject to appeal to the Joint Commissioners.

III.—In the months when the Joint Commissioners are absent, *i.e.*, between 1st December and 15th May, or the dates that may hereafter be determined, all cases which may arise shall be decided by the Wazir of Ladakh, subject to appeal to the Joint Commissioners.

IV.—The Joint Commissioners shall not interfere in cases other than those which affect the development, freedom, and safety of the trade, and the objects for which the treaty is concluded, and in which one of the parties or both are either British subjects, or subjects of a foreign State.

V.—In civil disputes the Commissioners shall have power to dispose of all cases, whatever be the value of the property in litigation.

VI.—When the Commissioners agree, their decision shall be final in all cases. When they are unable to agree, the parties shall have the right of nominating a single arbitrator, and shall bind themselves in writing to abide by his award: should the parties not be able to agree upon a single arbitrator, each party shall name one, and the two Commissioners shall name a third; and the decision of the majority of the arbitrators shall be final.

VII.—In criminal cases of the kind referred to in clause 4, the powers of the Commissioners shall be limited to offences such as in British Territory would be tried by a subordinate Magistrate of the first class, and as far as possible the procedure of the Criminal Pro-

cedure Code shall be followed. Cases of a more heinous kind and of offences against the special laws regarding religion in Kashmir should be made over to the Maharaja for trial, if the accused be not a European British subject; in the latter case he should be forwarded to the nearest British Court of competent jurisdiction for trial.

VIII.—All fines levied in criminal cases, and all stamp receipts levied according to the rates in force for civil suits in the Maharaja's dominions, shall be credited to the Kashmir Treasury. Persons sentenced to imprisonment shall, if British subjects, be sent to the nearest British Jail. If not British subjects, the offenders shall be made over for imprisonment in the Maharaja's Jails.

IX.—If any places come within the line of road from which the towns of Lehce are supplied with fuel, or wood for building purposes, the Joint Commissioners shall so arrange with the Wazir of Ladakh that those supplies are not interfered with.

X.—Whatever transactions take place within the limits of the road shall be considered to refer to goods in bond. If a trader opens his load, and disposes of a portion, he shall not be subject to any duty, so long as the goods are not taken for consumption into the Maharaja's territory across the line of road. And goods left for any length of time in the line of road subject to the jurisdiction of the Commissioners shall be free.

XI.—Where a village lies within the jurisdiction of the Joint Commissioners, then as regards the collection of revenue, or in any case, where there is necessity for the interference of the usual Revenue authorities in matters having no connection with trade, the Joint Commissioners have no power whatever to interfere; but to prevent misunderstanding, it is advisable that the Revenue officials should first communicate with the Joint Commissioners before proceeding to take action against any person within their jurisdiction. The Joint Commissioners can then exercise their discretion to deliver up the person sought, or to make a summary enquiry to ascertain whether their interference is necessary or not.

XII.—The Maharaja agrees to give Rs. 5,000 this year for the construction of the road and bridges; and in future years His Highness agrees to give Rs. 2,000 per annum for the maintenance of the road and bridges. Similarly for the repairs of serais, a sum of Rs. 100 per annum for each serai will be given. Should further expenditure be necessary, the Joint Commissioners will submit a special report to the Maharaja, and ask for a specific grant. This money will be expended by the Joint Commissioners, who will employ free labor at market rates for this purpose. The officers in Ladakh and in British Territory shall be instructed to use their best endeavours to supply laborers on the indent of the Commissioners at market rates. No tolls shall be levied on the bridges on this line of road.

XIII.—As a temporary arrangement, and until the line of road has been demarcated, or till the end of this year, the Joint Commissioners shall exercise the powers described in these rules over several roads taken by the traders through Ladakh from Lahoul and Spiti.

APPENDIX 15 (see p. 142).

Rules to provide for the refund of duty on goods exported from British territory to Kashmir or to Central Asia (Turkistan) via Kashmir.

These Rules are framed to give effect to Article IX of the Treaty between the British Government and His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, dated 2nd May 1870, by which the British Government agrees to levy no duty on goods transmitted in bond through British India to Central Asia or to the territories of His Highness the Maharaja.

2. The places agreed upon between the Punjab Government and the Maharaja of Kashmir as the places where goods may be declared and sealed for transmission in bond, and where refund of duty may be claimed under these rules, are Calcutta, Bombay, and Amritsar. Goods intended for Turkistan may be declared, sealed, &c., at these three places, and also at Sultanpur, in the Kulu tehsil of the Kangra district.

3. Any merchant trading on his own account, and any merchant or agent trading on account of the Maharaja of Kashmir, who wishes to claim the refund of duty allowed by these rules, may apply to the Collector of Customs of Calcutta or Bombay or the Deputy Commissioners of Amritsar and Kangra, as the case may be, for the same in the following manner:—

4. The goods intended for export to Kashmir or Turkistan (Central Asia) are to be declared on invoices, and opportunity is to be given to the Collector or Deputy Commissioner to inspect them if required. The packages are to be sealed in presence of the Collector or an officer authorised by him.

5. Goods sealed at Calcutta or Bombay must not break bulk anywhere before they reach the Kashmir border, or Sultanpur, in the Kangra district.

6. Goods intended for Kashmir or Central Asia, and which are required to break bulk on the route up-country, may more conveniently be declared, sealed, &c., at Amritsar.

7. The duty of which a refund is claimable under these rules is the customs duty specified in the Schedules of Act VI of 1863 (the Consolidated Customs Act). The amount of such duty shall be calculated at the values assigned to goods in those Schedules.

8. The Collector, as aforesaid, will furnish the applicant with a certificate in the annexed form A., specifying the numbers on the packages sealed by him or under his orders, the kind of goods, the gross weight, the destination, and the amount of duty to be refunded in the event of the goods reaching the Kashmir border, or the station of Sultanpur, intact. The Collector will keep a register of such certificates in serial order.

9. The goods may then be conveyed by any route the applicant chooses. There is no restriction as to routes, but refunds are only claimable at the place where the packages were sealed, i.e., Calcutta, Bombay, and Amritsar, for the Kashmir trade, and Sultanpur for the direct trade to Turkistan, on production of the invoice duly attested by the Customs officers of His Highness the Maharaja or by the official appointed on that behalf at Sultanpur, in Kulu.

10. On arrival of the goods within the boundaries of Kashmir, the Customs officials of the Maharaja at the borders of His Highness the Maharaja's territory on the various routes into Kashmir will examine the packages to see that the seals are untampered with, and that the number and weight of packages corresponds with the certificate, and will endorse the certificate accordingly.

11. The owner, or his agent, will then be entitled to present this certificate to the Collector at Calcutta, Bombay, or Amritsar, as the case may be, and obtain payment of the amount of duty stated therein.

12. In the case of goods sent to Turkistan via Kulu, the owner, or agent, may present the certificate for payment at the Sultanpur tehsil after furnishing proof to the tehsildar that the goods have left the limits of the tehsil in the direction of Turkistan. Further detailed arrangements on this last point will be made by the Deputy Commissioner of Kangra.

Invoice of Goods for transmission in bond through British India to the Territory of His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir and Jammu from to

1	2	3	4	5	6	
No. of Invoice.	Specification of goods.	Weight of goods.	Rate of duty chargeable.	Amount of duty.	Gross weight of packages.	REMARKS.
						Attestation of Customs officials of His Highness the Maharaja.

Name of Office.
Date of delivery.

APPENDIX 16 (see p. 144).

No. 1390G., dated Simla, 6th July 1875.

NOTIFICATION—By the Government of India, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

The following revised rules for giving effect to Article IX of the Treaty between the British Government and His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, of 2nd May 1870, in respect to the refund of duty on goods exported from British territory to Kashmir or Central Asia *via* Kashmir, having received the sanction of His Excellency the Governor General in Council, are published for general information :—

I. The places agreed upon between the Punjab Government and the Maharaja of Kashmir as the places where goods may be declared and sealed for transmission in bond under these rules, are Calcutta, Bombay, and Amritsar. Goods intended for Central Asia may be declared and sealed at these three places, and also at Sultanpur in the Kulu tehsil of the Kangra district.

II. Any merchant trading on his own account, and any merchant or agent trading on account of the Maharaja of Kashmir, is entitled to claim refund of duty under these rules in the manner hereinafter described.

III. The goods intended for export to Kashmir or Central Asia shall be declared on invoices, and opportunity shall be given to the Collector or Deputy Commissioner, or the official at Sultanpur appointed on that behalf, to inspect them as required. The packages shall be sealed in presence of the Collector or Deputy Commissioner, or an officer authorised by him, or in the case of packages declared at Sultanpur in the presence of the official appointed on that behalf.

IV. Goods sealed at any of the places mentioned in Rule I must not break bulk until the seals shall have been examined and certificates attested by one of the officials described in Rule IX; otherwise all claim to refund of duty will be forfeited.

V. Goods intended for Kashmir or Central Asia, but contained in packages which it is necessary or desired to open on the route up-country from sea-ports, may more conveniently be declared, sealed, &c., at Amritsar or Sultanpur.

VI. The duty of which a refund is claimable under these rules is the customs duty specified in the Schedules of the Indian Tariff Act in force for the time being. The amount of such duty shall be calculated at the values assigned to goods in those Schedules.

VII. In the case of goods sealed and declared at Calcutta or Bombay the officers empowered to grant certificates, and in the case of goods sealed and declared at Amritsar the Deputy Commissioner, and in the case of goods sealed and declared at Sultanpur the official appointed on that behalf at Sultanpur, will furnish the applicant with a certificate in the annexed form (A) specifying the numbers on the packages sealed by him or under his orders, the kind of goods, the gross weight, the destination, and the amount of duty to be refunded in the event of the goods reaching Srinagar, Jammu or Leh, as the case may be, intact. The officers appointed to grant certificates should be furnished with the customs import tariff of fixed values, and with regard to *ad valorem* goods should be cautioned to investigate the claim as to drawback so as not to give drawback on the actual value of goods as laid down say at Amritsar or Sultanpur, which would include the cost of carriage from the sea-port at those places. Drawback should not be given on more than the customs tariff value at the port of importation.

The officers empowered to grant certificates will keep a register of such certificates in serial order (B).

VIII. When the certificate described in the preceding section shall have been granted, and the goods duly sealed, they may be conveyed by any route the applicant chooses.

IX. The holder of certificate granted under rule VII will only be entitled to claim a refund on such certificate after it has been attested either—

- (1) by the customs official¹ of His Highness the Maharaja on arrival of the goods at Jammu or Srinagar of His Highness' dominions, or
- (2) by the British Joint Commissioner at Leh on arrival of the goods at Leh.

When any of the above-named officials are called upon to attest the certificate, they will examine the packages to see that the seals are untempered with, and that the number and weight of packages correspond with the certificate accorded.

X. The owner, or his agent, may then present this certificate either to the British Joint Commissioner at Leh, or in the case of goods sealed and declared at Calcutta or Bombay, to the Collector at Calcutta or Bombay respectively, or in the case of goods sealed and declared at Amritsar to the Deputy Commissioner at Amritsar, and obtain payment of the amount of duty stated therein. No refunds will be paid at Sultanpur.


¹ Notes.—The name and designation of the said officials are at present as follows :—
At Jammu, Parsh Singh, Farmer of Customs.
At Srinagar, Boda Singh, Farmer of Customs.
Any change in their name or designation will be notified in the Gazette.

APPENDIX 17 (see p. 150).

GENEALOGY OF THE KHANRE OF CENTRAL.

Babz Eyoob,

An adventurer from Khurasan.
 Babz Ilkhan.
 Babz Wazed.
 Babz Isargull.



APPENDIX 16 (see p. 53).

1. On the 27th August 1860, Mr. Hayward wrote to the Viceroy's Private Secretary, asking, on behalf of the Royal Geographical Society of London, that the Government of India would facilitate and countenance in the four following modes his intended exploring expedition into the Pamir Steppe:—

- I.—Would advance him a sum of money to enable him to make an earlier start than could be effected by waiting for the receipt of such sum from the Geographical Society in England.
- II.—Would allow him to purchase some half dozen Commissariat mules, or to be furnished with them on hire.
- III.—Would allow him to purchase some old Government arms and ammunition to give as presents to the Kirghiz Chiefs, &c.
- IV.—Would request the Maharaja of Kashmir, through the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, to furnish him with the necessary orders to obtain supplies as far as his territory extends into Gilgit, and not to throw obstacles in the way of obtaining the supplies necessary for the onward journey.

2. The Government of India (No. 1375, dated 27th September 1860) replied that it would be impossible to comply with the four requests preferred, especially with that concerning the Maharaja of Kashmir, without giving to Mr. Hayward's journey an official character, or, at any rate, without affording the Chiefs and tribes beyond our frontier grounds for supposing that he was an authorised or accredited Agent of the British Government.

Looking to the difficulties of the route and to the impossibility of guaranteeing travellers, however experienced, against serious risk or obstruction in the districts which Mr. Hayward proposed to visit, Government regretted that it could not give official sanction to the project which he had in view.

The request and the refusal were communicated to the Secretary of State in despatch No. 335, dated 11th October 1860.

3. On the 2nd October Mr. Hayward wrote explaining his reasons for intending, even without the assistance of Government, to proceed *via* Gilgit to the Pamir Steppe, with a view of deciding its configuration and settling its hydrography.

This was communicated to the Secretary of State in No. 354, dated 18th October 1860.

4. In the spring of 1870 Mr. Hayward explored nearly the whole of the basins of the Gilgit and Yasin rivers, and wrote that he was particularly well treated by the Chief of Yasin, Mir Wali Khan, meeting at his hands with "a most favourable reception and friendly assurances." He found that the Darkote Pass, leading into Wakhan and the basin of the Oxus, was still closed with snow, and would not be practicable for laden animals till May or June. Thinking it risky staying in Yasin till the passes opened, he returned to Gilgit, and wrote from thence (22nd March) that he found that the Maharaja's officials there, in order to serve their own purposes, had caused a report to be spread that he had been plundered in Yasin, and had sent off orders to Astor for the force there to march at once to Gilgit for the purpose of invading Yasin. His return stopped them and they were then hurrying back, but not before he had ascertained the truth of the movement.

5. From Gilgit he returned to Kashmir and Murree. There the Viceroy saw him in April last, and took the opportunity of pointing out to him some of the dangers and difficulties which, even under the most favourable circumstances, he would have to encounter, and did everything in his power, short of absolute interdiction, to dissuade him from undertaking his adventurous journey.

6. In the *Pioneer* of the 9th May there appeared a letter signed by Mr. Hayward, and dated Yasin, 7th March, describing the cruelties which he asseverated the Kashmir troops had committed during their invasion of Yasin in 1863.

7. By the Viceroy's direction a letter (No. 790P., dated 16th May) was thereupon written to Mr. Hayward, pointing out that the already great risks attending his journey were much enhanced by the publication of the letter, and most strongly advising him to postpone his journey till he could receive further instructions from the Royal Geographical Society. And on the 13th May the Viceroy telegraphed to the Secretary of State, begging him to see Sir R. Murchison and strongly advise him to forbid Mr. Hayward to proceed on his journey. The Secretary of State (14th May) telegraphed in reply that Sir R. Murchison would write to Mr. Hayward, and that meanwhile Government should do what was best for his safety.

8. In a despatch (No. 26, Secret, dated 17th May) to the Secretary of State, the Government of India explained their reasons in detail. They expressed their belief that Mr. Hayward's statements might be exaggerated, and said that the alleged proceedings of the Kashmir Government in Gilgit might be capable of a different explanation from that which Mr. Hayward gave of them. Be that as it might, the publication of those statements and the comments thereon, when known to the subjects of the Maharaja of Kashmir—and it was impossible to prevent them from being known—

"most excite feelings of intense irritation and resentment among a wild population, little disposed to weigh the consequences of their acts. The result will necessarily be not only the possibility of personal danger to

Mr. Hayward, but great risk that the Maharaja himself may be compromised. Should any misfortune befall Mr. Hayward within the limits of the Kashmir territories, or even after he has crossed the ill-defined frontier, it would assuredly be attributed by many to the Maharaja's resentment."

For Mr. Hayward's own safety, therefore, and in fairness to the Maharaja of Kashmir, it had seemed necessary to advise Mr. Hayward to postpone his further journey till he received instructions from the Geographical Society. Measures had recently been taken to open up communications with Turkistan.

"Unless their success should be retarded by the jealousy and distrust which the publication of Mr. Hayward's reports was naturally calculated to excite, Government felt assured that the unexplored regions of Turkistan would in a very short time become easily accessible to travellers and traders of every class, and the information now sought through difficulty and danger, become available without risk. Government was prepared to give all assistance to the immediate prosecution of endeavours to acquire accurate and scientific information regarding those regions; but it could not condescend to the attainment of this object, or be for the interest of the public, that the success of the efforts made at great trouble and expense to open up those regions to the commerce of the world, should be endangered by such public statements as Mr. Hayward had made."

9. On the 30th May Mr. Hayward wrote to the Foreign Secretary from Srinagar to say that the publication of his letter in the *Pioneer* was entirely in opposition to his wishes and instructions, and that he had deemed it right, after learning the views of Government to offer to Sir R. Murchison to sever his connection with the Royal Geographical Society, so as to relieve it from all responsibility on his account. But though fully alive to the perils which he might meet with, he declined to abandon his enterprise. At the same time he sent a copy of a letter addressed to the Editor of the *Pioneer*, expressive of his regret that his former letter, which was intended only for information, should have been printed in the form in which it was received. This letter was published in the *Pioneer* of 2nd June last.

10. The Foreign Secretary (No. 64P, dated 16th June) replied to Mr. Hayward that, whether his letter had been published in the *Pioneer* against his wishes or not, the effect was the same, and that Government still considered that the difficulties of his journey had been enhanced thereby.

"If," it was added, "knowing the opinion of His Excellency in Council, you still resolve on prosecuting your journey, it must be clearly understood that you do so on your own responsibility."

It was at the same time explained to Mr. Hayward that the Viceroy made these remarks with no other object than what was dictated by anxiety for his personal safety, and by a sincere desire for the ultimate success of the most interesting exploration in which he was engaged.

11. "Preparing" for his second journey to Yasin, Mr. Hayward first wrote to Mir Wali from Kashmir, the letter being sent by post to Gilgit, where it was given over to a man of Mir Wali's on the 25th May. Mr. Hayward himself reached that place on the 7th July, and left it for Yasin on the 9th: this time he had a larger amount of baggage, his camp being carried by 33 coolies; he had the following people with him in his service—

"A Manabi, two Kashmiris (Khanasab and Chuprasai), two Pathans, whom at this time he took on to Gilgit.

"It is believed that, making long marches, he reached Yasin on the 13th July; the last direct communication was a letter received from the frontier, addressed to Major Smyly.

12. "On the 29th July, 20 days after Mr. Hayward's departure, a letter from Mir Wali was received at Gilgit, saying that the Sabib had stayed but two days in Yasin, and it was not quite known which way he had gone, whether to Badakshan or to Hunga."

13. At starting from Srinagar on the 13th June, he had written to say that he did not believe there was any great danger in the way of his expedition. The Maharaja of Kashmir did not share this belief, for he told Sir Henry Durand—

"that such were his relations with the territories beyond Gilgit that he had endeavoured to dissuade Mr. Hayward from attempting that route, and had plainly told him that he, the Maharaja, could not be responsible for Mr. Hayward's safety in the countries where his influence and control practically ceased."

14. Isa Bahadour¹ wrote² (12th August) from Payal to Hoshiara, the Kashmir Commander of Gilgit, then on a business visit to Hunga, that on the 10th August he had heard a report of Mr. Hayward's murder by Mir Wali,³ and that on the 12th August the news was corroborated. The news-writer at the Fort Sheer in Payal gave the same account and the following particulars regarding the corroborative report: Certain men on their way back from Yasin to Payal⁴ had been told by the people of the Fort Roshun that Mr. Hayward had been given coolies by Mir Wali and had started off for Goorchal on the Pamir Steppe in Badakshan; that Mir Wali did not show respect to Mr. Hayward, and that no presents were interchanged; that Mir Wali sent troops after him, who, when he had arrived in the Goorchal territory by the Darkote road, killed him and brought back his property to Yasin; that Mir Wali now repented of the deed, had sent for troops from Chitral, had strengthened the forts, and guarded the roads. Isa Bahadour said he had sent spies both secretly and openly to Yasin to get authentic intelligence. The Maharaja sent this intelligence to the Lieutenant-

¹ This is taken from Mr. Drew's Report of 20th October.

² This man is a brother of Aman-ul-Mulk, but went over to the Kashmir side, and has for some years ruled Payal as feudatory of Kashmir.

³ Panjab letter of the 27th August.

⁴ Nephew of Aman-ul-Mulk and Isa Bahadour, brothers of Mullick Aman and Phulwan Khan.

⁵ This tract is in this communication called "Panjal"; in Mr. Hayward's map it is called "Panjal;" but throughout the note I have continued the old and well-known spelling "Payal."

Governor, and said that he had ordered troops to be in readiness in Hunga and Gilgit, and awaited intimation of the pleasure of Government as regards the punishment of Mir Wali.

"The Lieutenant-Governor abstained from expressing any opinion or indication of the wishes of His Excellency on this point, *1st*, because he was aware that, before Mr. Hayward engaged in his present expedition, he was distinctly informed by the Government of India that his journey must be undertaken on his own responsibility; territory and subject to his authority; whether, in short, it is in the discretion of the Maharaja to treat this offence, supposing it perpetrated, as one in which, from his sovereignty over Yasin, the punishment of the offender rests in his will and pleasure."

All this the Lieutenant-Governor (who had telegraphed the intelligence of the murder on the 28th) reported in his official letter of the 27th August, No. 274-1010.

15. In a demi-official letter of the 5th September, Sir H. Durand expressed himself in favor of permitting Kashmir to conquer Yasin, and thus, while punishing Mir Wali, giving Government some means of curbing the quadrangle of wild tribes between the Chitral-Konur and Gilgit-Indus rivers.

The Viceroy (dated 21st September 1870) replied that, as far as could be gathered from the information available, Yasin was part of Chitral, and it was undesirable to permit Kashmir to conquer and annex it—

I.—Because the grant of such permission would involve an obligation to help Kashmir to maintain its hold there.

II.—Because it would give the Chitral Chief reason to doubt the sincerity of the British Government in making, or its power to enforce, the assurance given that the Maharaja of Kashmir had been warned not to endeavour to extend his dominions beyond those conferred on Golab Singh.

III.—Because the occupation of Yasin by Kashmir would be a menace to the neighbouring valleys.

IV.—Because there were certain advantages in the existence of a belt of independent territory between Kashmir and Wakhan and Badakshan. If this disappeared it would be difficult to control the diplomatic action of the Maharaja in the countries beyond.

And His Excellency doubted whether Kashmir could exercise any influence over the wild country south of Yasin between the Chitral and the Indus rivers.

16. There was for a time a gleam of hope that the rumour of Mr. Hayward's murder was unfounded; for on the 28th August¹ the Kashmir Dewan at Murree brought the Lieutenant-Governor a letter, dated Gilgit, 15th August, from the Maharaja's Officer, Colonel Indur Sing, saying that two men of Raja Ghuguu Khan, of Hunga, had come in from Goorchal, and had stated that Mr. Hayward had arrived at the latter place with hardly any baggage and only two coolies, had been prevented by the Ruler of Goorchal from going back to Hunga, and had started off towards Yarkand.

17. But on the 28th August² the Maharaja of Kashmir sent on a letter, which Aman-ul-mulk of Chitral had sent to the Thesaurdar of Gilgit, (1) saying that he had told Mir Wali not to bring the Englishman, but that Mir Wali had brought him on his own authority and killed him; (2) repudiating Mir Wali's action; and (3) announcing his deposition and the bestowal of the Yasin Chieftainship on Puhliwan Khan, another nephew of Aman-ul-mulk and brother of the deposed Mir Wali.

18. And on the 1st of September Colonel Pollock received a letter from Aman-ul-mulk, saying that a confidential servant of the British Government (evidently Mr. Hayward) had, in the past winter, arrived at Washkoom by way of Gilgit, had been invited to come on to Chitral whence he might go whither he pleased, but had not accepted the offer, and had returned to the Peshawur limits; that he had again arrived at Washkoom *via* Gilgit and had with six companions been killed, by the advice of Mullick Aman* who lives in Gilgit, by Mir Wali, who had also wounded and imprisoned another companion, a Moonshi, and forced him to write a letter, saying that the whole party had arrived in health and safety within the limits of Badakshan; that he, Aman-ul-mulk, had therefore sent Puhliwan, brother of Mir Wali, to go with a force and seize Mir Wali, who however had fled, he knew not whether to Gilgit or Badakshan.

19. The same news was repeated also to Colonel Pollock by a Mianzy traveller in the Chitral country, who stated that the scene of the murder was the Barighol³ pass into Yarkand.

20. The Lieutenant-Governor, when he heard of Mullick Aman's complicity, desired the Kashmir authorities to watch him; but he managed to effect his escape.

The following is the account of this matter given by the Maharaja of Kashmir. On learning of the Lieutenant-Governor's desire he issued the following orders to Bakshi Radha Kishen:—

"At the request of Dewan Nihal Chand, you are directed, immediately on receipt of this *perwans*, to place Mullick Aman under safe custody, and so arrange that he may not escape. Place Commandant Wuzun Sing and a few guards of sepoy in charge of him. Fail not to watch him strictly; you are responsible. His family also should not be allowed to escape. Should any escape you will be called strictly to account.

"Mullick Aman, however, escaped at night from the custody of his guard. His son, his minister Talla

¹ Sir H. Durand's telegram and demi-official letter dated 28th August, and demi-official letter of 29th August.

² Sir H. Durand's telegram and demi-official letter of 31st August.

³ Correctly speaking, only four.

* Eldest brother of Mir Wali. Mr. Forsyth says he quarrelled with Mir Wali a few years ago and came to Jammu for aid, and was allowed Rs. 150 per mensem and permitted to live in Gilgit.

⁴ Not the Barighol, but the Darkote Pass, the next to the east.

and his family were then placed in confinement. The officers in Gilgit then waited a few days pending search for him, and sent men after him in various directions. Pending his re-capture, they did not report his escape to me, but when they failed to secure him they reported his flight.

"Meanwhile a letter was received from Mullick Aman, addressed to Bakshi Radha Kishen, expressing the utmost surprise that the Bakshi should, listening to the slanders of his rivals, have ordered his and his family's imprisonment, protesting his entire devotion to the Kashmir Government, and stating that he would proceed to bring up and procure the release of his family. Thereupon repeated orders were issued to summon him. On receipt of the Bakshi's report the Maharaja says he thought of calling him and the guards strictly to account; but on receipt of Mullick Aman's letter, thinking that he might come in, the Maharaja considered that his end might be frustrated by rigorous proceedings against the Bakshi at present, and preferred for the present to encourage Mullick Aman's return. 'Measures,' he said, 'are being taken accordingly.'

This was the defence of the Maharaja of Kashmir when he received the Lieutenant-Governor's communication,—

"expressing his surprise and disappointment that Mullick Aman should have been allowed to escape, and that no report of the fact should have been made as soon as it took place. That the conduct of the Bakshi in charge at Gilgit, who is said to have received orders for the safe keeping of Mullick Aman, is inexplicable, and, may go far to frustrate any value that might otherwise have been attached to Mr. Drew's enquiry."

21. On the 12th September there came to Gilgit one Jamil Beg, a servant of Raja Gholam Mohsee-ood-deen *alias* Puhlwan Bahadur, and the bearer of a letter from him to Raja Isa Bahadur, announcing the expulsion of Mir Wali and his own succession to the Governorship of Yasin. Mir Wali, he said, had wound up a series of offences, compromising the relations between the ruler of Chitral and the Kashmir Government by bringing the European gentleman into the country in spite of Aman-ul-mulk's prohibition and then killing him. Jamil Beg was examined by Bakshi Radha Kishen, Governor of Gilgit, and gave the following account of what had happened:—

He was with his master Puhlwan, in the Mastokha country, of which Puhlwan was Governor. The son-in-law of Wazir Rahmat of Yasin came over with a message, (1) that Mir Wali had murdered the English gentleman (Mr. Hayward) for the sake of his property, and now said:—

"I have killed the big infidel. I will now kill the little one, i.e., Wazir Rahmat, for he does not obey orders, and until he is killed I cannot rule. When the Wazir is dead, there will be perfect tranquillity;"

and (2) that if Puhlwan came over, Wazir Rahmat would help him to expel Mir Wali and take the country for himself.

Puhlwan informed his uncle, Aman-ul-mulk, and asked permission to—

"proceed with a force to Yasin to expel Mir Wali therefrom, and to occupy the country. The Raja of Chitral sent him the following reply: 'Mir Wali at first, without my information, mischievously brought the English gentleman to this country and then of his own accord sent him away. Recently he again summoned him, and for the sake of his property killed him. This compromises me completely with the Maharaja, to whom I am bound by engagement not to allow such acts to be done. I have been rendered false to my engagements now.'

"The Raja of Chitral first wrote to the officers in Gilgit and to Raja Isa Bahadur, informing them that, as a punishment for the murder of the English gentleman, he had expelled Mir Wali from his country, and made over the Chieftainship of Yasin to Puhlwan Bahadur. He then sent a message to Puhlwan Bahadur, telling him immediately to proceed with a force to Yasin to kill Mir Wali and to take possession of his country."

Mir Wali, on hearing of his brother Puhlwan's approach, fled to Kuchal. He was pursued, but escaped. His family were then captured.

Of Mr. Hayward's property¹—

"Mir Wali gave away the cloth, &c. to the principal men and his own servants, and appropriated for himself the fire-arms and the cash."

These he carried away in his flight, but there were still left in the fort two chairs, a clothes box, and some papers in a box.

22. These articles the Lieutenant-Governor was asked² by Government to endeavour to recover as they would,—

"at any rate, be a melancholy confirmation of Hayward's fate and satisfaction to his friends."

23. When communicating the deposition of Jamil Beg to the Lieutenant-Governor, the Maharaja sent to ask—

"whether he should depute Mr. Drew, a gentleman in his service as a geologist, to Gilgit to make enquiries on the spot."

The Lieutenant-Governor replied that if the Maharaja desired to do so he could have no objection.

The Maharaja had, very soon after the news of Hayward's fate,—

expressed a strong desire that the British Government should depute an officer of its own to enquire on the spot and report to his own Government. The Lieutenant-Governor, however, preferred (so he wrote to Government) the deputation of Mr. Drew from consideration of the difficulties which beset the question of selecting and deputing an officer competent for such an enquiry, and of placing him in such a position as to security and independent authority as could alone render an investigation at Yasin by a British officer a reality and not a farce."

¹ Wazir Rahmat told Subadar Shree Ali that the following property was got from Mr. Hayward's camp:—

Rs. 1,000 worth of cloth.	5 Guns.
15 gold pieces.	8 Pistols.
15 pairs of small silver bracelets.	5 Swords.

² Secretary's semi-official letter to the Lieutenant-Governor, dated 27th September.

24. Hearing that Mir Wali had been given an asylum by Aman-ul-mulk¹ in Chitral, Bakshi Radha Kishen² wrote to him on the subject. Aman-ul-mulk and Puhlwan sent back confidential agents (motamids) with a reply from Aman-ul-mulk to the following effect:—

"Mir Wali having against my orders, by false and deceitful promises and friendship, ensnared the trusty agent of the English, and murdered him and six of his attendants, I dissolved my connection with him and took no concern in the case. But when Raja (Sholan) Mohes-ood-deen Bahadour got intimation of the matter, he marched with a force the same night and took possession of Yasin. Mir Wali was confounded and fled to Badakshan. Mir Muhammad Shah, who is my sincere friend, immediately after Mir Wali got arrived in his country, regarding him as an enemy, sent him under an escort to this country. As I was not to reproach of the people of the world, as it would not be wise to do so."

"P.S.—Mir Wali has come back and has entreated to be allowed to remain here. He has been permitted to do so for the present. Hereafter who knows what God Almighty may choose to ordain."

25. The Maharaja instructed Radha Kishen (1) to tell Aman-ul-mulk's motamids—

"that Mir Wali is an offender against the British Government and myself, and that the Chitral ruler has acted improperly in giving refuge to him; that it is advisable for the ruler to seize Mir Wali and his accomplices and send them over either to the Commissioner of Peshawar or to my own officers in Gilgit; and that for this act he would be treated with favour both by the British Government and by myself; but that otherwise he should know that the consequence of his conduct should not be good for him;"

and (2) to detain the motamids till the Lieutenant-Governor's instructions were known.

26. The Maharaja sent on the intelligence to the Lieutenant-Governor, who (6th October) replied that if Aman-ul-mulk could be prevailed to give up the murderer, and if he left the place where they should be surrendered optional, it would be best that they should be sent over to Gilgit, then across Swat to Peshawar, and that in any case their surrender to the Chief of Badakshan would be clearly useless. There was no need to detain Aman-ul-mulk's motamids.

27. On the 6th October the Maharaja sent on a letter which the Raja of Hunga (Ghuzun Khan) had sent to Radha Kishen in answer to one from him (the contents of which are not mentioned). He said that Mir Wali after killing Mr. Hayward had sent to him and the neighbouring Hill Rajas to say that—

"he had killed an honourable Foreigner, for the sake of the Mohammadian religion, and added that we expected that the infidels would send troops against him, and begged all the Mohammadian Rajas to help him with their forces."

"He added, 'we, the Hill Muhammadans, are true to our word and engagement; we have not got a double tongue. We know only this, that my house is the Sircar's, and yours mine own. Hereafter I shall have an agent of mine permanently stationed at Gilgit.'"

24. The Viceroy, on receiving the intelligence mentioned above in paragraphs 25 and 26, approved⁴ what had been said by the Lieutenant-Governor, and authorised him to—

"inform the Maharaja of Kashmir that the British Government will defray any reasonable expenditure which His Highness may incur in any legitimate efforts to effect that object."

The Lieutenant-Governor conveyed this message to the Maharaja.⁵

29. On the 27th October Mr. Drew and Bakshi Radha Kishen reported to the Maharaja of Kashmir that the body⁶ of Mr. Hayward had been recovered and brought back to Gilgit, and interred in the Government garden there with military honors. It was found that the vertebrae of the neck had been quite severed by a sword-cut; there was a sword wound on the right side and another on the right thigh, and a wound from a stone⁷ on the head. Mr. Drew had by this time almost finished his investigation into the circumstances of the tragedy. The report was forwarded to Government on the 15th November by the Lieutenant-Governor, who said that he had taken steps to obtain from independent sources additional evidence of the circumstances. Those steps were as follows: Captain Ormanney of Hazara sent a trusty emissary to Yasin to find out what he could, not telling him who was supposed to have committed the murder, and Colonel Pollock sent another quite independently.

30. Government, in a confidential letter of the 14th November, expressed satisfaction at learning that this had been done, and said that it might be desirable to send F. B. round by Badakshan for the purpose of getting additional information. Regarding this suggestion the Lieutenant-Governor remarked that it would be better to send some one else, not F. B., who, being one of Mr. Forsyth's informants, had probably preconceived ideas regarding Kashmir.

31. In a confidential letter⁸ No. 21A., dated 30th November, the Lieutenant-Governor

¹ Some confusion is caused by the fact that the Kashmir authorities always call him Aman-ul-mulk, thus making it difficult to distinguish him from Mullick Aman, the brother of Mir Wali and Puhlwan; but as he is called the Ruler of Chitral, it is clear that he is not Mullick Aman.

² I infer that this was the purport of Radha Kishen's letter, but it is not forwarded.

³ Enclosure in letter from Punjab, No. 338-1182, dated 14th October 1870.

⁴ Letter from Government to Punjab, No. 39A.P., dated 24th October 1870.

⁵ Letter from Punjab to Government, No. 9C., dated 15th November 1870.

⁶ That it was recognisable after so long an interval is due (1) to the extreme dryness of the air there; (2) to the fact of the body being, like those of the servants, buried under a heap of stones, not exposed to heats of prey; (3) to the colour of Mr. Hayward's hair, and the shape of his hands and feet being different from those of his followers.

⁷ Due probably to the stones under which the body was buried.

⁸ N.B.—The original of this confidential letter never reached this office; a duplicate has been sent by the Punjab Government—see telegrams of 5th and 6th January.

sent up the first report of Captain Ommaney's emissary,¹ from whom a further communication was expected shortly. He had got his information from the people of Washkoom² (which I gather to be an *alias* for Yasin), some of it from the Wazir of Aman-ul-mulk. He or his informants, it is to be observed, clearly believed that Mr. Hayward was on a mission from Government, of which he formed one limb, Mr. Forsyth being the other.

The emissary's account was as follows:—

"Mr. Hayward and his companions were killed by order of Mir Wali with swords, knives, and stones under the trees towards the north of the village of Washkoom; their property was plundered by Mir Wali.

"When intelligence of this event reached Aman Mullick at Chitral, he advanced with his forces against Mir Wali; the latter fled and Aman Mullick replaced him by Pahlwan, brother of Mir Wali, who was before Chief of Mastuj. The Chitral Ruler himself then returned to his own capital.

"Apparently the Chitral Ruler displays much displeasure with this act of Mir Wali's. He remarks that the English godseaman was a guest in his country, and the act of putting him to death was a very unworthy one. He says—'On one side of my country there is Mir Muhammad Shah, the Chief of Badakshan, who is subordinate to Amir Sher Khan, who is an ally of the English; on the other side is the Maharaja, who is also ally of the English. A poor man as I am, what am I that I should act as an enemy of the English.'

"Mir Wali escaped into Wakhan and Shongiman, on the border of Badakshan, and thence wrote secretly to the Akhund, complaining against his unlawful expulsion from his country by the Chief of Chitral, and soliciting his (the Akhund's) assistance. The Akhund paid no attention to this request and said in reply that Mir Wali had done an unworthy act. If a solitary Englishman had come into his country, he (the Englishman) was not capable of taking his country from him. Moreover, Muhammadans go into the country of the English, but the latter do not either kill or detain them in confinement. He upbraided severely Mir Wali's men and sent them away.

"Another brother of his, named Abdool Rahman,³ son of Gohar Rahman, resided as a hostage in Kashmir; having got intelligence of this occurrence he fled at night, and the Ruler of Kashmir is in great anxiety on account of his flight."

N.B.—It is odd that the emissary makes no mention of Mir Wali having come in and received asylum in Chitral.

32. Colonel Pollock's⁴ emissary Rahut⁵ Miau Kakakheyli, wrote (14th November) from Chitral that he had bought and had sent in Mr. Hayward's watch for Rs. 25, and hoped to get, from Aman-ul-mulk Mr. Hayward's two breech-loaders, which Aman-ul-mulk had taken from Mir Wali.

"Mir Wali, who had fled, had gone away sid Wakhan. He has come back from Zeibuk to Chitral, where he is present now. Mehta Aman Mullick says he has detained him under surveillance, so that he may not go away elsewhere; but this is all tricky.

"The people are trembling with fear as to what the Government may do.

"Aman-ul-mulk is a dependent of Mir Muhammad Shah, the Ruler of Badakshan, and went on the 2nd October to Zeibuk to pay his respects to the Mir. He has arrived there now."

33. Sir H. Durand remarked⁶ on this—

"It is so far satisfactory that, from two perfectly independent enquiries on the spot, not a hint of any suspicion of that kind has been intimated. As both of these independent emissaries were Mussulmans, naturally hostile to the Kashmir Ruler, and men who would have been ready enough to blacken the face of the Hindu Raja, the fact of their silence as to any sort of suspicion of the Kashmir authorities amounts to a strong presumption in favour of their not having instigated this atrocious deed. The boasting of Mir Wali leads to the same presumption. If Your Lordship wish it, presence could now be put upon Aman-ul-mulk from the side of Badakshan through the Amir of Kabul; and finding himself between two fires, one on the side of Kashmir, and another on the side of Badakshan, Aman Mulk might think the pressure too hot to be resisted in spite of Pathan usages, and would probably, influenced by the Maharaja's high pecuniary reward, prefer surrendering Mir Wali in a quarter where he, Aman Mulk, is sure of a large sum of money, to surrendering him to the Amir, who certainly is too thoroughly Afghan to give him a six-pence."

34. There are yet two other persons making or ready to make enquiries, under the instructions of Dr. Cayley,⁷ who from what he has heard is strongly impressed with the belief that Mr. Hayward's death was instigated by Kashmir:—

(1) Muhammad Niaz, a Yarkandi, who went to England with Dr. Leitner two years ago, and who this season came to Ludkh, hoping to accompany Forsyth's party to Yarkand, but arrived too late. On his asking for some employment in India, Dr. Cayley suggested that he should go to Gilgit and Yasin to enquire about Mr. Hayward's death. He went as a petty trader, and may probably be expected at Peshawar about the end of this month.

¹ This emissary also prepared the following account of Aman-ul-mulk's treatment of Captain Grey's emissaries, Dilwan Khan and his companions. They were brought across the border and taken to Aman-ul-mulk by two men, one of Peshawar the other of Kabul. Aman-ul-mulk kept them in confinement, but was inclined to let them go, till warned by some men of Peshawar, that if he did so after he had kept Ismail Khan's men from following their master to Badakshan, he would much displease the Akhund of Swat. Thereupon he "had been conveyed to the Koh-i-Nookan (mountain of injuries) between Badakshan and Kashmir, where they were left by the escort. Nothing was heard of the ambalor afterwards, but on enquiry of some of the men of Chitral I ascertained that he and his comrades were buried under snow."

² The emissary styled the whole country Kashmir. It had all belonged to Gohar Rahman, Aman-ul-mulk's brother-in-law; now part of it belonged to the Maharaja, and from the extremity down to Urakku was occupied by the Uzbekos. Urakku had been held for Aman-ul-mulk by Mir Wali, his sister's son, and Lower Kashmir belonged to Aman-ul-mulk himself.

³ Perhaps an *alias* of Mullick Aman, just as Pahlwan Khan's real name is Mohee-ood-deen.

⁴ Sir H. Durand's demi-official letter to the Viceroy, dated 20th December, and official letter No.

⁵ Or Rahmut.

⁶ 20th December 1870.

⁷ Dr. Cayley's letter of 31st December to the Lieutenant-Governor.

- (2) Mr. Reilly, an East Indian, who was 18 years in Kashmir service, but this year left it in disgust. He made enquiries in Kashmir, but is now ready to go *enid* Jellalabad into Chitral, and from his appearance and knowledge of the languages could, Dr. Cayley told the Lieutenant-Governor, easily pass as a native.

It is to be observed that Muhammad Niaz, knowing probably Dr. Cayley's own suspicions, will not omit any point that tells against Kashmir, nor would Mr. Reilly were he sent. 34A. Lastly, Radha Kishen's letter of 15th September to the Maharaja gives an indication of certain men who would be able to give evidence as to the circumstances of Mr. Hayward's murder. "Three traders from Kulu," he said, "went with Mr. Hayward, and were present where the Sahib was murdered." They were then detained by Pahlwan, but, as they carry on an extensive trade with Gilgit, might be expected to return thither as soon as they were set free. The Punjab Government might be asked to find out what has become of these men.

35. On the 12th Ramzan Aman-ul-mulk wrote to Colonel Pollock, saying¹—

"Mir Wali in his flight took the road to Badakshan *enid* Wakhan. By a thousand stratagems and devices I called him back from the Zebuk country. Had I not got him back, there was great risk of his making forages and raids upon the territories bordering upon my own limits, and had there been an enemy near me, most undoubtedly trouble and damage would have resulted, whilst vigilance and precaution would have been constantly necessary. Now, however, as one quite crippled I hold him a close prisoner, notwithstanding the many claims for compassion upon my own feelings. Very shortly I will despatch Mian Rahut Shah in company with one of my own confidential servants to your presence. Whichever of two courses is considered proper for Mir Wali shall be put into execution; either, firstly, he shall remain a close prisoner as long as my rule lasts, or else, secondly, if it be desired that he be banished to a foreign country, on receipt of the order I will expel him from my territory."

36. To this the Foreign Secretary replied (10th January) by asking whether Colonel Pollock thought there was any reasonable chance of Aman-ul-mulk's being induced to surrender Mir Wali, and if so, whether an attempt should be made to get him delivered² up to the Peshawar authorities, or the Amir of Kabul, or the Maharaja of Kashmir. The Viceroy was quite ready to promise that Mir Wali's life should be spared, although it would certainly be necessary to keep him in strict confinement in British India.

37. On the 12th December³ the Maharaja of Kashmir sent to the Lieutenant-Governor a copy of his reply to the letter⁴ which Aman-ul-mulk had addressed to him (giving intelligence of the misdeed perpetrated by Mir Wali, of his expulsion from Yasin as a punishment for his crime, and his replacement by Pahlwan Bahadour in the principality of Yasin, and intimating his desire to maintain friendship with the Kashmir and British Governments).

The Maharaja reminded Aman-ul-mulk that Mir Wali was always inimical to the Kashmir Government; that he invaded Gilgit and fought against the Kashmir troops there on several occasions; that the Maharaja had constantly borne his chastisement in mind, but had refrained from doing so in deference to Aman-ul-mulk's request; that he would not send any forces to Yasin, and assurances that he, Aman-ul-mulk, would be responsible for any misconduct on the part of Mir Wali.

The Maharaja dwelt on his own fidelity to British interests, on the power of the British Government, and on the guilt of Mir Wali, and said—

"In the event of your failing to surrender him, your action will be opposed to the expectations which our friendly relations justify and to your own best interest; in fact, you will deprive yourself of all advantages. If you will cause Mir Wali to be conveyed, properly guarded, either to Gilgit or Peshawar, whichever of those places you may consider suitable, you will reap many advantages. Your friendship with us will be consolidated in perpetuity; you will secure the satisfaction of the British Government which will be advantageous to you in many respects; and every consideration will be shewn to Pahlwan Bahadour in Yasin (who is in the place of a son to you), in future. You are yourself wise."

38. He sent this letter by the hands of Aziz Munshi and Mirza Taraufah, former lumberlar of Gilgit, who had for a long time resided in Srinagar, and to whom he now held out hopes of restoration to his former office if he succeeded in this negotiation. The Maharaja's secret instructions to Taraufah were to work on both the timidity and cupidity of Aman-ul-mulk, to inform him—

"In the event of his either surrendering Mir Wali to the British Government or sending him over to Gilgit the sum of one lakh of Srinagar rupees shall be granted to him; for the future he would be regarded as a staunch ally of my Government; and the British Government would regard his act as one of good service rendered to it. If Aman-ul-mulk should not surrender Mir Wali, he would certainly be regarded as an offender against the British Government, and the consequences to him will not be good; and furthermore in that case it will be difficult for Pahlwan Bahadour, his nephew and son-in-law, to retain possession of Yasin."

And the Maharaja had deputed Mian Mookesur to Rahmut-collah of Dir to induce him to use persuasion with his relation Aman-ul-mulk.

"The Lieutenant-Governor called attention to the care with which the letter to Aman-ul-mulk is composed, direct threat being carefully omitted, and such degree of menace as the letter contains being only implied, not expressed.

"Also the instructions to Mirza Taraufah are of greater latitude; but evidently they base the hope of a successful issue to the negotiation rather on the cupidity of Aman-ul-mulk than on the fears which the allusion to an undisturbed hold on Yasin by Pahlwan Bahadour are calculated to excite.

¹ Colonel Pollock's demi-official letter to Foreign Secretary, dated 30th December.

² Colonel Pollock has since replied that there is not the slightest chance of the Khan of Chitral giving up Mir Wali, even if it were certain he has the power to do so.—C. U. A.

³ Sir H. Durand's demi-official letter to the Viceroy, dated 10th December, and official letter No. 437-1390, dated 20th December.

⁴ This letter was evidently identical with that addressed to Bakshi Radha Kishen. It has not been sent up.

"The measures adopted by His Highness the Maharaja appear to His Honour (it was remarked) equally earnest, well considered, and judicious."

39. The Lieutenant-Governor, in No. 434-1412, dated 27th December, sent up Mr. Drew's report of his investigation, which he "had just received" from the Maharaja. *N.B.*—Mr. Drew had finished his investigation in Gilgit, Payal, and Gnojo, and returned to Srinagar by the 27th of November (Punjab letter No. 412-1350, dated 8th December), and Mr. Drew's report is dated Gilgit, October 29th. I put Mr. Drew's report withinfold, as it can hardly be summarized, and with it I put the deposition of Jamil Beg, already mentioned, which had been previously taken by Radha Kishen. It is to be remarked, in the first place, that the evidence produced before Mr. Drew is quite consistent in all its parts with just such little variations as would naturally be expected; next, that it bears out the accounts which have from time to time come up from the Maharaja; thirdly, that it differs from the accounts received from the Chitral side only in one point, making no mention of Mullick Aman as the instigator of the murder. Now, Mullick Aman was so mentioned, and that incidentally by no one on the Chitral side, but Aman-ul-mulk, his maternal uncle; and there are good reasons why Aman-ul-mulk should desire to blacken the face of Mullick Aman, seeing that he was a discontented member of the Kashmir family under the Maharaja's protection, and that, as is shown in Pundit Munphool's memorandum on Keshkar, it had been the Maharaja's pet policy to see discontented members of that family as his tools for promoting his designs in that country.

40. It is true that Kootob-ood-deen, deriving his information from the talkative Mehta Sher Sing, told Mr. Forsyth on the 4th October that the murder had been committed by Mullick Aman's men at the instigation of the Kashmir authorities; but I think there is ample ground for discrediting their story entirely, and also for coming to a conclusion as to how it arose:—

(1) Kootob-ood-deen said the murder was committed in Payal at a village called Koochal. Now, Koochal is far from Payal, beyond the Hindu Kush. I pass that by. But Captain Ommaney's emissary bears out the evidence taken by Mr. Drew in saying that the murder was committed within Mir Wali's jurisdiction, quite north-west of Payal. As to the exact place there is really little doubt. Mr. Drew's informant, Gufar Khan, who drew his information from the headman of Darkote, said it was in the jungle north of that village, which is below the pass of the same name (see Mr. Hayward's own map put up). With this agreed the account previously given to Bakshi Radha Kishen by Jamil Beg, who learnt what he knew from Wazir Rahmat. Captain Ommaney's emissary said the scene was the jungle north of the village of Urshkum. Now Urshkum seems to be a generic name for the whole of Yasin.

(2) Kootob-ood-deen not only assigned the murder to Mullick Aman as the principal, but also mentioned the accusation against Mir Wali to dismiss it as a calumny of Mullick Aman's. Nay, he thought it was Mir Wali who sent the news to Peshawar, which we know to have been a mistake. Now, if we are to believe not only the Bakshi Radha Kishen and Mr. Drew's informants, but the letters of Iea Bahadoor of Payal, Mir Wali's uncle, and Puhlwan, Mir Wali's own brother, the burden of the crime rests on Mir Wali alone. And even if these letters are to be regarded as tainted, owing to their having passed through Kashmir, there remain (1) Aman-ul-mulk's letter to Colonel Pollock, laying the blame principally on Mir Wali, and only mentioning Aman-ul-mulk as the instigator; (2) the statement of Hydar Shah, when he came down to Peshawar, that Mir Wali boasted of the deed; (3) the statement of Captain Ommaney's emissary, that the murder was committed by Mir Wali, no mention being made of Mullick Aman as having any share in the guilt. And yet the emissary knew of Mullick Aman's flight, for which he evidently did not know how to assign a specific motive.

And not only so, but his information led him to believe that the Maharaja was much put out by Mullick Aman's flight,—very natural, seeing that the presence at Gilgit of Mullick Aman, a discontented member of the Kashmir family, would always give the Maharaja a ready opening for prosecuting his design on that country.

Why then, it will be asked, should Kootob-ood-deen mention Mullick Aman as the murderer? Clearly because of flight, which again was, I think, very naturally to be accounted for by the instructions to seize him sent by Sir H. Duraud on receipt of Aman-ul-mulk's letter criminating him. As far as the evidence now procured goes, there seems no reason for disbelieving Mullick Aman's stout assertion that this was a slander. Indeed, it is difficult to retain a belief in Mullick Aman's guilt after reading that indignant letter, unless we are to believe that it was forged and cooked for a purpose by the Kashmir authorities.

(3) Next, Kootob-ood-deen got from Mehta Sher Sing his information about the previously formed design against Mr. Hayward, which was executed through Mullick Aman. Now, Mehta Sher Sing had left the Kashmir Court for Ladakh before the news of Mr. Hayward's murder arrived.² His information must, therefore, have been received in the way of scandalous gossip flying from the capital to that out-of-the-way place, Leh, or else he knew of the designs against Mr. Hayward's life while as yet they were but designs. This last supposition

² They certainly are so from the Maharaja's point of view. But they seem to me also to be very shrewdly framed, so as to cut both ways in favour of any designs which the Maharaja may hereafter put in execution against Gilgit. If we approve of them, we could hardly hereafter check an advance on Yasin or Chitral, which, the Maharaja would reasonably argue, had our sanction. If we say nothing about them, the Maharaja will still be able to say he gave us due notice of his intentions.—C. U. A.

³ The Maharaja reported on the 25th August that he must have arrived in Ladakh by that time.

is most improbable. Why should a design like this have been communicated to one who was to have no hand in executing it; why still more to one known to have, as Mr. Forsyth says,—

“a long tongue, and never so happy as when displaying his knowledge and making much of himself?”

These questions are not answered by Mr. Forsyth's explanation of Sher Sing's knowledge of this secret.

He says:—

“The experience I have had of Kashmir tells me that though their intrigues are carried on with great secrecy and cunning, still it is possible to find them out; and unquestionably they are not confined so closely that trusted officers about the Court do not know them. Sher Sing is one of their most trusted officers and is most likely to know all that goes on. Having been just appointed Wazir of Ladakh, where he would have to carry out the Maharaja's policy, it is probable that he would be treated with much confidence. At all events, I cannot believe that he would propagate any false story to the detriment of his master. This story he told Mullick Kootob-ood-deen in strict confidence.”

That is to say, the designers of this deed, either voluntarily or involuntarily, allowed the secret to get into the possession of one who was not to have any part in the deed; and he, careful though he was of his master's interests, allowed the secret to get, the moment he met him, into the hands of a man who was a British subject, and who had been closely connected with a British officer through a long journey from which he had just that day returned, binding him to strict confidence which he at once violated. Mr. Forsyth can hardly have weighed the matter when he accepted a story, implying such an amount of mingled treachery and confidence on the part of the holders of a most dangerous secret. The only reasonable supposition is, I think, the following: The first impulse of every one hearing of Mr. Hayward's death would be to set it down to Kashmir intrigue. Kashmir officials know so much real ill of the doings of their Court that they would at once believe such a story; and a vain, long-tongued man like Mehta Sher Sing would be delighted to relate it to men coming in from outlandish parts. Kootob-ood-deen would not allow the story to become less black in passing it on to Mr. Forsyth, who was coming back full of anger with the Kashmir Court.

41. Kootob-ood-deen also made the following statements to Mr. Forsyth:—

(2nd Statement.)—*That the Kashmir authorities tried to poison Mr. Hayward.*—This, says Mr. Forsyth, we know for certain from Mr. Hayward's own statement to Dr. Henderson, before the party left Srinagar. The particulars are not mentioned, and I think it would be hardly worth while asking for them. The story would probably turn out to be the hearsay account of the suspicion which passed through Mr. Hayward's mind when something disagreed with him. Mr. Hayward's death in Kashmir territory after the publication of that letter in the *Pioneer* would be the greatest misfortune for the Maharaja.

42. (3rd.)—*That Kashmir authorities did everything to forward Mr. Hayward's journey even after the publication of the letter in the "Pioneer."*—This is quite credible, but is not at all in point. Here I must observe that the several letters written by Mr. Hayward, which have been sent up, conveying the warm acknowledgments for all that the Kashmir authorities at head-quarters and in Gilgit had done for him, were all written before his second and disastrous visit to Yasin. Neither therefore are they in point.

43. (4th.)—*The complicity of Bakshi Radha Kishen.*—In support of his belief in this, Mr. Forsyth says:—

“As I was marching from Leh to Srinagar, the Mullick one night brought into my tent a letter which had been sent from Dewan Nihal Chund to Wazir Pannu, the officer appointed to bring my camp to Kashmir from Ladakh. This letter betrayed signs of great alarm, the Maharaja having just received through Dewan Nihal Chund, who is in attendance on the Lieutenant-Governor at Murree, the copy of a letter sent by Hayward to Thornton (I think it was to him). In this letter Hayward had made stout assertions of the efforts and artifices used by the Maharaja's officials to compass his destruction. All this was read out to me by the Mullick, who also told me (whether from the same letter or through other sources I cannot be sure) that Hayward had written a similar letter to the Maharaja which had been kept secret till now; but finding that the same information had been given to the Indian Government, the Maharaja was taking steps to avert any blame from himself by having perwannahs written to Bakshi Radha Kishen, which will be produced at the proper time to make-believe that everything was done to help Hayward.”

“I heard from Mr. Griffin that a letter had been received from Hayward of the nature just described, so that the contents must have been got at in some underhand way by the Kashmir Dewan.”

If such a letter had been written by Mr. Hayward to Mr. Thornton, and copy handed over to the Maharaja's Agent by the Lieutenant-Governor, surely he would have mentioned it in his letters to Government.

Besides, this allegation is inconsistent with the fourth statement, and if true would prove too much, not that Bakshi Radha Kishen had instructions to get Mr. Hayward killed by some means which would throw no suspicion on Kashmir, but that he was to compass his destruction himself.

¹ If such a letter was written by Mr. Hayward and got into the hands of the Maharaja, nothing would be more likely to cause alarm. Knowing the confidence that would be placed in any statement made by Mr. Hayward, it was most natural that the Maharaja should be anxious to clear himself from suspicion.

If such a letter was written, where is it? Why is it not sent up? Before Mr. Hayward left Kashmir, I know as a fact that he wrote letters to the editors of several papers to say that if anything happened to him they might be sure that he had a hand in it. The Editor of the *Pioneer*, the moment he heard the report of the murder, came to me Kashmir had a hand in it. The Editor of the *Express* sent me a copy of the letter Mr. Hayward had said to say he had received such a letter. Mr. Clarke of the *Express* sent me a copy of the letter Mr. Hayward had said to say he had received such a letter. Mr. Clarke of the *Express* sent me a copy of the letter Mr. Hayward had said to say he had received such a letter. It merely gave utterance to Mr. Hayward's suspicions, and contained nothing whatever that is intelligible. Probably the letter to Mr. Thornton, if written, was of the same sort, and proved nothing.—C. U. A.

44. (51A).—*Complicity in allowing Mullick Aman to escape.*—Mr. Forsyth says:—

"I have it in the handwriting of Dewan Kirpa Ram's son, Mullick Aman was allowed to escape two months ago; and not only no information was given to the Government, but the connivance at his escape is clearly shown by a document written by Dewan Nihal Chund to the Maharaja, advising him now to make some show of acting so as to avert suspicion, and recommending for this purpose that his guards who allowed him to escape should be imprisoned. There are other expressions in these papers which are full of significance."

The circumstances are stated above (paragraph 20). Mr. Forsyth has been asked to send all the documents which support his statements. Till this one comes no explanation can be hazarded. But I can quite understand that the Kashmir authorities may have done and written all that they are said to have done or written about so valuable a personage as Mullick Aman from quite other motives than a belief in his complicity in Mr. Hayward's murder.

45. Dr. Cayley, too, from what Mr. Reilly, Colonel Gardiner, and others have told him, believes in the guilt of Kashmir. There is a statement deserving notice in his letter of 31st December, to the Lieutenant-Governor, viz. :—

"When Mr. Drew was up in Gilgit making enquiries, Aman-ul-mulk wrote that Mir Wali had doubtless killed the Feringshi and he had him in custody, but that if an investigation were held, God only knows what would come to light."¹

implying that there was something beyond the mere fact of Mir Wali being the murderer. I have asked him for the authority for this statement.

In another statement Dr. Cayley appears to me mistaken. He said :—

"The Ruler of Yasin is in great dread of Kashmir and quite under its influence, and has always Kashmir Agents at his Court."

The information possessed by Government seems to show that Mir Wali was a bitter enemy of Kashmir; so does Aman-ul-mulk's letter to the Gilgit authorities and the Maharaja's letter to Aman-ul-mulk. The Maharaja had endeavoured to win Mir Wali over to his side, in order to facilitate the advance of his troops on Hunza in 1866, and thought he had done so, but found himself mistaken, inasmuch as the sudden desertion of Mir Wali's force, when the Kashmir troops were well advanced, led to their disastrous defeat. [*Pundit Munphool's memorandum, page 16.*]

46. When Sir H. Durand received Mr. Forsyth's account of what Mullick Kootool-ooddeen had told him, he remarked as follows :—²

"It is of course possible that, in satisfaction of vengeance, Mr. Hayward's murder may have been deliberately planned, and cautiously and treacherously carried out, and that to cover the guilt of such a crime a system of deception, of pre-arranged reports, and of cooked depositions, may have been put into play and continuously brought before this Government with a view to deluding it; but on the other hand, it must be remembered that the Kashmir Government had nothing to gain and very much to lose by such a course; that revenge on the person of a single individual was likely to be very dearly purchased; and that to carry out successfully a protracted and complicated scheme of deceit exposed its author to imminent risk of exposure from the many persons who must co-operate, all more or less liable to be tampered with, and among whom there would inevitably be some who might make capital with the British Government by the betrayal of so bloody a tragedy. Such danger attended this course, and it was one of so reckless a kind that its adoption would hardly, His Honour considers, have been characteristic of the acumen of the Kashmir authorities."³

And he had not then received the accounts of the emissaries sent by Captain Ommaney to Colonel Pollock.

47. Till receipt of further reports by those emissaries, by Muhammad Niaz, and by the emissary sent in lieu of F. B. to make enquiries in the Badakshan side, the suspicions of Kashmir complicity in this tragedy cannot be finally set at rest. But as far as the evidence as yet procured goes, there is nothing to prevent the acceptance of Mr. Drew's conclusion that the murder was effected by Mir Wali (from no instigation on the part of others), but from lust of the wealth which Mr. Hayward was supposed to be carrying on to other parts; partly too from anger at some rough language which Mr. Hayward is said to have used towards him. A servant of Mr. Hayward has spoken to Dr. Cayley (see Dr. Cayley's letter of 31st December) of his forbearing and conciliatory manner during his first trip into Yasin. This may have been the case, but Dr. Cayley had (he told me) heard a very bad account from Yarkandis of Mr. Hayward's way of regarding and treating Natives,⁴ and thought that, except in the matter of physique, he was not at all the man to make his way in these wild regions; so that when crossed by Mir Wali in his desire to go on to Badakshan, he very possibly *did* use the rough language attributed to him by Mushan Sobudar Sher Ali, Guzar Beg, and Tamig Beg, whose informant was Wazir Rahmut, and the Chitral Vakil, whose informant was one of Mir Wali's instruments.

48. A crime like that charged against Kashmir is to the best of my knowledge without example in the dealings of Indian Princes with British officers. Often as a Native Chief must have desired to rid himself of a British officer who had wounded his feelings or made unpleasant disclosures; easy as to outward appearance it would seem to procure such a riddance covertly, there is, I believe, no established instance of such an attempt having been made. And in this case there was everything to make the Maharaja desire the safe return of Mr. Hayward. He and every one knew that if any harm befell Mr. Hayward, the first burst of

¹ If this is the document which Mr. Forsyth gave me to read when he was in Calcutta, it contains nothing more than an appeal to the Maharaja to exert himself and so avert the suspicion which had grown in the Lieutenant-Governor's mind from the fact of Mullick Aman's escape not having been reported.—C. U. A.

² See the expression at A. in earlier part of this *preface*. It is a common Oriental ending.—C. U. A.

³ Paragraph 12 of confidential letter No. 100, dated 16th November.

⁴ e.g., beating his servants in presence of Yarkandis.

suspicion would fall on him, so much so that Dr. Cayley, who knows much of the motives that influence the Kashmir Durbar, said, up at Simla, that as far as Kashmir territory was concerned, Mr. Hayward had increased the chances in favour of his expedition by the publication of that letter.

49. His Excellency the Viceroy will now be able to pass orders on the recommendation in Sir H. Durand's letter of December 20th, to get Amir Sher Ali to put pressure on Aman-ul-mulk from the Badakshan side (see above, paragraph 33). One of Mr. Drew's informants, Soobadar Sher Ali, sent with a Moonshi, Muhammad Kasim, by Bakshi Radha Kishan, to Yasin, to get information, said he had been told in Yasin that Mr. Hayward had been killed by Mir Wali at the bidding of Aman-ul-mulk. And these same persons, Sher Ali and Muhammad Kasim, were present when a letter came from Aman-ul-mulk to Puhlwan, which, there being no other Moonshi by, was read by them, and in which Mr. Hayward was styled "beloved one," "light of the eye," and Puhlwan was told to take care of his property.

"A grave doubt," the Lieutenant-Governor remarks in his forwarding letter of 27th December,—

"arises on the face of these papers, viz., the degree of complicity with crime, or of sincerity in its exposition and punishment, indicated by the part played during these transactions by the Chief of Chitral, Aman-ul-mulk, a Ruler, otherwise compromised by his treatment of subjects of this Government."

If these were really Aman-ul-mulk's expressions, it seems unlikely that any but the most extreme pressure should induce him to give Mir Wali up.

50. Besides the watch recovered in Chitral, which is now in Colonel Pollock's possession, the following property was recovered by the Maharaja's emissaries in Yasin :—

1. A baggage pony.
2. A tent, the ropes cut off.
3. The tressel legs of a small table.
4. Twenty-three books, the covers of which have been all torn off.
5. Some loose papers, printed and manuscript, and a roll of maps.

Mr. Drew said :—

"The pony and tent will be sold at Gilgit or in Kashmir, and the price remitted; the books and papers will be brought down with care."¹

The Lieutenant-Governor has not reported how these articles have in effect been disposed of. The Punjab Government will do so doubtless before long.

51. On the 18th March the Secretary wrote demi-officially to the Lieutenant-Governor asking about the further progress of the enquiry,—

"who are being employed and what are the fruits of their researches as yet. The Secretary suggested that an impartial agent or two might with great advantage be employed to approach the scene of the murder from, it might be, a fresh quarter, say Badakshan, and thus clear up the doubtful circumstances."

To this letter no reply has, I believe, been received.

52. The next paper that arrived was a demi-official from Major Montgomerie, dated 17th March last, who sent on the account of a Sapper Havildar, who in the disguise of a Syud came back through Chitral from his explorations in Central Asia.

The circumstances of the murder as detailed to him agree with what Government has already heard. Mir Wali said to the Havildar himself that he had ordered the murder because the Sahib had used abusive words to him. The Chitralis, he found, believed Mir Wali would not have done this without Aman-ul-mulk's consent, and that Mir Wali's flight to Badakshan had been arranged by Aman-ul-mulk as a blind to the English authorities. Mir Wali had, he said, returned to Chitral on the 28th August [hereby he throws additional doubt on the story of Captain Osmoney's emissary (paragraph 31 of the previous Note). I noted at the time the suspicious circumstance that the emissary, writing at the end of October or beginning of November, said not a word of Mir Wali having returned to and received asylum at Chitral after his temporary flight to Badakshan. On the contrary, Aman-ul-mulk was reported to be genuinely angry with him, and as having expelled him from his country.]

This Havildar says Mir Wali returned to Chitral on the 28th August, and on the 4th September he was seated in public Durbar beside Aman-ul-mulk, the Havildar being placed between them.]

The Havildar, when questioned by Major Montgomerie, seemed to think there was no chance of getting hold of Mir Wali :—

"I asked Major Montgomerie says, what effort money would be likely to have, but he said none unless Mir Wali had fallen out with the Chief when an offer was made to them, then it was possible enough, as on a small provocation they would sell their own children."

In a further letter Major Montgomerie gave his reasons for thinking that the Havildar was not exposed to any distorting influence on the part of Kashmir authorities.

53. In answer to a telegram (7th April), stating that an agent of the Chief of Chitral, then at Peshawar, said his master might be induced to give up Mir Wali, but (12th April),

¹ His Excellency has already ordered that everything belonging to Mr. Hayward is to be carefully preserved and transmitted to his friends in England at the public expense.—C. U. A.

² He never heard any one mentioned as the instigator except Aman-ul-mulk. The people, according to his account, stand in such awe of their Chief that it is not wonderful they should believe that what was done by Mir Wali could not have been done without his aid.

certainly not to the Kashmir¹ authorities, the Secretary on the 15th wrote demi-officially conveying His Excellency's willing sanction to the offer of Rs. 10,000 for the rendition of Mir Wali to the Commissioner of Peshawar, but saying that as Aman-ul-mulk might be merely trying to read the hand of the British Government, all offers should be verbal, until at all events there was an assurance that he was acting in good faith.

In a letter without number dated 10th April, the Lieutenant-Governor forwarded information about Chitral and Gilgit affairs sent by the Maharaja of Kashmir.

The gist of it was that Isa Bahadour, Ruler of Lower Yasin, who has long been an adherent of the Dogras, reported a rumour of an intended combined attack on Gilgit by Aman-ul-mulk of Chitral and the Ruler of Hunza, a stout opponent of the Dogras, who were trying to get the Ruler of Nagar (close to Hunza) to join them; and (2) that Wazir Rahmat (late Mir Wali's, now Pahlwan's Wazir), who had betrayed the Dogra cause in 1864, but had last year given much of the information about Mr. Hayward's murder, was now making overtures for reconciliation and reception in Gilgit.

The Maharaja thereupon issued orders that if an attack is made on Gilgit it should be repelled, but that the Kashmir troops should not pass the border without permission.

54. On the 19th April the Lieutenant-Governor sent a confidential² letter (which should be read) :—

1.—Forwarding the detailed deposition of Aman-ul-mulk's emissary, Muhammad Rahim; it added the following information to that which Government had already acquired.

Muhammad Rahim was in the territory of the Khan of Asmoo (unknown to me) when Mr. Hayward was murdered, and the people there said that he had been killed by Mir Wali, and that by Aman-ul-mulk's orders Pahlwan had gone and taken the country, Mir Wali escaping.

Shortly after Muhammad Rahim returned to Chitral Aman-ul-mulk went off to Badakshan, because the Amir of Kabul, not satisfied with the tribute of a slave boy and girl sent to him from Chitral, had threatened an attack by way of Badakshan. Aman-ul-mulk therefore bound the Mir of that place to his interests by marrying one of his own daughters to the Mir's son. Mir Wali was then in Badakshan, and the Mir begged Aman-ul-mulk to take him back with him as he did not want one who "was a refugee on account of his own crimes." Aman-ul-mulk in his turn objected, saying:

"I had great hopes of friendship with the British Government, but this man has destroyed them all. If I take him back it is probable that he will go back to the Maharaja of Kashmir, at whose instigation he has done this deed (not a probable speech). "It is," Muhammad Rahim said, "besides notorious that this act was done at the instigation of the Maharaja of Kashmir. Indeed, Mir Wali himself acknowledged it to the Mir of Badakshan. I have myself seen Mir Wali at Chitral and in the majlis (Aman-ul-mulk's darbar assembly); he has openly stated that he did it at the instigation of the Maharaja of Kashmir. Aman-ul-mulk asked him in my presence where was his letter authorizing him to do it. Mir Wali said that the letter was lost with some of his property at Badakshan."

At Zeibuk, the Mir of Badakshan said :—

"I cannot keep Mir Wali in my country because I am afraid of his committing raids on border villages having been deprived of his own country; secondly, that he may escape from me and go back to the Raja of Kashmir, who has instigated him; thirdly, it is best for you to have him since I hear that you are on good terms with the British Government, and if there is an enquiry it is best for you to have him in your possession.

"On these accounts the Aman-ul-mulk took charge of him and brought him to Chitral, where he keeps him, not prisoner but under surveillance in a separate house.

"When the Mir of Badakshan made him over to the Aman-ul-mulk, the latter placed six men over him with secret instructions to guard him carefully, but he said to Mir Wali, I give you these men by way of servants; do not be afraid, I will do you no harm; I will give you your head, but I will not give you your country.

"One day when Muhammad Rahim was by, Aman-ul-mulk produced a sword which had been sent to him by the Commissioner, and said it was a great mark of distinction, and he was pleased to be considered a friend of the British Government, and then turning to Mir Wali said, 'you have done a very bad act and thrown great discredit upon me,' Mir Wali hung down his head and said, 'It was my *nazib* (fate), what more can I say.' Aman-ul-mulk then said, '—If there is hereafter any enquiry in this matter I shall clear myself by concealing nothing, and you must do the same, if you wish for any chance of escape.' Mir Wali replied, 'my great mistake was not to have consulted you, but when I acted on the Maharaja's instigation I never expected this matter would become public.' Then Aman-ul-mulk said, 'you have done very wrong and your only way of clearing yourself is to produce the correspondence you had with the Maharaja, and if you give me the papers I will use my best endeavours for intercession.' Mir Wali replied, 'my papers were lost with my property in Badakshan. If these are found my papers will be found with them. If necessary, and enquiry is made, I will conceal nothing and tell the whole truth if it will lead to your clearance with the Government.

"I (Muhammad Rahim) have not heard that Mullick Aman was concerned in the murder. Since the murder I have heard that Mullick Aman has fled from Gilgit and is living in Darel (the independent hills bordering on Gilgit). I have heard that he fled from Gilgit with the connivance of the Maharaja's Colonel commanding the Fort, who said:—'You had better go or else they will demand you of me.' He must have gone with connivance, or how could he have got out of the Fort? I heard this from the men of Pahlwan, who were sent by Aman-ul-mulk after Mir Wali, in the presence of Aman-ul-mulk.

"Mullick Aman and Mir Wali are certainly not friends. I don't know that the former was implicated in the murder, but if this is an important point I can ascertain it."

Muhammad Rahim gave a very detailed explanation of the reason for the enmity between Aman-ul-mulk and Mir Wali on one side and Mullick Aman on the other. Some time

¹ Reason for rendering this desirable in the eyes of His Excellency the Viceroy, that the British laws and procedure would not allow the British authorities to sentence him to capital punishment, but that there were less objections to hanging him in Kashmir.

² No. 167-481

ago Aman-ul-mulk sent Muhammad Rahim down to the Commissioner of Peshawar (who at first distrusted him for the reason given in the Lieutenant-Governor's letter), with the following secret instructions:—

"He (the Aman-ul-mulk) looked upon the British Government as his friend, and his country as a part of service is approved by the Government, he is willing to do anything in his power to further an investigation to meet him there and carry out any wishes the Government might express as far as lay in his power. Besides this he told me to tell the Commissioner that he was willing to send his son and a confidential agent by way of Gilgit in the matter. He would send his son to Peshawar, to Ocutta, or anywhere desired by the Government. Besides this the Aman-ul-mulk said to me that he would do this on condition that the Government sent a trustworthy messenger with me by way of flight. He made no stipulation as to his being a Hindu or Moslem, so long as he was a confidential servant of Government. The Aman-ul-mulk said that it would be better that an English gentleman should go, and he (Aman-ul-mulk) would meet him at Gilgit."

He had heard from a student that Aman-ul-mulk had expelled Mir Wali, who had gone to Dhir.

He would, he says, himself have got Mir Wali in long ago had he effected his desire to obtain an interview with Colonel Pollock.

As to the prospect of getting hold of him now he said:—

"How should Aman-ul-mulk send him if he was never asked. I have not heard that he refused to give him up as he was his sister's son. I don't believe he wrote to this effect. Why should he? He would give him up as a matter of course, if the arrangement was properly made. He cannot give him up without some promise from the British Government or arrangements to secure his safety."

As to the terms he at first asked—

"that the Government should protect Aman-ul-mulk from the oppression of the Maharaja of Kashmir and guarantee him the restoration of his country taken from him by the Maharaja. This could be only well arranged by an interview with a British officer at Gilgit."

Then he said:—

"He would give up Mir Wali without any specified condition as to promise of consideration afterwards for the service performed."

And finally:—

"In the first place the Aman-ul-mulk would wish an expression of the satisfaction of the Government at his service rendered. And secondly, let a Government officer go with the son of the Aman's as hostage and make any enquiry desired."

Aman-ul-mulk was, he said, a comparatively wealthy man.

(Muhammad Rahim by the way gave an account of the death of Dilawur Khan and his companions, which quite agrees with what Government had already heard, that Dilawur Khan was the last man to have been sent as he was well known and disliked for his heretical opinions, and assigned as the cause of Aman-ul-mulk's suspicions, owing to the attempt of the party to get through the country secretly. Had he brought, Aman-ul-mulk said, a slip of paper to shew that he was a British emissary, he would have been sent through in perfect safety.)

55. II.—Forwarding a letter from Aman-ul-mulk, (1) entreating Mr. Macnabb to put trust in Muhammad Rahim his representative; (2) informing him that he had lost all trust in Rahut Shah, who had at first accompanied Muhammad Rahim to Peshawar and belonged to a family in the interest of the Maharaja of Kashmir, and who had now shown himself untrustworthy (this Rahut Shah was Colonel Pollock's emissary, see Section 32 of the previous Note. He said that Aman-ul-mulk's pretended surveillance of Mir Wali was all trickery); (3) professing the utmost readiness to do whatever the British Government wished him to do. For a certain action of his in relevancy to the present case he accounted on the following ground:—

"That as my pecuniary resources are very limited, and as I have no intentions, lest in the event of my being invited by the English Government to do service for them against the Russians or some other ruler I should not be able to do so."

(4) Accounting for Mir Wali's presence in his country in the same way that Muhammad Rahim had done.

50. III.—Unfolding the Lieutenant-Governor's suspicions (stated in a doubtful manner) that the Kashmir authorities were implicated in the matter, as, I have said, the letter stating the ground of these suspicions should be read; and here I put it withinfold.

Those suspicions rest not so much on any statements by Aman-ul-mulk, or his servants [for, as the Lieutenant-Governor observes, there is enmity between Aman-ul-mulk and Kashmir], as on the disappearance of Mullick Aman through Kashmir agency, the evidence of which agency rests partly on Muhammad Rahim's statement above mentioned, which is vague, partly on Kootool-ood-deen's statement, which is precise, and partly on the letters which Kootool-ood-deen intercepted.*

* Or Rahut.

† It would, I submit, be well to convey to the Lieutenant-Governor, demi-officially, a remark as to the extreme impolicy, to use the mildest term, of making use of intercepted letters. Whatever truth there may or may not be in the statement, that whatever goes on in our office is known in Kashmir, this fact is at all events sure to be known. And how can Government expect the Maharaja to take measures for preventing his servants from tampering with letters to its agent in Ladakh, when it connives at such acts on the part of its own informants. Besides, he must have a poor opinion of native wit who thinks that any really compromising letter would be sent by a channel which could be tampered with.

Now, it appears to me that this third destroys the value of the second. Kootob-ood-leen's statement was that Mullick Aman was actually incited to escape at Gilgit when the order came for his arrest. The letters show that he escaped long before from Iskardo, 80 or 70 miles nearer to Kashmir than Gilgit. As to the mention of suspicions¹ in the letters, of course the Kashmir authorities saw that Mullick Aman's flight, to which no suspicion would have attached had it been reported at the time (and the Maharaja's explanation of the reason for not doing so—that there was a prospect of his returning—seems to me most credible), became suspicious from its not being so reported, really from no fault of their own.

57. But these papers now supply an additional reason for regarding Kootob-ood-leen's statement as utterly valueless. In his interview with the Punjab Officiating Secretary, he for the first time mentioned that Mir Wali's participation in the crime had been stated by Sher Sing from the very first to be notorious. I hold it to be impossible that he could have reported this to Mr. Forsyth when he gave his first information, or Mr. Forsyth would not have omitted a fact of such first-rate importance in the corroboration of his view of the affair. Clearly the mention of Mir Wali was an after-thought, when Kootob-ood-leen came to know the weight of the evidence which pointed to him as the murderer. This fact affords sufficient ground for extreme doubt of the story, but the very union of Mullick Aman and Mir Wali's names as fellow-instruments of Kashmir vengeance affords an even stronger ground. There is much appearance of probability in the idea that Mullick Aman, the refugee from Yasin, who had received asylum with the Kashmir authorities, might have consented to become such an instrument. There is even some grain of possibility in the idea that Mir Wali, though his territory was so much coveted by Kashmir, might have been induced to do so through fear if he refused, and promise of immunity from annexation if he consented. But in the idea that Mullick Aman, who also coveted Yasin, had once turned Mir Wali out of it, and had then been turned out by him, should have induced him to turn round suddenly and carry out a Kashmir scheme of wickedness; that Mir Wali should then have fled to a country intimately allied with Kashmir's greatest enemy—Chitral—while Mullick Aman took flight in quite a different direction, that then the Kashmir authorities should manifest a readiness² to take advantage of the crime for the purpose of advancing into and of course annexing Yasin, and thus lead the Chitral Chief to manifest a disposition³ to procure protection for Yasin from the Maharaja's aggression by giving up the Maharaja's supposed tool;—all this appears to me a tissue of improbabilities (one hypothesis reasonable enough in itself conflicting with another element of the story) such as no man could accept for an instant. If this be not sufficient reason for disbelieving the story, there is the fact that those who wish to injure Kashmir most (the Chitral informants) have never represented Mir Wali and Mullick Aman as both of them tools of Kashmir, or both of them implicated in the murder.

58. The Lieutenant-Governor, when sending on these papers, proposes to send Aman-ul-mulk—

"a letter, asking for his aid in the capture of Mir Wali and Mullick Aman, both of whom he has himself accused of taking part in the murder of Mr. Hayward, and to cause their delivery to the Commissioner of Peshawar, and to add that the Government will take into favorable consideration any services he may render to it; and in the event of His Excellency in Council sanctioning the measure, the Lieutenant-Governor would give verbal assurance to the Agent for the payment of Rs. 10,000 on the delivery of the criminals.

"At the same time His Honour is not sanguine that the object can be attained. In addition to the various feelings restraining the Chitral Ruler from giving up his relatives and co-religionists, the difficulties of sending them to Peshawar are by no means slight. He feels confident, however, that no dependence can be placed on the Maharaja in the matter, and he is disposed to agree with the late Sir Henry Durand in his estimate of the difficulties of attaining to any successful results through the deputation of a British officer to Gilgit. But this, if ultimately resolved on, would not be incompatible with the proposed negotiation with Aman-ul-mulk."

59. Lastly, the Lieutenant-Governor recommends that pressure be put on the Maharaja of Kashmir to procure the recapture of Mullick Aman, the responsibility for whose escape rests on him.

This suggestion His Excellency will probably approve.

60. The next letter, No. 160-192, dated 21st April, sends on a long tirade by F. B. against the general conduct of Kashmir and Yakob Beg, of Yarkand, containing many false facts and still more false inferences. What facts there are are already known to the Government. The part of his paper which deals with Mr. Hayward's murder—a mere repetition and an inaccurate one—of statements and accusations already known, is marked with slip Z. I have marked in the margin the inaccuracy of his statements and inferences.

61. Letter No. 516, dated 24th April, sends on the Maharaja of Kashmir's answer to the Lieutenant-Governor's question whether anything had been heard of Mirza Tavangfa and Aziz Munshi, sent by the Maharaja with a letter to the Chief of Chitral for the purpose of trying to procure the delivery of Mir Wali (see paragraph 39 of former Note). The Maharaja says nothing has been heard of them since they moved on some time ago from Yasin towards Chitral, and he fears they have been imprisoned. He sends on a renewed

¹ In addition to the evidence of that readiness already obtained, there are now the repeated stories sent by the Maharaja's agents of an intended and united attack on Gilgit, clearly intended to prepare the British Government to consent to an advance of the Gilgit troops, or perhaps even to hear that there has been a collision and a consequent advance in self-defence.

² I assume this to be his motive, partly because it is indicated by Muhammad Rahim's overtures, partly because there could be no other motive than fear of aggression from Kashmir for readiness to give up his sister's son. He has not yet been threatened on account of the asylum he gives that relative from the side of Kabul or Badakshan; and to give him up for a mere bribe would make him the scorn of all the Muhammadans of Central Asia, who would on the other hand accept as reasonable the excuse of pressure.

³ Never both at the same time,—Mullick Aman at first, Mir Wali afterwards.

account of the endeavours made by the agents of Aman-ul-mulk and the Chief of Nagar to stir up the neighbouring Chiefs to attack him, and says that he has told the officer in Hazara and Gilgit to hold the troops in readiness and to be vigilant.

62. Letter No. 173-521, dated 27th April, adds to the difficulty of getting to the bottom of the matter by forwarding the mystifying information derived by Niaz Muhammad, Dr. Cayley's emissary, mentioned in paragraph 31¹ of the previous Note. It is derived from Mir Wali's Munshi with whom Niaz Muhammad said he had some previous acquaintance. (If so, how did he maintain his disguise in Yasin? He had been imprisoned for a long time on suspicion of being a spy.) His account of the scene (Daghot, two stages north-west of Yasin) and circumstances of the murder almost exactly agrees with that given by Mr. Drew.

63. The information he brings destroys all hope of getting information from the so-called Kulu traders mentioned in Section 34A of the previous Note. They are from Kulu, a wild country somewhere in the Yasin neighbourhood.

64. As to the guilty parties his account is as follows:—

"Mir Wali sent a message to Aman-ul-mulk, saying that Mr. Hayward was coming to Yasin in a few days: Aman-ul-mulk in reply sent Khoshal Beg, his Wazir, with instructions to bring the Sahib from Yasin to Chitral: Mir Wali and Khoshal Beg tried unsuccessfully to induce Mr. Hayward to go to Chitral, the motive² being that he might be killed by the lawless Shiganis beyond Chitral without any one being the wiser as to the instigator: Mir Wali consulted Khoshal Beg, who advised him to let the Sahib proceed, and to kill him and his retinue two days after his departure: after the murder Mir Wali wrote to the Maharaja to the effect that the Sahib had been killed by Aman-ul-mulk for the sake of plunder: the Maharaja then wrote to Aman-ul-mulk and Mir Wali, disapproving of the murder, and advising its concealment, and also to conceal Mr. Hayward's Munshi; in the meantime Aman-ul-mulk wrote to the Maharaja, saying that he had not ordered the Sahib to be killed, but that Mullick Aman (who was in the service of the Maharaja at Gilgit) had written to his brother Wali to kill and plunder the Sahib, who was going to Yasin. If the English were to ask him (the Maharaja) for satisfaction for the murder of the Sahib, he might give up Mullick Aman to their revenge. He (Aman-ul-mulk) would send his army under Puhlwan Bahadur to conquer Yasin and kill Mir Wali. Aman-ul-mulk also wrote³ privately to Mir Wali, informing him that he would have to send some men to apprehend him, and that Mir Wali had better fly for refuge to Chitral: on the receipt of this letter, Mir Wali ordered Mr. Hayward's Munshi, who had been kept alive a month⁴ after his master's murder, to be killed: the Maharaja then ordered Mullick Aman's arrest, but Bakshi Radha Kielen warned him privately first, at Gilgit, and allowed him to escape⁵ to Darel: his wife and son were thrown into prison, where they received a monthly allowance; and subsequently Puhlwan Bahadur and Wazir Rahmut⁶ (who had also advised the murder) procured the release of some of Mullick Aman's servants."

The Lieutenant-Governor's conclusion is:—

"On the whole, the deposition does not afford strong evidence incriminatory of Aman-ul-mulk, but it does lessen the weight of that hitherto collected relative to the part taken by the Maharaja."

67. On the 30th May, Mr. Girdlestone received through the Kashmir Vakil:—

I.—A letter from Durree Khan, Mokuddum of Chilas, to the Maharaja of Kashmir, saying that he had at Saran (? say in the bottom of the Tungeer valley) met Mir Wali, who said (1) he had killed the Englishman according to the sealed writing of Aman-ul-mulk; (2) that he would give himself up if the Maharaja in writing would promise him security (*aman bukshud*).

Durree Khan himself then came to Chilas, and Mir Wali sent his agent, Muhammad Nasir, Akhoondzada, to the Maharaja without telling Mullick Aman (Mullick Aman⁷), but that agent was kept back by illness. Meanwhile, Mir Wali would remain in Tungeer in expectation of an answer; Durree Khan asked for a present for himself and the Akhoondzada who, he said, was doing this service at the risk of his life, as the people of Darel and Chilas were not pleased with what was being done.

II.—A letter from Puhlwan Bahadur to Radha Kielen of Gilgit:—

- (1) announcing the return from Chitral of Wazir Mirza (whom the Maharaja had sent in January) and Aziz Munshi;
- (2) saying that Aman-ul-mulk had forgiven Mir Wali; that standing on his dignity he would not give him up to the Maharaja, but had sent him away to the Afghans; that Mir Wali had since gone to some other place; when Puhlwan knew where exactly he would tell Radha Kielen;
- (3) asking for the despatch of a force of 2,000 men to enable him to catch Mir Wali "who is the enemy of us both;"

¹ The Secretary remarked in the margin of that paragraph—"He has probably imbibed Dr. Leitner's bitter hatred of Kashmir," and I observed that this man, knowing probably Dr. Cayley's suspicion, would not omit any point that told against Kashmir.

² Quite possible, the Lieutenant-Governor observes, as Mr. Hayward (according to Mr. Drew's report) gave Mir Wali an intimation of his coming by letter, dated 25th May.

³ This statement that the murder was designed by Aman-ul-mulk is inconsistent with that Chief's incrimination of Mullick Aman, and with his readiness to give up Mir Wali, provided he got protection against Kashmir aggression. The motive assigned too—"dislike of English explorers"—disagrees with all previous accounts.

⁴ Most improbable, the Lieutenant-Governor says, as the Maharaja would certainly have produced such a letter had it been written.

⁵ This is confirmed by Aman-ul-mulk's subsequent words of affection regarding Mir Wali. But on the other hand Mir Wali was at once deserted by his Wazir, fled to Balakhan, not to Chitral, and some of his followers were killed in the attack.

⁶ No, not a month.

⁷ Inconsistent with the statement in the letter intercepted by Kootob-ood-deen that Mir Wali escaped from Iskerdo.

⁸ Not much of the information, incriminating Mir Wali, came from Wazir Rahmut's men.

⁹ No—more probably Aman-ul-mulk.

(4) saying:—

"I send you my foster brothers, Sultan and Mughal, and if you do not believe these I will send Wazir Bahadur, that you may have confidence, and give the force."

68. In No. 13, dated 6th June,¹ Mr. Girdlestone reported to the Punjab Government that the Maharaja was deferring his replies to Durrce and Puhlwan till he heard the result of Mr. Girdlestone's references to Government; but had meantime told Radha Kishen and General Hoshiyar, Commanding at Gilgit, to let Durrce and Puhlwan know—

"that if either succeeded in capturing Mir Wali he might reckon on a reward of one lakh of Chitki rupees, and would ever afterwards be considered as a well-wisher of the Kashmir Government. His Highness had expressed to Mr. Girdlestone his disinclination to spare the life of Mir Wali, or to grant him security if he falls into his hands."

69. The substance of these communications from Durrce Khan Mr. Girdlestone sent by telegram on the 1st of June to the Foreign Secretary, who, on the 4th, replied by the following telegram:—

"Impress on Maharaja desirability of using every effort to obtain custody of Mir Wali. Promise of half a lakh, or more if needful, in addition to what Durbar may give. Maharaja may promise life will be spared if he surrenders within sixty days or such longer time as you think suitable."

70. And in his demi-official of the same date the Foreign Secretary added the following remarks, that as [while the rest of the story was lost in doubt] the fact that the murder was committed at Mir Wali's immediate order might be considered certain, it was of the greatest importance that he should be delivered into British hands; should not, therefore, be executed if he fell into the Maharaja's hands, but should be made over to us. Nothing of this should be at present communicated to the Maharaja. The Maharaja was to be left to adopt his own measures for obtaining Mir Wali's capture. No opinion as to movement of troops was to be expressed.

71. The translations of Durrce and Puhlwan's letters were on the 8th June sent by the Lieutenant-Governor to the Foreign Secretary, who wrote again demi-officially to Mr. Girdlestone, saying that he should hint at no terms with Mir Wali except the sparing of his life.

72. In his No. 14,² dated 9th June, Mr. Girdlestone reported the words of the letter, in which he had suggested to the Maharaja the message which he should send to Durrce and Puhlwan, his reason for making the suggestion being that it was desirable to guard against the use of the ambiguous language which native durbars affect.

73. After consultation with Mr. Drew, he increased the reward to be offered to Puhlwan to a lakh of Company's rupees, the Chitki rupees being little valued in the parts about Yasin, whereas Company's rupees were much prized.

There was no need of increasing the reward offered by the Maharaja in the case of the Mokuddum of Chilas, as considering his circumstances it was munificent.

74. The Maharaja was recommended to give to Durrce Khan and empowered (if he thought it desirable) to give to Puhlwan the assurances of the British Government,³ that Mir Wali's life would be spared if he surrendered within *one month* (not 60 days) of bearing of this condition.

75. The Maharaja was also asked to take any further action that might commend itself to his judgment, for the purpose of attaining the object in view. *e.g.*, endeavouring to get at Mir Wali through Mullick Aman⁴ or the Mirs of Darel or Tungeer.

76. In his No. 16,⁵ dated 10th June, Mr. Girdlestone sent up a translation of the report written by Aziz Munshi on his return from Chitral, recounting (1) that when the demand for the surrender of Mir Wali was conveyed to him, Aman-ul-mulk was disposed to consent, but through fear of neighbouring opinion contented himself with expelling him; (2) offering to meet the Maharaja on the border of the two territories, and arrange terms of everlasting peace with him.

Aziz closed his account by saying:—

"Having said this he sent off vakils,⁶ by name Muhammad Kurteem and Dewan Begi, with presents of horses, hawks, &c., and with letters for the Maharaja. What his intentions are in his inmost heart God only knows. The true state of Puhlwan Bahadur and Mullick Aman (the fugitive) and Mir Wali, *the ingrate!* will be known from the letters of the Bakshi. After a few days when I have got leave from the Bakshi I shall start for your presence."

Mr. Girdlestone was to see Aziz Munshi, Wazir Mirza, and the Chitral Vakils when they came, and hoped to elicit further information as to the intentions of Aman-ul-mulk.

77. He had received copy of a letter from the Council of Chilas to the Maharaja, saying that Mir Wali had a little time before arrived with 60 servants at Shukab, perhaps a place in Tungeer, from whence the zemindars of Tungeer had turned him out.

78. In No. —, dated 1st July, the Punjab Government forwarded a letter, dated 21st June, from the Maharaja of Kashmir, sending a translation of letter from Abdoolah, his secret

¹ Enclosure in Punjab letter No. 288, dated 14th June.

² Enclosure in Punjab letter, No. 668, dated 24th June.

³ The reason for this being that Mir Wali might not be satisfied with the Maharaja's assurance.

⁴ As Mullick Aman had not been quite cleared of suspicion, Mr. Girdlestone did not suggest to the Maharaja to hold out direct hopes of pardon to him, but could only hint at his employment in such a general way as to leave him to infer that if he succeeded in getting Mir Wali into the Maharaja's power, he might look for a favourable consideration of his own case."

⁵ Enclosure in Punjab letter No. 568, dated 24th June.

⁶ These accompanied Aziz Munshi and Wazir Mirza back to Gilgit.

news-writer at Chitral, to the effect that Mir Wali had "at the suggestion of the miscreant Aman-ul-Wali" left Sankar and gone to Khaili to get help; that Aman-ul-mulk had sent 800 horsemen to help him; that Mullick Aman had left Sankar and gone to Savan; that all three, Mir Wali, Aman-ul-mulk, and Mullick Aman, intended to attack Gilgit; and that after the departure of Aziz Munshi, Aman-ul-mulk had sent an agent to the people of Darel to invite their co-operation in the attack.

79. In No. 103S., dated 31st July, the Punjab Government sent on a letter dated 7th July, from the Maharaja's officers in Gilgit, saying that they had found out from an envoy of Puhlwan¹ that Mir Wali had been sent out of Chitral by Aman-ul-mulk only for the purpose of killing the inveterate enemy of Aman-ul-mulk, Mullick Shah,² and his brother, with the promise that if he did so he would be given the Governorship of Yasin or Mustoj; that Mir Wali having accomplished his purpose of killing Mullick Shah had returned to Chitral; and that Puhlwan was now apprehensive of the promise being fulfilled, and of his being turned out of Yasin. He, therefore, wanted to secure the promise of the support of the Maharaja of Kashmir, so that whether Mir Wali were made Governor of Mustoj or Yasin, they, aided by Kashmir, might attack and capture him.

The Gilgit authorities were about to send off to Puhlwan the Maharaja's letter, offering a lakh of Chilkki rupees for the apprehension of Mir Wali.

80. In acknowledging this Government said it presumed that the Resident in Kashmir had been put in possession of the information.

81. In No. 131S., dated 21st August, the Punjab Government sent on another communication from the Maharaja's officers at Gilgit, of the same date as that above summarized, viz., 7th July, forwarding a distinct offer from Puhlwan and Wazir Rahmut, that, in case Aman-ul-mulk gave Yasin or Mustoj to Mir Wali, they would get Aman-ul-mulk murdered, and with the co-operation of a force from Kashmir seize Mir Wali himself.

82. In reply (No. 1361E., dated 9th September) Government expressed concurrence with the Lieutenant-Governor, in thinking that the suggestion, even if it was certain that it had been made by Puhlwan, was not one to be encouraged.

83. In No. 143S., dated 30th August, the Lieutenant-Governor forwarded a letter from Mr. Girdlestone, in which was enclosed a translation of a letter from Isa Bahador to the Governor of Gilgit, dated 6th August, stating that he had received news from Yasin that, consequent on Aman-ul-mulk having given Yasin to Mir Wali, Wazir Rahmut had collected all the men of Yasin, and had brought them with the ladies of Puhlwan Bahador, his own ladies and the property of Puhlwan to the fort of Rosbus, in Payal; also that Puhlwan had sent a messenger to Wazir Rahmut to say that if Yasin was given to Mir Wali he would not stay in the country. Isa Bahador went on to say that he anticipated good results from the quarrel between Puhlwan and Mir Wali, and apparently expected the arrival of a force from Kashmir. In reply to the above the Maharaja ordered every attention to be shown to the refugees; that if Puhlwan applied for a force to assist him he should be put off with vague promises, and that further enquiries were to be made as to the truth of the statement that Yasin had been given to Mir Wali.

84. Mr. Girdlestone said that, though the above news reached Jammu a week before the date of his letter, no further confirmatory intelligence had been received; on the contrary a vakil from the Khan of Chitral, lately arrived, expressed his belief that Aman-ul-mulk and Puhlwan Bahador were on friendly terms. Mr. Girdlestone considered that the movement was probably a feint on the part of Rahmut with the view of obtaining in Yasin the assistance of a force from the Maharaja for some purpose of his own.

85. In another letter, No. 145S., dated 30th August, the Punjab Government forwarded a translation from Aziz Munshi to the Maharaja of Kashmir, giving an account of his mission to Chitral.

He left, he said, with Mirza Taraufa, who is not subsequently mentioned, but in his place Mirza Wazir, probably the same man. Before reaching Mustoj, they met some horsemen coming from thence, and from them heard of the assassination of Mir Ghazi, a brother of Mir Wali and Puhlwan Bahador; near Mustoj met Puhlwan Bahador who took them aside and said that, though he was a son-in-law, he was no friend of Aman-ul-mulk; was willing to fight against him and take Mir Wali prisoner; and would accompany Aziz Munshi and Mirza Wazir to Chitral; this he did. A few days after their arrival at Chitral they had an interview with Aman-ul-mulk, and gave the Maharaja's message about his surrender. Aman-ul-mulk replied:—

"It is difficult to send Mir Wali to Peshawar, for extensive independent territory intervenes between that place and Chitral. I will now make Raja Puhlwan to make a false agreement with Mir Wali and will send him to Yasin. When he arrives at Yasin, Wazir Mirza and Puhlwan Bahador will send intimation to the officers in Gilgit, and summoning an escort of one or two thousand men will deliver Mir Wali to the men to convey him to Gilgit. Mir Wali urges me to make over to him the territory of Mir Ghazi. I will now offer him half the territories of Mustoj and Yasin, and he will doubtless agree to this arrangement, and will proceed with Raja Puhlwan to Yasin."

"For two months Aman-ul-mulk continued to speak in the same strain, and day after day promised to send Mir Wali with Raja Puhlwan to Yasin. After two months Aman-ul-mulk stated in open Court that he had offered to make certain arrangements between Raja Puhlwan and Mir Wali, but that the latter had

¹ See K. W. Secret Proceedings, August 1871, Nos. 36-37.

² A cousin of Aman-ul-mulk. Quarrelling with him in 1862 he took refuge with the Maharaja (see pages 68 and 88 of Pundit Munshood's Chitral).

³ See enclosure of Punjab letter, dated 30th August.

refused to agree. If he (Aman-ul-mulk) should now attempt to seize Mir Wali and send him to Yasin, the independent tribes of the intervening country, who had united together, would not allow him to be sent. Thus to Yasin, therefore he had expelled Mir Wali with his wife and children from his country; and he now proposed to send Wazir Mirza back towards Gilgit in the train of Raja Puhlwan, but that he would detain Aziz Munshi.

"Accordingly Raja Puhlwan was sent back, but I was detained. Aman-ul-mulk said that he had sent his own agents to Srinagar with the Mirza,¹ and that he would send back Aziz Munshi on the return of his own agents from Srinagar."

After a fortnight, however, Aziz Munshi succeeded in getting away, receiving from Muhammad Kurum Dewan Begi of Chitral, at his departure, a letter for the Wazir and the Dewan (of Kashmir) and being accompanied by Wazir Mirza. Two agents of Aman-ul-mulk were despatched at the same time, but travelled slowly and apparently separately, and one of them (Niamut Khan) was, when Aziz Munshi made this report, in Gilgit; the other (evidently Muhammad Kurim, who is mentioned further on) at Srinagar. Aziz Munshi took a month to reach Mustoj; thence he travelled through independent territory, Darel, Pashkor, Sandar, &c., and arrived in Yasin about the time of the great earthquake at Gilgit. A little further on they (he speaks in the plural) were met by Muhammad Kurrim,² the Dewan Begi of Chitral, Wazir Mirza (who, he had just said, accompanied him from Chitral), and a little before had said went off before him with Puhlwan Bahadoor), and the agents of Puhlwan Bahadoor.

86. With this was forwarded a translation of the above-mentioned letter from Aman-ul-mulk to the Kashmir Wazir and Dewan. In it Aman-ul-mulk said that if the seizure of Mullick Aman, who was in Darel, was wanted, he would get Puhlwan Bahadoor to entice Mullick Aman in by an offer of half his territory, would then seize him and give him over to the Kashmir officials. If, again, the Kashmir authorities had any designs on Badakshan, they should send to say through Aziz Munshi and Masalla (the person who is mentioned below) and quickly, for now was the time when the dispossessed Mir Jehandur Shah was in Shignau.

"Dewan Peeji Abdoel Kurrim and Aziz Munshi will," Aman-ul-mulk said, "represent all to you."

87. With this also was sent translation of a letter from Aman-ul-mulk to the Maharaja himself, saying:—

(1) On Mir Wali's murder of the Englishman,—

"I sent a strong force against him. He fled before it towards Badakshan, but the authorities of that country being my friends sent him to me. I had desired to deliver him to Your Highness's officials at Gilgit, but this would have ruined my reputation among the Muhammadans throughout Afghanistan and Badakshan; so immediately on arrival of Your Highness's agents, I expelled him from Chitral.

"Mir Wali was formerly in the middle of the way; he involved himself in misfortune by his own mischief. Another brother of his was also mischievous. He was put to death and I appointed Raja Puhlwan Bahadoor in their room. He is in the place of a son to me, and as long as he lives he will not fail to serve Your Highness faithfully, for I have repeatedly advised him not to fail in doing so.

(2) "Formerly I sent with Iman Mokuassar, the son of my Wazir, and my brother's son, to Your Highness, but the mission proved fruitless. I am not aware whether this was not owing to the intrigues of the Mian who is very mischievous. Now that Your Highness has sent me a perwana, I have written a reply in the hope that Your Highness may act contrarily to the past, and train and cherish me. Any service which may then be entrusted to me, connected with these parts, as far as the borders of Badakshan, I shall esteem it my good fortune to perform in the best manner.

"If Your Highness may be pleased to include me amongst your friends, I beg that Muzoola Khan and another confidential agent may be sent a little distance this side of Gilgit.

"I will then, if Your Highness should so choose, send my nephew and my Wazirs to Gilgit, and will take the opportunity of a hunting excursion myself subsequently to proceed to Yasin or Reehan and there meet any of Your Highness's officers deputed from Gilgit and Isa Bahadoor. A perpetual treaty will then be concluded between us, and whatever orders I may receive through Your Highness's agents I will carry out. Should at any time misfortune overtake me, I expect that the victorious troops of Your Highness will be sent to help me; and should Your Highness at any time so desire, I will, as behoves a friend, immediately send forces to chastise Your Highness's short-sighted enemies."

88. In No. 199, dated 23rd September, the Punjab Government sent on a letter No. 77, dated 13th September, from Mr. Girdlestone, forwarding—

(1) Translation of a letter from the Khan of Chitral to the Maharaja of Kashmir, brought by his wakil Muhammad Kurrim Dewan Begi of Chitral.

[This translation agrees substantially in all respects but one with the translation of the copy which was sent by the Maharaja to the Punjab Government, and was forwarded in Punjab letter No. 145S., dated 30th August. The omission is, however, important. At the close of the one sent by Mr. Girdlestone, there are these words:—

"Aziz Munshi and Muhammad Kurrim will say two words of a private nature."

Mr. Girdlestone hoped to ascertain in due time what these verbal representations were. In the copy sent by the Maharaja of Kashmir to the Punjab Government, the whole of this sentence is omitted.]

¹ Does this refer to the deputation of Mian Mokuassar mentioned below?

² Mirza Wazir? But Mirza Wazir is lower down mentioned as having accompanied Aziz Munshi back.

³ Whom a little before he said land, when he left Chitral, given him a letter for the Kashmir Wazir and Dewan. The whole of the latter part of the story is full of contradictions.

⁴ According to Aziz Munshi it was Mir Wali who was to be the victim of this design.

⁵ See enclosure of Punjab letter, dated 30th August 1871, No. 145S.

⁶ Mir Ghazi.

⁷ See enclosure of Punjab letter, dated 30th August 1871, No. 145S.

(2) *Enclosure in Mr. Girdlestone's letter. Statements made by Muhammad Kurrim to Mr. Girdlestone.*—He said that the Khan's reason for deputing an officer of his rank was to add force to his desire for intimate friendship with the Maharaja; that Mir Wali was in Tungeer when he left Chitral about the middle of June;¹ that he had come with Wazir Mirza, Aziz Munshi, and Niamut Khan;² that—

“before³ Mr. Hayward's death the Khan and Mir Wali corresponded with each other occasionally, but they could not be said to have been on friendly terms; that the Khan of Chitral has occasional intercourse with Darel, Tungeer, Yasin, Chilas, and Payal; but as he considers these States to be subject to the Maharaja, he does not cultivate close relations with them. These States, if they have any business with Chitral, send *sukils* thither, but not otherwise.”

“The Khan wanted Mr. Hayward to go to Chitral after his first visit to Yasin, but Mir Wali would not let him. On the occasion of his second visit Mr. Hayward had been killed before the Khan knew of his proximity. He had a dispute with Mir Wali about the carriage of his property, and ordered Mir Wali angrily in Durbar, if he could not procure coolies, to take up a bundle himself. This made Mir Wali determine to kill Mr. Hayward.”

“The Khan would not seize Mir Wali, although offered a reward of a lakh of rupees by the Maharaja of Kashmir, because he feared the vengeance of his Mussulman neighbours.”

He said:—

“I am not aware of any difference having lately arisen between Aman-ul-mulk and Puhlwan Bahadour. On the contrary my recent letters go to show that they are on the most friendly terms with each other. I do not know how to write.”

He said too that the private seal of Aman-ul-mulk never left his possession, nor his larger seal, or that of the Dewan Begi or the Dewan Begi's brother's, thereby disproving (2) the statement made by Mr. Hayward's khansama to Mr. Drew, and by him repeated to Mr. Girdlestone,—

“that⁴ the Khan's seal was sent to Yasin to be impressed on the petition which Mr. Hayward took from Mir Wali to the Punjab Government concerning the recovery of Gilgit.”

the statement sent by Durree Khan to the Maharaja (enclosure 1 in Mr. Girdlestone's letter of 30th May) that Mir Wali had killed Mr. Hayward on the authority of a letter sealed by Aman-ool-moolk.

(3) *Enclosure in Mr. Girdlestone's letter—Statements made by Aziz Munshi to Mr. Girdlestone.*—He said he had been three months in Chitral; had only had two interviews with Aman-ul-mulk, who had before his arrival received intimation of the Maharaja's offer of a lakh of rupees for Mir Wali's surrender. Aman-ul-mulk said at the first interview that he could not send Mir Wali by the Peshawar route as he feared the Eusufzais and the people of Swat and Bonyr: but would bring about a reconciliation between him and Puhlwan Bahadour, one receiving the Governorship of Mustoj, the other of Yasin; and then make Puhlwan Bahadour seize and surrender Mir Wali, the ill repute of the deed thus falling not on him but on Puhlwan Bahadour. Mir Wali was during this time at a village called Aujon on the road to Dheer. Rather more than 1½ months afterwards Aman-ul-mulk told Aziz Munshi in open Durbar that he had expelled Mir Wali from his dominions, but was afraid to surrender him for fear of exciting the wrath of the Muhammadans of Yaghistan. Nothing more passed till the day of Aziz Munshi's departure, when Aman-ul-mulk said that both Mir Wali and Mullick Aman were, he heard, in Tungeer, and again promised to get Mir Wali apprehended through the instrumentality of Puhlwan Bahadour. Leaving Chitral Aziz Munshi met Puhlwan Bahadour and Wazir⁵ Mirza at a place nine marches distant from Gilgit; was told that Mir Wali was in Tungeer, and organizing an attack against Puhlwan Bahadour, who was preparing to repel it; and that Puhlwan Bahadour had, shortly⁶ before Aziz Munshi's arrival, killed Mir Ghazi (his brother) at Bakhan near Mustoj simply from enmity.

“Puhlwan Bahadour⁷ is,” Aziz Munshi said, Governor of Mustoj as well as of Yasin. He is a thorough well-wisher of the Khan, and very loyal to him. His loyalty is due to their close relationship. The Khan puts great confidence in him. He does not receive tribute from him I believe, but a present of slaves is often sent; for instance, after killing Mir Ghazi, Puhlwan Bahadour sent all his victim's servants as slaves to the Khan.”

89. In No. 196 of 30th August, the Punjab Government sent a letter, No. 64, dated 21st August, from Mr. Girdlestone, forwarding papers received from the Maharaja, *i.e.*,—

(1) A letter from Isa Bahadour to Radha Kishen, Governor of Gilgit, dated 8th August, saying that Wazir Rahmat had brought his family, and the family and property of Puhlwan

¹ It is not easy to reconcile this date with those given elsewhere. Aziz Munshi and Wazir Mirza, whom the Maharaja had sent off to Chitral in January, were reported to have returned to Yasin in a letter sent by Puhlwan Bahadour to the Maharaja, and enclosed in Mr. Girdlestone's letter of 30th May: and they have told the Maharaja that they took more than a month in the journey.

² This man, Mr. Girdlestone says, came to Gilgit as *sukil* last autumn, and was sent by Mr. Drew there.

³ See enclosure of Punjab letter, No. 198S, dated 28th September 1871.

⁴ Enclosure of Punjab letter, No. 198S, dated 28th September 1871.

⁵ This person, Aziz Munshi said, had been ordered to stay in Gilgit and not to come on to Srinagar.

⁶ Aman-ul-mulk, in his letter to the Maharaja, says that he killed Mir Ghazi, and the terms in which he says this seems to show that it was about the time of Mir Wali's flight from Yasin in 1870. And Aziz Munshi had in his report to the Maharaja said that on his way to Chitral he had, when nearing Mustoj, boarded Mirza Ghazi.

⁷ See enclosure of Punjab letter, No. 198S, dated 28th September 1871.

Bahadour, with all the men of Yasin to the fort of Roshun in Payal; the reason being the receipt of news that Aman-ul-mulk had given Mustoj to Mir Wali.

"Nothing better," Iaa Bahadour said, "could happen than that a violent quarrel should occur between Mir Wali and Pahlwau, so that in the winter their affair should be concluded (?). Amongst one's enemies there should always be dissensions. Let it be known that I am quite ready for that one's coming [probably the Maharaja is meant, the phrase used is *au taraf*.]"

(2) *The Maharaja's reply to the letter in which Radha Kishen had sent this on.*—It was to the effect that the Maharaja, though not trusting Aman-ul-mulk, still "did not believe that he should at all set thus." Radha Kishen was to make enquiries. If Wazir Rahmut and Pahlwan Bahadour or their families came in, they were to be well treated, but separated.

30. I now turn to the communications which have been received from Mir Wali himself.

In a demi-official note of the 6th July, the Lieutenant-Governor sent on translation of a letter, dated 11th May, received through Mr. Macnabb, and addressed by Mir Wali to British officers in general, asserting his innocence, and accusing the following persons:—

Mir Ghazi Khan [his own brother and enemy].

Pahlwau [another brother and his supplanter], and Wazir Rahmut, who had been his, and was now Pahlwan's, Wazir.

"The true state of the case is," he said, "that the Sahib came to Yasin and made great friendship with me and then went back again; and because of my having been friendly towards him people on all sides were angry with me and determined to kill the Sahib. I was well aware of their designs, but for fear of my own life dare not disclose them, because your servant was not strong enough to risk displeasure in these quarters."

"When the second time the Sahib came to me in Yasin and expressed his intention of going to Badakshan I was afraid to speak to the Sahib explicitly of the intentions (towards him) entertained in other quarters, but I told by implication and hints that it was unwise for him to go to Badakshan, as it involved risk to both our lives. The Sahib would not take heed to our warnings, but giving me three certificates of satisfaction in his own handwriting started off for Badakshan on his own responsibility. He reached Darkote, a place seven *coz*s from Yasin, where four roads meet, one, the road to Mustoj, another to Badakshan, the third to Payal, and the fourth to Yasin. At that place the servants of Pahlwan, by name Makhont, Shabaka, Jujoon, and others, and the servants of Mir Ghazi Khan, his brother, and Wazir Khan, a relation, lay in ambush for the Sahib on his way to Darkote. Your servant had no knowledge of this ambush of theirs. When the Sahib got to Darkote they killed him and turned me out of the country, and spread report in every direction that I, Mir Wali, had killed the Sahib, and that they had expelled me from the country on that account. I have been unable to send any report of the real state of the case, being a poor man."

"If the Sahibs, laying aside intentions of violence and oppression, will send a trusted man of their own to me, let him be a sensible man in the confidence of the Government, able to read and write, and a speaker of truth, then will I show him the papers, the traces, and the goods, and the *razinama* of the Sahib, and will tell him the state of affairs in neighbouring countries."

This letter was brought to Syud Gholam Ali Shah of Ullai (the country between Khagan and the Indus), by whom it was sent on to Mr. Macnabb. Mr. Macnabb begged the Syud to send him the man who brought the letter, and asked the Lieutenant-Governor whether he should endeavour to ascertain if Mir Wali really wrote the letter.

91. With No. 132C., dated 17th August, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab sent on another letter from Mir Wali, also dated 11th May, addressed to Futteh Ali Shah of Khagan, and to the same effect and in the same handwriting as the one above mentioned.

The Lieutenant-Governor said:—

"Mr. Macnabb, the Commissioner, is making efforts to discover whether the letter is genuine, and where Mir Wali is."

And Mr. Macnabb wrote:—

"I have every reason to believe these letters to be genuine, as the Syud to whom the last was addressed, though it never reached him, says that a Kohistani who put up with him some time ago in Kaghban, asked him if he had received a letter from Mir Wali, and on his saying he had not, told him that seemed strange as he had himself seen Mir Wali give a letter addressed to the Syud, to a man who said he was coming that way."

"I do not expect the man I sent up to make enquiries to return till a fortnight or three weeks hence."

92. In reply, Government (No. 2035P., dated 26th September) said with reference to the passage marked A in Mir Wali's letter,—

"that it would be very desirable to act on this suggestion if His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor thinks it practicable to do so. On the return of Mr. Macnabb's messenger, if the letter turned out to be genuine, perhaps the Lieutenant-Governor may see his way to take steps to open up direct communication with Mir Wali."

93. In a demi-official letter of the 24th August, to the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Girdlestone reported that one Muzoolla Khan, an Afghan, employed for some time by the Maharaja of Kashmir in the Trans-Indus regions, but who had (Mr. Girdlestone believed) quarrelled with his employers, and was anxious for service under the British Government, told Mr. Girdlestone that he had received and sent on to the Maharaja three letters from Mir Wali, (whom he had known of old) written, the first from Chilas, the second from Tungeer, the third from Darel, protesting his innocence of Mr. Hayward's murder, begging that he might be brought before some British officers when his innocence would be established, and lodging

¹ See enclosure of Punjab letter, No. 1428, dated 30th August 1871.

² *Tu dar Zamiestan Kar-i-mhan Kwabad shud.*

³ Enclosure 2 of Punjab letter, dated 15th September 1871, No. 1768.

⁴ See enclosure of above letter.

the blame of the murder on¹ Radha Kiehen, the Kashmir Governor of Gilgit, and Aman-ul-mulk of Chitral.

The seal on this letter was described as oval, about two-thirds of an inch long, and one-third of an inch broad.

The seal² on the original of Mir Wali's letter of 11th May, sent on by Mr. Macnabb, is quite different. It is hexagon, about .55 of an inch long, and only a trifle broader than it is long.

The Kashmir authorities had, Mr. Girdlestone thought, not wished that Mazoolla Khan should meet him, the reasons for thinking this being (1) that he had been in Srinagar for a fortnight without mention of his presence being made to Mr. Girdlestone; (2) that after he had spoken to Mr. Girdlestone he was at once sent off to Jammu.

Mazoolla purported going on to Sealkote, and Mr. Girdlestone gave him a letter to the Deputy Commissioner, begging that he might be fed and lodged, pending reference to Mr. Girdlestone.

94. Mr. Girdlestone also referred to a request which he had sent to His Excellency's Private Secretary for permission to spend some secret service money in obtaining information.

The acceptance of this request had already been communicated to Mr. Girdlestone by the Private Secretary, and in a demi-official note of the 21st September, the Foreign Secretary said that Mr. Girdlestone might either let him know what he wanted, or advance the money himself, being reimbursed afterwards.

And the Foreign Secretary said:—

"The great object to be arrived at is to bring in Mir Wali or Mullick Aman or any of the minor personages of the drama, and to get hold of some certain evidence on which we can rest as an ascertained basis for further enquiry. If money can secure it you will not be staid."

On the same date (21st September) Mr. Girdlestone's letter was sent (demi-officially) to the Lieutenant-Governor, with the remark that—

"if Mazoolla Khan comes to Sealkote or enters British territory, some discreet officer should be instructed to talk to him and get from him all he knows."

95. In a demi-official note of the 17th September Mr. Girdlestone sent on a demi-official note from Major Jenkins, Deputy Commissioner of Sealkote, reporting that as Mazoolla was not allowed to leave Jammu, his brother, Saleh Muhammad, also in the Kashmir service, got away on pretext of having to buy medicine and get medical advice; and had told Major Jenkins that his brother was the bearer of a letter without date addressed to the "Lord Secretary" by Mullick Aman. It was as follows:—

"I, Raja Mullick Aman, represent that my enemies here without cause made me a thief (or assassin) from the dwellings of the English, and being perturbed in mind I am wandering about in Yaghistan. Be it known to those gentlemen that a letter from Mr.— a Government official— has reached me, which paper I did not consider authentic, because the ratification of the Viceroy was not attached to it.

"The present letter has been entrusted to Sirdar Mazoolla Khan, and will without fail be delivered. The verbal information given by Mazoolla Khan should be believed."

The letter was, Saleh Muhammad Khan says, given by Mullick Aman to Mazoolla. Saleh Muhammad having mentioned it in his first communication to Major Jenkins, went away and fetched it; Major Jenkins sent it on in his demi-official note of 22nd September to the Secretary.

Mr. Girdlestone, commenting on this, said that Mazoolla never spoke to him of being the bearer of a written petition from Mullick Aman.

96. Major Jenkins in his note of the 22nd said that he had paid Rs. 15 to Saleh Muhammad for his expenses.

In a note of 6th October this money was repaid to Major Jenkins.

97. In a note of the same date Mr. Girdlestone was told that his letters had been sent to the Punjab Government for any information they have about Mazoolla Khan and his brother, and with the remark that if Mazoolla Khan and his brother are not impostors they might be made use of to get in Mullick Aman.

98. And this was said in a note of the same date addressed to the Secretary of the Punjab Government. At the same time photographic *fac-similes* of Mir Wali's seal, as impressed on the original letter received through Mr. Macnabb, were sent to Mr. Griffin and Mr. Girdlestone, in order that Mazoolla's description of that seal might be tested.

¹ In the letter forwarded by Mr. Macnabb, Mir Wali had said that Mir Ghazi, Pahlwan, and Wasir Rahmat conspired to effect the murder, and their servants effected it.

² A photograph has been taken of this original, and one copy sent to Mr. Girdlestone.

³ Name may be read Hudoor or Hudroo (Hrew).

⁴ *Et c.*, who is a servant of the Sirdar, perhaps the Kashmir Government.

⁵ The word used means "an agreement" or "treaty."

APPENDIX 19 (see p. 172).

Report by MAJOR J. BIDDULPH, Officer on Special Duty in Gilgit, on a Journey to Yasin and Chitral.

I LEFT Gilgit on the 7th October and was met on the Yasin frontier, which I crossed on the 14th, by Kho Badshah, one of the foster-brothers of the Mir of Yasin.

2. For about nine miles on both sides of the frontier the road is exceedingly difficult, with constant small but steep ascents and descents along the river bank, and with two rock staircases, extremely difficult to pass, about four miles apart. These difficult passages are always jealously guarded, the space between them being looked upon as neutral ground between Gilgit and Yasin. The valley is very narrow as far as Roshan, where it opens out a little, the hills on both sides rising to a great height in fantastic pinnacles and castle-like crags with perpendicular scarps.

3. On the 16th I reached Yasin and was met at Gindai, about six miles out, by Pahlwan Bahadur. He is a stout, good-tempered looking man of twenty-seven years of age. His proper name is Gholam Mohi-u-deen, the one he is commonly known by being a nickname bestowed on him when a boy. On reaching Yasin a number of Darel men, who had lately come there, fired volleys from their matchlocks as a salute. Firing at a mark from horseback took place, a bullock was led out before me, and I was rather pointedly asked if I objected to its being slaughtered. It is an ancient custom to hack the bullock to death with swords as a compliment in front of a person arriving at a place. This has been partly abandoned for some years, the present custom being only to lead out the animal and afterwards slaughter it in the orthodox manner. I believe there was a good deal of speculation as to whether I would show any Hindu-like objection to the ceremony, and Pahlwan seemed much pleased when I told him I had none.

4. I encamped half a mile from the fort and had a private interview the next day with Pahlwan. He commenced by expressing his pleasure at my visit, and begged me to understand that he received me out of a sincere desire to show his friendship to the British Government, and not from any regard to the Maharaja. So anxious was he to impress this on me that for a long time he refused to receive the letter from the Maharaja brought by the Maharaja's vakil who accompanied me, so that it might not appear that he was entertaining me in compliance with instructions from Jammu. In answer, I expressed my pleasure at meeting him and the satisfaction that his friendly reception of me would cause to the British Government. I then alluded to a report current in the country, to the effect that I had come to demand that troops should be cantoned in Yasin, and told him that it was quite untrue, and that I had no demand to make of him, but had come solely for the promotion of friendship.

5. He proceeded to state his desire to make a treaty with the British Government and declare his allegiance and readiness to do service to the same. I explained to him that he had already got an equivalent in the treaty lately concluded between Amann-ul-mulk and the Maharaja, from whom he received an annual subsidy. He answered that he owned no allegiance to Amann-ul-mulk or to the "Sikhs"; that he had not been consulted in the matter, and that he had met with nothing but bad treatment and bad faith from Kashmir; that in consequence he had determined on sending no more vakils to Jammu, but he wished to send a vakil to the Viceroy of India. I told him that he was mistaken in supposing that there is any difference of policy or interests between the British and Kashmir Governments; that the Maharaja is a loyal and trusted dependant of the British Government, and can do nothing without the consent of the latter; that it was possible he might have had good grounds of complaint against the late officials at Gilgit, but that he must not confound their acts with those of the Maharaja who had, as he well knew, lately removed the officials who had been to blame. I told him that without previous permission he could not send a vakil to the British Government, but that as his vakils had already visited Delhi (on the occasion of the Imperial Proclamation), it was possible he might again be invited to send vakils on some future occasion. He answered that he had not been treated by the Kashmir Government as he had a right to expect, on which I reminded him that his father had been a bitter enemy of Kashmir and had on several occasions inflicted much loss on the Kashmir troops in Gilgit, so that it was unlikely the Maharaja should treat him with unreserved confidence; and that after the abusive language he used to Bhai Gunga Sing on the occasion of their meeting last year it was impossible that a favourable report of him had been made at Jammu. He laughed at this and said that he would perform any service demanded of him by the British Government, but that he wished to have no further dealings with Kashmir. I told him that the only service at present required of him is to help in preserving peace on the frontier, but that should any special need arise for his services his good intentions should not be forgotten. I further pointed out that his friendly reception of myself formed a sufficient refutation of any charges of disaffection made against him by mischief-makers, and that had the things said against him been believed, the consequences would long ago have been very serious for him. I added that the bad effect produced by the acts of his father (Gohr Amann) and his brother (Mir Wali) could not fail to tell against him at first, but that my presence in Gilgit would in future ensure that his conduct should be correctly reported. I ended by urging him to send his vakils to Jammu. To this he replied that he felt no inclination to send vakils to

Jammu unless he was put on a better footing than the Mirs of Hunza and Nagar, whereas at present his subsidy is smaller than theirs, pointing out at the same time that his influence in Darel, Jangir, and Hunza makes him worthy of better treatment. I told him that I could then said that he would consider the matter of sending vakils to Jammu.

6. I gave him the presents I had brought for him, and after some further conversation I showed him the sepoy's of the Guides at drill, which pleased him so much that he asked me to repeat it on the following day.

7. The next day I marched from Yasin up the Woorshigoom Valley towards Durkote, accompanied by Pahlwan Bahadur, who begged me to travel wherever I liked in his territory, and did his best to entertain me with hawking, polo, &c. Amongst other things he got up a horse race, the course being up the valley from Yasin to Hoondur, a distance of about nine miles, and presented the winner to me. At Barkolti he took me into a fort he has lately built. It is of the ordinary pattern common in this country, but the walls are thirty feet high and twenty feet thick, and the towers are fifteen or eighteen feet higher than the walls.

8. The Woorshigoom Valley, which above its junction with the Kho Valley is narrow and stony, opens out considerably at Yasin; the mountains on either side lose their precipitous appearance, and travelling becomes pleasant and easy as far as Hoondur, when the valley again narrows, but the road to the foot of the Durkote Pass is easy. The villages are small, and there is an evident want of population, much land lying uncultivated. The soil is particularly rich and fertile. Yasin itself has now a very small fixed population, and the country generally shows that it has never recovered from the oppressive rule of Gohr Aman and the losses suffered in the Dogra invasion of 1863.

9. In the Woorshigoom and Kho Valleys are a number of stone circles which are said to be of great antiquity. They are about thirty feet in diameter, formed of huge boulders arranged with the flattest side outwards, placed so as to form a perfect circle about three feet high. On these are placed a number of flatish boulders of nearly equal size projecting over the edge of the circle all round. The centre is filled with small stones and rubbish. The labour of transporting and placing such huge blocks in position must have been immense. The local tradition is that the circles are the work of giants in old days. They are perhaps relics of fire-worship. The most perfect is one on the tongue of land at the junction of the two rivers.

10. On the third day I returned to Yasin, being afraid to delay my journey to Chitral as snow was falling heavily in the mountains. Pahlwan Bahadur urged me to repeat my visit on my return from Chitral, which I promised to do. He also told me that he had decided on following my advice about sending a wakil to Jammu, who should start at once, but that if nothing came of it this year in the way of placing him on a better footing as regards annual subsidy, he would not send any vakils again, and would hold no intercourse with Kashmir for the future. I asked him whom he had decided on sending, and he told me Bubar Khan, who had been sent to Jammu before in a similar capacity, on which I suggested that he should send a wakil of higher rank. To this he made no answer.

Dubar Khan has been sent.
(Sd.) F. H.

11. In Yasin I was met by a messenger from Chitral bringing letters from Aman-ul-mulk. His letter to me was in answer to the one I addressed to him on 1st October, and was properly worded, though no answer was made to my remarks about the improper wording of his former letter. He laid much stress on the famine in Chitral and the consequent difficulty of entertaining me, and requested I would bring as few men with me as possible. He was also desirous of meeting me at Drasin, and told me to be sure to bring Pahlwan with me. In his letter to Pahlwan which was shown to me, he stated that he had no wish to receive me, but could not well avoid doing so in consequence of a letter from Jammu desiring him to receive me, and that he was much afraid of the consequences, as it could not fail to make the Amir of Kabul hostile to him. He went on to complain that he does not receive from Pahlwan Bahadur the support he is entitled to expect from him, and ended by saying: "I know what the Firangi is coming for; be sure and come here with him, and we will give him an answer together."

12. Pahlwan put the letter into my hands and asked my advice about his accompanying me to Chitral. I told him that I wished him to please himself in the matter, as I should be sorry to cause a misunderstanding between him and Aman-ul-mulk by giving advice on such a subject. He then talked to me about Aman-ul-mulk whom he had till then avoided mentioning to me. He said, "I owe him no allegiance, and he can claim no obedience of Yasin. He is my uncle and calls me his son, but I do not trust him. Mir Wali was his son-in-law and was betrayed by him. I have known him ever since I was a boy, but I do not know all his tricks, and he is so deceitful that I keep away from him as much as possible." He went on to give me several instances of Aman-ul-mulk's deceitful character, and related how he had been tricked by him into joining in a raid on Kafiristan last year.

13. The next day he again spoke to me about accompanying me to Chitral. He said that on my visit to Yasin and Chitral being first mooted, he (Pahlwan) had strongly recommended Aman-ul-mulk not to invite me, but had declared at the same time that if I did come, nothing should induce him to join in any unfriendly act against me. His Wazirs and Aksekals now advised him strongly not to go to Chitral, and he was inclined to take their advice, because, though he was solely responsible for my safety while in Yasin, he would also become jointly responsible for any want of proper treatment I might meet with in Chitral, by going there with me. Unless, therefore, I particularly desired him to accompany me, he

would rather not come. I told him I had no wish to put any constraint on him in the matter. He went on to speak of Aman-ul-mulk in a way to show that he entertained the profoundest distrust of him, but was actuated by no active hostility against him. He quoted two instances of notorious breaches of faith in his (Aman-ul-mulk's) former dealings with Kashmir, and said, "He brought Mir Wali to destruction by sending him four letters in one day with contradictory orders." I asked him what part Aman-ul-mulk would take in case of a war between the British Government and the Amir. He evaded my question at first, but when I pressed him he answered, "He will neither be your friend or the Amir's enemy; he will be the friend of whichever is the strongest." He then told me that Aman-ul-mulk had despatched a force of two hundred men under his son Murid to assist the Khan of Dir in attacking Jandul.

14. Amongst the presents I had given Pahlwan Bahadoor was a gold watch and chain. It came to my knowledge that he was in money difficulties, and was trying to sell the watch for considerably less than its value. I accordingly made my Munsibi purchase it, ostensibly for himself, and I also presented Pahlwan with fifty tillas at parting.

15. In spite of the long time I was in his territory both coming and returning, he steadily refused to allow me to pay for supplies, but continued to furnish my camp of over eighty persons most liberally at his own cost for the whole time I was in his country, a space of thirty days. Nor was any attempt made at any time to hurry my movements or in any way inconvenience me, but a genuine desire was evinced by all that I came in contact with to make my stay as pleasant as possible.

16. The opinion I formed of Pahlwan Bahadur was, that though somewhat rough and rude in manner, and with a not very acute mind, he is straightforward and open in his ways and thoughts. He prides himself on adhering to his word and in acting without deceit, and is scrupulous in his religious observances. He seems generally liked by the people about him, but is liable to sudden fits of temper, and is evidently a man of considerable energy and decision of character.

17. I left Yasin on the 22nd. Before parting Pahlwan said to me, "This is a poor country, and I have done my best to entertain you, but you will see how they will treat you in Chitral." He then gave me a list of the chief men in Chitral that are to be depended on, and told me that his Wazir (Rahmat), his foster-father (Noor Hayat), and the Akhsakal of Mastooh (Shah Sultan) would accompany me to Chitral and keep me fully informed of whatever was being said or done.

18. He also told me that he had arranged to send his cousin, Abbas Ali Khan, to Jammu, together with Bubar Khan, and they should start immediately. I afterwards learnt that just before starting Abbas Ali Khan got discontented and fled to Gilgit, where his brother had been living for several years past, and Mustapha Aman had to be sent instead.

19. On my first arrival in Yasin territory I was shown a letter lately received by Pahlwan from his brother Malik Aman, saying that he had settled himself in Tungeer and trusted Pahlwan would leave him in peace. I was told that Pahlwan had taken pity on him and had sent to say that he would not attack him. A few days after I left Yasin, I received a letter from Pahlwan telling me he had determined on expelling his brother from Tungeer and was sending a force against him for the purpose. Lest the news of it should reach Tungeer, he asked me to send no letters to Gilgit for a few days. I wrote at once to say that any movement of armed men was improper while I was in the country, and would certainly be misrepresented. The same advice was given him by others, and before my letter reached him he had recalled the expedition from the foot of the pass leading into Tungeer. When I saw him afterwards in Chitral he said that he had sent a message to his brother to say he might live in Tungeer as long as he behaved peaceably. Just before I returned to Gilgit a letter from Malik Aman to Pahlwan was forwarded to me, thanking him for the permission and promising not to make a disturbance.

20. I marched by the Kho Valley and reached Chashi (8,500 feet) on the fourth day. The road so far is exceedingly difficult, the valley is narrow, and sparsely populated. Beyond Chashi the road leaves the main valley, and rises suddenly among low rounded hills on to open Pamir-like ground for the next thirty-four miles, till Laspoor (9,400 feet) is reached. Two miles beyond Chashi the Pandar Lake, two-and-a-half miles long and half a mile broad, is passed at an elevation of 9,400 feet. This is said to have been formed by a landslip about seventy years ago, and is now gradually drying up again.

21. Eleven miles beyond Chashi, Ghizr, or Shevare, as it is sometimes called, is passed, whence a good road branches off into the head of the Swat Valley. At twenty-four miles from Chashi the road leaves the Ghizr Valley and ascends gradually to the Shandur plateau, which is about five miles across and perfectly level. The height of the plateau is 12,000 feet. There are two pieces of water on it, the largest of which is two-and-a-half miles long and three-quarters of a mile broad. There is no surface drainage from either piece of water, nor do they communicate with one another. Leaving the plateau the road descends rather abruptly into the narrow Laspoor Valley and becomes again more difficult as far as Mastooh. The Laspoor district, though limited, is well populated, considering its small area, and is celebrated for its fertility.

22. Mastooh (7,500 feet) is now a very small place, but is capable of supporting a considerable population, much land lying uncultivated; the Yarkhoon Valley is here nearly a mile broad.

23. Looking down the valley a magnificent mountain called Tirich Mir fills the whole view. Looking up the valley from Chitral in the same way it occupies the whole landscape,

and is said to be equally conspicuous from Zebah in the Oxus Valley. It is said to be visible also from a great part of Kafiristan, where it is called Meyarnoon. It is the theme of many wonderful traditions, and, roughly speaking, cannot be less than 27,000 feet high. I have secured data for fixing its position and altitude.

24. Below Mastooch the Yarkhoon Valley has an average breadth of from three-quarters of a mile to a mile, down to its junction with the Moolkho Valley.

25. The Parbeck plain, six miles below Mastooch on the right bank, is divided in half by a deep chasm extending from the river to the hill-sides. This can only be crossed at one place which is commanded by a stone tower, and is regarded as one of the chief defensible positions in the valley. When Mahmood Shah tried to invade Chitral by the Baroghil Pass in 1872, an Afghan force from Dir occupied this point in support of the Chitral and Yasin forces that defended the pass itself. The fact is interesting, as it shows the readiness of the people of Dir to make common cause with Chitral against an invader. The position is not tenable against long-range weapons.

26. Crossing the Yarkhoon and Moolkho rivers, I entered the Chitral territory at Drasun on 1st November, where I was met by Aman-ul-mulk's son, Afzul-ul-mulk, a boy of about thirteen years of age. Drasun (6,700 feet) is situated in the Moolkho Valley, about eleven miles above its junction with the Yarkhoon Valley. The Moolkho, Toorikho, and Tirich Valleys, which constitute the most important part of Chitral Dala, are unmarked in any maps. The Toorikho Valley runs nearly parallel with the Yarkhoon Valley to its junction with the Tirich Valley, below which it is known as the Moolkho Valley. For nearly twenty miles above the junction of the Moolkho and Yarkhoon Valleys the two streams are separated by the Kargah Lusht plain, some 600 feet above the water levels, and the water-shed forms the boundary between Chitral and Yasin territory. The Toorikho, Tirich, and Moolkho Valleys are thickly populated, the cultivation being continuous. The villages extend high up the hill sides supported by innumerable springs which gush out everywhere. The soil is mostly gravel and clay, the hill sides are bare and rounded, and wood is somewhat scarce. The Moolkho Valley is very open, and the high peaks on both sides are invisible, being shut out from view by low hills that intervene.

27. The summer route from the Baroghil Pass to Chitral, after crossing the Shanallispur, lies down these valleys to the junction of the Moolkho and Yarkhoon streams below Drasun, where the former stream is the most considerable of the two. Men on foot can travel down the Yarkhoon Valley at all times, but the road requires making in one or two places to permit of horses travelling by it in summer. At other times, when the river is everywhere fordable, no difficulty is experienced.

28. Below the junction of the Moolkho and Yarkhoon streams, the valley again narrows, and travelling becomes more difficult till within four miles of Chitral. The villages are large and populous, the land rich and fertile where cultivable, and the cultivation neater and better than in the Gilgit Valley. The level of the stream in summer and winter varies about twenty feet.

29. Below Barenia, a large village twenty miles from Chitral, Yasin territory on the left bank ceases.

30. Four miles above Chitral, at the junction of the Injigan valley, the main valley suddenly widens and its whole character changes. The hills, no longer rocky and bare, slope away gradually into grassy rounded tops with forest-clad sides. Looking south the valley retains this character as far as can be seen, the peaks on both sides are hidden from sight, and travelling becomes easy and pleasant.

31. After leaving Yasin I received several letters from Aman-ul-mulk. A letter from him to Pahlwan Bahadoor was opened and shown to me by Wazir Rahmat, who travelled with me. In it Aman-ul-mulk asked for early information about me, as he did not think it probable I should come, in spite of what I had written on the subject, and in case I should come Pahlwan was to be certain and make me pay well for all supplies. His not doing so was, I afterwards heard, a matter of great vexation to Aman-ul-mulk, who felt obliged to furnish supplies to my camp without payment while I was in Chitral. Instead, however, of it being done in the same liberal manner as in Yasin, everything was given grudgingly, and there was a daily wrangle about the quantity. At the same time I was not allowed to pay for anything, though I constantly offered to do so. The letter went on to say, "Why do you accuse me of deceit, when it is through me that you have become great. You are still only a child, and understand none of these things."

32. While in Yasin, I heard that Aman-ul-mulk was preparing to send one of his sons to Kabul. I accordingly sent a message by his foster-brother, who was in my camp, that he should delay doing so till my arrival. Three days before I reached Chitral I received a letter telling me that on receipt of my message he had determined on not sending his son, but another vakil; that preparations had accordingly been made, but that he had since determined to delay sending anybody till my arrival.

33. In the same letter he complained that I had brought the enmity of the Amir on him by coming without invitation, and asked me if I had come on behalf of the British Government or merely for pleasure, as in the former case he would not complain though he suffered in consequence, but that if I had come for my own pleasure it would be the cause of unforeseen results and great trouble to him.

34. Fifty miles from Chitral I met six hundred men who had been sent by Aman-ul-mulk to help Pahlwan Bahadoor in the raid on Tungeer mentioned in paragraph 19. The Yasin men with me turned back the party, and were furious at this trick of Aman-ul-mulk. No help had been solicited by Pahlwan.

35. On the 6th November I reached Chitral and was met by Aman-ul-mulk, who rode out three miles to meet me. He is said to be fifty-seven years old, but looks much older. We dismounted and sat down for a few minutes, and he presented to me three of his sons. Remounting, we rode to Chitral, crossing the river by a very good wooden bridge protected at each end by a stone tower, through which it is necessary to pass. On a spur overlooking the bridge are two more towers. Half a mile below the bridge is the Badshah's fort. Chitral comprises six large villages which extend for three miles along both sides of the river. The usual firing at a mark took place before me, and a bullock was led out to be slaughtered as in Yasin.

36. I afterwards heard that Aman-ul-mulk had been undecided as to whether he should come himself to meet me, or only depute his sons to do so. His deciding to do so himself was in consequence of the advice of a Kaka Khel trader, by name Mian Arif Gul, who was then in Chitral. This man, a native of Peshawar, came to me daily while I was in Chitral, and was most useful to me. He on several occasions gave me useful information, he advanced me money, and I finally entrusted him with letters to take to Peshawar.

37. Aman-ul-mulk complained to me of a disaster he had just experienced in the expedition against Jandul. As well as I could make out, the combined Dir and Chitral forces took a fort in the Painda Khel country, and while dispersed plundering were attacked at night by the Osman Khel whose neutrality had been reckoned on, and the whole force was put to flight with considerable loss. Fifty or sixty of the Dir men were killed and about forty of the Chitral men were killed and wounded, among the latter being Aman-ul-mulk's son Murid. A number of the wounded were carried past me the day I reached Chitral.

38. The day after I arrived Aman-ul-mulk paid me a complimentary visit, and on the following day I had a long private interview with him. I began by telling him of my pleasure at visiting his country and the gratification that the news of his hospitality would cause to the British Government. He replied that my coming was a new thing calculated to cause misgivings among his people, and bring upon him the hostility of the Amir. I told him that he might rely upon the British Government never permitting him to suffer on account of his hospitality to myself. I then went on to say that three or four years ago the Amir had been warned not to meddle in Chitral affairs, and that so long as (Aman-ul-mulk's) friendship for the British Government was evident, he may rely on protection from external enemies. To this he replied, "Now tell me about the treaty." A little conversation showed me that he was quite aware of impending hostilities, though it was apparently not publicly known in Chitral, and he had formed the idea that I had come to make a treaty of alliance with him. I answered that Government requires nothing of him, but that he shall remain at peace within his own borders and in no way interfere. I also reminded him that he had already a treaty with the Maharaja, which is tantamount to a treaty with the British Government. He pretended not to understand me, so I produced a copy of the treaty and read it to him. He impatiently put it on one side and said "That is nothing; now I want a treaty with the English." He went on to say that, if the British Government will give him a proper subsidy, he will offer passage to a force from Gilgit to attack Badakshan next spring. He evidently had made up his mind that the object of my coming was to arrange this. When I told him that Government has no thoughts at present of sending a force to Badakshan, and that I had come simply to know if his friendship for Kashmir is sincere, he answered angrily—"Is that all, I thought you had come about some great thing." Finding that he refused to speak any longer on political subjects, I told him I had brought him some presents. He asked what they were, but refused to receive them then, asking me to send them over at night, with the object no doubt that he might be able to say afterwards that I had given him nothing. Shortly after he went away, and I sent him over the presents in as public a manner as possible, taking good care that they should be seen by everybody.

39. Soon afterwards his Wazir Mozuffer Khan came over to see me, and told me that Aman-ul-mulk had taken an immense fancy to my Express rifle, and hoped I would give it to him. I answered that I could not part with it. He then asked me about the length of my stay, and I answered that I proposed to stay two days longer and then return to Gilgit. I also told him that I had not said all I wished to Aman-ul-mulk, and would therefore say it to him, which was to warn Aman-ul-mulk against sending vakils to Kabul, or making any matrimonial alliances with the Amir so long as he maintained his present hostile attitude towards the British Government; also to remind him that Aman-ul-mulk had not fulfilled his promise to the Maharaja to send Nizam-ul-mulk to Jammu.

40. Mozuffer Khan returned after a short time and told me that Aman-ul-mulk willingly complied with both requests as regarded Kabul, and hoped that I would stay three days longer in Chitral. Aman-ul-mulk excused himself for not having sent his son to Jammu on account of his youth. In spite of his promise he dispatched a wakil to Kabul within a few days of my departure from Chitral.

41. I had been told before reaching Chitral that, in consequence of the death of Abdulla Jan, the Amir had agreed that the daughter of Aman-ul-mulk, who had been intended for that Sirdar, should be married by one of his other sons. I afterwards learnt on good authority that the first overtures for the marriage between Abdulla Jan and Aman-ul-mulk's daughter had come from Aman-ul-mulk.

42. During the next four days I saw Aman-ul-mulk twice. I showed him some rifle practice at 700 yards. He had taken into his head that the powers of the Snider rifle had been much exaggerated to him, so was considerably surprised to see some excellent practice made by a sepoy of the Guides.

right to Panyal, I will openly declare myself to be the dependant of the British Government, I will receive a British Resident permanently in Chitral and another in Yasin, either English or Muhammadan, and I will fight in the service of the British Government against the Afghans and the Russians. Pahlwan is entirely with me in this matter, and so is my son, Nizam-ul-mulk. The men of Hunza, Darel, Nagar, and Panyal cannot do anything without me. The Kashmir Government has granted me an allowance, but such a sum is nothing to me. I can take a few Kafir women and sell them for as much. I take as much from one kafila of merchants. If you will not do this, I will not relinquish my claim on Panyal which is mine, and which I will fight for. I will not receive troops (chowki) into my country, not for a fort full of tillas, but if my wish is granted I will abandon my claim to Panyal and be a faithful servant to the English. Now you know all. If you go away and nothing comes of this do not call me disloyal and a liar if I make friends with others. I recognise four great powers—Turkey, Russia, England, and China: next to them, but smaller, are Cabul and Persia. My sons and Aksakals wish me to ally myself with the Amir because he is a Mussalman, but I know there are other things to be considered. The result now depends upon you, but I must have an answer this winter."

51. A letter addressed to the British Government which had already been written was then produced and an addition made, and Aman-ul-mulk, Pahlwan Bahadur, and Nizam-ul-mulk affixed their seals to it. The letter is appended, the part finally added being marked.

52. I thanked him for speaking out so plainly, and said that the British Government prefers an open enemy to a doubtful friend. That hitherto both good and evil report of him had reached the British Government, but that his hospitable reception of me could not fail to tell in his favour; that I could make no promises of any kind to him, but that I trusted to being able shortly to give him such an answer that he should not repent my coming. I reminded him that the British Government is not in the habit of granting subsidies for the asking, but must be assured that adequate service will be given in return. I then requested his acceptance of the rifle he had expressed a wish to have, and took leave of him.

53. Pahlwan Bahadur and Nizam-ul-mulk rode out half a mile with me, and at parting the former took me on one side and said—"You may depend on his keeping to what he has just said to you, and I will keep to my share of the engagement, but if you do not do anything in the matter you will have no hold on him in future. He is really in earnest in what he has now said. I wish to be your friend always."

54. The estimate I formed of Aman-ul-mulk's character is that he is a very shrewd man, avaricious, unscrupulous, and deceitful to an uncommon degree. There was not a day during my stay in Chitral in which some instance of deceit on his part did not come to my knowledge. He seems utterly careless of what he says so long as it serves his purpose for the moment, and he is ready to deny his own words and ignore his own orders as it suits him. Even in small matters he prefers working by underhand means. He trusts nobody and believes nobody, not even those nearest to him, and has a great belief in his own power of playing off one person against another. He is not of a warlike disposition, and prefers working by fraud rather than by force. His natural tendency to deceit is so great that the only chance at present of holding him long to any engagement is to make Pahlwan Bahadur a responsible party to it. The latter is so distrustful of his uncle and so afraid of falling into a snare set by him, that he would at once make known any tricks that are being played.

55. The Sirdar Nizam-ul-mulk is seventeen years of age, and is well spoken of. He seems to differ considerably from his father in character, being rather slow in intellect. He is much attached to Pahlwan Bahadur, which is a matter of anxiety to his father, who is in constant fear that the two will combine against him. He resides generally in the Toorikho Valley, which he holds as a jaghir. Though not the eldest son, he is constituted heir-apparent in consequence of the rank of his mother. His brother Afzul-ul-mulk only enjoys half the revenues of the Moolkho Valley, the rest going to Aman-ul-mulk.

56. Aman-ul-mulk's eldest son, Shah-i-mulk, a young man of twenty, is a great favourite among the people. He resides at Darosh.

57. Murid, Aman-ul-mulk's son by a slave, was absent in Dir during my visit. He is spoken of as the ablest of all Aman-ul-mulk's sons, but is not popular. His jaghir is in the Injigan Valley.

58. Owing to the unusually heavy snow-falls last winter most of the autumn-sown crops were destroyed. This occasioned great distress in the lower part of the Kaskhar Valley and in the part immediately round Chitral absolute famine. The number of people that died was not very great, but the population was much diminished by emigration. The consumption of all the seed-corn has prevented proper sowing for next year, and it must be several years before the effect of the famine ceases to be felt. Some compensation was obtained, though late, in the rice and maize crops just gathered, which were of extraordinary abundance. The distress of the people was much aggravated by the severe earthquake of 2nd March, which levelled many villages and threw down part of Aman-ul-mulk's fort.

59. I found it impossible to make any approximate calculation of the population ruled over by Aman-ul-mulk, but should reckon it in ordinary times to be not less than 150,000 souls, without counting the tribe of Siah-Posh Kafirs, who are tributary. The valley below Chitral is said to be thickly populated, and the land is noted for its fertility.

60. Aman-ul-mulk in conversation mentioned that he could dispose of six thousand fighting-men, but I have reason to believe that the number available is much greater. Owing, however, to the great extent of frontier to be guarded and the want of compactness in the

population, he would probably not be able to bring more than seven or eight thousand together at any one place.

61. The numerous forts which form so marked a feature in the valleys to the eastward are wanting in the Kashkar Valley. The only ones I saw were at Dracon and Chitral. They are of the usual rectangular shape with disproportionately high towers.

62. The people of Chitral are a handsome race with dark gipsy-looking features. They are noted for thievish propensities, but differ greatly in character from the Afghans. On one occasion a number of things were stolen from my camp, and no attempt to recover them was made by the officials until I remonstrated. The things were recovered the same day.

63. Orpiment is found in great quantities in the Tirich Valley and exported to Peshawar. Copper is found in small quantities near Chitral, and iron is found lower down the valley near Narisat.

64. Carpets of an inferior kind are made, and Chitral daggers and sword-hits are in much request in the neighbouring valleys.

65. I found by hypsometrical observations that the elevation of Chitral is considerably less than what has been laid down in the survey maps, being little over 5,000 feet.

66. Twenty miles above Chitral I found a curious rock inscription in a character not known to me. It is said to be extremely ancient.

67. The question of the possibility of the Chitral Valley being used as a route by which the Punjab can be invaded from Hindukshan is necessarily an interesting one. The want of accurate maps and detailed knowledge must at present constitute a serious obstacle, but from all the information I could gather, there seem to be no difficulties so great as to render it practically impossible.

68. The two best passes across the Hindu Kooh are the Dorah and the Baroghil. Both are contracted on the south side to a narrow defile admitting of easy defence. The defile which closes the Dorah Pass also covers the Khatinza Pass, and is described as being quite impregnable if properly defended. The road from the Dorah leads down the Injigan valley, which joins the main valley four miles above Chitral.

69. The defile on the south side of the Baroghil Pass is also described as being easily defended. A good account was given me by an eye-witness of Mahmood Shah's attempt to force it in October 1872. The fighting lasted four days, and ended in the total defeat of the Afghans with the loss of five hundred men and all their guns and camp equipage, while the defenders suffered a loss of only five men.

70. It is possible that the natural advantages of the ground would be diminished by the use of long-range weapons, and there is always the chance of one of the passes being taken by surprise, as they are left unguarded in ordinary times.

71. Should an invading force gain possession of the Baroghil Pass, it would have the choice of roads by the Toorikho or Yarkhoon Valleys to which I have already referred in paragraph 27. Along neither route is there apparently any strong natural position. The former, though somewhat longer, is described as being very easy, and lying through a fertile and populous district. The latter, as I have already mentioned, is at present impassable for five months in the year, except by men on foot, as the road is not good enough to admit of horses travelling by it without crossing the river in two or three places. A very little labour would suffice, however, to make a road good enough for guns along either side of the river, as the soil is mostly gravel, clay, or friable rock which could be worked without blasting. Between the Baroghil and Chitral there are probably not more than half a-dozen places where blasting would be required. South of Chitral the roads to the Punjab and Jellalabad are freely used by traders, who state that their only difficulties are caused by the numerous heavy dues exacted from them by different Chiefs.

72. The state of the passes differs considerably in different years. In ordinary years the Dorah is closed to horses by snow for about three-and-a-half months, and the Baroghil for about two-and-a-half months. Both of them are sufficiently good to allow of the passage of guns which have frequently been taken across them. Of the two the Baroghil is the best on account of the gentle inclines on both sides.

73. I took some pains to ascertain the exact nature of the relations between Yasin and Chitral. No allegiance is claimed or acknowledged, and the two rulers deal with each other on an equal footing. Within the memory of people still living Chitral was temporarily subdued by a Yasin prince, but the presence of the Dogras at Gilgit and the comparatively superior wealth of Chitral has of late years given that country a preponderating influence in Yasin affairs. Pahlwan most distinctly declared that he could do as he pleased, and that Aman-ul-mulk has no authority in Yasin: Aman-ul-mulk said when I asked him, "Pahlwan is my son and can do nothing without me," but he never claimed to be able to dispose of Yasin affairs against the will of its ruler. Much rivalry exists between the followers of the two.

74. While I was in Chitral deputations of the Bushgal and Kalash Kafirs came to me, and gave me much interesting information about the Siyah-Posh tribes, and showed me their national dances and mode of sacrifice. They asked me to visit their country, but the near approach of winter and the treacherous character of Aman-ul-mulk made me refuse. Their hospitality to strangers is proverbial, and should the alliance of Chitral be secured there will be little risk in visiting their country. They pay a yearly tribute of children of both sexes to Aman-ul-mulk. Two Kafir slaves were offered to me by the latter while I was in Chitral.

75. The day before I left Chitral I received a verbal message through Aman-ul-mulk

from the Khan of Dir, asking me to wait at Chitral for his Wazir Malik Marchabai, who would arrive in a few days. I found on enquiry that Malik Marchabai would not leave Dir till it was certain that I would wait for him. This would have entailed considerable delay, and as I am unaware of the recent dealings of Government with the Khan, I wrote him a letter to say that I was unable to prolong my stay in Chitral, and requested that he would communicate anything of importance he had to say to the Commissioner of Peshawar. I sent him a pair of binoculars with the letter. In Yasin I had a visit from his brother, Azaoolah Khan, who has lately left Dir on account of a quarrel with Rahmatoolah Khan.

76. From the way in which Aman-ul-mulk spoke of the Amir, I became convinced that some understanding exists between them, and after leaving Chitral I received information, which I have no reason to doubt, that a treaty was signed three years ago, and taken to Kabul by Nizam-ul-mulk, in which Aman-ul-mulk acknowledges allegiance to the Amir and pays a tribute in slaves, &c., one condition being that no Kabul official shall reside in Chitral. No subsidy is given by the Amir, as far as I can learn, but occasional presents are sent.

77. Aman-ul-mulk asked me more than once the reason of Sher Ali's hostility to the English, after all the benefits that had been bestowed on him. I was much struck by his speaking on several occasions of England and Kabul as equal powers, and he argued with apparent sincerity as if the power of England to protect him from the Amir was doubtful. His reason for thinking so seemed to be founded on the idea that Russia will take the part of the Amir in case of the latter quarrelling with England. He said to me more than once, "Sher Ali has become the ally of the Russians who are your enemies."

78. From the allusions made by him, he evidently looks upon it as probable that the Amir will surrender Badakshan to Russia. His wakil had returned from Kabul only a few days before my arrival in Chitral.

79. I spoke to Aman-ul-mulk about the Maharaja's wakil in Chitral. This present man, Shah Muhammad by name, was sent up with money last year, and, though not intended to remain, had been detained by Aman-ul-mulk. I found him in a great state of poverty, dependent on Aman-ul-mulk for everything. He told me that all the letters he writes or receives are intercepted and read, and that Aman-ul-mulk frequently spoke of dismissing him. Not without some opposition I left another man with him as an assistant, and told Aman-ul-mulk that if he was displeased with Shah Muhammad he should be recalled, but cannot be dismissed without being changed.

80. While in Chitral I had several visits from a Badakshani, named Muhammed Latif, a respectable looking man, who asked me if Government would assist the people of Badakshan who are ready to rise against the Afghans if they can secure assistance. I told him that I must have some information as to the feeling of the people before I can answer his question. He gave me the names of the chief Aksakals in Badakshan, and promised to bring me letters from them to Gilgit. He said that the people are anxious to declare their allegiance to the English Government, that they do not aspire to independence, and prefer the English to the Russians.

81. A letter reached me secretly from Sadik Shah, brother to Shah Abdul Rahim of Zebak, to say that a Kirghiz had arrived with a letter from the Russian Governor of Khokand claiming the obedience of the Chiefs of Badakshan, and asked me what answer should be given. I recommended that no answer should be sent. The messenger brought news of the taking of Kashgar by the Russians and the death of Jehandar Shah.

82. I also received a letter from Shah Abdul Rahim acknowledging the letter I sent to him in July.

83. In Yasin I met a near relation of the Mir of Wakhan, whom I had known in Punjab in 1874. He told me that my coming to Gilgit has excited much apprehension amongst the Afghans in Badakshan. He said that any wishes of the British Government will be carried out in Wakhan where the Mir and people are most anxious to place themselves under British protection. I entrusted him with a letter to Ali Murdan Shah.

84. I also received a complimentary message from Yusuf Ali Shah of Shighnan. I was told that a Russian officer had visited Shighnan, where he stayed four days under pretence of demanding the surrender of a Kipchak Chief who had fled from Khokand. This was, however, afterwards contradicted.

85. I had promised to pay Pahlwan a visit in Yasin on my return from Chitral but was unable to do so on account of his being detained by Aman-ul-mulk. I believe this was purposely done to prevent his meeting me again. The Yasin Wazir, who had travelled with me to Chitral, accompanied me to the Gilgit frontier.

86. I returned to Gilgit on the 2nd December and dispatched five hundred rupees to Pahlwan Bahadur as a present from the British Government, as some acknowledgment for the large amount of supplies he furnished to my camp for so long.

GILGIT,
22nd December 1878.

JOHN BIDDULPH, Major.

